million a year, or six times the profit sent home from British investments there; such is latter day "imperialism."

In 1963, Britain signed a treaty binding itself to defend the Malaysian Federation, and it has honored that pledge. But the whole subject was blasted open in August when Singapore suddenly withdrew from the federation. In an editorial entitled "What Are We Doing There?" the *Economist* asked a few questions of the kind bothering many Britons: "Just how necessary is it that Britain should be in a position to restrain Dr. Sukarno or his—quite possibly Communist—successor? What part ought Britain to play in containing China?"

If the British decide to phase out of Singapore or to reduce their commitment in the rest of Malaysia, Malaysia might become another Vietnam. It might anyway. The United States, in any event, may find itself obliged to take up the slack there, as it may in many another place east of Suez. The British, for example, want to get out of Aden, on the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, even though some Britons regard it as vital to the country's Persian Gulf oil interests.

An important question is whether even existing British bases in the East are now enough—i.e., whether they are located in the most advantageous positions to box in southeast Asia and Africa. The United States may want to, indeed may have to, move in to back up and enlarge the West's outposts by establishing communication centers, supply bases, ports, and airports on a number of well-placed British islands in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Africa.

Meantime U.S. obligations in Europe, which are great, cannot easily be reduced. Some 250,000 of our best-trained men are stationed in Germany. Just as the Chinese and other Asiatics would misread a withdrawal of troops from Korea, so the Russians might be emboldened by a sizable reduction of forces in Germany, or more precisely by a U.S. commitment to Asia on a scale that would deplete European reserves. Some U.S. specialists have already been shipped to Asia, and the West Germans get alarmed every time a group leaves.

Any speculation on future increases in military spending must weigh the possibility that France might pull out of NATO, and that our pipelines, bases, hospitals, etc., will have to be moved outside France. This restructuring of European military deployment will be expensive, even though the United States is developing a kind of long-range logistics system to offset it. The Pentagon finds, for instance, that it can often fly spare parts right from the United States more cheaply and expeditiously than it can maintain many depots abroad; everything needed for B–52 bombers is now stored in Texas, and for the F–100's in Utah.

INFINITE COMBINATIONS

The precise effect of any of these various defense spending possibilities on the country depends of course on *if* and *when* each becomes an actuality; the balance of an economy can change very fast when it is growing at around $30 billion a year. The range of possibilities is almost infinite. If the Vietnam conflict subsides, annual military spending may not rise above the $55 billion now in prospect; but a stepup to a rate of $60 billion or more by next summer would surely