

of the spectrum of aggression and that we must, therefore, have other forms of military power, both to deter lesser aggressions and to defeat them if deterrence fails. We need these other forms of military power, not so much for the defense of our own territory as for the support of our commitments to other nations under the various collective defense arrangements we have entered into since the end of World War II. These include the Rio Pact in the Western Hemisphere, NATO in Europe, SEATO and ANZUS in the Far East, and the bilateral mutual defense agreements with Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Philippines.

All of these mutual defense treaty commitments, involving a total of some 40-odd sovereign nations, stem from the great policy decision, made at the end of the Second World War, to base our security on the collective defense of the free world.

In fact even without these treaty obligations, I suspect that our country's action would not have differed significantly in the more than two decades which have elapsed since the end of World War II. We must remember that we twice came to the assistance of our friends in Western Europe without any prior treaty commitments; we did so because we deemed it vital to our own security. We came to the assistance of South Korea—and we are now assisting South Vietnam—for the same reason. So it is not the treaties themselves that cause our greater involvement in the affairs of the rest of the world, but rather what we deem to be our own vital national security interests over the longer run.

While the distinction between General Nuclear War Forces and Limited War Forces is somewhat arbitrary in that all of our forces would be employed in a general war, and certain elements of our strategic forces in a limited war (e.g., the B-52's against the Vietcong forces in Vietnam), it is primarily the limited war mission which shapes the size and character of the General Purpose Forces. Because we cannot predict in detail the actual contingencies we may have to face, we must build into our forces a capability to deal with a very wide range of situations. This accounts for the great diversification in the kinds of units, capabilities, weapons, equipment, supplies, and training which must be provided and seriously complicates the task of determining specific requirements.

Nevertheless, our continuing study of these requirements has reaffirmed my conclusion that the General Purpose Forces which I presented here a year ago are about the right order of magnitude. This conclusion takes into account the contributions to collective defense which our allies can be expected to make, as well as our own going capability to concentrate our military power rapidly in a distant threatened area.

Although our General Purpose Forces are primarily designed for nonnuclear warfare, we do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons even in limited wars. However, as I have pointed out in previous years, the employment of such weapons in a limited war would not necessarily be to our advantage in every case, and it would present some extremely difficult and complex problems.

A careful review of our General Purpose Force requirements, including the temporary augmentations for southeast Asia, indicates a need in fiscal year 1968 for a total land force of about 31½ division force equivalents. By "division force" I mean the division itself, plus all