it is doing very well. It is highly motivated and recognizes the tremendous challenges that face it in the future. I believe that it has the capacity to grow with the demands that will be made upon it and it has learned a great deal that will be applicable to the problems of the future. In view of this I find it difficult to see any just reason for now breaking up the OEO and placing fragments of it with various departments of the executive branch of the government. I can see little in the way of advantage in such course of action and many disadvantages. My recommendation therefor is that it be continued. I find that there is some widespread misunderstanding about the problem of the OEO since by definition it would appear to be a policing or regulatory agency where in fact it is an operational agency. It seems to me that the head of it, or the chairman of the economic opportunity council, should have executive authority to manage the affairs of the OEO. Above all it needs authority to manage resources, and time for planning. With these it will perform well. The definition of the authority of the head of it should be clear both in terms of his relationship within the executive branch and in terms of his responsibilities. With the clarification of this role, I think that we may confidently go ahead with OEO in its present form and I would strongly recommend that we do so.

JAMES M. GAVIN, Chairman, ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY. JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Cambridge, Mass., July 27, 1967.

Hon, Carl D. Perkins.

Chairman, Education and Labor Committee, House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Perkins: I am writing in reply to your telegram of July 24, asking my opinion regarding the proposal to transfer the activities of the Office of Economic Opportunity to the several Executive departments with related functions.

For the typical governmental activities, the arguments against having operating programs in the Executive Office of the President, and in favor of assigning programs to the permanent departments, are of course valid.

On the other hand, I believe that programs of an emergency nature may from time to time require administrative arrangements that provide for more initiative and flexible executive direction than can be provided by the regularly established personnel and procedures. Some of the programs during the Depression period and the Second World War were cases in point. It seems to me that the current situation, as the events in some of our major cities during the past few weeks suggest, similarly requires exceptional treatment.

While I do not pretend to have studied this particular administrative problem closely, and hence cannot express a detailed professional opinion on it, I have followed it generally and with great interest. If I were a member of Congress, I would, under the present circumstances, vote to extend and strengthen the role of the OEO, and oppose any move to abolish it or curtail it functions.

Yours sincerely,

DON K. PRICE, Dean.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY. THE MAXWELL SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Syracuse, N.Y., July 28, 1967.

Hon. CARL D. PERKINS, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN PERKINS: This letter is in response to your telegram of July 21, 1967, on the subject of the appropriate administrative arrangements in the Executive Branch for the Anti-Poverty Programs.

I wish it were possible to set forth a series of immutable principles of public administration which could govern specific organizational dilemmas of the kind which you have posed. Alas, there are none. Like law, public administration is redolent with conflicting precedents and precepts. Traditional academic definitions of terms like "staff," "line," "span of control," "coordination," 'hierarchy," "unity of command," are inherently ambiguous. Their utility is deeply contextual. Their application to a given situation is inevitably conditioned by prior assump-