

Mr. LEVINE. I guess the only addition is that, as you probably know, Senator Clark has asked us to talk to the Bureau about it. Anything the Bureau releases that we give to Senator Clark, I am sure, we will give to this committee.

I also have a speech that I gave to the Senate committee, but I don't think you want to hear it. Can I provide it for the record?

Mr. STEIGER. I might be interested in reading it. I would ask you to provide it at least for the members of the committee. May I join with Senator Clark in asking that you do try and get the Bureau of the Budget to release this kind of information. I am frankly dismayed that that kind of material on PPBS is not available to the Congress, because I don't quite follow how it is possible for us to make the kinds of judgments necessary about programs that are being drawn if we cannot have that kind of data available to us, so that we can make some legitimate judgments based on the kind of experience that PPBS can give to us.

(Mr. Levine's speech follows:)

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN THE WAR ON POVERTY

Last summer the Office of Research, Plans, Programs and Evaluation of the Office of Economic Opportunity put together an anti-poverty plan and a four-year program based on that plan, for OEO and for the total War on Poverty of which OEO-funded programs are a part. OEO was probably the first civilian agency to do this. It was done hurriedly with the due date of Labor Day and with a planning staff that did not come on board until the first of July.

I want to share some experiences of this planning process. Although planning of this type was first done by the U.S. Government in 1961, in the Department of Defense, our problems as a civilian agency are quite different from those of Defense.

1. Welfare is easier to define than national security. That is, we know what we mean and can measure what we mean in terms of improvement of people as defined by income and other variables. Deterrence is much more difficult to measure.

2. We had a lot of data to begin with—more than defense. Good economic data have been gathered and tabulated in this country for 30 years or more, and for the 20 years since the Employment Act of 1946 created the President's Council of Economic Advisers, the data have been quite good. Unfortunately, as most users will testify, these data are almost always out of phase with operational needs. There are problems such as the need for series on time and geographical bases different from the bases on which the data are gathered.

3. Unlike the Defense Department, we play a game against nature which makes our task considerably easier. We do not have to contend with a malevolent enemy.

These first three make our job easier than Defense; the next makes it more difficult, however.

4. Unlike many of the Defense programs, our results are testable. They have not really been tested yet, although, when the 1965 Current Population Survey reported a drop of one million in the number of poor people from 1963 to 1964, a copy of the release was sent to OEO by a White House staffer who had written across it "nice going Sarge." Unfortunately, the change had taken place before OEO had really gotten into the business. In any case, the results of our activities are testable and are being tested and that means that our concepts will come into direct contact with what one of my colleagues calls the "real world out there." Thus far, deterrence theory has made no such contact.

5. Perhaps our greatest difficulty compared to the Department of Defense is that we started with no long history of accumulated systematic analysis in the field of poverty and social welfare. There had been, of course, much writing by economists and sociologists on related topics, but remarkably little