

require us to make greater investments in assured destruction, which, as I will describe later, is precisely what we now propose to do.

It is this interaction between our strategic forces programs and those of the Soviet Union which leads us to believe that there is a mutuality of interests in limiting the deployment of antiballistic missile defense systems. If our assumption that the Soviets are also striving to achieve an assured destruction capability is correct, and I am convinced that it is, then in all probability all we would accomplish by deploying ABM systems against one another would be to increase greatly our respective defense expenditures, without any gain in real security for either side. It was for this reason that President Johnson decided to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union, designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of ABM systems, while including at the same time about \$375 million in his fiscal year 1968 budget to provide for such actions—e.g., protection of our offensive weapon systems—as may be required if these discussions prove unsuccessful.

In this connection, it might be useful to reiterate another fundamental point, namely, that the concept of assured destruction implies a “second strike” capability, i.e., a strategic force of such size and sufficient strength to destroy the attacker. Thus if assured destruction is also a Soviet objective, they must always view our strategic offensive forces in their planning as a potential first strike threat (just as we view their forces) and provide for a second strike capability.

THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE THREAT

In order to assess the capabilities of our general nuclear war forces over the next several years, we must take into account the size and character of the strategic forces which the Soviet Union and Red China are likely to have during the same period. Again, let me caution that, while we have reasonable high confidence in our estimates for the close-in period, our estimates for the early part of the next decade are subject to much uncertainty. As I pointed out in past appearances before this committee, such longer range projections are, at best, only informed estimates particularly since they deal in many cases with a period beyond the production and deployment leadtimes of the weapon systems involved.

The Soviet strategic offensive-defensive forces

Two significant changes have occurred during the last year in our projections of Soviet strategic forces. The first is a faster than expected rate of construction of hard ICBM silos; the second is more positive evidence of a deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system around Moscow. (Both of these developments fall considerably short of what we assumed in the “higher than expected” threat, against which we have been hedging for several years.) Our current estimates for other elements of the Soviet strategic forces are generally in line with those I discussed here last year.

Summarized in the following table are the Soviet’s strategic offensive forces estimated for October 1, 1966. Shown for comparison are the U.S. forces.