gun, the armored vehicle bridge, and the combat engine vehicle, all of which use the M–54 chassis.

In fiscal year 1968, advance production engineering for the main battle tank will require $11 million. Additional funds will be required for the U.S. share of the development costs.

The revised fiscal year 1967 program for trucks and other noncombat vehicles total $653 million ($154 in the supplemental request). For fiscal year 1968 $483 million is requested for a variety of these vehicles. Included in the fiscal year 1968 program are ¼-ton, 1¼-ton (M715), 2½-ton and 5-ton trucks of all types.

For communications and electronic procurement, the revised fiscal year 1967 program provides $617 million ($30 million in the supplemental request and the fiscal year 1968 request totals $55 million.

For ammunition the Army's revised fiscal year 1967 program includes $1,36* million ($584 million in the supplemental request). For fiscal year 1968, $2,2** million is requested. Ammunition procurement will continue to increase in fiscal year 1968 in order to meet the projected needs of southeast Asia. Among the major items are: small arms ammunition (5.56 mm., 7.62 mm., and 30 caliber); 40 mm. ammunition; 81 mm., 105 mm., 106 mm., 152 mm., 155 mm., and 4.2-inch cartridges; and 2.75-inch rockets.

The revised fiscal year 1967 program for other support equipment (road graders, tractors, etc.) totals $608 million ($247 million in the supplemental request) and $437 million is requested for fiscal year 1968. The revised fiscal year 1967 program for production base support totals $272 million, ($220 million in the supplemental request and $95 million is requested for fiscal year 1968.

Navy General Purpose Forces

The Navy General Purpose Forces proposed for the fiscal year 1968–72 period are shown on the classified table provided to the committee. Except for the Vietnamese-related forces, the major changes from the program planned last year concern the antisubmarine warfare forces, the guided missile ships, the amphibious ships and the minesweepers. There is, however, one general problem in this area which deserves special mention, and that is the dolorous state of the American shipbuilding industry.

It has become increasingly apparent in recent years that our shipbuilding industry, both public and private, has fallen far behind its competitors in other countries. Not only does it cost twice as much to build a ship in this country, it also takes twice as long.

This is a startling development in view of the fact that the United States is the most highly industrialized nation in the world. It is even more startling when we realize that the modernization of the European and Japanese yards has been achieved by applying, on a massive scale, U.S. automobile and aircraft manufacturing technology to shipbuilding.

Unfortunately, public discussion of the shipbuilding problem in this country has been focused on what is actually the minor part—its relationship to the Merchant Marine problem. I can well understand why the American flag line operators should wish to sever the present interlocking relationship between the Merchant Marine and the