

that his career plans and educational intentions make him too valuable a civilian to go into the army or make it a national interest that his service be postponed a few years. In saying this, I have in mind a level of armed forces of about the present magnitude or as it may be in the aftermath of the Vietnamese war, that is, something closer to 3 million than to 6 million men. If the armed forces were very substantially larger for a prolonged period, I would have to reconsider the need for a national manpower program that paid explicit attention to the educational base of our population and to the need for particular skills and professions. For the present level of manpower, the economic benefits of discriminating among young men will be so modest, and so largely confined to the young men who benefit, as to be outweighed by the greater simplicity and fairness of a lottery. (The only profession for which I might have to make an exception would be the medical profession, and I am not qualified to make any specific proposal on that.)

(8) It should be possible to design a lottery that, without becoming too complicated, permits a young man some freedom of personal choice in the year that he chooses to be placed in the lottery. I would make any such freedom of choice equally available to all young men. And I am attracted to a national lottery without quotas or any sort, by state or otherwise.

(9) I endorse the idea of special training and rehabilitation programs for those who are rejected either as enlistees or as draftees, both for the sake of more nearly universal service and for the social and economic benefits; but I am not qualified to offer any specific advice. At the same time I am wholly unsympathetic to the notion of universal national service, civilian and military, both because compulsion in our society ought to be limited to real national emergencies and because I am dismayed at the thought of the federal government trying to find civilian service for millions of young people, most of whom have a pretty good idea of what to do with themselves in a free society.

(10) A final conclusion, perhaps not as urgent but of long-lasting significance, relates to veterans' benefits. This Committee might well undertake a study that the long-term cumulative effects of G.I. and other benefits, state as well as federal, involving job preference, tax concessions, educational and unemployment benefits, insurance and cash bonuses. It is natural that state governments as well as the federal government should want to reward those who have served in the armed forces, particularly those who have served in combat, perhaps especially those who served out of the country's need rather than the individual's choice, and served with inadequate compensation by ordinary civilian standards. There is some tendency for benefits to be haphazardly related to income and property taxes, to civil service preference, and to things of that sort. The consequences, in both equity and economic efficiency, are not guaranteed to be favorable. What we end up with is a system of partially deferred compensation, often on a contingent basis, that may make less sense altogether than each particular piece of legislation makes by itself. A study conducted by this Committee might provide some valuable long-run guidance for those who wish to legislate deferred compensation in the most effective way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHELLING. I both agree and disagree with Mr. Oi, and it may be helpful to you, in keeping continuity, if I attach some of my remarks to his.

First, I think it is a mistake to orient this discussion toward whether or not there ought to be some kind of a draft. There is bound to be a potential draft, that is to say, the Government will reserve to itself the right, through compulsion, to get military manpower in an emergency. And if the Government is wise, it will have at least a legislative basis laid for any such drafting in an emergency.

The real question is, how far do you want to rely on a draft, in contrast to other incentives, including the economic incentives?

Here, there are even more reasons than Mr. Oi gave us for taking seriously the advantages in paying for what we get. One that he did not mention, but that I hope Mr. Wool will talk about, is that merely in managing military manpower, it is good for people to