7 percent for work connected expenses.
4 percent for child care.
4 percent for other social services.
2 percent for adult basic education.
1 percent for medical care.

III. The primary objective of Title V has been to increase the employability and earning power of the hard-core poverty population not to produce highly skilled production workers and technicians. In particular, the Program has been focused primarily on heads of families who are unemployed, and actual or potential recipients of public assistance.

In 1965, this group numbered approximately 1.3 million poor households.

IV. Evaluations of Title V have been hampered by the lack of baseline data with which Program performance can be compared. For this reason, aggregative measures of "success" such as placement rates are practically meaningless for evaluative purposes.

V. Aggregative analyses also overlook the wide variations in the effectiveness of individual projects. Approximately 50 percent of this variations is attributable to differences in prevailing economic conditions, and social and demographic characteristics of participants.

These factors operate independently of any particular administering agency.

VI. Progress is being made to raise the average level of Program effectiveness through:

A project rating system which will identify the most successful of projects faced with essentially the same exogenous factors and the ingredients of success which can be duplicated in similar projects.

Expanded opportunities for training and vocational instruction made possible by the 1966 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act.

Implementation of the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) to improve Program coordination and close gaps in present job and skill training programs.

## WORK EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING PROGRAM

*Introduction*

The conventional wisdom regarding the solution to poverty among the adult non-aged groups in the population is a variation of what Secretary Gardner has termed the vending machine concept of social change. You simply put a nickel in the training machine and out comes the production worker, neatly cleaned and pressed and self-supporting.

Economists and other practical men are the most notoriously strong adherents of this view. One is not entirely unsympathetic with the approach; there is a certain tidiness in the logic which observes that skilled workers are not poor, the poor are not skilled; ergo, enrolling the poor in MDTA programs will solve the poverty problem. One must hasten to add that this view is not entirely attributable to the training program syndrome; it is also related to the desire to declare an enterprise a success or failure on the basis of the number of nickels returned for each nickel deposited in the machine.

The intelligence reports which have been received from the War on Poverty indicate, however, that the problem is much more complex than those who offer training as a panacea would have us believe. It is simply not a straight forward uncomplicated job to alter the effects of a lifetime of deprivation and discrimination, of little success and frequent failure, of little education, lack of skill, and ill health, and the attitudes which such conditions foster. At present, the concensus seems to be that poverty will probably yield to treatment for some who are poor. Success, if it comes, will hinge on our ability to stage a comprehensive and coordinated set of programs which are designed to overcome a combination of impediments. The most important barriers to improved earning power are described below.

*Barriers to improved earning power*

In most cases, poverty is the result of a geographic mismatch between labor supply and labor demand. Situations of this sort arise because the primary employer in an area moves out, suffers a severe and sustained reduction in the demand for his product, or adapts a method of production which uses relatively more machines than men. The Appalachian Region is a prime example of this sort of phenomenon. The economic status of those who live in this Region de-