

Although our tactics have changed, our objective remains the same. We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese regime, seize its territory, or achieve the unification of North and South Vietnam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Vietnam or for special privileges of any kind. What we are seeking through the planned military buildup is to block the Vietcong offensive, to give the people of South Vietnam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures—to give them time to strengthen their government, to reestablish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Vietcong harassment and attack in recent months. We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined.

INCREASES IN U.S. MILITARY FORCES SINCE 1961

Fortunately, we have greatly increased the strength and readiness of our Military Establishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds of forces which we now require in southeast Asia. The Active Army has been expanded from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions; 20,000 men have been added to the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out their combat structure and at the same time facilitate the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force have been increased by 51 percent. Our airlift capability has more than doubled. Special Forces trained to deal with insurgency threats have been multiplied elevenfold. General ship construction and conversion has been doubled.

During this same period, procurement for the expanded force has been increased greatly: Air Force Tactical aircraft from \$360 million in 1961 to about \$1.1 billion in the original fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft—from \$1.8 billion to \$2.2 billion; Army helicopters—from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and related equipment was increased about 150 percent in the fiscal year 1962-64 period, compared with the preceding 3 years. The tonnage of modern nonnuclear air-to-ground ordnance in stock tripled between fiscal year 1961 and fiscal year 1965. In brief, the Military Establishment of the United States, today, is in far better shape than it ever has been in peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie ahead.

Nevertheless, some further increases in forces, military personnel, production and construction will be required if we are to deploy additional forces to southeast Asia and provide for combat consumption while at the same time maintaining our capabilities to deal with crises elsewhere in the world.

FURTHER INCREASES IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

To offset the deployments now planned to southeast Asia, and provide some additional forces for possible new deployments, we propose to increase the presently authorized force levels. These increases will be of three types: (1) additional units for the Active Forces, over and above those reflected in the January budget; (2) military personnel