

Mr. STAATS. I would like, Mr. Chairman—

Chairman PROXMIRE. I know this is something you may not care to do right now orally, because it would take quite a while to do that.

Mr. STAATS. I think it would.

Chairman PROXMIRE. But if you could document it to some extent at least, it would be helpful.

Mr. STAATS. We have found GSA particularly cooperative on the matters we have brought to their attention. We have found the Corps of Engineers very receptive.

We find, Mr. Chairman, in a great many cases that the External Auditor, if you will, the General Accounting Office, going in is able to develop factors in a way which is persuasive to the top manager where he does not previously have that information available to him, and it may not be dereliction in all cases. It may be the fact that he does not have adequate recording systems available to him. He may not have an adequate internal audit arrangement available to him.

Certainly all of our reports do not carry the implication that there is any malfeasance or misfeasance involved.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I understand that.

Mr. STAATS. It is a very large Government.

Many of these are very complicated issues. I think what we are saying is that the GAO, as an outside organization, is able to develop its facts in such a way that in most cases—not all, but in most cases—we can persuade management we are right, and some corrective action needs to be taken.

We would be very happy to supply for the record a series of illustrations of this type.

(The following material was subsequently filed:)

ILLUSTRATIONS OF CIVIL AGENCY REACTIONS TO GAO REPORTS ON CONSTRUCTION

1. We found that the Federal Aviation Administration had approved the construction of control towers without having analyzed the relative benefits and costs of the tower design, and that as a result, the Administration would incur additional costs of about \$2.3 million in constructing 28 towers of a new design. The Administration agreed with our findings and proposals for corrective action, substituted a lower cost tower design at four locations already scheduled for new towers, and revised its policy and operating procedures in a manner which should, if properly implemented, prevent the recurrence of similar situations.

2. In a review of contracts awarded by the Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration, we found that in 15 out of 28 buildings, the Government had encountered construction difficulties because of foundation design problems and unanticipated soils conditions. We found that the professional engineering staff of the Service did not include specialists in soils mechanics and foundation engineering and concluded, on the basis of our review, that had such specialists been available, certain of the construction difficulties experienced by the Service could have been avoided and the costly effects of others minimized. In response to our proposal, the General Services Administration advised us that the needed in-house soils mechanics and foundation engineering capability would be expanded and certain other corrective measures would be taken.

3. We found that the Bureau of Reclamation and the Bonneville Power Administration, Department of the Interior, had adopted different practices in constructing tower footings for high-voltage transmission lines without fully evaluating alternative methods of construction. We believed that the results of our review, which considered the substantial differences in the costs of footings under the practices of the respective agencies, indicated a need for centralized coordination to provide reasonable assurance that, when improved systems or techniques are developed they will be promptly implemented by all the agencies which can bene-