years of age, and 71.5 per cent were nineteen or older at the time of enlistment. There is a slight trend toward older ages in periods of high draft calls, but the trend is slight. The uncertainty of being drafted motivates many of these men to enlist for tours of three to four years. According to the 1964 DOD survey, the percentage of draft-motivated enlistments who were 20 or older at time of entry was 59.5 per cent as compared to only 31.3 per cent for men who were 17 to 19 years of age.

According to the Commission's lottery proposal, men would be examined at age 18.5. Qualified males reaching the age of nineteen would then be arrayed into an order of call by some random selection system. We can imagine that each man is assigned a number, say from 1 to 2 million if there were 2 million men in the pool. The lowest numbers would be called first. The status of student deferments has not been resolved, but for the sake of this paper, I shall assume that

they are put into the qualified I-A pool and assigned numbers.

The size of the draft call in any year, D_t , is determined by the gap between requirements A_t and voluntary supplies of enlistments E_t . Personnel turnover will, moreover, influence requirements A_t . The loss of one regular enlistee who serves for three or four years, necessitates the induction of two or more men each serving only two years. By eliminating the uncertainty of being drafted, the Armed Services are likely to lose some of the draft-motivated enlistments who must be replaced by two-year draftees. If men with low numbers are permitted to volunteer, some fraction of them will do so.

Under a continued Selective Service draft, the DOD projections for FY 1970–75 indicate annual flows of 416.7 thousand voluntary enlistments, of whom 71.5 per cent, or 298 thousand men, will be nineteen or older. At most, only 15 to 20 per cent of the qualified pool will be affected by the lottery if peacetime force strengths revert to their pre-Vietnam levels. Hence, we can conservatively estimate to lose 80 per cent of the draft-motivated enlistments who were 19 or older. This loss of 112 thousand enlistments would result in a rise in the size of the draft calls from 55.3 to 279 thousand men per year.

By reducing the uncertainty of being drafted, the lottery is anticipated to result in larger draft calls. The decline in voluntary enlistments could be offset if pay were advanced to make military service competitive with civilian jobs. Such a pay increase would have the added merit of mitigating the financial

inequity of involuntary service for those who are drafted by the lottery.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT BILL

The expiration of the present draft law on June 30, 1967, means that Congress must enact legislation within the next six weeks. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and its subsequent extensions are almost exclusively concerned with the problem of manpower procurement. There is little if any attempt to integrate the manpower procurement system into an overall military manpower policy of the Department of Defense. The reports of the Marshall and Clark Commission are guilty of this same myopia. I have argued in the preceding section that the adoption of the lottery implies a greater need for the draft because it entails higher personnel turnover. That younger men are more desirable for the combat positions is not being questioned. However, one should also inquire about the supply of men for the highly technical positions which require long training periods. The voluntary force with its greater retention can achieve this latter objective more efficiently.

All proposals which have been put before Congress entail radical changes in military manpower procurement practices. The Vietnam War is not a global conflict requiring the services of nearly all qualified males. The manpower procurement bill which Congress enacts should not, therefore, be dominated by short-run considerations. Instead, it should address itself to the peacetime military manpower needs of the defense establishment. In the light of these considerations, I would like to make some recommendations with the following

objectives in mind:

(a) To design a system of military manpower procurement which places maximum reliance on volunteers;

²¹The DOD survey of first-term enlisted men indicates that the pressure of a draft liability accounted for 46.9 per cent of voluntary enlistments who were 19 or older at the time of entry. In the projection years 1970–75, it is estimated that 298 thousand volunteers will be 19 or older. Multiplying .469 x 298 yields 140 thousand draft-motivated volunteers. Since 80 per cent of these will be bypassed in the lottery, $0.8 \times 140 = 112$ thousand is the estimated loss of voluntary recruits.