ag the program. We had good communications and a good understanding of what our objectives are, both theirs and ours.

Mr. Quie. Do you recommend similar action by other contractors at Job Corps centers who have problems with communities, as a substantial number of them have had and a number of them still do?

Mr. WHITAKER. The bill before the House, as I read it, does provide for this. I think you have done a good job of anticipating what we have already found through experience works.

Mr. Quie. Last year one of our amendments that was adopted on the floor required the same thing, so there is nothing new in the bill this year, which I found interesting because they call it a new program.

The last question I would like to ask is a little bit on the philosophy of the Job Corps. I was reading Christopher Weeks' "Job Corps," where he goes over the history of it. As you know, he was on the Job Corps staff here in Washington. He talks about the negative side of the sheet.

Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, so that what I quote here will not be taken out of context by anyone who reads it, and since the last chapter is very short, I request that the conclusion be placed at this point in the record. Chairman Perkins. Without objection it can be placed in the record. (Excerpt from "Job Corps" by Christopher Weeks follows:)

## CONCLUSION

As Sargent Shriver led off the poverty program hearings on St. Patrick's Day of 1964, he pledged that "if, as time goes on, we find that any of these programs is not making a contribution to the total effort, we will change that program or get rid of it..." In 1966, Congress came close to asking Shriver to make good on that pledge. Obviously riled at the administration of the program, Congress tacked several amendments onto the Job Corps section of the legislation designed to force tighter discipline, better evaluation, and a different method for assigning enrollees to centers. Well-founded rumors disclosed that a proposal to transfer the entire program to the Labor Department was beaten down by the closest of margins in the House Education and Labor Committee. And it was a grudging Congress that approved \$211 million to continue operations for another year, \$17 million less than the Administration asked for. Had it not been for that fact that the Job Corps had already spent more than \$100 million in building, modernizing, and equipping more than one hundred centers, the cuts might have been far deeper.

Clearly the Job Corps has fallen far short of the goals set out for it in 1964. In part this is because the program was oversold to begin with. Its superficial similarity to the Civilian Conservation Corps led many to hope that it could emulate its predecessor's success. But the similarity was only superficial. In fact, the Job Corps was an incredibly more complex undertaking. The Civilian Conservation Corps was concerned only with taking men off the streets and putting them to work; it was a solution to an economic problem. But the Job Corps was designed to solve a social problem; it had to do everything the CCC did, and on top of that it had to figure out ways to rework social attitudes, build work skills, and imbue its enrollees with the habits of good citizenship.

work skills, and imbue its enrollees with the habits of good citizenship.

Moreover the Civilian Conservation Corps was able to use existing organizations to overcome the challenge of getting into operation fast. This option was closed to the Job Corps by the early demise of the proposal to use the Defense Department to handle Job Corps planning and logistics. Operating without funds, the Jobs Corps planning group in 1964 was hobbled in any attempt to mobilize talent, start construction, purchase initial allotments of equipment, or develop training materials. Once appropriations became available, the task of recruiting staff and putting together an organization took months.

Then the Job Corps could rely on to achieve its stated objectives.