

to point-to-point service in support of our current effort in southeast Asia. Our plans now call for retaining these ships in this role through the end of fiscal year 1968. Subsequently, with the end of the Vietnam conflict, we would expect to return them to their forward mobile depot role and add more ships for this mission. The Victory ship fleet would be retained until a sufficient number of the more efficient FDL's became available in fiscal year 1970.

During fiscal year 1966, MSTS operated in the nucleus fleet an additional general purpose cargo ship to help meet the increased requirements of our southeast Asia operation. Tentatively, we now plan on retaining this ship through fiscal year 1968, after which the active general purpose cargo fleet is scheduled to decline. Another minor change in last year's planned deployments resulted from the fact that one roll-on/roll-off ship which had been expected to enter service in May or June 1966 has been delayed.

With respect to special purpose cargo ships, the temporary Vietnam augmentations which I described a year ago have now been extended through fiscal year 1968. In addition, MSTS will operate 13 more LST's in fiscal year 1967 than envisioned last year and 1 more through fiscal year 1968. After fiscal year 1968, the special purpose cargo fleet is tentatively scheduled to return to the pre-Vietnam level.

FINANCIAL SUMMARY

The airlift and sealift forces outlined will require total obligational authority of \$1.6 billion in fiscal year 1968. A comparison with prior years is shown below:

[In billions of dollars]

	Fiscal years—						
	1962 actual	1963 actual	1964 actual	1965 actual	1966 actual	1967 esti- mated	1968 pro- posed
Total obligational authority.....	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.6

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Included in this major program are all the research and development efforts not directly identified with weapons or weapon systems approved for deployment. We have made a special effort again this year not only to cull out marginal projects in the research and development programs, but also to defer to future years all projects whose postponement would not have a serious adverse effect on our future military capabilities. But even while we have eliminated, reduced and deferred projects in some areas of this program, we have had to add, increase and accelerate projects in other areas, to meet new needs growing out of the conflict in southeast Asia and the military situation generally.

Last year I described Project Provost (priority research and development objectives for Vietnam operations support) which we had established to ensure that the research and development program related to limited war situations, which had been accelerated in prior years, would be wholly responsive to the more specific requirements