

curity, because we do know, and I think we have every reason to believe, that just from the sheer arithmetic of the thing, assume we needed a relatively moderate increase in strengths in the Armed Forces of perhaps 10 percent in a given year's time. Assume we were in a situation which would happen, of a depleted Reserve force, because you wouldn't be getting the volunteers into it, and you wouldn't be getting the turnover of active-duty military personnel who had a Reserve obligation in a voluntary situation.

This in fact is what we have in countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Not Australia now, but they had it a few years ago. You would have to rely upon the only method available, the market mechanism for increasing your strengths.

A 10-percent increase in strength, given the turnover situation, means something like a 50-percent increase in recruitment. Using the curves developed by Dr. Oi and his colleagues, to get that kind of increase in a short period of time, given the lags involved in any decisionmaking process, not only in the Congress or the Department of Defense, but in terms of changing people's attitudes toward service, and you can't push a pay button and get people to jump up and change their minds about what they are going to do about their lives, it just doesn't happen that way, I think that that would create that kind of inflexibility.

Now our record shows that when we didn't need draft calls we didn't have them. We didn't have them in 1949 to 1950. There were 2 months in 1960 when there were zero calls. There were other months when there were 3,000 calls, because at that time—and, incidentally, in a period of economic recession—the Army was able to get a relatively large number of volunteers in relation to a 21½-million-overall-strength level.

Now it is quite possible that, perish the thought, if we have a relatively high level of unemployment or, conversely, if we are successful in many of these management initiatives which are being pressed—it is completely possible that there may be periods in the future, that with the authority to induct, we might not need to draft people and we would be delighted.

Representative RUMSFELD. Let me see if I can summarize that in a sentence. Then you agree that the proposal that Dr. Schelling and Dr. Oi are putting forward is flexible and is not gambling with the Nation's security, as long as that compulsory system is available. It is sufficiently flexible to be triggered in, and there is no allegation that their proposals are inflexible. This argument disappears.

Mr. WOOL. I think that, first of all, I am not talking about pay policy.

Representative RUMSFELD. No; I am talking about how you answer my question.

Mr. WOOL. Secondly, as far as the extension of the induction authority and using it as little as is needed, if this is the essence of their recommendations, and of a continuing positive effort to maximize volunteering, if this is the thrust of the argument, I don't think there is any issue.

Representative RUMSFELD. Then the argument about flexibility goes out the window.