

sure that the accuracy of the limits of the range are worth quite all that attention.

I do have the impression as I look at his data that he may have underestimated some of the savings, due to reduced training cost, lower required accession rates, and so forth, and that in interpreting what it is that attracts a young man, he used the total pay plus services in kind, whereas it may be that services in kind needn't be increased at all and we can apply his percentage figures to a smaller base; namely, the cash figure, rather than the larger total.

This would cause me to put his best estimate at a figure perhaps half the size it is. On the other hand, I think we should recognize that aside from the fact that the data are in many cases very circumstantial and indirectly relevant only, that it isn't just pay and unemployment that matters.

The job changes. If you make an estimate of what it would take to get half a million men in the Army when it means going to Europe for 2 years, that may be different from getting half a million men in the Army when it means going to South Vietnam and being shot at for a couple of years. Therefore, even if Mr. Oi or Mr. Wool were exactly right about what the data show you could have done in 1962 or in 1964, this is 1967. We are talking about the next half dozen years and the character of Army, Navy, and Air Force life is going to be very different.

In addition to that, when we superimpose changes in the character of society through poverty programs, and so forth, we may also be affecting, in the half dozen years to come, the incentive to stay out of the Army, the incentive to go in the Army, the alternative opportunities available, so we are in a range of uncertainty that I think is even wider than Mr. Wool himself has asked us to accept.

We just don't know, and I don't know any way to find out, but if we were convinced that, for other reasons, a significant pay increase made sense, then we could get at least one experimental observation—again limited to the time it occurred—but at least one more important observation from which to make judgments.

Representative RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Representative CURRIS. I am very pleased to see the unanimity on the general proposition that Mr. Rumsfeld was able to develop.

Let me revert then to the resolution that I have been proposing in the Congress since 1963 that the Pentagon successfully subverted. This resolution would merely create a joint committee of members of the Armed Services Committee and Labor and Education to study this area. That is all.

I felt that it needed study, and that it couldn't be done by the Armed Services Committee alone. It had to tie in with those who were familiar with the manpower situation in the civilian sector; namely, those on Labor and Education Committees. I said at the time that I felt that we had to keep the draft or the compulsion on the shelf, even if something did come out that was feasible, and I still feel this way.

I have already said that the time is too late to do a study. The Pentagon has been successful in sabotaging an honest study in public, in order to get something done by June 30. It is impossible. This is why I have a little bit of impatience with such testimony. Yet I am