

beginning in fiscal 1967. The prospect of \$60 billion a year, almost everybody agrees, would keep the economy at capacity and perhaps threaten to overheat it, especially since the Armed Forces would then be using up scarce manpower. Merely in anticipation of this level of spending, business would be less inclined to reduce excessive inventories, and more inclined to keep its capital spending high. Tax cuts would go out the window. There would be talk of inflation, of cuts in nondefense Government spending, of voluntary wage and price restraints, perhaps of controls.

One influence that may help convert such a possibility into actuality is a remarkable 100-page "secret" report put together under the auspices of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the highly regarded Senate Armed Services Committee. The report argues that even before the Vietnam buildup Defense should have been spending billions more a year for Army procurement. It points to shortages and obsolescence in radio, spotting, and warning equipment, and guidance and control systems; in trucks, troop carriers, and helicopters; in machinegun, antitank-gun, and rifle ammunition. The report also urges an immediate funding for new procurement, and estimates that the Army alone needs between \$12 billion and \$18 billion worth of additional equipment during the next 5 years. On the assumption that the other services have suffered similar underprocurement, many have estimated the total "shortfall" in terms of \$5 billion a year or so.

Senator John Stennis, of Mississippi, chairman of the subcommittee, admits there is no evidence of shortages in Vietnam; the so-called shortages one reads about there are generally a simple problem of transporting equipment to where it is needed. But Stennis argues that to keep forces in Vietnam well supplied the Army has had to strip assets and resources of the Reserves and active forces elsewhere. Hanson Baldwin, the well-informed military correspondent of the *New York Times*, has long criticized McNamara's lean budgets and recently let it be known that one of the reasons President Johnson did not call up the Reserves for Vietnam last July was that they lacked training and equipment. If true, this alone could presage a large increase in procurement.

McNamara naturally disagrees with the charges—stubbornly, sharply, and explicitly. He and his staff point out that the Armed Forces are in a much higher state of readiness than they were 5 years ago, "particularly in the kinds of forces we now require in southeast Asia," and they argue that the shortcomings cited in the report make little real sense. No army is ever completely modern, they say, nor does it want to be if production lines are to be kept open, and if large blocks of equipment are not to be out of date at once. Furthermore, they say, standards of logistic readiness cannot be used to measure combat readiness.

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But even by their own definition the time may be at hand to start producing for war. Georgia's Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is one important figure who seems to think so. He defines need as "everything on earth the American soldier can possibly need to fight a battle," and insists that Defense will have to spend much more. He has denounced a "casual attitude toward a situation that holds greater dangers than those inherent in