

FIGURE 4

*Number of fatalities in an all-out strategic-exchange (assumes Soviet reaction to U.S. ABM deployment)*

[In millions]

|                             | Soviets strike first,<br>United States retaliates |                      | United States strikes first,<br>Soviets retaliate |                      |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
|                             | U.S.<br>fatalities                                | Soviet<br>fatalities | U.S.<br>fatalities                                | Soviet<br>fatalities |
| U.S. programs:              |                                                   |                      |                                                   |                      |
| Approved (no response)..... | 120                                               | 120+                 | 100                                               | 70                   |
| Posture A.....              | 120                                               | 120+                 | 90                                                | 70                   |
| Posture B.....              | 120                                               | 120+                 | 90                                                | 70                   |

The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970's is shown in the table below:

*Chinese strike first (Operational inventory)*

|                                | X missiles | 3X missiles |
|--------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| U.S. fatalities (in millions): |            |             |
| Without ABM.....               | 5          | 10          |
| With ABM.....                  | 0+         | 1           |

This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the 1970's almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well beyond 1985.

It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not be made now.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, we propose:

To pursue with undiminished vigor the development, test and evaluation of the Nike-X system (for which purpose a total of about \$440 million has been included in the fiscal year 1968 budget), but to take no action now to deploy the system.

To initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of ABM systems.

To reconsider the deployment decision in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful; approximately \$375 million has been included in the fiscal year 1968 budget to provide for such actions as may be required at that time, e.g., the production of Nike-X for the defense of our offensive weapon systems.

I would now like to turn to our specific proposals for the strategic forces in the fiscal year 1968-72 period.

#### STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

The force structure proposed for the fiscal year 1968-72 period is shown in the classified table furnished to the committee.