

Accelerated development of the Poseidon missile.

Approved production and deployment of Minuteman III.

Developed penetration aids for Minuteman.

Now in the fiscal year 1968 program we propose to take a number of additional actions to enhance the future capabilities of our assured destruction forces, of which the following are the more important:

Produce and deploy the Poseidon missile.

Produce and deploy improved missile penetration aids.

Increase the proportion of Minuteman III in the planned force and provide it with an improved third stage.

Initiate the development of new reentry vehicles, specifically designed for use against targets heavily defended with ABM's.

I will discuss each of these actions in greater detail later in connection with our other proposals for the strategic forces. But for now, let me point out that the net effect of these actions would be to increase greatly the overall effectiveness of our assured destruction force against the Soviet Union by mid-1972. Even if the Moscow-type ABM defense were deployed at other cities as well, the proposed U.S. missile force alone could inflict about 35 percent (86 million) fatalities on the Soviet Union in 1972—after absorbing a surprise attack.

As I noted earlier, a relatively small number of warheads detonated over 50 cities would destroy half of Red China's urban population and more than one-half of her industry.

Thus the strategic missile forces proposed for the fiscal year 1968-72 period would, by themselves, give us an assured destruction capability against both the Soviet Union and Red China, simultaneously.

Capability against "higher than expected threats"

As I indicated last year, our assured destruction capability is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are greater than those projected in the latest intelligence estimates.

The most severe threat we must consider in planning our assured destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet ABM deployment combined with a deployment of a substantial ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability. Such a Soviet offensive force might pose a threat to our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective Soviet ABM system might then be able to intercept and destroy a significant portion of our residual missile warheads, including those carried by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher than expected.)

To hedge against the possibility of such a threat to our land-based missile forces, we have authorized the development and production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we are considering the development and deployment of a new Advanced ICBM, designed to reduce vulnerability to such a Soviet threat. The deployment of the Nike-X as a defense for our Minuteman force would offer a partial substitute for the possible further expansion of our offensive forces.

But again I want to emphasize that we don't know whether the Soviet Union will develop and deploy the kind of forces assumed