

estimated at about \$1.5 to \$2.4 billion and would provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors and airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program would cost about \$800 million more than the one we are now producing. We would also need some of our antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event, the "current" estimates of the investment cost of the total damage limiting package would amount to at least \$12.2 billion for posture A and at least \$21.7 billion for posture B.

To test the contribution that each of these Nike-X deployments might make to our damage limiting objectives, we have projected both the United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM deployment) to the time when posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place.

The fatalities which these Soviet forces could inflict upon the United States (with and without a U.S. ABM defense) and the fatalities which the U.S. forces could inflict on the Soviet Union (with a Soviet ABM defense) are shown in the figure 3.

FIGURE 3

*Number of fatalities<sup>1</sup> in an all-out strategic exchange (assumes no Soviet reaction to U.S. ABM deployment)*

[In millions]<sup>2</sup>

|                | Soviets strike first,<br>United States retaliates |                      | United States strikes first,<br>Soviets retaliate <sup>3</sup> |                      |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
|                | U.S.<br>fatalities                                | Soviet<br>fatalities | U.S.<br>fatalities                                             | Soviet<br>fatalities |
| U.S. programs: |                                                   |                      |                                                                |                      |
| Approved.....  | 120                                               | 120+                 | 100                                                            | 70                   |
| Posture A..... | 40                                                | 120+                 | 30                                                             | 70                   |
| Posture B..... | 30                                                | 120+                 | 20                                                             | 70                   |

<sup>1</sup> Fatality figures shown above represent deaths from blast and fallout; they do not include deaths resulting from fire, storms, disease, and general disruption of everyday life.

<sup>2</sup> The data in this table are highly sensitive to small changes in the pattern of attack and small changes in force levels.

<sup>3</sup> Assumes United States minimizes U.S. fatalities by maximizing effectiveness of strike on Soviet offensive systems.

The first case, "Soviets Strike First, United States Retaliates," is the threat against which our strategic forces must be designed. The second case, "United States Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate," is the case that would determine the size and character of the Soviet reaction to changes in our strategic forces, if they wish, as they clearly do, to maintain an assured destruction capability against us.

These calculations indicate that without Nike-X and the other damage limiting programs discussed earlier, U.S. fatalities from a Soviet first strike could total about 120 million; even after absorbing that attack, we could inflict on the Soviet Union more than 120 million fatalities. Assuming the Soviets do not react to our deployment of an ABM defense against them, which is a most unrealistic assumption, posture A might reduce our fatalities to 40 million and posture B to about 30 million.