groups testified in favor of the repeal of 14(b). Rather than my attempting to respond to you now, perhaps it would be much more efficacious if I were to refer you to the well-formulated written positions as expressed at that time, last summer, I think it was.

Mr. Thompson. The summer before that. The hearings are clear on

that point.

Mr. Gardner. Do either of you other gentlemen care to comment or

stand on that?

Monsignor Quinn. As Rabbi Hirsch pointed out, the Roman Catholic Church was represented in hearings coming out for the repeal of 14(b).

Mr. Gardner. Thank you.

Reverend Igarashi. I am not quite sure what policy statement we have to support the statement of Rabbi Hirsch, but nevertheless our general stand is pretty clearly articulated in previous testimony.

Mr. Thompson. If the gentleman will yield, I might relieve him of

any fear of the immediate repeal of 14(b).

Mr. GARDNER. I am delighted to hear that, Mr. Chairman, I must admit. I have a hard time in my own mind understanding how various groups can be concerned about individual workers and not be concerned about the right of an individual to join a union under his own choice. I will be quite frank in this. It seems to me your position is very contradictory. I would share the same concern over the right of an individual in North Carolina or any other State that has 14(b) to, of his own choice, join a union.

I would be just as concerned with this as a worker having an opportunity to a voice speaking for him. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Thompson. I might point out to the gentleman an example of how opposite things can happen and one can disapprove of one aspect of a situation and approve of another.

Under the cotton marketing regulations, you know, every cotton grower, whether he wants to or not, must pay \$1 per bale of cotton for

advertising of cotton without any choice.

Mr. GARDNER. That is according to the law. He has no choice.

Mr. O'Hara. If I may pursue the analogy the chairman started to make, I think one important point, sometimes overlooked about section 14(b), is that the Labor-Management Relations Act requires that once a labor organization has been recognized as the bargaining agent for a group of employees, it is required by the law to represent each and every one of those employees in grievance procedures, in arbitration, in wage and working condition determinations, whether or not all employees are part of the union.

And the requirement of the union shop, which is sometimes referred to as the Taft-Hartley union shop, is not the same as the traditional union shop which existed before the passage of the Taft-Hartley law. Under the so-called Taft-Hartley union shop, the employee, if there were a union shop agreement, would not be required to join the union

if he did not want to.

If there is a union shop agreement in a non-right-to-work State, however, he is required to pay the union the equivalent of the dues and initiation fee even if he does not belong to it. He is not required to join any organization which he does not want to join, but he is required to pay his share of the cost of the representation the union is obliged to furnish him.