

volunteered to get into the lottery early, they would be automatically picked up.

We should avoid State quotas under a lottery. A young man's risk of being chosen should not differ according to what State he lives in and how many people in that State are qualified or unqualified for service.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you, Mr. Schelling.

Our last witness this afternoon is Director Harold Wool, in charge of Procurement Policy and General Research on Manpower, of the Department of Defense.

**STATEMENT OF HAROLD WOOL, DIRECTOR, PROCUREMENT POLICY
AND GENERAL RESEARCH (MANPOWER), DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE**

Mr. Wool. Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I would like to differentiate my posture here from that of my two colleagues. As a civil service employee of the Department of Defense, I do not have quite the same scope in recommending policies as they may have as private citizens. The policy position of the Department of Defense, as well as of the administration, is on record in the recent Presidential message on the draft and in recent legislation recommendations.

As you know, in 1964, at the direction of President Johnson, the Department of Defense initiated a study which had as one of its principal objectives an assessment of the feasibility of meeting military manpower needs in the coming decade on a completely voluntary basis. The results of this study were submitted to the House Armed Services Committee by Secretary Morris last year, together with a large volume of supporting information. Its main conclusions, with respect to the all-voluntary-force alternative, may be summarized as follows:

First, it found that in the absence of a draft, military strengths would decline to a level of about 2 million or slightly higher in contrast to force levels of about 2.7 million required immediately prior to Vietnam, and to a current military strength of about 3.4 million.

Secondly, that the net budgetary cost of *attempting* to maintain military strengths at the pre-Vietnam level of 2.7 million on a completely voluntary basis would be very high, probably ranging from \$4 billion to \$17 billion, with \$8 billion as the most probable estimate under a 4-percent unemployment rate level.

Third, that even these outlays would not assure an adequate supply of better educated manpower for the many professional and technical specialties needed by the Armed Forces, nor would it provide for adequate manning of our Reserve Forces.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, that there would be very limited flexibility under an all-voluntary system to increase military strengths even moderately within a short time period should the need arise.

It may be helpful to discuss briefly some of the basic research findings and assumptions which resulted in these conclusions. In particular, I would like to address myself to the question of the inherent reliability of the estimates and the reasons for expressing them in a rather broad range of possible costs.