

But if the Job Corps is to achieve this potential for developing new, more effective techniques for solving the most complex teen-age poverty problems, it must change its administrative priorities. In simplest terms, it needs to give far more attention to the *quality* of its effort, and far less to the *quantity*. There is little to be gained from pushing larger and larger numbers of trainees through programs of doubtful effectiveness which many of them fail to complete. There is much to be gained from putting far greater effort into finding out what it takes to hold the enrollees in the program and what makes a successful graduate.

In short, it would be bitter irony indeed if Congress were to shut down one of the programs most likely to produce new breakthroughs in social technology at precisely the time when our existing technologies for dealing with social problems simply do not measure up to our goals. The country needs the Job Corps today not to *solve* the problem of teen-age poverty, but to *find a way to solve it*.

Mr. QUIE. He talks about the 30-percent dropout at Breckinridge and he speaks of the social cost of this being quite high because the Job Corps is the last resort and salvage effort and if the enrollees lose again, it would seem they would cease to have hope any more.

He says this fact was documented by the Job Corps finance poll of Job Corps dropouts carried out by the reputable survey firm of Louis Harris & Associates. The Job Corps attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the results of the survey, which shows unemployment was higher among Job Corps dropouts than before they enrolled and more than half of the unemployed dropouts were either working or were in school before they entered the Job Corps. Also, after 20 months of operations there were six dropouts or "kickouts" for every Job Corps graduate, six defeats for every victory.

As time passes, this ratio may improve, but until the Job Corps can demonstrate its successes outnumber its failures, it cannot claim it is making a positive contribution to the elimination of poverty. So long as this contribution to the poverty program remains debatable, then its essential justification is subject to serious question.

I don't want to give you the impression that Christopher Weeks says we should do away with the Job Corps—he does not—but raises some of these questions.

I assume you don't count these people as dropouts until after they have been in the camp for a month, so there is an additional number who have left and are not benefited by the Job Corps.

When do you think we will reach the point of positive contribution? I assume you are not satisfied with the 30 percent either. What point do you think we ought to reach in the whole Job Corps dropout picture before we can really say this is succeeding and the number of dropouts is negligible?

Mr. WHITAKER. You have asked a number of questions and I will try to answer them one at a time. While we are trying to improve the dropout rate, it is understandable when you are working with this kind of material.

Second, the Harris report is in my judgment, while accurate as to facts, misleading in some respects. First of all, it was made in August of 1966 of those who dropped out or graduated before that date.

So you are looking at much material that comes from training that was done in 1965 and early 1966.

The third thing I would like to say is—

Chairman PERKINS. You mean that was during the early period that many mistakes were made and the Job Corps was under attack resulting in much criticism?