

capabilities must be assessed in conjunction with the capabilities of these allied forces. Although we have considerable knowledge of the force plans of our allies, we cannot be sure how they will change with the passage of time. This creates some uncertainty about the specific requirements for U.S. forces in the more distant years of the 5-year programming period, for which we must make allowances in our force planning.

ARMY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The Department of Defense for many years, and under several administrations, has been striving to make the "One Army" concept a reality as well as a slogan. You may recall that when I appeared before the congressional committee in May 1961 in support of President Kennedy's recommendations on the realignment of the Army Reserve components, I noted that "they must be so organized, trained, and equipped as to permit their rapid integration into the Active Army." Since that time we have not only been working on the question of how the Reserve components should be organized but also on how the Reserve and Active Army structures could best be meshed together. This latter question requires not only a comprehensive analysis of the total Army force requirement but also a very careful and detailed analysis of which elements of the total structure should be provided in the Active Forces and which in the Reserve Forces.

Fundamental to this type of analysis is the concept of a "division force." Although the combat division has long been the most widely used standard for measuring the strength of the land forces, it accounts for only about one-third of the combat and support units required to sustain the division in combat over an extended period of time. A "ready" division without "ready" support elements would be incapable of combat. The division force concept ensures that our planning explicitly recognizes this relationship (indeed, interdependence) between the division and its major support elements, since it requires us to identify these elements in detail.

As a first approach to the problem, we have grouped all of the organized (T.O. & E.) units of the division force into three categories:

- The division itself.

- The initial support increment (ISI), i.e., the nondivisional combat and combat support units which are required to support the division in the initial combat phase.

- The sustaining support increment (SSI), i.e., the additional nondivisional units including the combat, combat support, and service support needed by the division for sustained combat operations beyond the initial phase.

By structuring the division force in this way, we can see more clearly the relationship of the divisions themselves to the other Army units shown on the classified table provided to the committee.

In addition, the division force concept helps us to:

- Relate standards of unit readiness, manning levels, etc., directly to the time phased unit deployment schedules, which underlie our contingency planning.

- Determine more precisely which units must be provided in the actual forces and which could be provided in the Reserve components.