

reach those vehicles before they are launched at our cities. Conversely, the strategic defensive forces—manned interceptors, anti-bomber surface-to-air missiles, antiballistic missile (ABM)—which we usually associate with the second capability can also contribute to the first. They can do so by successfully intercepting and destroying the enemy's offensive weapons before they reach our strategic offensive forces on their bases and launch sites.

As long as deterrence of a deliberate Soviet (or Red Chinese) nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies is the overriding objective of our strategic forces, the capability for assured destruction must receive the first call on all of our resources and must be provided regardless of the costs and the difficulties involved. Damage limiting programs, no matter how much we spend on them, can never substitute for an assured destruction capability in the deterrent role. It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable 20th century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves.

What kind and amount of destruction we would have to be able to inflict on an attacker to provide this deterrent cannot be answered precisely. However, it seems reasonable to assume that in the case of the Soviet Union, the destruction of, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of its population and one-half to two-thirds of its industrial capacity would mean its elimination as a major power for many years. Such a level of destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any industrialized nation and, thus, should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies.

Assured destruction with regard to Red China presents a somewhat different problem. China is far from being an industrialized nation. However, what industry it has is heavily concentrated in a comparatively few cities. We estimate, for example, that a relatively small number of warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people) and more than one-half of the industrial capacity. Moreover, such an attack would also destroy most of the key governmental, technical and managerial personnel and a large proportion of the skilled workers. Since Red China's capacity to attack the United States with nuclear weapons will be very limited, even during the 1970's, the ability of even a very small portion of our strategic offensive forces to inflict such heavy damage upon them should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of such an attack on their part.

Once sufficient forces have been procured to give us high confidence of achieving our assured destruction objective, we can then consider the kinds and amounts of forces which might be added to reduce damage to our population and industry in the event deterrence fails. But here we must note another important point, namely, the possible interaction of our strategic forces programs with those of the Soviet Union. If the general nuclear war policy of the Soviet Union also has as its objective the deterrence of a U.S. first strike (which I believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our part to reduce damage to ourselves (to what they would estimate we might consider an "acceptable level") would put pressure on them to strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent forces. Conversely, an increase in their damage limiting capability would