

forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them. We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs.

There is nothing we have seen in either our own or the Soviet Union's technology which would lead us to believe we cannot do this. From the beginning of the Nike-Zeus project in 1955 through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have invested a total of about \$4 billion on ballistic missile defense research—including Nike-Zeus, Nike-X and Project Defender. And, during the last 5 or 6 years, we have spent about \$1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help ensure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses. As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already in hand to counter any offensive or defensive force changes the Soviet Union might undertake in the foreseeable future.

We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or assured destruction force as the United States. Therefore, deployment by the United States of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before.

With respect to protection of the United States against a possible Red Chinese nuclear attack, the lead time required for China to develop a significant ICBM force is greater than that required for deployment of our defense—therefore the Chinese threat in itself would not dictate the production of an ABM system at this time.

Similarly, although the protection of our land-based strategic offensive forces against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack the Soviets may be able to mount in the mid- or late 1970's might later prove to be worth while, it is not yet necessary to produce and deploy the Nike-X for that purpose.

I have already discussed, in connection with my review of the capabilities of our strategic forces for assured destruction, the third major purpose for which we may want to deploy an ABM defense (i.e., the protection of Minuteman). Now I would like to discuss the other two purposes.

Deployment of Nike-X for defense of our cities against a Soviet attack

What is involved here is an analysis of the contribution the Nike-X system might make to the defense of our cities under two assumptions:

That the Soviets do not react to such a deployment.

That the Soviets do react in an attempt to preserve their "assured destruction" capability.

As you know, the major elements of the Nike-X system are being developed in such a way as to permit a variety of deployments; two have been selected for the purposes of this analysis. The first, which I will call "posture A," represents a light U.S. defense against a Soviet missile attack on our cities. It consists of an area defense of the entire continental United States, providing redundant (overlapping) coverage of key target areas; and, in addition, a relatively low-density Sprint defense of a number of the largest cities to provide some protection against those warheads which get through the area defense.