

(b) To raise first-term pay, thereby alleviating some of the financial inequity of involuntary military service;

(c) To examine the overall military manpower policies of the Department of Defense with the aim of achieving greater efficiency in the utilization of the nation's scarce labor resources.

With these objectives in mind, I propose the following recommendations to be considered for possible inclusion in the military manpower procurement bill which will replace the present draft law.

1. *Two-year Extension of a Draft.*—A draft law which includes as a minimum recommendation 2 and 3 below, should be extended for a period of only two years rather than the four years proposed by the Marshall Commission.

Since all the alternatives proposed to date entail radical changes in the nature and implementation of a draft liability, Congress should exercise some caution and allow for possible revision in the light of experience under any new draft law. During the first year, data on its operation can be assembled. In the second year, these data can be studied to determine its strengths and weaknesses. If the law operates in an efficient and reasonably equitable fashion, Congress could easily extend it in 1969. On the other hand, if serious shortcomings are uncovered, youths in the vulnerable draft ages need not be subjected to four years of an inequitable draft law. The two-year extension is sufficiently long to permit compilation and analysis of relevant data while not causing a prolongation of a badly conceived law.

2. *Lottery of the 21-year-olds.*—Under the current draft law, an individual can remain in a draft-vulnerable status for seven and one-half years. To alleviate costs to the individual arising from the possibility of his being drafted, the Marshall Commission has proposed a lottery of 19-year-olds to shorten the period of draft uncertainty. However, as argued in Part V above, the uncertainty of a draft is not an unmitigated evil. To eliminate nearly all such uncertainty (as the present lottery proposal would do) leads to the loss of substantial numbers of voluntary enlistments. This loss necessarily entails a more than twofold increase in draft calls, thereby increasing the fraction of each age class that must be subjected to involuntary military service. The objective of placing maximum reliance on volunteers suggests an intermediate method of selecting draftees which would entail a smaller loss of reluctant volunteers, thereby lessening the need for a draft. Its essential features can be summarized as follows:

(a) All qualified youths are to be classified at the age of 18 into three draft classifications: (1) I-A and available for service, (2) II-S student deferments, and (3) hardship and conscientious-objector exemptions. Hardship deferments will be granted on an individual basis, using criteria similar to those of eligibility for the poverty program.

(b) Men who obtain a student deferment are placed in a state of suspended animation at a draft age of 19. Upon termination of their student deferments, they are returned to the I-A pool and assigned a draft age of 19. Thereafter, their chronological age is ignored, and their draft status within the I-A pool is entirely determined by their draft age.

(c) The period of maximum draft vulnerability will be limited to two years. Men whose draft age exceeds 21 are placed into a lower order of call for five years and can be called only when the I-A pool is depleted.

(d) The order of call within the I-A pool will begin with the oldest. Recall that the oldest men in the I-A pool have a draft age of 21. If monthly requirements are less than the pool of men reaching their 21st "draft birthday" in a particular month, a random selection of birthdates determines the ranking within that month.

(e) All occupational and dependence deferments (other than hardship) will be discontinued.

This lottery of 21-year-olds has the advantage of retaining the flows of reluctant volunteers in the 19- and 20-year-old groups. Hence, the loss of reluctant volunteers in this system of induction is only 42 thousand men per year as compared to the estimated loss of 112 thousand enlistments under the Marshall Commission proposal. If the pay hike of recommendation 3 is adopted (and I hope that it is), the financial cost of involuntary service by the reluctant volunteers will be far smaller. Indeed, the pay raise will attract larger flows of volunteers, so that there may not even be a loss of voluntary enlistments under this proposal.