

United States versus Soviet intercontinental strategic nuclear forces

	Oct. 1, 1966	
	U.S. ¹	U.S.S.R.
ICBM's ²	934	340
SLBM's (UE launchers) ³	512	130
Total intercontinental ballistic missiles ⁴	1,446	470
Intercontinental bombers ⁵	680	155

¹ These are mid-1966 figures.

² Excludes test range launchers and Soviet MR/IRBM's capable of striking Eurasian targets.

³ In addition to the SLBM's, the Soviets possess submarine-launched cruise missiles whose primary targets are naval and merchant vessels.

⁴ In 1965, intelligence reports estimated Soviet intercontinental missiles as of mid-1966 to number between 430 and 500.

⁵ In addition to the intercontinental bombers shown in the table, the Soviets possess medium bombers capable of striking Eurasian targets.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles. As of now, we have more than three times the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (i.e., ICBM's, and SLBM's) the Soviets have. Even by the early 1970's, we still expect to have a significant lead over the Soviet Union in terms of numbers and a very substantial superiority in terms of overall combat effectiveness. In this connection, we should bear in mind that it is not the number of missiles which is important, but rather the character of the payloads they carry; the missile is simply the delivery vehicle. Our superiority in intercontinental bombers, both in numbers and combat effectiveness, is even greater and is expected to remain so for as far ahead as we can see. There is still no evidence that the Soviets intend to deploy a new heavy bomber in the late 1960's.

Antiballistic missile defense. We have been aware for many years that the Soviets have been working on an antiballistic missile defense system, just as we have been. After a series of abortive starts, it now appears that the Soviets are deploying such a system (using the "GALOSH" missile, publicly displayed in 1964) around Moscow. They are also deploying another type of defensive system elsewhere in the Soviet Union, but the weight of the evidence at this time suggests that this system is not intended primarily for antiballistic missile defense. However, knowing what we do about past Soviet predilections for defense systems, ¹ we must for the time being, plan our forces on the assumption that they will have deployed some sort of an ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970's. Whether made up of GALOSH only, or a combination of GALOSH and other types of missiles, a full scale deployment would cost the Soviet Union at least \$20 to \$25 billion.

The Red Chinese nuclear threat

There has been no basic change in our estimates for the Red Chinese nuclear threat. Their firing of a nuclear armed missile over a distance of a few hundred miles last October falls within the limits of that estimate.

¹ The Soviets for more than a decade have spent substantially more on air defense against strategic bombers than has the United States. But if our Strategic Air Command is correct in its judgment that a very high proportion of the U.S. incoming bombers could penetrate the Soviet defenses and reach their targets, and I have no reason to dispute it, then we must conclude that the bulk of these Soviet expenditures has been wasted.