

person or an economic establishment. They have built a truly admirable record of success in meeting this obligation and the documentation of that record is worth serious consideration.

Both legal and technical protections can be strengthened and extended considerably beyond present practice. Indeed, employing the computer in the development of integrated file systems can make available for the first time certain protective devices and policies that are impossible outside the kind of reforms that we are advocating. For example, such reform will permit the use of internal control codes that can be made the object of special surveillance and it can make possible a whole range of machine monitoring devices that can extend the range of human surveillance. One can argue that the capital costs and design problems associated with extending protections to personal privacy almost require an increase in system integration.

Second, my assertion rests upon the fact that there will be much less temptation to pervert a statistical system for intelligence purposes than is commonly supposed.

(a) The core of the record content of a general purpose statistical file consists of information concerning the *public face* of an individual—for example, obvious demographic characteristics—rather than his *private face*—criminal records, and so forth. Only a part of such a statistical record might represent information not available almost literally to public inspection.

(b) Statistical files are often loaded with information irrelevant for intelligence purposes—concerning deceased respondents, no longer existing enterprises, and so forth—that are important for statistical purposes but increase the inefficiency of the files for intelligence purposes.

(c) A general purpose intelligence system, if it is going to be efficient has to be as nearly complete as possible. Ideally it should constitute a census so that every possible individual search request could be fulfilled. Statistical systems do not contain “all of the data on everyone,” to borrow a purple phrase, but only some data on some of the people. Even the census is largely a sampling instrument. It is not very tempting to run all the expense and risk of trying to violate a well-protected system to find out something about an individual if there is only one chance in four his record is even contained in the system.

(d) Most important of all, those who seek dossier type information have too many easy options available to them. We can rely on the market. No one is going to pay \$500 for a suit if he can get the same suit at a lot less trouble for \$50. Anyone who has any knowledge of informal intelligence sources and the formidable intelligence industry in this country can readily see that the temptation to pervert a properly protected statistical system would be practically nonexistent.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we stand on the threshold of an era where relevant and timely information of special value to public policy and social research can be made available in ways undreamed of before. Given the rapid increases in the complexity of social life and the issues of public policy, this opportunity may be coming none too soon. We badly need to avail ourselves of these tools. In undertaking to provide them we must take seriously the necessity of protecting personal privacy. I am convinced that the provisions of this new capability can be made consistent with adequate protections for the privacy of the individual.