

Although the fatality estimates shown for both the Soviet Union and the United States reflect some variations in the performance of their respective ABM systems, they are still based on the assumption that these systems will work at relatively high levels of effectiveness. If these ABM systems do not perform as well as our technical people postulate, fatalities on both sides could be considerably higher than shown in figure 3, or the costs would be considerably higher if major improvements or additions had to be made in the systems to bring them up to the postulated level of performance.

If the Soviets are determined to maintain an assured destruction capability against us and they believe that our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the "United States Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate" case to the levels shown in figure 3, they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment in one of these possible ways:

Level of U.S. fatalities which Soviets believe will provide deterrence¹

Fatalities (millions):	Cost to the Soviets of offsetting U.S. cost to deploy an ABM
40-----	\$1 Soviet cost to \$4 U.S. cost.
60-----	\$1 Soviet cost to \$2 U.S. cost.
90-----	\$1 Soviet cost to \$1 U.S. cost.

¹ U.S. fatalities if United States strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

If the Soviets chose to respond in that way to our ABM deployment the results would be as shown in figure 4.

In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and economic capacities to offset any further damage limiting measures we might undertake provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the Nike-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970's. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.

Defense against the Red Chinese nuclear threat

With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM defense might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a missile attack, at least through the 1970's. The total investment cost of such a program might amount to \$3.5 billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.