

expect some substantial results from the Pre-School, Day Care, Recreational, Vocational Training, Alcoholism, Legal Aid, Homemaking, Community Development programs, and all the rest.

c. History of CAP: 1964-66

In July 1964, after several visits from Dr. Robert A. Roessel of the OEO Task Force, Governor Lloyd Allison of the Gila River Indian Reservation appointed a committee of five to draft a Community Action Program. The preliminary proposals were to be submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity by 1 September 1964. Dr. Roessel met with the CAP Committee late in July to explain the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. He made suggestions about possible opportunities provided by the Act, but left the actual writing of proposals to the Pimas. The CAP Committee's proposals were approved by the Tribal Council on 26 August 1964. These provided for the establishment of pre-schools, day-care centers, the development of recreational facilities, and the training of adults in home management arts, practical agricultural methods, and mechanical and building trade skills. Dr. Mayland Parker of ASU wrote a section on the training of VISTA workers. These proposals were sent to OEO on 31 August and the CAP Committee, having fulfilled its purpose, was officially disbanded.

The first Community Action Program submitted by the Gila River Pimas was returned for revision. The Advisory Board and the CAP Committee invited Dr. Roessel, later Director of the Indian Community Action Center at Arizona State University, the Special Assistant to the Phoenix Area Office Director of the BIA, and the Acting Superintendent of the BIA Agency at Gila River, to consult with them in preparing revised proposals. Much of the writing was done by these people. The new components included pre-school education for five-year olds, sewing and home management instruction, and day-care nurseries. The Recreation component was retained, while a special section on program administration was added. The discussion draft of the revised Community Action Program was completed by 21 January 1965, and forwarded to OEO. This was followed two weeks later by additional documentation requested by the Program Analyst of OEO detailing the checkpoint procedures observed, the mobilization of resources, the specific duties of the Program Director, and how the contributions in kind were calculated. Notification of the receipt of these materials was sent from OEO on 16 February to the Lieutenant Governor, and on 9 March, Governor Allison received a telegram from Sargent Shriver, OEO Director, informing him that the Gila River Community Action Program had been funded in the amount of \$216,455. Not supported was the Sewing and Home Management component. The grant was made available on 16 March 1965.

Application for CAP directorship was made by Milan J. Mockovak in a letter to the Gila River Tribal Council early in March of 1965. Favorable action was taken on Mr. Mockovak's application at the 16 March meeting of the Council, but the contract was not signed until 7 April. Mr. Mockovak was paid from tribal funds until May, when he was entered on the CAP payroll. As explained in the CAP narrative progress report for the period 18 August through 30 September 1965, "Routine administration and the selection of professional personnel is the responsibility of the CAP Director. All other policy matters are discussed with the Tribal Advisory Board each Friday morning (when it convenes) to discuss progress and planning or at any other time at either's request."

At this point it is necessary to briefly discuss the background of the Advisory Board in order to understand its position as liaison between CAP and the Tribal Government. The Tribal Advisory Board was originally created in 1960 to meet on a per diem basis twice a month. By 1964 its work load had become such that the Board was reestablished on a full-time salaried basis by resolution of the Tribal Council. The Lieutenant Governor was installed as Chairman and three individuals were appointed as members. According to this resolution, the Board was to have "such powers and perform such duties as the Governor or the Council may direct."

The recruitment of personnel to run the Recreation program proved particularly difficult. Eight local residents were hired by the CAP Director as Recreation aides between 16 May and 14 June. Several of these had to be replaced for inadequate performance. On 17 May selection was made from a field of eight candidates for the position of Recreation Program Director. The new Director was to start work on 7 June, but two days prior he notified the CAP office that because of family illness he would be unavailable. A second choice was then made and this individual reported for work on 21 June, but resigned two weeks later because of "a disabling personal illness." After consultation with the Tribal

Advisory Board, Burdette Morago, one of the Recreation aides, was promoted to Director.

The full-time Recreation program remained in effect until the resumption of school in September. It was then decided, with approval of the Tribal Council, that instead of having the Recreation aides continue to work weekends as originally planned, responsibility should be placed within each community for carrying on recreation activities. Four full-time Recreation aides were "to serve in the role of expeditors and contact men with regard to other programs." The Recreation Program Director, Burdette Morago, was also assigned new administrative duties as Assistant Project Director.

In preparation for this new position, Burdette Morago accompanied Milan Mockovak to a three-week course for sixteen CAP directors from Arizona, New Mexico, and Nevada in September 1965, conducted by the Indian Community Action Center at Arizona State University. On 1 November 1965 the Recreation program was restarted on a modest basis, being limited to supervised basketball, but this was terminated in the spring of 1965.

A Child Care specialist began work on 19 July. Two aides and a cook were also selected. Sacaton had originally been designated as the site for the Day Care Center. Later the site was changed to Santan where more adequate facilities were available. To supervise the operation and maintenance of the Center a board was established made up of the Day Care teaching staff, two members of the Tribal Advisory Board, two people from BIA Welfare, the PHS Chief Medical Officer at Gila River, and a PHS Field Health Nurse. The Center opened on 13 September with six enrollees, and by June 1966 enrollment had reached twenty-four.

The Pre-School teachers were chosen from more than 80 candidates. A principal teacher was hired and the teachers were assigned to six communities, each in different districts. Twelve teacher-aides were selected from twenty-seven applicants and were assigned in pairs.

An eight-week workshop for the Pre-School teachers and teacher-aides was included in a contract between the Tribal Council and Arizona State University. The workshop opened 28 September with enrollment restricted to five-year-olds. When the program was broadened to include four-year-olds, the enrollment increased to 288. A second training session for Pre-School teachers and teacher-aides was held from 11 through 17 May 1966.

On 19 May the Ak Chin Community Council resolved to have their Community Action Program incorporated into that of the Gila River Reservation. This proposal was ratified by vote of the Gila River Tribal Council on 21 July. Although referred to as The Maricopa Tribe, Ak Chin is a separate reservation with a small resident population made up almost entirely of Papagos. Because so few people live on the reservation, OEO denied the funds requested by Ak Chin. After passage of the above resolution, the BIA conducted a survey of the Ak Chin Reservation to determine family composition and income, and with this information Ak Chin was written into the 1966-1967 Gila River Community Action Program soon thereafter.

A preliminary draft of the Community Action Program for 1966-67 was presented to the Gila River Community Council on 2 February 1966. The CAP Director and his assistant discussed the components: Community Development and Program Administration, Education, Alcoholic Rehabilitation, Health Assistance, and New Employment Opportunities to be provided through a community improvement program. These proposals were approved by the Tribal Council and sent to OEO on 17 March 1966.

In the meantime administrators of tribal government, CAP and the BIA had been discussing the possibility of coordinating the efforts of all agencies in comprehensive single plan for reservation rehabilitation, noted earlier, which had been given the title *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju*, the Pima phrase roughly translated as "It Must Happen." The CAP contribution was to be the components outlined at the February Tribal Council meeting, exclusive of the Health Aide program. The plan was discussed at a meeting of community chairmen on 10 May, and was submitted for consideration of the Tribal Council at a special session three days later. A Legal Aid Service component was subsequently added to the Community Action Program on 15 May and incorporated into *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju*. Final ratification of the coordinated reservation plan by the Tribal Council occurred on 18 May. During the week of 23 May, delegates from the tribal government, CAP and BIA traveled to Washington to explain their plan to the agencies involved. Since their return they have been attending local community meetings around the reservation to enlist the support of the people.

The Community Development aides' training began in May when they attended a three-week course conducted by the Indian Community Action Center at Ganado on the Navajo Reservation. An eight-week course, also under the direction of ICAC, was held for the Pre-School teachers and teacher-aides during June at Fort Apache.

On 1 June 1966 the CAP Director received a telegram from Sargent Shriver informing him that all but the legal services component had been funded. This latter component was subsequently approved, but operating funds had not arrived as of 10 July.

d. CAP Administration and Tribal Government

The constitution of the Gila River Indian Community allows for formation of an elected Gila River Community Council (Tribal Council) and creates the positions of an elected Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and an appointed Tribal Advisory Board.

Ultimate authority is vested in the Gila River Indian Community Council whose membership is elected from the reservation's seven districts. The meetings of the Tribal Council are chaired by the Governor or Lieutenant Governor. The Advisory Board was designated as having "such powers and duties as the Governor of the Council may direct." The constitution also allows for district councils, chaired by the district's senior council member. The district councils may discuss local issues and make recommendations to the Tribal Council.

The Tribal Council is organized as a democratic institution, but informants have expressed doubts about the membership being representative of the people. One informant said that people do not believe the Tribal Council functions as anything more than a "rubber stamp" for the decisions of the BIA. Two persons interviewed said, "The Council does not represent all the people but it could come up with a list of needs most people would agree with." There is little interest in the functioning of the tribal government, except by a few politically oriented people.

One Tribal Councilman said that the people elect Councilmen who they think are good; but once the individual takes office he becomes the recipient of the community's scorn for the tribal government. He described Tribal Councilmen as caught in a situation that limits their ability to communicate with the people. The Tribal Treasurer used the following analogy to describe Pima feeling: "It's like crabs in a bucket—when one tries to climb out the others grab him and pull him back."

The younger members of the Tribal Council from the west end of the reservation have stated that they are trying slowly to unseat the older generation through actively soliciting votes from other young members of the communities. The young people feel that the older members of the Tribal Council do not take them seriously.

The membership of the Advisory Board, which may or may not include members of the Tribal Council, at present consists of two non-Council members and one Council member. Officially, Advisory Board meetings are to be chaired by the Lieutenant Governor, but this is infrequently the case. Often the meeting is directed by whichever member feels like being chairman.

The Advisory Board was designed to function as an adjunct of the Governor—a fact-finding organization which could make recommendations. The Advisory Board was not given authority to make executive or legislative decisions. The Tribal Council itself is described as the only body with power to make policy decisions.

Observations have shown that the Advisory Board has acted with considerably more power than specifically authorized. One example was observed at a Council meeting when a resolution was introduced concerning tribal lands. At the end of the vote, a Board member expressed dissatisfaction with the decision. The Council rescinded the resolution.

Other observations confirm that the Advisory Board has been able to assume considerable power. A reaction was seen in a statement made by a former tribal governor at a local community meeting. He commented that the Advisory Board had been "acting with executive powers for which it was not authorized." On 23 June the Governor informed the Board that it would not be treated as an executive body. This was done in response to hostile actions of the Board toward the CAP Director.

The power exercised by the Advisory Board might indicate that it is an expression of the people's wishes, but evidence shows that while it is a major power bloc, it has no base at the grass-roots level. Members of the Board are

chosen by the Tribal Council, not by the people, and the people do not view the Board as a distinct entity.

Local meetings in the communities, though not provided for in the tribal constitution, are formally structured. There is regular membership, scheduled meetings, and a formal organizational hierarchy. These local community councils are the major means of communication between the grass-roots and the Tribal Council. To win support for Tribal Council decisions, or for the projects of any tribal agency, support of the local communities must be gained through discussions at these local council meetings.

Organization of the local community councils is not uniform. Generally there is one council per district, with the exception of District Six which has two. It should be noted that these local councils are not the district councils. The constitution calls for the district councils to be chaired by the senior councilman of the district; the local community councils, while generally functioning for one district, are not chaired by any of the councilmen, but by a resident of the district elected by the people. An interesting situation arises in the Maricopa section of the reservation where a community council exists but rarely meets. Instead, most community meetings are called by the leadership of two farm cooperatives, this leadership being parallel to that of the community councils in Maricopa Colony.

The local community council appears to be an effective line of communication to the people. The community councils may be more representative and may more closely express the wishes of the local people, though not a formal part of the tribal government.

The Community Action Agency has a formally designated position in the governmental organization. The CAP Director was hired by the Advisory Board. If the Advisory Board makes recommendations for changes in CAP structure or activities, it must take these matters to the Tribal Council.

The hiring of the CAP Director illustrates the way the tribal government has functions with the Community Action Agency. At the Tribal Council meeting on 16 March 1965, a number of applications for the post of CAP Director were considered. The Tribal Council had not been involved up to this point in the selection of the nominees. The CAP Committee had been working with Task Force member Dr. Robert Roessel, and later with BIA Special Consultant, Dr. Brenda Brush. The temporary CAP Committee was partly made up of members of the Advisory Board. Therefore the CAP Committee and the Advisory Board were responsible for presenting the program and the nominees for CAP Director to the Tribal Council at the 16 March meeting.

Three nominees for Director of CAP were presented at the latter meeting. The nominee whose chances were considered best was a former BIA and PHS employee who at the time was program analyst for the OEO Indian Desk in Washington. This man had the backing of most of the Advisory Board and the Governor. Another nominee was the brother of the Tribal Treasurer. A third nominee was a counsellor at the Sacaton public school.

The Tribal Council meeting appeared to be a formality to approve the first nominee, but one Board member opposed to the first nominee managed to divert the proceedings. Using the dress of the delegate from the BIA as a diversion, this person ranted about not backing anyone who was a candidate of "that naked woman" and wore down the opposition until the third nominee was picked as a compromise candidate.

The Tribal Council, the Advisory Board, and the CAP Administration have not followed the formally designated chain of command. In proposals submitted to OEO Washington in January 1965 the chain of command is again explicitly designated: "The ultimate responsibility for program direction, policy making, and advisory responsibility rests with the Tribal Council and Advisory Board." The proposal states that the CAP Director would meet regularly with the Advisory Board and Tribal Council.

The CAP administrators have met with the Tribal Council as formally designated. However, the Tribal Council has shown apathy toward the efforts of the CAP Administration to keep them informed. At one Tribal Council meeting the CAP Administration was awaiting Tribal Council decision on proposals; the meeting went on for quite a while when a Council member moved that the motions be tabled until the members could read the proposals. One Council member pointed out that they all had had the proposals to read for at least a week. Further examples of apathy and ineptitude are to be found in comments of Councilmen interviewed who demonstrated little knowledge of CAP proposals with which they have dealt. Some Councilmen complained that the people did not know enough about the CAP projects, yet none mentioned that they were the people responsible for communicating Tribal Council business to the communities.

This situation is again an example of lack of leadership qualities, which appears a direct result of the policies of the Governmental agencies which have been responsible for Indian affairs. Indians, generally, have not been given the opportunity to develop the potential abilities of leadership. To compound matters, it is apparent that in matters of government the Pimas have moved with extreme caution and deliberateness. This again may have resulted from ubiquitous BIA control that heretofore fettered most Indian attempts at self-government. Now, for probably the first time in their history, they are being asked to move with utmost celerity into a program that will irrevocably change the life of the Pimas.

At a recent Advisory Board meeting (June 1966) a hostile attitude was apparent. The CAP Director was before the Board to discuss two projects—a manpower survey to be conducted in connection with *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju*, and the use of additional members of NYC. The Advisory Board, led by one member (the same one who chose the present CAP Director as a compromise candidate), was very antagonistic, essentially questioning everything the CAP Administration brought before the Board. The underlying complaint seemed to be that the Board's position was not respected and that the Board was losing power. The members complained that it was a rarity for the Director to come to the Board for its opinions, although the CAP Director has met with the Board regularly.

The members who were taking an antagonistic stance made statements such as "You never came to us before, why are you coming now?" and "You do not come to us for opinions, but only to rubber stamp decisions you've already made!"

The CAP Director was confronted in particular about the use of the two University of Arizona community development interns to conduct a manpower survey for *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju*. The Director pointed out that these students were not being paid out of tribal funds but were employed by the ICAC at Tempe. The crux of the Advisory Board's complaints were "Why not hire Indians to do the job?" While this was the voiced complaint, it was apparent that the real problem was that the Board wanted to reinforce its power. In order to meet the demands of the Board, the CAP Director agreed to dismiss the two students. These same students were rehired the next day with the approval of the Advisory Board after the Superintendent of the reservation impressed upon the Board the need for a manpower survey. A compromise was reached when it was agreed that the supervision of the manpower survey would be done by a member of the Tribal Council.

The question of the use of NYC workers, as presented to the Advisory Board by the CAP Director, is also illustrative. The Advisory Board questioned the CAP Director as to why he was presenting the NYC requests since there was also an NYC Director. The CAP Director explained that a phone call from the Regional NYC Director had been placed to the reservation's NYC Director, but since the NYC Director was not present, the CAP Director had taken the call, and therefore was presenting the situation to the Advisory Board. The NYC was to be expanded by fifty and the CAP Director hoped to use the additional NYC employees in the *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* project at Coolidge. The Advisory Board again did not speak to the request, but directed critical remarks at being used as a "rubber stamp" and toward the NYC Director's inefficiency. The Advisory Board had no answer for the CAP Director when he pointed out that the NYC Director had been chosen by the Advisory Board.

A source of friction has arisen when the Advisory Board has been asked to nominate some people for positions which might be available under various programs. They have failed to do so, and have forced the CAP office to go out and find them. The Advisory Board then objects to CAP's selections.

The decision by Governor Allison on 23 June to stop the Advisory Board's use of executive power will modify the pattern of interaction between CAP and the Tribal Council. Now the CAP Director will take his proposals directly to the Council, while keeping the Advisory Board informed of changes and of the progress of CAP projects. By meeting regularly with the Tribal Council the CAP Director hopes that the programs will subsequently be explained by the Council members to their constituents. Recently the Governor and other members of the Council have made efforts to discuss CAP and the comprehensive development plan in local community meetings. During these local meetings it is apparent that some political campaigning is being carried on.

Some of the differences of opinion became evident at these community meetings when the Governor obviously expressed his lack of faith with the Alcoholism project. This was done in the Pima language and would not have been noticed except for a comment in English by a member of the audience that understood

Pima. This came after many expressions of total cooperation between all the participating groups, and an affirmation of complete support for all the programs.

The CAP Administration has recognized the existence of the local community councils. The CAP Director has expressed his hopes of organizing the local community council chairmen into a CAP committee. The CAP Committee would be used as a sounding board for CAP proposals. They would be a direct line of communication with the people and ideally would prepare the way for CAP programs in their districts. The CAP Director began organizing the Committee in mid-1965. In order to stimulate attendance at meetings, CAP buses are sent out to communities to bring in the local chairmen.

Difficulties have arisen because of the rule which prevents Tribal Council members and their relatives from being CAP employees. During at least one Advisory Board meeting, the possibility of requesting a waiver of this rule from Shriver was discussed.

The above results indicate the interest of the communities in having representatives involved in CAP. The CAP Director recently commented that he intends to intensify effort to involve community chairmen and form a viable CAP committee.

Although superficially the present report would seem an indictment of Indian ineptitude in the handling of Indian affairs, it is strongly felt by a consensus of the survey team conducting research at Gila River that something must be said in Indian defense. The fear of termination of protection by the Federal Government should readily point up the unintentional but very effective development of an attitude of paternalism on the part of the Government, and the consequent total dependency by the Indian upon the Governmental agencies. At this time the Indian cannot put his affairs in order without guidance from non-Indians. He resents this, and this further contributes to his resistance and to internal disorder, to the detriment of attempts to help him to his feet. Because of many cultural differences, it is easily understood how and why various Governmental agencies often feel it is easier to take over and do what must be done for the Indian than to try to teach him, in a short time, a totally different concept. For his part, the Indian soon feels that it is far simpler to let the white man handle all functions that are culturally confusing to him in his relation with the outside world.

This is not of course, an indictment of Federal Government or its agencies. The point is rather that there is still an enormous communication gulf between the two cultures, and it will take much gentle and patient guidance on the part of Government to bring the Indian to an understanding of the intricacies of self-management in a democratic context.

e. CAP Relations with Other Agencies

(1) *Relation of CAP and BIA.*—Cooperation between CAP and BIA on the reservation is primarily a result of personal relations between individual members of the two agencies.

Prior to the arrival of the present BIA Superintendent in 1965, the BIA had limited communication with the reservation population. Informants have noted a marked improvement in communication among reservation groups due to the efforts of this new Superintendent. He has summarized his own policy as aiming to "pass as much responsibility as possible to the Tribal Council and to encourage Indians to take the lead in the development of their own programs."

This point of view, on the part of the Superintendent, made him very sympathetic to the philosophy of OEO and CAP. This attitude is also shared by the assistant Superintendent, who at the time of initial introduction of CAP to the reservation was the Acting Superintendent. The first OEO proposals were submitted by the original CAP Committee. These had to be rewritten and the Acting Superintendent played a major role in the rewriting. Today the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent work closely with the CAP Administration.

Many examples have recently shown the close interaction between the administrations of CAP and BIA. In June the ICAC in Tempe sponsored a manpower survey to be conducted by two community development interns from the University of Arizona. The survey is part of *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju*, under which all reservation agencies will cooperate. The interns began work out of the CAP Director's office, but consulted frequently with all levels of BIA. The work was temporarily interrupted when the Advisory Board of the Tribal Council objected to the survey. The Board's objections were said to be based on the lack of Indian involvement, although indications are that its reaction was more politically motivated. The CAP Director withdrew the interns until he had consulted with the BIA Superintendent, who in turn went directly to the Advisory Board. The result was

the reinstatement of the survey by the community development interns, under sponsorship of the Board.

Communication between the CAP Director and the BIA Administration has been direct. The above is only one example of numerous times the BIA Superintendent has spoken for CAP to the tribal government. The backing that the BIA Administration has given CAP has been witnessed at local community meetings as well.

The CAP Director is an activist. His direct approach in getting things accomplished has strained relations between some BIA employees and CAP. The Superintendent has used his influence to resolve these difficulties in some instances. Part of the difficulty apparently arises from the fact that some long-term employees of the BIA feel their jobs threatened by CAP activities.

Cooperation between individual BIA employees and CAP personnel has been observed. During one informal session, a VISTA volunteer, the CAP Director, and representatives of BIA discussed the plans of *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* and a juvenile home to be jointly administered by representatives of the three agencies. When Pre-School was beginning, the Tribal Council, VISTA, and BIA cooperated with CAP to prepare an old BIA home school for CAP use, and the CAP proposals for a Sewing program include the BIA home economist as an instructor.

The actual cooperation is frequently dependent upon inter-personal relations. The sympathetic attitude of the BIA Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent is of paramount importance. The BIA Administration has not only encouraged cooperation from within, but has attempted to insure that other reservation groups understand and agree to full cooperation.

(2) *Relation of CAP and PHS.*—The cooperation between CAP and PHS on the Gila River Reservation is seen in varying lights, depending upon the point of view of informants. While good cooperation is spoken of by some administrators, this apparently remains on the administrative level, relating primarily to projected proposals.

The CAP Administration, in interviews and at public meetings, has talked about the sorts of cooperation necessary between the two agencies. At a local community meeting held in June, the acting Assistant CAP Director spoke about the plan for a new hospital and how all agencies—PHS, CAP and BIA—had been working together to draw up these plans. The Tribal Attorney spoke on the same subject at another community council meeting.

In March, in an interview with researchers connected with the present project, the Assistant Superintendent of the reservation spoke of the need for increasing cooperation among agencies. He emphasized that there will be "no room for accusation, name-calling, or any chance to embarrass one particular segment in order to gain some particular point."

Some strain in PHS-CAP relations has been a result of personality conflicts with one individual in PHS. This individual felt that the CAP Director was putting too much pressure for speed upon the PHS. He said that the CAP Director believed "you have to create a furor to get things done." The informant explained that some PHS people were not ready to move rapidly and this has caused misunderstanding.

PHS personnel generally express a desire to cooperate with the programs, but there is an attitude among them that they are doing the very best they can under the present circumstances. It is possible that PHS is understaffed, which would make it difficult for them to be very active in their participation with CAP. A major block to participation is the attitude of the lower level PHS personnel. The employees are very willing to express their empathy with the Indian, but it is flat sounding. As one said, "We wouldn't be out here unless we were really interested." There is a bureaucratic detachment manifest among the lower level PHS personnel. The ambulance service has been complained about many times by the Indians. A PHS doctor said the Indians take advantage of this service and sometimes use it just "to get a ride into Phoenix." The doctor indicated they were attempting to solve this by "trying to hold the calls on the reservation to a minimum of two a month." His defense of the service is diluted by cases of Indian police on duty calling for an ambulance for stricken Indians, and then being refused. The reason for the refusal given to the police officers was that they "wouldn't know whether the person was really ill or not." These comments would indicate that the PHS staff has a considerably more detached attitude toward the Indian than CAP would like for complete cooperation.

Some cooperation has existed between representatives of PHS Administration and CAP Administration. The formation of the Alcoholic Prevention and Treatment program proposal is an example. In the spring of 1965 the Gila River Com-

prehensive Health Committee was formed through the efforts of BIA, PHS and school officials. This Committee was enlarged to include twenty members drawn from the Tribal Council, the Advisory Board, PHS, BIA, the Tribal Court, school officials, representatives of reservation missions, CAP Administration, and average reservation citizens. The Committee meets once a month and the focus as stated in reports has been "the problem of family disorganization—the problem of alcoholism." The Chairman of this Committee is the Acting Chief Social Worker for PHS, who describes himself as the "PHS liaison with CAP."

In a letter to the Tribal Governor, dated 18 February 1966, the PHS Social Worker stated that the CAP proposals are "creative, potentially far-reaching in their effects, and soundly comprehensive in treatment approach, encompassing medical therapy, psychotherapy, work treatment, and educational activities." He further stated that the Gila River Comprehensive Health Committee "unanimously endorsed the program."

(3) *Relation of CAP and ICAC.*—The Gila River Community Action Agency has called upon the Indian Community Action Center at Arizona State University for two kinds of services: training programs and consulting.

The technical services aspect has not been a major need for the Gila River CAA. The CAP Director has kept the ICAC staff informed of program activities through personal visits to the center. Visits by ICAC technical assistance staff have not been requested, due to lack of need for assistance in proposal writing by the Gila River CAA.

Consultation services for the Pre-School program and the Day-Care center have been requested under the terms of the consultation contract with ASU.

The need for training programs has been steadily increasing, as the Gila River CAP has added to the number and variety of program components, and in consequence, has acquired and will require additional personnel in the categories of CAP Director, teacher-aides, Pre-School teachers and aides, community aides, and Health aides.

The present CAP Director anticipates that training needs will constitute the major number of future requests to the ICAC.

(4) *The Relation of CAP and NYC.*—There has been close contact between NYC and CAP since NYC began at Gila River. The NYC Director was chosen by the Advisory Board, with the approval of the Tribal Council. Although NYC does not come under CAP it has been necessary for the CAP Director and Assistant Director to assume major roles in the direction of NYC, because NYC directorship has been a part-time position and consequently the Director is not always available when needed.

Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ba-Ju calls for the cooperation of NYC. Much of this plan has been drawn up by the CAP Administration working with the BIA. The CAP Director, due to the absence of the NYC Director, proposed at a recent Advisory Board meeting that NYC people be used in preparation of buildings for the Pima-Coolidge Development Corporation, which may later employ reservation residents.

One result of close cooperation between NYC and CAP has been the idea, throughout the reservation, that NYC is part of CAP. This view of NYC prevails at the grass-roots level, in the Advisory Board, and in the Tribal Council. Much of the criticism of NYC has therefore been directed at CAP.

Specific problems met by NYC are lack of definite and worthwhile jobs for youth, lack of adequate supervision of those on jobs, and lack of education for NYC people as to how to handle their salaries. There have been local supervisors chosen recently to help alleviate this situation. It has been necessary for the CAP Director to play a dominant role in explaining NYC and in trying to help NYC resolve these criticisms.

(5) *The Relation of CAP and VISTA.*—The relationship between VISTA and CAP on the Gila River Reservation is generally determined by the individual relationships between volunteers and CAP Administration. At present, the CAP Director is responsible for the VISTA volunteers on the reservation. The original responsibility for VISTA was delegated to the Tribal Council, but a recent decision of the Tribal Council Advisory Board has put VISTA directly under the supervision of the CAP Director and the sponsorship of one member of the Advisory Board.

With the recent change in administrative responsibility, the CAP Director predicted that three volunteers would resign because he was not going to let them continue to sit around. On the other hand, it has been observed that many VISTA volunteers look to the CAP office for field support and consult with the CAP Director on projects they have in mind. There has been some cooperation, as evidenced in the CAP Director's report on a VISTA volunteer working on a

family visitation project in conjunction with BIA and PHS: "She was helpful in coordinating the efforts of the local PHS hospital staff and the aforementioned welfare agency (BIA) to rehabilitate a family."

Volunteers who have conflicted with the CAP Director have been observed to ignore him or work around him. One incident may reflect many aspects of the VISTA-CAP relationship as well as the position of the CAP Director in relation to the tribal government. One VISTA volunteer asked permission from the CAP Director to take a number of teenagers from the reservation to the pow-wow at Flagstaff. The volunteer also asked for the use of CAP buses. The Director denied the request. The VISTA volunteer then took his request to the Advisory Board and received its approval. (It should be noted that this incident occurred before Governor Allison's statement of 23 June 1966 limiting powers of the Advisory Board.)

The foregoing situation not only reflects the kind of conflict that takes place between the VISTA volunteers and the CAP Administration, but reflects the ambiguous power structure on the reservation.

VISTA-CAP cooperation is dependent upon individual relationships, as is observed in conflicting opinions of the volunteers. Most volunteers working near Sacaton and generally on the eastern portion of the reservation have more direct contact with CAP and are frequently seen in the CAP office. At the west end of the reservation volunteers report frustrated attempts to establish communication with the CAP Director. The Pimas on the west end generally like the VISTAs and what they have accomplished. The Maricopas are rather neutral concerning VISTA. There is one VISTA volunteer among the Maricopas who seems to work along in spite of general disinterest. The teenagers come around, but the feeling is that they are waiting for a handout or some sort of organized recreational activity that VISTA might instigate.

One explanation for the lack of communication between the west end VISTAs and the CAP Administration lies in the long-time rivalry between the people of the two areas. People in the west end have felt that all programs—BIA, PHS, and so on—have always focused on the areas near Sacaton to the exclusion of west end communities. VISTA volunteers have reflected some of these opinions of the west end which may be one reason for the lack of communication.

The VISTA Training Program from ASU has been located chiefly in west end communities. The VISTA Training Director and the CAP Director have had some difficulties in their relationship, which may be part of the problem. While the people of the west end are happy with their permanent VISTAs, they are not enthusiastic about the Training Program. They cannot understand the point of having a trainee for just three weeks.

The VISTA Training Program on the reservation has created some prejudice in east-end communities. The prejudice has hampered VISTA assignments and projects in these communities. In one of the VISTA training groups part of the trainees were sent to east-end communities without preparing the communities. One woman reports that she came home one day to find a strange metal object near her house. On investigating she found it was a sheet-metal structure which contained two VISTA trainees. The trainees told her that they had been brought there to spend several days. The metal structure was called a poverty hut, and was to serve as their living quarters. The Pima woman telephoned the VISTA Training Director. She said that she would like to have the poverty hut removed from her yard, and in concluding added, "How would it settle with you if I pitched my 'tipi' on your lawn?"

The overview of the relationship between CAP and VISTA reflects a split between the two ends of the reservation. The CAP Director has the responsibility for VISTA work on the reservation. At the east end of the reservation this is a functioning role; at the west end there is little evidence of a working relationship between the VISTA volunteers and CAP.

f. Indian Reaction to CAP

The initial reaction toward Community Action Programs was conditioned by the circumstances of the introduction of the CAP idea to the reservation.

The majority of the Tribal Council members knew little about CAP until March 1965, when they were called upon to select a CAP Director. After a Director was selected, there was a wait of two months before OEO funds were actually available. Since OEO information had not been disseminated on the reservation, and there were no operating programs until May 1965, the general reaction was indifference. There were no applicants for the jobs which were to be available under the funded components.

When the programs actually went into operation, reaction was in terms of the individuals employed. There has not been a concept of a general program.

The best supported Community Action Program on the reservation is the Pre-School program. The benefits to the children were mentioned by everyone.

Individual teachers and aides had personal difficulties with people, but by June 1966 these individual problems failed to overshadow the positive aspects of the Pre-School program.

A major effort to develop a favorable opinion climate has been made by the CAP Director. He has held a monthly community chairmen's meeting to discuss CAP, with the object of creating a reservation-wide CAP committee. The effects of these meetings are evident in interviews with the chairmen, which indicate that these men are informed on CAP matters.

During May and June of 1966, there were several Tribal Council sessions, community chairmen meetings, and community meetings at which *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* was presented by BIA, CAP and Tribal Council representatives.

At the same time, several individuals began using CAP programs to test the political climate for indications of possible support and possible issues in the fall election of a new Governor and Lieutenant Governor.

(1) *Indian Reaction—Specific Programs.*—The Pre-School is universally regarded as a good thing. The Day Care Center is similarly regarded, but since it does not yet affect many people, it does not enjoy as wide approval.

Other programs—the Community Aide, and the Recreation Program—seem to have had little impact other than on individuals directly involved.

General Program.—"Another do-gooder-program—They come and they go." This reaction seems to derive from past experience with other programs. People feel that the Community Action Programs are made up first, then handed to them for approval; and they feel that if they do not approve they will not have any programs, so that it is better to say yes than to lose them altogether. Many also feel that the programs are moving too fast and changing all the time before they have a chance to hear about them or to understand them. Many think that this is just another white man's program—so why get excited about it, it will probably not last long.

Although there is a certain amount of apathy towards the general program because of past experiences, the majority of the Indians have expressed acceptance of it. The majority feel that if the programs are fully developed and reach their ultimate goals, both the individual and the reservation will be uplifted to a semblance of equality with surrounding communities.

Reservation Agencies.—A reaction which has been increasing is that CAP may lead to termination of the Federal trust status of the reservation. The linkage of CAP with other agency programs in *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* appears to have added to this fear.

It should be pointed out at once that there is no strong negative reaction against CAP, and that the BIA is the chief target. There is an ambivalent attitude toward possible termination. The Indians, although they express desire to direct their own progress, are fearful of complete withdrawal of support by the BIA. There has been some trepidation expressed about financial dealings with white businessmen in adjacent communities. The closeness of the Gila River Reservation to the expanding urban area of Phoenix and satellite towns gives the reservation land considerable value as space for urban, industrial expansion. *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* clearly involves urban, industrial expansion in several of its projects.

In general, the Indian does not fully comprehend the implications of encroachment of the highly urbanized areas adjacent to his reservation. Most do not realize the potential high value of the land or its strategic position.

Indian committee members have been named by the Tribal Council to work on these projects and some of these members express lack of confidence in their own abilities to deal knowledgeably with the non-Indian businessmen members of these boards, or with the financial problems of industrial park leasing and other projects under consideration.

Personnel—Indian/Non-Indian.—The sentiments about a non-Indian having the job of CAP Director are varied. They range from a disavowal that a white man could know the Indians' reactions and needs, to beliefs that an Indian Director could not have accomplished as much in such a short time. Some people think the reservation people would trust an Indian and there are others who feel that the opposite would be true. The majority of people do not know what they want in this respect.

The present Director has publicly stated many times since his selection that he wishes to keep the job only until a Pima is trained and ready to move into the directorship. He has also stated that the present Assistant Director, a Pima, is the logical choice.

There are opinions pro and con among reservation residents as to the succession pattern. However, it is universally admitted that there is no other qualified Pima available at present.

Political Factionalism.—Factionalism is closely involved with opinion about CAP. One faction is seen as supporting the present Director. Other factions oppose or support CAP on a personality basis as faction members are personally affected by some action or inaction of a CAP staff member.

Organized reaction is manifest in a group called the Farmers Association, a semi-secret Pima organization with a history of opposing BIA programs. The Association was active during the 1930's in opposing programs considered infringements on Pima water rights. At present, it is said to be holding secret meetings conducted in the Pima language, sending members around to influence voter opinion in the forthcoming election and, through influencing Council members, affecting Tribal Council decisions. The Association opposes CAP and *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* because both appear attempts at extending white domination over the Pimas—to the point that the Pimas will finally lose their land. One elderly man is said to have jumped up to exclaim, "We fought the Apaches for our land. Now we will have to fight for it again."

Apathy.—Indifference is the most common reaction to all development programs. The indifference stems from past experience with other optimistic programs which never got off the ground. The Superintendent has stated on at least one occasion at a community meeting that the BIA office had "stacks" of old five and ten year plans that never got out of the paper stage.

Lack of Information.—The CAA administrators, in attempting to bring information to a wider audience, are continuing to develop the community chairmen as a CAP committee, with the hope they may communicate their information to their own community council meetings. The CAA administrators attend community meetings themselves to discuss CAP action. It is required of CAA employees, Pre-School staff, and others, that they attend the meetings in the communities in which they work.

A frequent reaction to CAP is "we need more information." People who have attended meetings at which CAP projects have been discussed say, "We need more explanation. Someone should come around to talk to the people at their homes."

Explanation in both English and the Indian languages is considered best. People want to be sure that explanations are the same in both languages, and some of the older people are more comfortable in their own idiom. This is apparent at community meetings.

(2) *Attitudes by Geographical Area.*—As earlier noted, the Gila River Reservation consists of two distinct population centers—an east and west end. These sections are separated by thirty miles of desert with the seat of government and all reservation agencies in the east end. As a result of geographical separation there has been a difference in reaction to the OEO programs between the two.

The west end feels that it has been ignored by the BIA and tribal programs. This attitude has developed because of real and imagined slights compounded through the years. The west end has transposed some of this antagonism into a resistance to CAP.

The young people have become more active in politics on the reservation in recent years and on the east end a number of young people are involved in the CAP directly. The Assistant CAP Director is an example. On the west end, where participation is more concerned with tribal politics, there is active effort to enlist voting support from young people in outlying areas, though there is a definite traditional attitude against the young voicing opinions.

The older people who show up at the presentation meetings rarely understand the tremendous impact of the program. The first time most of them hear of *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* is at community meetings, so they do not feel it is "their program." Even though they are told constantly that it is "the people's program," the people are more apt to "wait and see," as they have in the past.


At the west end, especially among the Maricopas, primary opposition to the program seems to be directed at intrusion of more white men onto the reservation. West end attitudes indicate a more traditional outlook than those of the east.


Many of the Indians in the east are either in the tribal government or have jobs with the Federal agencies. Some feel that CAP is a threat to the status quo they enjoy. There is a certain amount of apprehension about relinquishment of power in tribal politics.

Animosity exists towards the CAP Director at both ends of the reservation, though it is stronger at the west end where the majority opinion is that the CAP Director pushes them too much. People of the east end share this feeling, but some feel that because of the Director's drive he is the only man for the job.

Pre-School and VISTA programs are met with appreciation in both sections of the reservation. There has been dissatisfaction in the management of the NYC program in both areas. These are the only specific programs that most of the people have had contact with so far.

The majority of the Maricopas are disinterested in CAP and tribal politics. Maricopas offer two comments: "The Pimas and all their magnificent plans that never come about," and "The Pimas are always fighting among themselves." These statements are the sum of the Maricopas' feelings towards the activity on the Pima portion of the reservation.





GILA RIVER & MARICOPA RESERVATIONS, ARIZONA

B. PAPAGO RESERVATION

1. *Historical and Cultural Background*

The history of the Papago may be divided into three periods for the purpose of indicating the nature of their adjustment to their physical and social environment, which in turn has implications for their response to opportunities offered by OEO programs today.

a. *Early History*

Excavations by Dr. Emil Haury at Ventana Cave in the northwestern part of the Papago Reservation have uncovered evidence that man has been in the Southwest for at least ten thousand years. The lowest levels in the cave contained bones of now extinct animals hunted by the inhabitants. The earliest cultures found in the bottom of the cave are called "hunting and gathering" because their projectile points, scrapers, and bone awls show that the people hunted wild animals and prepared them for food and clothing, and the various grinding tools indicate that they gathered wild seeds and roots and ground them for food. There is no evidence that these early people practiced agriculture or made pottery.

In the next stage, beginning about the first century A.D., corn and pottery are found for the first time. This period marks the beginning of a more or less sedentary agricultural population who lived in the cave until about 1400 A.D. Besides the corn and pottery archeologists also found human mummies, cotton textiles, woven sandals, and baskets. This cultural material seems to have been a local variation of the general Hohokam culture which was spread widely over southern

Arizona in the same time period. The ruins at Casa Grande National Monument represent one of the final stages in the Hohokam culture. Although very little is known about the people in this area from 1400 until early Spanish contact with the Papago Indians in 1698, the evidence strongly suggests that there is a direct cultural continuity between Hohokam culture and the present-day Papago.

b. Spanish Contact and Early Culture Pattern

The second period of Papago history begins with the journey of the famous Jesuit priest, Father Kino, through the area in 1698. It ends shortly after 1870, when the Papago came under nominal control of the Indian Agent on the Pima Reservation. These one hundred and seventy-two years coincide roughly with the duration of the Apache Wars.

The Spanish differentiated the Indians in Southern Arizona as follows: there were the Papagos (the "desert people") in the center; to the north were the Pimas of the Gila River; to the east were the Piman Sobaipuris and to the west were the various Yuman peoples. The "desert people" differed from the river people in that they did not make as much use of agriculture and did not raise cotton. Otherwise the culture throughout this area seems to have been basically the same.

The essential features of Papago culture in the 1500's and 1600's were an economic life which required annual movement from hills to valley, a patrilineal family and village organization, and a simple system of ceremony and ritual. We will briefly discuss each of these, and their interrelations. The patterns established then remain important now; while there have been many changes, there are common trends and processes.

(1) *Economy.* The economic life of the Papago was typical of many Indians in northern Mexico. The nature of this economic adjustment led the Spanish to speak of them as *rancheria* people. A *rancheria* is a village which has a permanent location but which is not occupied continuously. The Papagos cultivated fields, growing corn, beans, and squash, along the intermittent streams during the summer months. The rains came in the late summer months, and provided moisture for the crops. After the crops were harvested, people went into the hills and through the winter relied on hunting and gathering of wild food products. Thus, each local group had two village sites, one in the valley and one in the hills, and in the course of any year divided their time between the two. The population was rather sparse, and there were no towns as large as those of the Pueblos in the north.

(2) *Politics.*—The important political unit of the Papagos in the 16th and 17th centuries, as now, was the village. Each village was independent; there was never any general tribal organization under a single head man. Every village group had two ceremonial houses, one in the summer village and one in the winter village. These houses were the focus of religious and political activity. The house was circular and was called the Rain or Cloud House. It was only in the Rain House that the sacred fetishes which each village possessed could be opened on ceremonial occasions. It was here also that the men of the village met regularly to plan work, decide questions of government, and discuss village affairs generally.

The meetings of the men in the Rain House were presided over by a village patriarch who was called the Keeper of the Smoke, a title indicative of his duty of building the fire before a meeting. He was not only the chairman of all secular meetings but also the leader of village ceremonies for rain and ritual purification. Other village officials were the crier who announced all the meetings in the Rain House and the leader of the hunt, the games and races, the war parties, and the ceremonial singing. Each of these men had many ritual duties in connection with his leadership, and all were definitely subject to the deliberation of the council of elders in whose hands the ultimate control of the village affairs rested.

Within each village the people were organized into what might be called patriarchal families. All the children of a man called him by a certain term, the same one which he and his brothers and sisters had applied to their father. This term was not the ordinary one for father but was regarded as indicating a person's membership in a certain patrilineal line. There were at least five such terms among the Papago: *aapap*, *apki*, *maam*, *waahw*, and *o'kari*. These patrilineal lineages were grouped into two larger units, one called the Buzzards and the other the Coyotes. These two large groups regulated marriage. No member of the Buzzards could marry within his group. The lineages and the two larger groups had certain ceremonial duties. The lineages were somewhat like clans but never at-

tained the importance in Papago social structure that clans attained among the Pueblos.

(3) *Religion*.—The religious practices of the Papagos in early post-contact times were centered around the recurring events of the annual agricultural cycle. The regular annual round of ceremony included as its most important events a festival in early summer at the time of the fathering of the fruits of the giant saguaro cactus, a deer dance in the autumn when the people had moved back from the field villages, and rain dances in the spring before the ripening cactus. In addition there was an important ceremony called the Viikita, regarded as a harvest festival, which was celebrated every four years.

The Viikita was an elaborate ceremony in which were to be seen most of the important elements of Papago ritual. It required the cooperation of several villages and a long period of preparation. The men of each village worked for a period of ten days immediately preceding the event, construction images to represent various mythical beings or places and a quantity of sticks with feathers attached to be used as prayer offerings. Each village contributed groups of singers with a leader, and it was the duty of the leaders to compose songs especially for the occasion. Also taking part in the ceremony were masked performers who acted as clowns. These men, like most of the other ceremonial participants in Papago ritual, held their offices through inheritance. The Viikita ceremony proper included the singing of songs while the effigies were carried in procession, the symbolic representation of the sun and moon, the sprinkling of corn meal, and the representation of parts of the Papago flood myth.

Thus, the Papago social organization was based on small autonomous village units governed by decision of the older men in more or less democratic fashion, with officials who were ritual rather than political leaders. It was a type of organization adapted to the small rural community primarily concerned with the business of getting a living.

The foregoing indicates the general nature of Papago culture at the time of earliest white contacts. The changes which have taken place since are many. During the period of first contact with the Spanish, "governors" were appointed for each village. These men were truly political officials as none of the village officers had been before. They had nothing to do with ceremonies, but were purely secular in function, and a major part of their activity consisted in acting as go-betweens with the Spanish. Their power grew steadily at the expense of the older ceremonial officials. The early Jesuit missionaries worked effectively at combining the traditional Papago beliefs and rites with Catholicism. When the Franciscans took over the field, the Papagos refused to accept them at first as their teachers, but remained independent as the Sonora Catholic Church. They maintained their own native priests and adhered to the earlier established ritual.

c. The Development of the Papago Reservation

The formation of the Papago Reservation as it now exists did not follow the usual pattern of boundary definition, by treaty in return for the cessation of hostility. The Papago had been cooperating with the Anglo Americans, particularly in the suppression of the Apache raids. This cooperation had been particularly important to the existence of both the Papago and the early settlers in the vicinity of Tucson in the two decades 1850-1870.

In 1874 an executive order established a reservation of 69,200 acres surrounding the mission of San Xavier, and in 1884 another small area near Gila Bend on the Gila River was set aside as a reservation for the few Papagos living there. This left the greater part of Papago territory between the Santa Cruz River and Gila Bend open to settlement by non-Indians. The Papagos were thus in a situation unique among Indians in Arizona and New Mexico. Elsewhere, relatively large portions of the territory ranged over by the Indians were set aside as reservations exclusively for Indian use. The Papagos, lacking any treaty with the United States since they had fought on the side of the Anglo-Americans, were given no formal protection against settler encroachment, except for the relatively minute areas at San Xavier and Gila Bend (Spicer 1962:136).

The period from the 1870's to the early 1900's saw extensive Papago-Anglo contacts in two areas: mining and ranching. For these purposes the whites settled among the Papago, and in these contexts the Papagos came to see Anglo society operating. Ranching practices, for obvious reasons, had the most influence on Papago ways of life.

In the early decades of the 20th century, many Papago children were educated in BIA boarding schools. In these boarding schools the Indians learned the use

of English, and were cut off from the patterns and patterned reinforcements of the traditional Papago ways of coping with the world.

By 1928 the situation of ranches, boarding schools, and mission activities from Protestants as well as the longer established Catholics, had worked to fractionate Papago political orientations. There were two factions: the "Good Government League," which was the more "progressive" in terms of adaptive concessions to the Anglo society. These people tended to be Presbyterian. There was also the "League of Papago Chiefs": tradition-oriented and largely Catholic.

In 1918, by executive order, a reservation of some two million acres was established for the Papago. It lay between Tucson and Ajo, and ran southward to the Mexican border. There were two important exclusions: a strip of territory through the center, which was dominated by white ranchers on some of the better grazing lands, and the rights to the minerals under the reservation land. This exclusion of the mineral rights once again placed the Papago in a unique position *vis-à-vis* other American Indians. It was felt politically necessary to do this in order to create the reservation at all.

Government programs for the Papago were established with creation of the reservation. In the 20's the major expenditure was for deep wells. These wells were held to be mystically dangerous, and the location of them in relation to villages was a further source of factionalism—creating tensions between the progressives and the traditionalists.

In 1931 "the strip" of land through the reservation was restored to the Papagos, in part through the activities of the League of Papago Chiefs. This group and the Good Government League were active in removing a hostile superintendent. As political activity of this sort increased on the reservation, it became apparent that the locus was not reservation-wide, but was confined to the southeast corner of the reservation. This area had the most contacts with Anglo society, and had the highest wage-employment rate in Tucson and, to a lesser degree, Phoenix.

In 1934, under the new Indian Reorganization Act, the Papagos were encouraged by the reservation superintendent to form a Tribal Council. A constitution was adopted in 1937. The Papago were, by this constitution, divided into eleven districts, each having two representatives in the Tribal Council. As well as being political divisions, these districts were worked out to be cattle grazing areas.

The districts included two outliers from the main Papago Reservation: San Xavier and Gila Bend. Leadership in the Tribal Council was assumed by the southeastern part of the reservation (the Baboquivari District).

The political organization of the Papago brought together Indian groups who were not, in general, in contact with each other: the reservation is large, the transportation poor, and so there had been a high degree of internal isolation. Another event which brought widely scattered Papago together was the establishment, at the height of the depression, of Civilian Conservation Corps camps. Spicer analyzes the development of Papago political and social reservation-wide networks as leading to both a sense of contentment with the progress in the economic development of the reservation, and a tendency to withdraw somewhat from the non-reservation social world.²

2. Recent Conditions and Present Context

a. General Economic Trends

In the post-war period, and through the 1950's, Spicer (*op. cit.*) finds two important trends in reservation life:

(1) *Wage Work.*—There has been a steady growth of off-reservation wage work, particularly in the cotton-growing ranches. The Papago seem to establish semi-permanent connections with particular ranches, so that particular rouns of Papago will return to the same ranches over the years.

The great majority of Papago had by 1960 made this a permanent adjustment, so that the overwhelming portion of Papago income has now derived from off-reservation sources. At the same time they maintained residence in their home villages and returned several times a year there for ceremonials or other matters (Spicer 1962:145).

(2) *Schools.*—The second important trend is the increasing number of Papago children attending school. By 1958, almost all Papago school-age children were enrolled in either a BIA, a mission, or a public school. Public school enrollment accounted for one-third. As the educational level of the Papago rises, so does the level at which they are integrated into the surrounding economy.

² See Spicer (1962: 143).

The Papago, in short, are in the process of developing an adjustment to Anglo society that is satisfactory to both themselves and the Anglos. This adjustment seems to be based on steady, if periodic, employment; a reservation to return to; and a few groups who are interested and active in building understanding and mutual adjustments between Indians and whites. The Papagos have been helped constructively in their adjustments to the surrounding Anglos since the 1930's, when a BIA social worker helped the Papagos employed in Tucson. Which is not to say that Papago/white relations are wholly satisfactory, but rather to point up the virtues of any constructive work in this difficult area. This is especially important as the expanding population forces the Indians to look outside the reservation for income, and to do this in ways that neither require them to sever themselves from the reservation completely, nor to renounce the attempt to adjust to the "great society."

The Papagos had escaped the sort of close government control which characterized the other Indians of the state, having come under Government supervision relatively late and undergoing the brunt of such supervision only after the new policy of the Indian Reorganization Act was put into motion. While a certain small proportion of Papagos developed the characteristic attitudes of dependency apparent on other reservations, the majority continued as before the establishment of the reservation in 1917 to rely on their own efforts to supplement their small-scale farming and cattle raising on the reservation. As resources became increasingly insufficient at home, they increasingly sought work for wages among the surrounding people, so that their primary economic adjustment was by 1960 no longer on the reservation (Spicer 1962:146).

b. Sociopolitical Organization

(1) *Religion*.—It is difficult to make generalizations about Papago religion since the several kinds of belief—aboriginal, Sonora Catholic, Roman Catholic, and Presbyterian—vary greatly in different districts and from generation to generation. Parts of the old religious pattern are still important to all the Papagos except the strictest Presbyterians.

Survival of the Aboriginal Religion.—Today in most parts of the reservation people say that the old men who know the ancient ceremonies are dying off and that no one else has learned how to conduct them. Papago ceremonial life seems to be concerned with two things: rain and health. Though many of the old practices have disappeared, the emphasis on these two all-important areas continues.

Many of the old Papago ceremonies were one way or another connected with bringing rain. Today the principal means directed to rain-bringing centers around the annual wine ceremony which occurs after the fruit of the saguaro cactus has been picked in June. Syrup is made from the pulp of the fruit and carried back to the villages to be fermented for use in the ceremony. When the time has been set, each family donates syrup for ceremonial use, about four quarts. This syrup is sent to the ceremonial round house in the village for fermentation in large jars. During the fermentation period of four nights the syrup is carefully watched and tested by men. Each night the villagers gather to participate in the songs and dancing which aid the process. They sing of clouds, wind, rain, and the growing crops and perform a simple circle dance around a small fire. Everything is done four times, since the number four has a magic quality in Papago belief. While the people sing and dance the medicine men rise and stand quietly, waving their sacred eagle feathers. If the feathers gather moisture or drip, the rain will come soon; if they stay dry, the rain is many days away.

After the medicine men announce that the wine has reached the proper stage of fermentation, they and the singers make speeches. Then the wine is ceremonially served to each adult in prescribed order. It should be noted that intoxication is not the objective of the wine ceremony. It is a means to an end. Papagos feel that the wine brings happiness and song which helps to erase the evil and ill feeling of the past year.

Sonora Catholicism.—In most of the larger Papago villages there is a little adobe building with a rickety wooden cross over the door—the Sonora Catholic church. Sonora Catholicism antedates other Christian faiths on the reservation today. The beliefs and practices of Sonora Catholics are remnants of the teachings of early Spanish missionaries, acquired either directly from Padres, or through other Indians or Mexicans. During the generations when no Catholic clergy came to Papaguera, the faithful carried on as best they could the ceremonies and devotions of the church. With the absence of priests and the passage of time much of the original Roman Catholic creed and ritual has vanished.

(2) *Family*.—The family is the most important unit in the Papago social structure and its solidarity is strong. Most often a household consists of the old parents, unmarried sons and daughters, and married sons with their wives and children—three generations in all. Since relatives may be depended upon for hospitality, it is a rare household that does not also include a widowed daughter, a distant cousin, or a child whose parents have died or remarried. Brothers or sisters of the old parents (also regarded as grandparents by their siblings' grandchildren) may also be part of the family. Thus a Papago child is born into a family that includes a varied combination of relatives. A child's family relationships are such that the absence of one relative is no deprivation, for there is usually another who is acceptable as a substitute.

The Papago family is patriarchal and there is always a recognized head of the house. In a typical household of three generations, the grandfather holds authority over the group, and each married son is head of his own family. If the grandfather grows too old for active responsibility, his authority passes gradually into the hands of the son who is generally considered to be the ablest—not necessarily the oldest. Although the head of the house always has the final word, he has a strong obligation to solicit and consider carefully the opinions of all the other family members before final decisions are made. Even small children are consulted in things which concern them directly, and a child's decision as to whether he wishes to go to school or the hospital is seldom questioned.

Seniority and respect for elders is the most important guideline for personal relations in the household. The child not only respects his parents, but he must also defer to older brothers and sisters. Each person in the family seems to have some authority over all those younger than himself. Men, as a rule, have greater prestige and authority than women. Descent is reckoned through the male line, and inheritance is from the father. Older brothers have more authority than older sisters, and all boys expect their sisters to wait upon them in the home. Men usually receive and spend the family's cash income. Even if a woman has a strong personality and actually makes decisions, the man is always the family spokesman, and the woman will disclaim authority, at least in public. However, women are not relegated to an inferior position. They are never ordered about and are never servile toward the men. The attitude of both sexes is simply that their duties and spheres of authority and influence are different. In recent years the women have been working outside the home and have been gaining some influence in spheres once dominated by men. For example, in the tribal elections in the spring of 1956, women voted for the first time.

(3) *Village*.—With its officers and activities, each village functions as a political entity. A headman acts for the villagers in outside contacts, especially with non-Papagos. He may inherit office or be elected by the Village Council, but holds office only by common consent. He may be replaced at any time his work becomes unsatisfactory. He is a spokesman rather than a leader, expressing village attitudes rather than forming them. The more accurately he reflects the opinions of his village, the better he is at his job. No Papago tries to make himself a "big shot." However, a headman may be powerful. Remarkably foresighted, concerned with his people's welfare, he is responsible for them and is expected to feel his responsibility. Villagers look to him for ideas. Therefore, although he may not formulate opinion, he guides and helps it along. He calls the meetings of the Village Council, composed of all the adult men, to talk over decisions of any importance. One headman has summarized his activities as follows:

When we're going to have a meeting, I go around and tell everybody what time we're going to have it. Meetings are held here at my house. If somebody from the Agency is coming through, he sends word so I can go around to tell the people to come. I tell the people there will be someone coming, and if I know his name, I call it. At the meetings, sometimes I tell the man's name and why he came over, and what he is going to talk about. I tell them to go ahead and say what they want to. We always have to use interpreters because some of the old people don't understand English.

A headman does not act on important matters until his council agrees on the course. Unanimity is a strong Papago idea—one they usually achieve at the cost of speedy action. It may take weeks or months. Some issues, never agreed upon, are never acted upon. When outsiders demand fast action, not allowing time for unanimity, Papagoes are disturbed.

(4) *District and Tribe*.—No tribal organization existed until 1937, when Papagoes organized under a written constitution, authorized by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The governing body is a Tribal Council consisting of

twenty-two members, two being selected from each of the eleven districts into which the reservations are divided. The Gila Bend and San Xavier Reservations are each one district. Each district is self-governing in local matters and is headed by an elected district council composed of not less than five members. All elected leaders hold office for two years.

The Tribal Council has always been quite democratically structured, the source of the force for a democratic orientation ultimately deriving from the village.

There was no immediate acceptance of tribal organization in the terms in which the Government men saw it. There had never been a subordination of one village group's interests to another, nor was there now. Representatives were not regarded by their districts as empowered to enact legislation, but rather were thought of as "legs," to use the old Papago term; that is, messengers and communicators of news to their district councils. This was notably true of San Xavier, which regarded itself as quite distinct from the "desert people" of the Sells Reservation (Spicer 1962: 144).

The political structure of the Papago, which is genuine "community action," is threatened when quick action on any issue is required. It is important not to confuse the size of the carrot dangled in front of the horse with the total dietary requirements of horses; however attractive the rewards for the Indians of a lot of money right away, the democratic, and slowly moving, Papago political processes ought not to be run into the ground, or be bypassed (albeit under pressure) by those more acculturated and accustomed to dealing with white society.

3. *Impact of the Community Action Program*

a. *Introduction*

The Community Action Program on the Papago Reservation is in a formative stage, moving from a base of Papago leadership to widening Papago involvement. The impact, at this stage, is in the realm of tribal politics, with CAP as a central element in the redefinition of roles of tribal leaders and Federal administrators at one level, and of the roles of tribal leaders and village leaders at another. Tribal administrators visualize the creation of Papago leadership, free of Anglo controls, as a possible outcome of Community Action Programs.

The CAP Director has formulated a set of community development principles as the result of his past experience as Tribal Chairman and of a long association with anthropologists. The following report will illustrate how the Director's philosophy has influenced the present position of CAP's development on the Papago Reservation.

The Director's position is fairly clear and is stated in the following quotation from an interview with him in March 1966:

The OEO Act called for maximum feasible involvement of the people. This is tailor-made for the Papago people because that is the way we do things. The Chairman in the Tribal Council cannot approve an action without reference to the people. The Chairman lends support, submits things to the Tribal Council, and full discussion follows. The Tribal Council seldom gives instant approval; instead, a proposal must go to the district meetings. Delegates may come in to Tribal Council meetings and say, "We cannot support something one way or another because it's not yet discussed in district meetings." This is exactly the way they carry CAP. . . .

Anything done with the people must involve everybody. There must not be programs without involvement of the people. The jobs must not be doled out as political plums. People will want relatives in jobs. If factionalism or nepotism creep in, it is the people's undoing. There is community involvement so they feel free to criticize. The CAP Committee helps decide who is to be hired or fired. The CAP Director may hire but people reserve the right to approve. . . .

We must be willing to take one step back to take ten tomorrow. You cannot ramrod anything through—it takes time, but when a decision is reached it is a decision of the people. We will never break any speed records, but we are building solidly so our work will not come apart at the seams.

(1) *The People.*—The influence of an earlier way of life on the modern adjustment of Papago Indians seems to be of considerable importance. This is in large part due to the relatively recent (1917) introduction of Federal services on the main reservation and to the continued isolation of reservation villages.

The most important political fact is that the Papago were never, until very recent times, organized as a tribe. It was a society of small autonomous groups, loosely held together by custom and tradition and governed by the unanimous decisions of the older men.

Papago culture was characterized by an emphasis on traditional religious ceremonialism and leadership, and a lack of interest in Anglo ideas of wealth and public works. There has always been a highly developed native literature in myth and song recital, in folk stories, and in formalized oratory. Papagos have been greatly interested in social gatherings and especially sensitive to the maintenance of form and custom in social intercourse. Early reports give an impression of an unhurried, relaxed type of life, and a dependence upon established tradition. There was a reliance on old people who understood this tradition to speak for the group, rather than reliance on individual initiative.

These values and traditions persist today, particularly in outlying villages. They account, in some measure, for the resistance to projects and proposals stemming from the white man's concept of "progress" and of wealth as a symbol of status and achievement.

Modern Papago life continues to revolve around the village or a combination of related and contiguous villages. As social units, these clusters of related families are far more meaningful to the average Papago than membership in the Tribe. This attitude is reinforced by a system of village and district control of grazing rights.

In the larger settlements a traditional social-political organization controls the daily lives of the people. The headman is frequently a powerful figure and is often tied to the traditional way of life through his additional duties as a native diagnostician (*Ma-kai*). To him, and to the elders in the village, are brought all local problems and decisions: the timing of a fiesta, the settling of land and other disputes, and dealings with the outside world. The leadership pattern within the extended family is a reduced version of the village pattern. The oldest male assumes the role of family spokesman and any situation arising within the family must be solved with this man as mediator.

Prestige in a village is gained by participation in local events—fiestas, the cattle round-up, the building of chapels and repairing of *charcos* (temporary rainwater reservoirs) and fences. Papagos talk about the "American way" (*mirigan kiidag*) and the "Indian way" (*'o'dham kiidag*). To work and live in the society of Indians, earning a living from farming and ranching, and making everything possible from local resources without dependence upon money and wage work, is the "Indian way" and the people who live this way are praised.

A type of political factionalism has grown out of the conflict between the "American way," which is identified with Sells, largest town and seat of the BIA agency, and with life in off-reservation communities, and the "Indian way," which is identified with the smaller reservation villages. Those who have begun to find success in the "American way" are generally considered "progressives" who do not oppose change or the influx of commercial life to the reservation. The "conservatives" take the other stance.

The pull of these forces is not an Indian choice. The reservation cannot support its population in the Indian way of life. Most families must seek wage work in Sells, or off the reservation, either permanently or temporarily, and thus are inevitably drawn into the cash economy and the ways of life of the American.

(2) *Family Economics and Settlement Patterns.*—Papago Reservation families may be roughly divided into five economic classes: (1) wage workers, (2) full-time cattlemen, (3) part-time cattlemen, (4) reservation residents with off-reservation employment, and (5) welfare recipients and others who are not in the labor force.

Wage workers are found mostly in Sells where they are employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Public Health Service, the Tribe and by traders and cattle buyers. Kitt Peak National Observatory, east of Sells, employs twenty-two Papagos and perhaps another twelve are employed by schools and traders at Santa Rosa and other reservation towns. Wage work income is estimated at close to one million dollars annually and involves about two hundred permanent and seventy part-time Indian employees.

Full and part-time cattlemen are estimated at 250, no more than thirty earning an adequate living from this source on a full-time basis. The part-time cattle raisers supplement their income principally from seasonal and temporary off-reservation wage work. Some are employed at temporary jobs on the reservation and some supplement their income through subsistence farming. Gross income from cattle raising is estimated at \$650,000 annually.

Indian families residing on the reservation who earn their livings through seasonal and temporary wage work off the reservation are estimated at 300 to 500.

The fifth important segment of the reservation population is the group living on unearned income, mostly welfare, and those not in the labor force. Most recent figures on welfare are for 1962, when an average of 536 adults were receiving welfare income in the following categories: old age assistance (265), aid to dependent children (154), aid to the blind (12), and general assistance (104).

In a 1964 study it was estimated that six hundred males over the age of fourteen and not in school were technically out of the labor force, either idle and not looking for work or unable to work because of old age or illness. Many of these, of course, are welfare recipients. Others are truly idle and are supported, in large part, by relatives.

There has never been a satisfactory study of family income on the reservation. Full-time cattlemen no doubt have the highest income, but no estimate is available. The group employed at wage work has an average annual income of about \$3500. The income of those who combine serious effort at cattle raising with wage work perhaps averages \$2500. The average annual income of other reservation families, including those on welfare is not known. A good estimate would be \$1100 plus or minus \$300.

It is estimated that just under five thousand Indians make their usual home on the three Papago reservations. Income, employment and residence data would indicate that about 20% are stable residents with incomes from cattle and wage work, another 13% make a fair living from cattle but supplement this income with wage work, about 40% have reasonably stable homes but are supported by welfare payments or by relatives, and 26% make their usual homes on the reservation but earn their livings through seasonal and temporary off-reservation wage work.

A significant aspect of the employment and settlement pattern has to do with tribal political organization and possible community development projects.

The small farming and cattle raising centers are losing population to Sells and to villages near the borders of the reservation because of the shift to a wage work economy. Cohesive communities with common employment and social interests are thus giving way to more heterogeneous communities whose inhabitants are not deeply committed to community affairs. Sells and the central Tribal Government at Sells are gaining in importance at the expense of outlying villages.

(c) *The Land.*—The problem of transportation and communication on the main reservation stems from the combined factors of distance and scattered small population centers. The reservation stretches sixty miles along the Mexican border and extends about ninety miles north to south. In this vast desert area of 4329 square miles are thirty-six villages with a mean population of 110, ranging from Sells with about seven hundred inhabitants to Vaye Chin with twelve. Between are the ranch homes of another five hundred residents.

Two good roads cross the reservation from east to west and north to south, meeting in the approximate center at Covered Wells. This gives all-weather access to about half the villages. The other half are on dirt roads, often impassible in wet weather. About 100 miles northwest of Sells is a small Papago reservation at Gila Bend with a population of about one hundred, and sixty-five miles east of Sells in the San Xavier Papago Reservation with a population of approximately five hundred.

Most of the reservation is desert land, suitable only for stock raising. The elevation on the east rises to over 7000 feet in the Baboquivari Mountains, but drops rapidly to the west to about 2400 feet at Sells, and to about 1500 feet at Chuichu to the northwest. Rainfall over most of the reservation averages about ten inches per year and temperatures range from a record high of 115 degrees in summer to a low of 17 degrees in winter.

Speculation with respect to possible non-Indian use of the main Papago Reservation serves to bring into perspective the nature of the land and its resources. Had this area never been an Indian reservation it would probably now have a non-Indian population of around one hundred families: perhaps twenty families at a tourist and trading center at Sells; another thirty or forty ranch families; another twenty or so engaged in farming at favorable locations such as Chuichu and Papago farms; and perhaps another twenty engaged in

mining and other enterprises. There would be a school at Sells, perhaps another at Santa Rosa, a gasoline station or two along the main highways, and probably little more.

(4) *Federal Agencies.*—Since CAP components now funded on the Papago Reservation are exclusively concerned with special educational programs and with child care, there is little integration with social and health services provided by Federal agencies and none at all with Federal programs aimed at employment, employment training, or resources development.

As is true of other reservations, the BIA agency at Sells has concentrated in recent years on education, vocational training and employment assistance, all in anticipation that the limitation of natural resources will force most Indians, in the future, to seek a living off the reservation.

(5) *Resources Development.*—Except for a possible expansion of mining activity there is neither promise nor prospect of any change in the near future that will produce additional sources of income for reservation Indians. Water and development for the livestock industry has reached near completion and there are no plans in prospect for the development of additional irrigated farm land.

In consequence, BIA attention has turned to employment assistance. The heart of this endeavor is a two-year vocational training program, mostly for high school graduates. During fiscal year 1966, 57 adults took advantage of this opportunity. In addition, 29 adults were given financial and technical assistance which permitted them to accept permanent employment outside the reservation area. About seventy out of eighty-six thus given assistance are expected to complete their training or remain on the jobs in which they have been placed. Since this type of assistance normally must be limited to high school graduates, those who can qualify are now limited, but their number should increase markedly in the years immediately ahead.

(6) *Service Agencies—Education.*—Since the end of World War II Papago parents have changed their earlier attitudes and are now insisting on education for their children. In consequence, the BIA has responded with construction of new schools, establishment of a new public school at Sells, and considerable improvement in the level of education available at off-reservation boarding schools where youngsters of high school age must be sent. In addition, the facilities available at Catholic mission schools have been expanded.

Practically all Papago children now finish the eighth grade, and well over one-third who finish the eighth grade go on to graduate from high school. About 1450 reservation youngsters were enrolled in school last year: 77% in elementary school; 21% in high school; the remainder in special education and institutional training. About thirty graduated from high school.

(7) *Health.*—The health program for the Papago Reservation, operated by the Indian Health Division of the PHS, includes both preventive and curative services and facilities. At Sells a fifty-bed hospital provides maternity and routine hospital care. More complicated cases of illness or injury are treated either at the Phoenix Indian Hospital or in private hospitals under contract with the PHS. Outpatient clinics are operated at Sells, Santa Rosa, Pisinimo and San Xavier. All medical services for reservation Indians are provided without charge.

(8) *Law and Order.*—Law enforcement on the reservation is directly under the supervision of the BIA, but the Tribe employs two court clerks and pays half the salary of a judge. On the BIA payroll are a special officer, chief of police, seven policemen and a part-time policewoman. All except the special officer are Papago.

(9) *Welfare.*—BIA finances and administers a general assistance and child welfare program. Other welfare programs are administered by the state through county offices. The BIA staff consists of four social workers and two clerks.

(10) *Agricultural Extension and Home Economics.*—BIA personnel consists of one extension man and one home economist. Extension work is almost exclusively devoted to programs of group education, particularly among young boys and girls through 4-H and other programs. The home economist, in addition to her regular program of work, has cooperated closely with the work of the Parent-Child Centers operated by CAP.

(11) *Economic Development.*—An office of reservation programs operated by the BIA has as its primary interest the development and coordination of all plans that may increase employment or improve community facilities on the reservation. Considerable time is devoted to the coordination of various Federal programs, such as those of the EDA, aimed at industrial development.

In addition, the BIA operates an administration office headed by a superintendent and an administrative officer, a realty office where records of individual and tribal land holdings and leases are maintained, a financial officer where rental and other payments for the use of Indian land is collected and disbursed to individual Indian land holders, a land management and soil conservation department, a plant management section in charge of maintenance and operation of all Federal property, and a road construction and maintenance department.

The entire BIA operation involves 114 permanent employees, seventy-three of whom are Indian.

b. History of Papago CAP: 1964-66

In April 1964 the Papago Tribal Council was informed of an American Indian Conference in Washington, D.C., convened to discuss ways of eliminating poverty on Indian reservations. The Papago Tribal Chairman was invited to attend but the Educational Consultant to the Papago Tribe went in his place.

The BIA became involved in the war on poverty after the Superintendent attended a meeting in Sante Fe, New Mexico, in June 1964. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the role of the BIA in the national war on poverty, with specific reference to industrial and commercial development, education, and housing on reservations. Upon returning, the Superintendent called a meeting to outline plans for Papago involvement. Representatives of BIA, PHS, and reservation missions were invited, and the Tribal Economic Development Committee was to help in setting up a program to be presented in Washington within thirty days. This Committee had been established in 1962 under the aegis of the Economic Development Agency of the Department of Commerce for the purpose of bringing industry to the Papago Reservation.

In August 1964 Dr. Robert A. Roessel, a member of the President's Task Force on American Indian Poverty, came to the reservation to inform the Tribal Chairman that the Papagos were one of the first thirteen American Indian tribes eligible to participate in OEO programs. Later that month Dr. Roessel visited the Baboquivari Youth Camp with the Papago Tribal Educational Consultant. In the course of the trip possibilities for a Papago CAP program were discussed. The consultant in turn brought up the subject of participation in OEO to members of the Papago Education Committee. Several days later while on a visit to Arizona State University, the Chairman of the Education Committee met with Dr. Roessel and immediately started to work on his return. An Education Committee meeting was held on September 4th with a group from the Tucson Indian Center, Ajo representatives (Ajo is a town with Papago residents, outside the reservation boundaries), Dr. Robert Hackenburg and Dr. Bernard Fontana. Dr. Roessel arrived the next day. There was a special meeting that evening at Santa Rosa with the Education Committee attending.

When informed that the war on poverty was designed for administration by the recipients, the Education Committee demanded whatever OEO data might be available. The BIA turned over such materials to the Tribe. This disassociation of OEO and BIA is in line with a sense of growing Papago nationalism.

On 3 September 1964 Tom Segundo, a former Tribal Chairman, was telephoned in Chicago and told that a real emergency existed with OEO proposal formation, the Tribe having only four days to write up an application. In response he accepted an invitation to come to Sells and help with the job.

The Tribal Education Committee requested a special meeting of the Papago Tribal Council on 5 September 1964. The Education Committee invited Dr. Roessel to help them in the presentation of the Economic Opportunity Act of August 1964. Dr. Roessel explained the provisions of the "anti-poverty bill" and specifically discussed the scope of a Community Action Program. Roessel explained, "It is the intent of Congress that the Papago people develop the program and that it be the kind of program that they want. Once formulated, the program would be implemented by the Community Action Program Committee of the Tribe." He emphasized that the CAP Committee would be appointed by the Council and that all policy decisions would be under the jurisdiction of the Tribe. Roessel's explanations were translated into Papago and his formal presentation was followed by a question and answer session with the Council members. At the close of the meeting, the Council appointed the Education Committee to act as CAP Committee.

The CAP Committee was requested by the council to conduct studies necessary for preparation of a Community Action Program. The Committee was also authorized by the Tribal Council to hire a director and other personnel neces-

sary for the development of CAP. The Chairman of the Committee told the Council that he would "like to meet with the people in each of the eleven districts and Papago communities off the reservation for the purpose of discussing the OEO and securing their ideas, suggestions, and recommendations as to what they feel ought to be included in action programs for their communities." He stated that "this will be done before the proposed Papago Community Action Program is drafted."

The CAP Committee began its work by asking the Tribal Council delegates to set up meeting dates in their respective districts. These meetings were arranged and the CAP Committee divided the responsibilities of explaining OEO to the districts. The meetings in the districts were similar to that with the Council—the philosophy and possibilities of OEO were presented and the session was opened for questions.

A source or recurring confusion, however, has been the similarity between CAP ideas and the BIA Ten Year Plan. At a Tribal Council meeting of 4 September 1964, one day preceding the OEO presentation, the BIA Program Officer presented the Ten Year Plan. The Plan encompassed many projects which were also among CAP potentialities.

Following is a list of projects in the BIA Plan read to the Councilmen:

1. Pre-Schools for four or five-year olds in the five largest villages except Sells.
2. Study halls in the five largest villages except Sells.
3. More classrooms, teachers, and dormitories at Santa Rosa School; add grades eight and nine at Santa Rosa School.
4. High school in Sells, or dormitories at Tucson and Casa Grande so high school students can go to school in these neighboring towns, or bus service for high school students from Sells to Tucson.
5. Tribal leadership training to be made available for tribal and district leaders who want to study the course.
6. Increasing vocational and employment assistance programs of BIA.
7. Recreation center at Sells.
8. Step up welfare program to help with family problems.
9. Foster homes, temporary or permanent, for abandoned children.
10. Day Care Center for working parents, especially at San Xavier and Chuichu.
11. Program to increase gardening and planting of fruit trees.
12. Big increase in roads program.
13. Study tribal office operations.
14. Help from Washington office on revising the tribal constitution.
15. Start program to encourage new home construction on reservation.
16. Community centers in five larger villages.
17. Recreation areas in eight larger villages.
18. Tourism and recreation at Baboquivari Cabin and Fresnal Canyon.
19. Encourage more small game hunters to buy permits to hunt on the reservation.
20. Storage dams could be built on the reservation somewhere in Vamori Wash.
21. Increase discussion of improved range management practices.
22. Flood control program for Sells and Santa Rosa washes.
23. Accelerate program of brush control and root plowing in some areas.
24. Bank protection program to stabilize water in the Santa Cruz River on San Xavier Reservation.
25. Increase efficiency of tribal herd production.
26. Relocate Chuichu farmers to area below Tot Momolikot Dam.
27. Cross fencing each district for rotation grazing.
28. Develop Papago farms.

The Ten Year Plan has never been further developed this this.

The CAP Committee Chairman, Cipriano Manuel, had been told the Committee had to have the proposals in Washington by 15 September. Very little time existed to hold meetings. They begged for a period of grace. Dr. Robert Roessel interceded and the Papagos were notified they had until 28 September.

The CAP Chairman contacted district councils and Tribal Council delegates to set up meeting dates whenever possible. Cowlic, Sells, and Big Fields asked for special meetings. Gila Bend, Big Fields, and Santa Rosa Ranch wanted the same day. The CAP Committee split up to make the meetings at Big Fields and

Santa Rosa Ranch. They cancelled Gila Bend. They worked through the Tribal Council and contacted district chairmen in setting up the meetings. The CAP Committee Chairman was the spearhead of the movement. The whole Committee would go when possible; when not, as many as possible would go. The Tribal Council had authorized travel expenses for the Education Committee out of tribal funds, and this allowed for CAP Committee travel. Eugene Johnson, Tribal Council Chairman, was invited to all meetings but could not make many. He chaired the meetings when present; otherwise the CAP Committee Chairman took over. Committee members were assigned different areas of the Act, for study, and requested to report findings back to the Committee. Everyone was briefed on the Economic Opportunity Act. They had very great problems in that copies of the Act were scarce and there were not enough to go around.

A standard question at the meetings was, "How is this different from BIA?" The people had difficulties with the BIA in the past and it was a problem to separate the CAP from the BIA in their minds. "Would the CAP Committee collide with the BIA?" Requests came for road and fence repairs, soil conservation, windmills, wells, classrooms, a high school at Pisinimo, a high school at Santa Rosa, an experimental farm as part of a school in Santa Rosa, and livestock assistance.

On 29 September, the proposal was submitted to the Tribal Council. There was discussion in the Papago tradition. There were questions on various aspects of Papago acculturation problems. Would Papago culture fade out? Could it be preserved? Could some satisfactory identity through adaptive acculturation be achieved through the CAP? How do the Indian people fit into a non-Indian society? Could CAP provide some means of preserving Papago culture through a library, museum, and history books? Initial discussions had to do with tangibles like the *charcos* (small depressions used to collect rainwater) and fences. Later the talk turned to arts and crafts, co-ops, social problems, and preservation of the Papago culture. Baboquivari, for example, wanted a school for the training of juvenile officers to deal with the delinquency problem.

The CAP Committee then made a final write-up and forwarded it to Washington. The Tribal Council approved the work of the Committee on 20 September.

Dr. Roessel called the Papago Tribal Office in Sells on 23 November to say that the Committee now had to work out budgets and priorities for the components.

On 23 November, the CAP Committee learned from newspaper and television reports that the Educational Survey and the Remedial English components had been funded in the amount of \$29,500. Several days later a letter of approval was received. None of the people on the CAP Committee read the letter thoroughly, since it appeared to be identical to the newspaper announcement. Some time later, Dr. Irving W. Stout, of the Department of Education at Arizona State University, visited the reservation to see what was holding up implementation of the Educational Survey. He was handed the letter of approval from OEO, which he read in its entirety. Dr. Stout pointed out that the second page of the letter was a request for the Papago Tribe to formally acknowledge willingness to accept OEO funds.

The CAP Committee had held meetings in the districts and on this basis presented a tentative program to the Tribal Council on 25 September 1964. The Educational Survey was one of the proposals approved by the Council. The proposal was approved on 25 October by OEO Washington, and on 4 December, Arizona State University signed the contract to direct the survey. The survey team consisted on Dr. Irving Stout of ASU, Josiah Moore, then Education Consultant to the Papago Tribe, and four Papago assistants. The survey began on 28 January 1965, with a meeting of the Tribal Council, the CAP Committee, and the survey team.

The survey covered the majority of villages and all districts of the reservation. The Tribal Council stated the *raison d'être* of the CAP Committee and Educational survey as follows:

The special committee that the Council appointed feels that this survey is necessary because false starts have been made in the past with an unwise expenditure of money due to an inadequate assessment of needs and inadequate preparation.

One of the survey workers said that in some areas people would not give the information wanted and in other areas they were rather skeptical. She cited San Xavier; someone said to her, "Where are the white people? Did they get tired of taking surveys?" On the basis of the survey, recommendations were submitted to

the Tribal Council. The report explained that, "Some of these recommendations will necessitate proposals to the OEO. Some suggest explanations which will lead undoubtedly to proposals later. Some are for steps that can be taken without the necessity for a proposal, at least not at this time." The recommendations were all aimed at improving opportunities on the reservation as "the people have been practically unanimous in their desire to live on the reservation." The recommendations of the survey included proposals for: an economic, legal, and engineering audit; a work study program; keeping records of bulls and their progeny; a self-help training program; tribal action in marketing Indian-made baskets; management training; pre-schools and parent-child centers; adult education; developing community action; workshops for councilmen; and recreation.

The final statements of the survey reaffirmed the basic philosophy of OEO and the dominant feeling of Papago leaders. "The survey was one step in meeting the needs of the people—an opportunity for them to look into their own needs, offer their own suggestions—and to begin planning for how to do it. The success of the program in the various villages will depend on their being allowed to do this, no matter how slow it may be, this is the only way to have whatever is done genuine community action."

The CAP Committee met on 5 March 1965 to discuss electing a new Chairman. The membership felt that the present Chairman had not maintained his interest in the Committee. At the 5 March meeting, the Committee asked for the Chairman's resignation and elected Josiah Moore in his place. Moore later became Assistant CAP Director and NYC Director for the Papago CAP.

Confusion arose two weeks after the election of the new Chairman when the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Los Angeles Branch, wrote to the former Chairman, informing him that a letter of credit had been established through the Bank in the name of the Papago Tribe, and asking him why no payment vouchers had been drawn against it during the period 19 February to 11 March 1965. When this communication went unanswered, the Bank wrote the former Chairman again. This time the new Chairman, Josiah Moore, answered the letter, pointing out that no information had been received from OEO that such a letter of credit existed. He applied to OEO for authority to sign payment vouchers in place of his predecessor. It took two months of correspondence to straighten out this matter.

During March 1965 the second round of proposals was submitted to OEO Washington. Component One involved the establishment of an administrative office for CAP. The Component Two application was for a survey of cultural resources, which was deferred. Also deferred was Component Three—Leadership Training. Component Four was a counselling service for Papago school children and dropouts. Component Five was Parent-Child Centers and Six was Pre-School. The last three—Counseling, Pre-School, and Parent-Child Centers—were granted funding in August 1965.

The CAP Administration requested BIA assistance with bookkeeping and legal problems in June 1965. There is no indication that the BIA actually gave the help requested, and eventually the CAP Administration retained a lawyer and a bookkeeping firm.

With the funding of the programs in August, the Papago CAP was notified, through the Tribal Chairman, that supplies could be ordered from the Federal Supply Service. Hiring of personnel began in the fall of 1965.

The CAP directorship was given to Tom Segundo, former Tribal Chairman. Segundo, between his time as Tribal Chairman and CAP Director, had been studying at the University of Chicago under Sol Tax and working as a civil engineer. He arrived in Sells on 13 September.

Josiah Moore, Chairman of the CAP Committee, was appointed Assistant Director. Segundo and Moore attended a three-week CAP Directors' training session, begun on 20 September under the sponsorship of the Indian Community Action Center at Arizona State University.

On 13 September Mrs. Lea C. Masters arrived in Sells to take charge of the Parent-Child and Pre-School programs. Mrs. Masters had been a professor of child development at the University of Alabama. She had also worked for the Government, developing Pre-School Centers, and had served as consultant to Operation Head Start in Washington, D.C. Mrs. Masters selected the personnel to run the Parent-Child and Pre-School Centers in Sells and Santa Rosa.

In November 1965, the CAP Director received information that the head of the Community Action Program for OEO was dissatisfied with the rate at

which proposals were coming in to his office from Indian reservations. It was his suggestion that a team be sent out from Washington to help the Indians speed up their work in organizing and planning the CAP programs. The CAP Director understood that this was to be a "crash" program. The Indian Community Action Center (ICAC) had already been established at Arizona State University in Tempe and an ICAC Technical Assistant contacted the Papago Reservation with the request that they rush the preparation of the CAP proposals.

In December 1965, the Papago CAP Director summed up the situation as follows: The CAP office on the reservation will be in charge of the conduct of the program and the administration of programs.

1. There is a counseling program authorized and financed but it has not yet started for lack of personnel.

2. There is a proposal for community leadership training but this has been deferred.

3. There was a proposal for a study of cultural resources on the reservation.

4. They are now in process of preparing a proposal for community development in Papago villages.

5. They also plan to write a proposal which would provide legal aid for members of the Papago Tribe.

6. The Remedial Reading program authorized in the first round of proposals has been financed, but for lack of personnel the project has not started.

Arizona State University (ASU) had promised to help find support and staff for remedial classes. There was implied help from ASU in direction and staff for this program and others. Since the ICAC has been established, this promise of help has been restated by ICAC personnel.

In December 1965, the CAP Director tried to find someone to teach remedial reading through ASU, the University of Arizona, teacher placement agencies in Phoenix, other CAP directors, individuals, and people at the universities. The CAA hired a teacher in January, prepared to start at Santa Rosa. The BIA School Director and the Santa Rosa School principal said now there was no room. The BIA contributed special items such as office furniture but has not provided space.

There was an attempt to submit a proposal for a legal aid component which was to be prepared by the Tribal Attorney. He turned this over to a woman who does public relations work. The woman wrote a proposal which was a plagiarized version of a report on the Papago prepared for BIA by the University of Arizona Bureau of Ethnic Research. This was submitted to Dr. Roessel and to Josiah Moore.

The Indian Community Action Center (ICAC) was asked for help in finding a Remedial School teacher and a counsellor. They gave referrals and helped in getting information on buying trailer units.

On 14 January 1966, the CAP directors of Indian reservations in Arizona, in their regular monthly meeting at the CAP office in Salt River, Arizona, discussed mutual problems. The Indian Desk Program Analyst for OEO, Dr. James Wilson, addressed the meetings, setting forth OEO policy respecting the preparation of new proposals. The next day, the Papago CAP Administrative staff, the Papago Tribal Chairman, and the Papago Tribal Attorney conferred with the OEO representative on the subject of contracting for the services of a lawyer and an accountant on a full-time basis. It was proposed that the Tribal Attorney be hired to handle CAP's legal matters and the accountants for the Papago Tribe be retained to manage the CAP books. The representative pointed out that OEO guidelines did not allow for the reimbursement of consultants for professional and technical services except on an "as performed" basis.

The relationship between the Papago Community Action Agency, the BIA, the ICAC, and the Indian Desk of OEO at this time may be illustrated by the following report of the Tribal Chairman to the Papago Tribal Council on 4 March 1966:

Trip to Washington, D.C.—This trip was made in regard to the OEO Community Action Program. At the beginning of this program we were told there were people in Tempe who would help us with our proposals if we needed help. Now it is getting to the point that they are just like other departments who feel that they should dominate us and keep us from making out our own proposals.

When Mr. Segundo came, he found that the financial records needed to be checked by an auditor so he set aside some money for accounting and for an attorney. The amount of work involved under this program makes it necessary

for this type of legal and accounting assistance. When Mr. James Wilson came, we talked to him about this and he did not like the idea of hiring an attorney and consultants. So when Roy Elson from Senator Hayden's office came to Tucson, Mr. Berger talked to him and explained to him what we had done. Later a letter from the Washington OEO came to the Papago Tribal OEO stating that only \$400 would be set aside for such services. Mr. Elson suggested that the Tribal Attorney and one of the tribal leaders should go to Washington. When we got there, Roy Elson had already arranged for us to see Mr. Kent Watkins, who is also working in the Senator's office. We were told that there were some people talking to him. We waited a while and when they came out, it was the people from the OEO in Tempe. Mr. Berger explained to Mr. Elson that these people were the cause of our problems. After they left, we talked to Roy Elson and Mr. Watkins. We told them that we needed help. Mr. Watkins said that he would talk to Dr. Roessel. We also told him that of the men appointed to help us, none of them are attorneys or accountants. This is serious business when you are handling Government funds; that is why we need these accountants.

We listened to him while he talked to Dr. Roessel, and he said that they did not care if the Tribe wanted to hire the accountants or attorney. Congress is now trying to relocate the OEO headquarters for the Southwest Areas in San Francisco. That is why we felt they were probably in fear of getting a cut in their funds. We know that at the end of the fiscal year whatever portion is not used of the money will have to be returned. The committee from Tempe is constantly asking us to call on them. If we don't ask them to work for us they will have money to send back.

It was arranged by Mr. Kent Watkins that we meet with the high officials of the OEO, including Warren Cardwell, Head of the Indian Section, and Jim Wilson,* Southwest Indian Program Analyst and also liaison man between the Congress and the OEO Office. All these men came together and it seems that it was already decided that there would be no change in their decision to permit the Papago OEO Office to contract for accounting, auditing and legal services, and that only \$400 could be set aside for accounting and legal services each. Mr. Watkins stated to us that from now on I will keep track of any more money being asked for this office for attorneys and accountants. We were also informed that Barry De Rose was not working for this group in Tempe.

There will be a legal aide who will visit the reservation to help the people with their legal problems, social security and welfare problems. Someday we will have such a person on this reservation. We told Mr. Watkins about our proposal and he said, "if you will send it in, I will push it from here!"

We also met with men in the Mining Department and asked why they are holding up the Newmont Mining proposal. The men in this office must have been there a long time and forgot all they ever knew about minerals. They could not see why this company would want to turn loose with that kind of money. We informed them that the Bureau of Indian Affairs office was going to settle for only \$10,000 bonus, but the Mining Consultant had advised us to ask for \$50,000; if we find that the claims in their area are already invalid, we will get \$100,000 and get royalties from this also.

Mr. David Jones stated, "I will go to New York and find out why this company wants to put up this amount of money when they do not know what is under this ground."

The Tribal Attorney replied, "You don't care anything about the Papagos because you don't want to do anything about this. This is the only source of revenue that will help the Papago people."

In May 1966, three teachers were hired for Counseling and for Remedial Reading. They began work on 10 May, two weeks before the close of the school year.

Through the spring of 1966, the Director and other members of the CAP staff attended district meetings around the reservation to discuss CAP proposals. The Councilmen heard monthly reports on CAP developments at the monthly Tribal Council meetings, where the CAP Director and Assistant Director gave regular reports.

c. Current Status of CAP

(1) *CAP as Part of Tribal Government.*—The Papagos officially became a Tribe with ratification of the Constitution of 1937. Before that time, when necessary, tribal action was conducted by essentially self-appointed *ad hoc* committees

* Dr. James Wilson has replaced Warren Cardwell as Head of the Indian Section. Cardwell is now with the Indian Health Division of the PHS.

made up of village leaders. The only formal units of government were the village councils, composed of elders who planned all village events, made judgments about social behavior, and meted out punishments. Decisions were made by a group of men and no single individual was formally responsible for all decisions.

Councilmen represented a cluster of kin-related villages, and the larger, older villages had leaders who dominated the council. This domination, however, was simply a result of the fact that larger villages had more people and more social ceremonial events to organize. Today it is still necessary to deal with village councils, despite the fact that tribal and district councils have been invented to expedite the information-getting and decision-making processes.

According to the Papago constitution, eleven districts are represented by two councilmen each in the Papago Tribal Council. These are selected in any manner the people of each district wish. Each of the eleven districts in turn elects a district council of at least five members, each serving for two years. From the membership of the district council one person is appointed Chairman. The district council manages all affairs within district boundaries, but issues involving more than one district are decided by the Tribal Council.

District councils seldom initiate action. They report and evaluate intended proposals.

The Tribal Council has the right to define membership, administer tribal law, levy taxes, and handle its own finances. But in all other spheres the Superintendent of the reservation has final authority.

On the reservation, Papagos are subject to Federal law in regard to ten major crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, larceny, incest, and robbery. All other offenses are dealt with according to tribal law.

The Papago Code of Law and Order, drawn up by a committee of the Tribal Council and approved in 1945, is mainly a codification of the old laws and customs of the people. However, it includes several white innovations.

On the reservation, law is administered by a tribal court and enforced by Indian police. Indian judges are appointed with approval of the Superintendent. Although the constitution provides for three judges, there is only one at present. Half of her salary is paid for by the BIA. Many difficulties are settled within the family without recourse to law, or are taken to village courts.

Since 1965, agency and council officials have been attempting to streamline the constitution so that more authority may be entrusted to the Tribal Council.

The CAP Committee went to the District Council to explain OEO during 1964. It was over a year before the CAP Administration was ready to return to the district level with its programs. The CAP Director met regularly with the Tribal Council to report on progress, but the Director did not meet with the district councils until May 1966.

Members of the Tribal Council have not demonstrated the understanding of CAP that would be expected after the number of meetings they have attended. Minutes of Council meetings confirm that detailed explanations have been given. Council members have expressed general indifference to the programs.

The CAP Administration told the Tribal Council in May 1966 that it was then prepared and would welcome invitations to speak to district council meetings. The majority of districts responded with invitations and the CAP administrators have begun their visits to these districts.

The CAP Director called an orientation meeting June 23-24 to which Tribal and district council members were invited, along with any other reservation residents. The two-day meeting was devoted to re-discussing OEO structure in Washington and on the reservation, the history and aims of CAP, and the desire for increased communication with the local villages. The orientation was sponsored by the ICAC and a number of ICAC representatives spoke at the meeting. All discussions were translated into Papago.

The CAP Director discussed the need for an OEO Board of Directors which would be a direct line of communication to the grass-roots. Speaking of the history of the Papago CAP, the Director explained the early CAP proposals were based on the findings of the Educational Survey conducted by the Education Department of Arizona State University. He told the group that he hoped they would go home and think about what had been done and said. He said that they were "running out of time during this orientation," and he hoped "they could return later with suggestions and help him think out his programs."




FIGURE 2. Organization of Papago CAP (Chart 1)

A second round of orientation meetings were subsequently scheduled for 30 June and 1 July. At the 30 June meeting the CAP Director discussed the proposed Board of Directors and their roles. The CAP Director made use of Chart 1 (Figure 2, page 125) to illustrate. As seen on this chart, the Papago Tribe represents both the district councils and the Tribal Council. The Board of Directors is seen as having a liaison function with the people in relation to the CAP staff. Each Director on the Board would be responsible for one component. As shown in Chart 1, each component was described as one element in the total community development scheme. The CAP Director advised the Councilmen to "take this back to your people and explain it to them—study this Board of Directors and decide to try to get the best person you can to represent you."

The CAP Director illustrated communication patterns with a flow chart as shown in Chart 2 (Figure 3, page 126). The community development workers would have the key position in facilitating the two-way communication between the village people, the tribal government, and the CAP Administration. This proposed structure was also presented to the Council members at the second orientation. They were instructed to return to the villages and districts with these new ideas. He said, "Things are happening slowly; whatever we accomplish will be for the benefit of the people."




FIGURE 3. Communication Patterns Prior to Submission of Proposals to OEO by Papago CAP (Chart 2)

(2) *Papago OEO Proposals—Component Project 1: Education Survey—\$17,065.00.*—The Education Survey came out of the September 1964 meetings of the Papago CAP Committee. The present CAP Director said that there had been much discussion in the meetings about educational programs.

This line of discussion, he thought, arose from the fact that the CAP Committee was originally a Tribal Education Committee, and from the frequent presence of ASU Education Department staff at these meetings. He said that he protested against this exclusive education focus, because there was no reliable information on which to base programs.

The idea of the Education Survey was then introduced by an ASU Education Department member present at this discussion. This ASU staff member said he had conducted such a survey some years before, on the Papago Reservation, and felt that he could aid the CAP Committee in developing a survey program, and then direct the survey operation. The Committee went to ASU to meet with the Director of the Educational Research and Testing Center. There was agreement between the CAP Committee and the ASU people that ASU would contract to carry out the proposed survey.

The program component was written by ASU staff and sent to Sells for Committee approval, and after approval was sent in to OEO as one of the first proposals made by the Papago CAP.

The survey program was submitted late in September 1964, then resubmitted in revised form in November.

The survey was carried out during a four-month period, February to May 1965. Two ASU staff members directed the work, with four Papago CAP Committee members as the survey workers.

The survey results were presented in a publication entitled "The Papago Education Survey."

Component Project 2: Remedial English Program—\$21,850.00.—This project was developed at the same time as the Education Survey. It is not clear who pre-

sented the idea for this program proposal, but the influence of the ASU Education Department people may be supposed to have contributed to some degree in drawing it up.

The program was funded at the same time as the Educational Survey, but implementation after funds were available was quite different. The Remedial English Program did not go into operation until June 1966.

In November 1965 the Papago CAP Director explained to an ICAC technical assistance staff member that the cause for the long delay had been that the Tribal Council and CAP Committee had been insisting on having Papagos fill all jobs in the Remedial English Program. However, no qualified Papagos had filed applications. The CAP Director was able to hire a qualified non-Indian teacher in late January 1966 through a teachers employment agency in Phoenix. The teacher was hired, but did not return to the reservation and was finally terminated. A second teacher was hired through the same employment agency in May 1966 and began work in June.

Problems manifest in implementing this program component include :

(1) Papago Tribal insistence on hiring Papagos, even though none of the qualified Papagos would quit their jobs to take this one.

(2) The space problem was raised as a point of dissension between CAP and BIA. Approval for Remedial English Centers in BIA schools had been obtained at the time of program application and was reaffirmed in conversations between CAP staff and administrators of BIA schools. However, when the teacher was hired in January and a program appeared to be ready to begin, space was not available for the work in the BIA schools. The BIA school people said this was because the schools were overcrowded. The Papago CAP people said that they had a feeling that the BIA school administrators talked cooperation with no intention of actual compliance.

(3) The problem of getting qualified professional people to take jobs in the relatively isolated small reservation communities also retarded the program.

Component Project 7-1: CAP Development Office—\$26,112.00.—This component provides for administrative services, with a director and an assistant director. The proposal was developed during CAP Committee meetings in the fall of 1964. The reasons for a later (March 1964) submission date relate to slowdown in CAP Committee activity after October 1964.

Provision for this component was made in the 5 September 1964 Tribal Council resolution creating the CAP Committee. The resolution provided for the Committee to hire a director and such other staff as necessary.

The resolution, as has been noted elsewhere, was prepared at the suggestion of Dr. Robert Roessel. This component thus reflects the Committee view as influenced by the advice of Dr. Roessel.

Component Project 3: Papago Counseling Service—\$25,056.00.—This component came out of fall 1964 CAP Committee activity. Arizona State University Education Department members and the Sells Public School Principal aided the CAP Committee in preparation of this proposal.

The Tribal Chairman, who was on the 1964 CAP Committee, the Tribal Educational Consultant, and the Tribal Attorney, together made a trip to the Washington offices of OEO in late July of 1965 to find out what had happened to the project proposals that had been sent to Washington in March. They said that they had not received any communication from the Indian Desk since April. During March and April they had several telephone conversations with the Program Analyst, but this line of communication closed.

The first visit in Washington was to the office of Arizona Senator Carl Hayden. The second was to the BIA. The third was to the OEO Indian Desk. Regarding the latter, they stated that the Program Analyst told them that the Papago programs were being held up because here was nothing written into the proposals about integrating minority groups in the Papago program. The Tribal Chairman told him that there are no minority groups on the reservation. There are some Mexican residents married to Papagos, but only three or four and these are considered as belonging to the Tribe. The visit was inconclusive as far as the Papago delegation was concerned.

On the following day the delegation again visited the offices of Senator Hayden and the BIA, requesting advice on what to do about breaking the apparent impasse at the OEO Indian Desk. On the third day of this visit, the Papago delegation was informed by Senator Hayden's office that an announcement of funding for the Papago CAP would be made within two days. The Papago group returned

to Arizona in the afternoon and two days later the announcement of funding was made.

The operational path of this component is the same as that of the Remedial English Program. In November 1965 an ICAC Technical Assistant specialist came to Sells to urge action on the Remedial English and Counseling programs.

In January 1966 a husband and wife team was hired for Remedial English and Counseling. This team failed to appear and a second husband and wife team was hired for these programs in May 1966, beginning work in June.

Component Project 2: Papago Cultural Resource—\$18,039.00. No Funding.—This component proposal is another product of fall 1964 CAP Committee work. Dr. Robert Roessel, with Nicholas Lee, Principal of the Sells Public School in 1964-65, worked with the Committee on this proposal.

The idea of a tribal collection of ethnographical material has been discussed by Papago groups at various times over the past twelve years, as evidenced by Bureau of Ethnic Research records.

The attempt to obtain OEO financing for a Papago ethnographic center was unsuccessful, according to one CAP Committee member, because the 1964 CAP Committee Chairman became angered when a Sells Public School teacher expressed interest in participating in order to obtain an M.A. The chairman is said to have refused to continue Committee efforts to make proposal revisions recommended by Dr. Roessel.

Component Project 4: Community Parent-Child Centers—\$43,837.00.—This component was prepared by Dr. Grace Langdon, of the ASU Education Department, who has been interested in this type of center for many years.

This component was funded in August 1965. Mrs. Lea C. Masters was hired as Director of these centers and the Pre-Schools.

The Parent-Child Center, as written in the proposal, seems to have been designed on an urban settlement house pattern complete with a social worker. The social worker position, it should be noted, was added in a revision suggested by the OEO Indian Desk.

The two Centers established in Sells and Santa Rosa were delayed until December 1965 due to some problem in a frozen bank account, which was unfrozen through special appeal to the Arizona senatorial delegation.

The two Centers have become popular among Papago women as places to cut and sew clothing for their families and are, in fact, known as "the sewing centers" to all Papago women interviewed in the course of the present study. None of those interviewed recognized the term Parent-Child Center. Success of this component would therefore seem to be related to the stated need of all women interviewed, to have some place where village women can go to sew family clothing with access to sewing machines. The very modest beginning of the Parent-Child Centers did not offer anything beyond a sewing center, and this was precisely what was wanted by the Papago women.

Component Project 7-2: Community Parent-Child Centers—\$118,127.00.—The request for this component involves an on-going extended Parent-Child Center program. Specifically it requests three more units in addition to the two now in existence at Santa Rosa and Sells. These would be located at Chuichu, Pisinimo, and San Xavier.

Component Project 5: Pre-School Center—\$44,127.00.—This proposal is one of the ASU-prepared programs and seems to be an OEO package deal.

Interviews of reservation residents found no one who classified nursery schools as a prime need for the reservation.

It is not clear why only two schools were proposed, rather than schools for all the major population centers. Certainly the two, one in Sells, the other at Santa Rosa, caused resentment in the other villages. The feeling was that Sells and Santa Rosa get everything, and that other communities are forgotten.

The Pre-Schools, while not originally a Papago idea, have achieved popular acceptance, and continuance and expansion of the Pre-Schools component would be well received in all areas.

Component Project 6: Leadership Workshop for Potential Leaders and Tribal Council Members—\$14,419. No Funding.—This proposal requested funds for two projects: a one-week workshop for Tribal Councilmen, and a three-week workshop for unidentified "potential leaders." Since the original proposal in which the programs were evidently set out in detail was not available, it is not possible to comment on the proposal. A copy of an addendum to the proposal is available, however, indicating that Dr. Robert Roessel relayed to the CAP Committee a request from OEO for additional information.

(3) *Current Status.*—The current status of the Papago Community Action Agency is a direct reflection of the current status of Papago tribal government.

To review that status, the BIA retains either direct or indirect control over all major categories of activity. Insofar as local affairs are outside the sphere of BIA concern, the Papago district and village councils are in control. The Tribal Council structure occupies a position somewhere between the BIA Administration and the local councils. This position, at present, is much closer to the local councils than to the BIA.

The Community Action Agency reflects this position. The CAP Administrator and the Tribal Chairman, acting together, keep CAP matters away from possible involvement with the BIA.

This enmeshing of CAP, Tribal Council, and the local leadership may be leading toward the general Papago acceptance of a reservation-wide development program. It is apparent that there is a general atmosphere of readiness, as evidenced by the following interview excerpts:

"Right now the Papago are at their lowest ebb. The people want to do something different, they want to do something better, but there just doesn't seem to be any avenue for improvement. In the district here, there are few opportunities, and their work outside the reservation in the cotton fields is diminishing every year. Machines are doing so much agriculture work that there is less and less need for very many farm workers. Something could be done right here in the district on a rather simple level in improving the flood-water farming which is done through some sort of a Peace Corps-type project in which the farmers could be helped in selecting better varieties and perhaps more crops, and helping them to get a tractor. Now farming is done in the old style with a horse and a plow, with a hoe and a shovel. If perhaps there was even one tractor this would enable them to farm faster than they can do now. If there was someone right here to help them all the time this would improve things. If there was some way of getting insecticides in to spray grasshoppers when they are just about to eat up the crop, and if there was someone to show them how to use te insecticides. If there were ways of getting more adequate irrigation to the crops, this would be on a very simple level, but this would be something that would reach the people on a level where they are able to understand it and be able to profit from it.

"The fact that the Papagos are at their lowest ebb offers an opportunity for some real projects to be started with their complete cooperation to bring some change about. But if something isn't done soon, the opportunity will have passed and the people in this area, at least, will be completely disintegrated as far as any sort of a cohesive group. There is already a developing problem, not only in the problem of sobriety, but in the disintegrating family unit.

"Men are not able to make a living for a family and wander on and off the reservation looking for work here and there without any great success, leaving their wives and children in the villages sometimes, sometimes taking them with them. The family unit is becoming quite fragile, homes are breaking up easily, children are left with grandparents or with some other relatives in the village while the parents are off somewhere else, perhaps never to return. Any kind of program would be accepted. The present one with the sewing class once a month is well received but it does not happen often enough. The women are ready to work in some kind of program or programs all the time, rather than just once a month. The NYC program last summer was a real life-saver for many families. The Head Start and other such school-level things will be ineffectual because families will be gone. Those families who do remain will be those with cattle and farms who are better off than those who are going to be forced to migrate. Those who are the worst off will then simply become more so."

The four days of orientation meetings in Sells, and the CAP administrators' meetings with local councils, have developed an atmosphere or readiness for change programs. However, the avoidance of official agencies has meant that assistance in preparing program proposals has also been avoided. Originally, the Papago program proposals were, to a considerable extent, prepared by ASU staff members. Later, ICAC technical assistants were frequently called upon for advice. The avoidance of this assistance has contributed to a slowdown in program proposal submission and particularly in submission of proposals written in acceptable OEO form.

At the present time, July 1966, the Papago Community Action Program has five components in operation. All five are operating on OEO funds granted eighteen months ago, all having had several extensions.

There is a Legal Aid component in process which has not yet been received by the OEO Indian Desk. There are no other proposals pending OEO action.

The Papago CAP staff is working on eight new proposals, but none are yet in submission form. These are:

1. Community Development Program.
2. Homemaking Component.
3. Leadership Training.
4. Legal Aid.
5. Tribal Enterprise.
6. Work Training.
7. Recreation.
8. Radio Program.

If the CAP Administration can succeed in obtaining funds for their hoped-for total of fifteen components in operation, the evolving general acceptance of change programs may lead to a major self-directed Papago development program.

d. CAP and Other Agencies

(1) *CAP—ICAC*.—The relationship between the Papago CAA and the ICAC has vacillated between close reliance upon the ICAC to complete Papago independence from the ICAC.

During the early stages of the Papago CAP (fall 1964 to September 1965), responsibility for the program rested upon the Papago CAP Committee, which worked closely with ICAC. The CAP Committee met on a once-a-month basis during most of this time.

The CAP Committee conducted an Educational Survey during 1965 under the direction of ASU consultants. The new CAP Director went to a Directors' training program and the Teacher-Aides went to an Aides' training session, conducted by ICAC in the fall of 1965. The close reliance on the ICAC continued until February 1966. Then from March to May 1966, the Papago CAP maintained an independent stance, with minimal contact through an ICAC community development intern. There were no requests for the ICAC technical assistance.

In June 1966, the ICAC was contacted by the Papago CAA for advice on preparation of a new legal services component. Shortly after this visit, the CAP Director requested ICAC sponsorship of a two-day orientation session for the Papago Tribal Council and the District Council members. The session was to orient the councils on the OEO Community Action Program. Members of the ICAC staff took part in the orientation session as resource persons.

During June 1966, the Pre-School Teachers and Teacher-Aides went to Fort Apache for the ASU training session.

(2) *CAP—BIA*.—A description of interaction between the Community Action Agency and the BIA must consider historical Papago attitudes toward the Agency. The dominant trends can be characterized in three stages.

Between 1915 and 1945 the Papagos, through the traditional village leaders, tried to block all Agency moves. Specifically, the Papagos opposed the Agency's plans for range management, well drilling, the draft policy of World Wars I and II. The antipathy was not directed at the purposes of the programs, but at the imposition of outside force on the Papago villages. During the two Wars, the village leaders told the local youth to resist the draft, since they were not a Papago concern. The result during World War I was forced registration, carried out by a United States Marshal at the request of the Indian Agent.

The above situation typifies the relationship between the Indian leadership and the Agency until the 1940's. The Papagos lost every battle to the Indian Agent, and during the 1940's they capitulated. The attitude of direct antagonism gave way to an "Uncle Tom" approach. The Tribal Council members became yes-men for the BIA. Members of the Tribe who were forced to deal with the outside world cooperated with the Agency. Those who could avoid contact continued to live as they had traditionally, ignoring the activities of the Agency.

The third stage has been a recent reaction against this behavior. Some younger men have been aggressively antagonistic toward the BIA. The Tribal Council has swung away from a policy of cooperation to one of avoiding the BIA. The CAP Administration and the Tribal Council systematically avoid involving the BIA in project planning. The CAP Administration intends that their program will be totally Papago. As a result the BIA has not been invited to participate.

The BIA at the Papago Reservation began preparing proposals for OEO in

1964, but did not inform the Tribal Council of these plans. The Tribal Education Committee then took over and drafted the OEO program proposals at Dr. Roesel's suggestion.

A recurrent and confusing problem began when the OEO proposals and the BIA Ten-Year-Plan were presented at the same meeting. The CAP Administration has been forced to spend considerable time unraveling this confusion. Most informants reported they now had a clearer picture of CAP activities but it had taken some time for them to distinguish CAP from BIA. Some informants reported that CAP had been slowed because people thought CAP was a BIA program, traditional resentment of BIA being initially directed at OEO. This had to be cleared up before CAP could gain support on the reservation.

BIA employees interviewed in the present study acknowledged this confusion but expressed a desire to see cooperation. The BIA employees felt that any interaction between the two agencies depends on CAP. The reluctance of the CAP Administration to involve the BIA has been maintained out of the belief that still more confusion might arise and CAP might be condemned by those who are hostile to the BIA.

The CAP policy of non-involvement with BIA has given rise to criticisms from within the BIA. Most critical remarks have been aimed at specific programs and the BIA informants report a willingness to cooperate with CAP, if asked. As one BIA employee said, "The BIA has adopted an attitude of 'you have to come to me if you want anything from me.'" He said, "I'm not going to bug them to accept my help." This individual spoke favorably of CAP projects but could not understand why CAP was ignoring BIA. This lack of understanding of the problems of CAP-BIA communication was evident among all BIA personnel interviewed. Papago informants felt it best that the situation remain as is.

A members of the CAP Committee explained the situation as he saw it:

"BIA seemed resentful of the Papagos being solely responsible for the money used to finance OEO. They seemed to think all funds are better channeled through them, but it has been a good thing for the people to handle their own finances, and they are making it work."

(3) *CAP-PHS*.—Papago CAP-PHS interaction has been minimal. The long-time antagonism between the people and BIA also holds for PHS. CAP has been forced to take its independent stance in order to reach the most people. Since CAP has not consulted with PHS, some PHS employees have become increasingly hostile toward CAP.

The Papagos are critical of the quality of PHS service and the lack of cross-cultural understanding on the part of PHS personnel. The researchers encountered frequent complaints about the ambulance service, for example. One informant said, "You don't dare get sick except on the scheduled days. If you are sick on the day the ambulance is not scheduled to come, you'd better get well fast."

Criticisms are also directed at the PHS field nurses for not understanding Papago ways. Demands made by the nurses, while often appearing sensible to an Anglo, are often new to a Papago. When the PHS nurses express impatience with people who do not readily accept their suggestions, the people classify the nurses as undesirable. Similarly, doctors who disparage the *Ma-kai* (traditional diagnosticians) do not find themselves welcomed in traditional villages.

These are the factors that have widened the gap between PHS and the reservation population and therefore limited CAP-PHS cooperation. PHS provided physical examinations for the Pre-School children. There has also been some discussion of PHS participating in future orientation programs for new CAP employees. PHS and CAP administrators are hopeful that the community development workers will be able to serve as links in the communication between PHS and the villages.

(4) *CAP-VISTA*.—The two VISTA girls on the Papago Reservation have devoted most of their time to the General Education Development Program to enable high school dropouts to earn equivalency diplomas. Students who cannot get into Sells to attend classes are tutored in their homes by VISTA workers. The names of most of the students contacted by VISTA were obtained from the rolls of NYC. To date, three persons tutored by VISTA workers have earned diplomas, and one has gone on to higher education. Volunteers have organized informal physical education classes in Sells for girls at the junior high level, and helped with the NYC bookkeeping after the NYC accountant died in an automobile accident. One of the VISTA girls has been asked to work as a

counselor at two camp sessions to be held at Baboquivari on the Papago Reservation.

The VISTA workers have assiduously avoided being identified with the BIA. They feel that it is important to go about their work unobtrusively.

So long as VISTA workers show creativity and initiative in starting worthwhile projects, it is felt that the program should not be put directly under the supervision of CAP. The VISTA girls at Sells go to Josiah Moore, Assistant CAP Director and NYC Project Director, whenever they are in need of advice.

One of the VISTA volunteers expressed the view that if VISTAs are going to be assigned to an Indian reservation such as that of the Papago where many do not speak English, instruction should definitely be given in the language, culture and history of the people among whom they are to work.

(5) *CAP—Head Start.*—The Head Start Program began in the summer of 1965 with 312 children and fifty-two administrative and teaching personnel. There was a medical and dental checkup program provided by PHS. The BIA and Franciscan Missions provided the schoolrooms.

Problems in administration and communication were acute due to great distances between the ten schools. This was mentioned by several of the Anglo teachers who felt that a better integrated and coordinated program would have been more beneficial. The teachers were particularly dissatisfied with the administration, especially concerning supplies. Specifically, they blamed the principal, whom they said was "the major obstacle of the entire program." Everyone concerned was very pleased with the use of Papago assistants. The white personnel involved said these assistants were very capable and their interest was very high. It was also mentioned that the use of men was very beneficial to the program.

The Indian/non-Indian community is clearly divided in reaction to Head Start. The Indians and the Catholic missionaries felt the program was doing an excellent job. The Indian families felt that it was preparing their children for school. This was substantiated by some of the Sisters at the Mission School who said that "the Head Start children are more open in their outlook than those who did not participate," and if there were to be a program next summer, "it will be welcomed."

The opposition is from the BIA and the Protestant missionary groups. The BIA people feel it is a haphazard effort and has no real value in the outlying communities where "the children are not prepared for it." This is in direct contrast to comments by several Indians who feel that children in the outlying areas need this exposure the most, since "the children in Sells are already exposed to Anglo ways and the English language."

The Protestant missionaries expressed the belief that there is widespread dissatisfaction with Head Start because of a bus accident at the end of the summer of 1965. There is almost universal agreement among Indians and Anglos that the long field trips were not satisfactory, but the Protestant missionaries feel that this was just another example of a "play-school atmosphere." They also commented that the Indians used the Head Start schools primarily for baby sitting.

The Head Start bus accident created some difficulty for the instigation of the Pre-School in Santa Rosa because people confused the two programs and were afraid there might be a repetition of this situation. In the villages where Head Start schools were operating, there was a misunderstanding when they were discontinued while Pre-Schools were started in Santa Rosa and Sells. They felt that they were being left out, not realizing the Pre-School and Head Start are different programs.

There is a strong feeling among the Anglo teachers that anyone who would work in Head Start should be either "totally untrained in education, or trained for a Pre-School situation—not elementary school teachers as they are too rigid." They also felt that more Indian assistants or teachers should be used because "they establish better rapport."

(6) *CAP—NYC.*—During March 1965 the reservation Superintendent formed an ad hoc committee to discuss youth problems. The Chief of the Land Management Section of the BIA was placed in charge and work was begun on a plan for NYC. Only one Papago was a member of this committee—The Vice Chairman of the Tribal Council. The Land Management Chief and the Vice Chairman went to Phoenix where the NYC program was explained to them.

At that point the CAP Committee formed their own group and stated that any youth program would have to be a tribal program. The original committee

called by the Superintendent was then dissolved and the Land Management Chief brought all the NYC material that had been gathered to the CAP Committee and stated that he would be glad to work with them.

An NYC project officer was at the BIA office in Phoenix in April to accept proposals. Five CAP Committee members and the Land Management Chief brought him an incomplete proposal. The project officer then excluded the Land Management Chief from the discussions and met only with the CAP Committeemen.

A few days later, with the help of an administrative assistant from the BIA, the proposal was completed and submitted, but the Land Management Chief was frozen out of further NYC sessions by the CAP Committee.

Most reservation residents agree that NYC is a good thing. It results in an income that would not be forthcoming at all in some families, and has helped prevent disruption of families moving off the reservation to the cotton field in summer. In some cases a young person may make more money than the head of a household, and may be the sole support of the family. This fact has prompted at least one person to suggest that the upper age limit be expanded to thirty.

Complaints concerning NYC fall into four categories:

(1) There is not enough supervision. This seems to depend to a great extent on the abilities of the village headman, who usually directs the NYC in the area. In some villages there is excellent supervision; in others it is poor or non-existent.

(2) There are not enough jobs. Due to cutback in funds in the summer of 1966, all people in the NYC will be restricted to totals of eighty hours or one hundred dollars for the entire summer.

(2) According to some the added money gained from NYC has resulted in a significant rise in juvenile drinking offenses.

(4) There is need to set aside part of the money young people earn in NYC, since frequently it has been spent before the person returns to school.

The relationship that NYC has had with the PHS seems to have been satisfactory. PHS provided the jobs and NYC provided the workers. The girls who had worked at the BIA boarding school did well and would have been rehired had funds been available.

Since the very beginning CAP and NYC have been very closely allied. Even now the Assistant Director of CAP is the NYC Director.

(7) *Pre-School and Parent-Child Centers.*—The Pre-School program is a pilot project which began in September 1965. The Pre-School project was under consideration for seven months in Washington before approval was granted. After approval was granted and a starting date of 1 September established, the program received funds in December 1965.

The Pre-School Director began working 1 September without salary. Prior to receipt of funds, five teaching aides received five weeks of training at Arizona State University.

In December enrollment and teaching at the Pre-Schools began. There is presently one Pre-School in Sells and one in Santa Rosa. Enrollment in Sells is twenty-five students per class, with a daily average attendance of twenty. Enrollment in Santa Rosa is seventeen per class, with an average attendance of fifteen.

A second program supervised by the Pre-School Director is the Parent-Child Program, which began in November 1965 and employs a staff of two teachers, four aides, and two janitors divided equally between Sells and Santa Rosa. In this program one or both parents must accompany children who attend the Centers.

The buildings used for the Pre-Schools and Parent-Child Centers are, in Sells, rented from the Presbyterian Church, while in Santa Rosa a community building is used.

There are eighteen staff members presently employed by the two programs including four teachers. Two commute from Tucson to Sells; the others teach and live in Santa Rosa.

At the beginning of the Pre-School program the Director visited the major villages and explained the purposes of the program to parents. Instructors connected with the Parent-Child Centers maintain close rapport with the Indians both because they have the parents at the Center and because they pick up the children every day.

In the summer of 1965 there was a Head Start program in a number of villages. When Head Start activity ended and the Pre-Schools continued in Sells and

Santa Rosa there was confusion in the smaller villages, and the people "did not realize why the program had stopped."

The Indians voice satisfaction with the programs, except for the confusion with Head Start, and would like them continued. One Indian said, "Since the children began Pre-School, they have been speaking better English. We try to encourage this at home, and Pre-School has helped a lot." An Indian woman said, "I enjoy myself learning to sew clothes (at the Parent-Child Center)." Another woman said, "I'm learning to sew and my daughter is beginning to speak and understand English. I think this program is very educational for both of us."

There is agreement between Anglos and Indians that there is a need for more Papago women to participate as teachers, since those who teach have better rapport with the parents and children.

(8) *Missions*.—There are several Christian missions on the Papago Reservation: the Roman Catholic Franciscan Missions, the Presbyterian, the Baptist, the Assembly of God, the Nazarene, a dissident splinter group from the Assembly of God, and a Mormon Mission. Among these only the Franciscans and Presbyterians are of any importance outside the BIA Agency Center of Sells, and none of the missions are of major influence in any area of Papago village life.

The participation of the missions with the Papago Tribal Community Action Agency has been limited. Representatives of the majority of the missions attended a 1964 meeting at which the CAP Committee presented a discussion of the Papago OEO program proposals. Since that time interaction has been largely concerned with use of mission building and teaching staff. The Presbyterian mission has rented the Sunday school building in the Sells Presbyterian compound to the CAA as a Pre-School. The Franciscan mission has provided space for Head Start and Head Start teachers from the regular mission school teaching staff.

Several of the missionaries interviewed made reference to a strong anti-white sentiment among Papagos which inhibits close interaction with them. Because of this sentiment these missionaries feel that close cooperation with the Papago Community Action Agency is unlikely.

c. Indian Reaction

(1) *A Papago Leader's Observations*.—The President of the Association for Papago Affairs is familiar with the activities of CAP on the reservation. She has been a research assistant for the Bureau of Ethnic Research. The following is a synthesis of Papago feeling toward OEO programs, as recorded by this observer:

"In the fall of 1964 there was great interest and excitement over a new program. The Papago were hopeful about a program that would be created and managed by the people without help from the BIA or Washington.

"After the first flurry of meetings had aroused interest there was a lull in activities. After the people in the villages gave their ideas on the needs of their communities, nothing happened; for a year there was no further mention of the War on Poverty.

"The people's reaction to these events was to become skeptical. They were told that the program would be theirs—their ideas, their plans to meet the needs of their communities—but this had not happened. Ideas evolved during the one meeting in each community did not become realities. There is much confusion. People do not really understand the difference between BIA programs and Community Action Programs. To them these programs all come from the Government, and if one department (BIA) promises to do something for them and fails to do it, then the Government is blamed.

"Although the programs started on the reservation in 1965, in most villages nothing has been done, so people think they will not get any programs for their villages. There are only two Pre-School programs going, although there were several Head Start programs of six weeks duration. Many people feel this is all they will ever get for their villages. Still, they are told it is their program and it will help their people. Sells, which is the headquarters for BIA and tribal offices, has a Pre-School and Parent-Child Center, although children living there are constantly exposed to TV, radio, movies, and English-speaking children and parents. The children in remote villages with no exposure to the English language, TV, radio, and movies are not getting Pre-School training, even though theirs is a greater need.

"Most of the jobs available in the CAP are filled by Anglos, except for the Director and the NYC Director; few aides are employed, and in some villages NYC workers are used.

"Few people are really informed of the activities of CAP. People feel that many proposals are made up and the ideas submitted to the people. The Director, who has to direct the program and enlighten the people about CAP, is much too busy to give much attention to all villages, so people's questions go unanswered and eventually interest lags. The Tribal Councilmen who have more contact with the CAP do not always have good communication with the people of their districts, so the people do not know what is taking place. Villages are scattered and there is not transportation available. Therefore few people from villages come in contact with people from other villages, with the result that there is no knowledge of what is going on except in Sells and its surrounding villages. I was told by one person, 'People do not have objections or comments mainly because they do not quite understand it or do not hear the full story.' Another said, 'When anything comes up, any program, we grab it before we really understand it and that is why it does not work. There is always a time limit on all programs coming from the Government. Before word gets to all the people, it is usually too late to try to understand it.' People do not ask questions. If they would, they would probably be more interested in following these new programs. To translate the English language into the Papago language is very hard. Things can be interpreted several ways. There is a great deal of comment about the qualifications of jobs, the misunderstanding and the apathy of the people.

"People want a chance to work and thereby help themselves up from poverty. No matter how small an income they get, it will be better than none. But there is no industry on the reservation, and yet they talk about a vocational training program. 'Where will we use these skills that we train for? If it means leaving our homes, then it is just a waste of time and money, because Papagos are insecure in urban living because it is a new and frustrating experience.' Reservation living is so much more familiar and they know how to deal with the problems they encounter.

"There is a strong feeling that, given more understanding, more time to organize a working group of Papagos who will really get the people to work together and acquaint them with CAP, that it will interest the people, and the people will start working for themselves. This type of situation has been demonstrated in the success of the Tucson Papagos, who in 1958 organized into an association to meet and surmount problems in urban living. In order to make their programs work they had to organize. It took two whole years of weekly meetings, many discouragements, many arguments, many rebuffs from the city of Tucson. 'We were told that if we did not like it in Tucson, we should go back to the reservation.' They had no trained leaders but those who had learned by trial and error. They all learned together. They are still learning. The Migrant Ministry Office of Migrant Opportunity (sic) asked help from the Tucson Indian Association, so that they traveled fifty-four miles nightly after work to organize the Indians in the farming areas.

"Although the Indian Association of Tucson applied for OEO funds from both the reservation CAP and Tucson city CAP, they have been unsuccessful. The reservation CAP at first asked their cooperation, which they received wholeheartedly. Then they were told by the ICAC they were not eligible and should go in with the city of Tucson. This was done with much work on the part of the Indian Association, and although they were seventh on the priority list of all Tucson's programs, and although this is the only proposal that has come up from the poor people, they were not funded. The rest of Tucson's programs are from Red Feather Agencies. The Indians are wondering why. Who can they turn to next? Will all off-reservation Indians be left out?"

(2) *Santa Rosa*.—The CAP projects have focused in two areas, Sells and Santa Rosa. Described by the CAP Director as a pilot effort, the programs have been kept small. Traditional differences between Sells and Santa Rosa have concerned the CAP Administration, which is based in Sells. Criticism of CAP by Santa Rosa residents has resulted in two major complaints: (1) Santa Rosa should have more autonomy in controlling its programs; and (2) the CAP Administration has not kept Santa Rosa well informed. These criticisms have been expressed in Santa Rosa's leaders' suspicions of CAP.

The relationship of Santa Rosa to Sells and the effects on CAP are of concern because, as CAP grows to encompass more districts, similar problems may occur.

Since the establishment of the reservation, Santa Rosa and other areas have viewed Sells as non-traditional. Sells is the center of the BIA and people from other districts tend to equate Sells people with the BIA. A result of the BIA's focus on Sells has been increased acculturation of Sells residents. Most people in Sells have daily contact with Anglos, while people in Santa Rosa have minimal contact. General antipathy for BIA policy has deepened the sense of separation between the two areas.

Informants who have attempted to explain the differences between the two areas have mentioned dialect differences: "the people of Sells speak Indian like Mexicans." Another explained that dialect differences were only a part of total cultural differences. This informant explained that the people presently living in Sells were originally from Mexico, while those in Santa Rosa were descended from people living in the area before Spanish contact. Cultural differences, coupled with the bias against "BIA-Indians," has resulted in communication difficulties for CAP.

The District Council leaders of Santa Rosa have complained that CAP is functioning similarly to other programs directed by Sells. The difficulty facing the CAP Administration is not that people in Santa Rosa feel that specific projects are bad, but that leaders in Santa Rosa want the program to be completely their own.

During the formation of CAP Santa Rosa had three residents on the CAP Committee. When the CAP Committee visited the various districts, the opinions of Santa Rosa District leaders were solicited. The difficulties are after the projects were implemented.

District leaders asked the CAP Administration to schedule regular meetings with district councils, but paperwork in Sells made this difficult until recently. The councilmen in the area complained that they had not been given the option to hire and fire Pre-School personnel in their districts.

It should be emphasized that both the Pre-School and the Parent-Child Center have been evaluated on their individual merits in Santa Rosa. The Pre-School has been criticized by parents who feel more emphasis should be on reading and arithmetic. Pre-School has also been criticized by those who compared the Pre-School teacher to the Parent-Child Center specialist. The Parent-Child specialist made frequent visits to families in the area, and went to lengths to learn something of Papago culture, while the Pre-School teacher did not make similar efforts.

The Santa Rosa District Council has not been unduly critical of the specific projects, but minor irritations have been increased by the communication problems and cultural differences between Sells and Santa Rosa. An informant who is well acquainted with OEO programs said, "Sells and Santa Rosa are like New York slums and Appalachia; their problems are different."

The CAP Administration is aware of these problems and is taking every opportunity to increase Santa Rosa's voice in its own affairs. The Director's feelings that the early projects should be a "pilot program" has given him and his staff a chance to meet these problems and prepare carefully for CAP growth into other districts.

(3) *General Reaction.*—The first contacts the grass-roots had with CAP were in 1964. During September the new CAP Committee went to the reservation districts to canvass opinion. These visits created an opportunity for the people to hear about CAP and to make their needs known. The following are reactions picked up by project researchers two years later:

"The ideas did not come from the people here. They just listened to all these explanations. The Chairman only asked if they could fix the district fence and the *charcos*, and they told us the money was only for education programs."

Another informant commented:

"The Education Committee decided what was going to be done and they came out to the villages and told the people what was going to be done. We didn't have anything to say. Many of the people thought that they ought to fix some of the houses, or do something about our roads. We thought that maybe some work like that would be what OEO was going to do—you know, making things a little bit better for the poor. But then we found out that that was not what it was going to do. It was going to do education. Education is all right, and we need it, but we really need adult education. They could use programs for the adults. Everything is for the children."

A member of the CAP Committee discussed the difficulties the Committee has faced:

"It is hard to do anything about the problems here because they are only a few people who are interested, and very few understand about the Poverty Program. That is why we try to tell them to come to the meetings so they can get all this information. I only understand part of it and that is why I keep going to any meeting that they have here. The Councilmen don't attend all the meetings and the people who can really help us don't belong to any club and don't attend the meetings."

The CAP Committee members' statements have been confirmed by others who attend meetings.

"I can't tell you much about the meetings. We were there, but I can't remember what they were talking about. I can't remember which meeting it was because it has been a long time ago. I do remember the one that was held about two or three weeks ago with the CAP Administration and the Tribal Chairman. They asked the people if there was anything they wanted to ask for, but the people did not say anything. One reason, I think, is that they talked in English so long and most of the older people who were there went to sleep, and by the time they finally started talking in Indian, nobody was listening. I tried to get my kids to go around and wake them up, but they were afraid to I guess. Also, some of the people left the meeting by the time they talked in Papago. There was another meeting later, but I did not go. One thing, they never let us know about the first meeting until 6:00 p.m. Somebody came around and told us about it. I suppose some of the other people already were gone or had other plans for the evening."

One of the early difficulties facing the CAP Committee as noted was to make a clear distinction between the BIA's Ten Year Plan and CAP proposals.

Acting on a directive from Secretary Udall's office in Washington, the BIA began in 1964 to draw up a Ten Year Economic Development Plan. After consulting with members of the Tribal Council, including its Chairman, the BIA Program Officer picked a committee of ten Papagos, whose duties were left rather vague. Ostensibly they were to keep the BIA apprised of the needs and wants of Papago and to act as go-betweens for the BIA and the Tribe. When a preliminary draft of the Ten Year Plan had been completed, it was presented to the Tribal Council. Before the Councilmen would commit themselves, they wanted to know how long it would be before actualization of the Plan. To this question the BIA had to answer that it was yet without funds, and could not say whether such a plan would ever be implemented.

At the next meeting of the Tribal Council the OEO programs were explained. Because of similarities between the two and the close timing of their presentations, a number of Councilmen confused the BIA and OEO proposals. The same thing happened in other communities on the reservation where both BIA and the CAP Committee had gone to test opinion concerning projected plans. Inasmuch as BIA had acquired a reputation of not coming through on promises, CAP was at first disadvantaged by being associated with the BIA. This confusion has been generally cleared up, and CAP is widely accepted. Whenever the BIA brings proposals before the Tribal Council there are many critical questions.

In short, untangling of CAP components, BIA projects, and other OEO projects (NYC and Head Start) has never been satisfactorily accomplished. Said one interviewee:

"They came last summer and started a Head Start here. It lasted one summer, then went away. We haven't had anything else. I don't know where the Head Start came from. I don't think it was BIA. We were never asked anything about it, it just came. They didn't ask us if we wanted it, they just came with it."

The lack of clear understanding of CAP has in some cases caused antagonism. Regions which are neglected time after time, and are nevertheless called upon to support new programs, have begun to be purposeful in their irritation. Santa Rosa reactions are an example. The leaders there feel that they've been willing to listen in the past and that the lack of communication is not their fault. Now they are beginning to seek new ways of getting the attention they feel their districts deserve.

In other situations, people who know little about the programs are indifferent. Most people do not conceive of broad development plans or long-range goals. In nearly every case, people react directly to those specific programs with which they've had experience.

"We don't know very much about it in the villages. My brother sends his children to the Pre-School but he doesn't know if they are learning very

much. They do a lot of playing. They like it very much. It gives them a lunch and they do learn some English."

One aspect of the reaction to a specific program is expressed in a translated interview:

"He knows the program is a good thing, the Pre-School program, and he approved it because he has lived so long and he knows that there will be many changes and that the younger people will have to work with these changes. That is why he thinks the education is good. When he was little, he had a 'Highway of Life' which he is still following now. In the old days when there was very much needed here, they had flowers, grass, and food and they didn't need money the way they do now. The Indians are going to be white men before long. The old ways are going to be of the past. He was born in 1909 and he saw the time when it was beautiful here, flowers blooming, and food from cactus and the ground. Now there no more flowers, food. They didn't want the Pre-School program at first because it wasn't the Indian way. Later, decided it would have to be that way since the younger children will be more Anglos than Papagos."

The CAP Director reflected on the problems faced by the CAP Committee in 1964:

"The job of briefing the people was much more difficult because they had to do everything by speaking without any official papers to pass around. The usual question was, 'How is this different from BIA? In organization? In structure and hierarchy?' In the past, they had difficulties with the BIA and it was a problem to separate in the minds of the people, the CAP from the BIA. The question was: 'Would the CAP Committee collide with the BIA?'"

As the Director explained, there was a major concern that CAP would duplicate BIA projects. Therefore, requests for roads, fences, soil conservation, and so on could not come under CAP. The CAP Administration was rushed in the beginning. The Director has expressed awareness of the need for enhancing communication with outlying districts.

The Tribal Chairman, in discussing the CAP, stated:

"My personal reaction to this was that this idea was the best thing that could happen. Anything dealing with education has to be good. There is a lack of jobs here and the NYC fills that area in the training of the young people to get jobs later on. People first thought they would be getting money. I thought it was better to work on young men and women. Yes, I helped in some of the planning of the proposal. People came up with much the same ideas found in other places so that the program was not difficult to write. I worked on it all the way through.

"Anything that has anything to do with education is most effective. I think that lack of education is the basis of the poverty stage.

"The Pre-School, Parent-Child Center, which now has a counselor, is doing very well. The parent and child come into the Center on the bus and the child goes to Pre-School while the parent goes to sewing or cooking class. The biggest problem that we have is in getting personnel to come out here because there is no housing available.

"It takes time for the older people to understand about the programs. It was brought up three or four times at meetings before they finally could understand it. The Community Action Committee explained it to the people. It is hard for the people to understand the beginnings of any program. It takes a lot of meetings before they can really understand. This particular program took at least three meetings."

A summary of general reactions was given by a Tribal Councilman:

"Last year OEO was brought before the Council. We had several meetings in one month because of the OEO programs. I had read about it in the paper but had not heard about it directly from anyone who came and stood before the Council. At first we thought it would not happen here on this reservation. We had several promises from people before, and then when we asked for things we wanted we never got them. It was a big program, this OEO, and would be a big thing coming to the Papagos. Programs on the reservation are important, but we have these problems all over, all over the United States. We were afraid that the Papago would not receive much, that it would all go to the poor in the cities.

"The Education Committee tried to explain to the people what the programs were. They explained most of the programs in the district I represented, but I did not attend any of the meetings. The Education Committee tried to go over some of the projects with the people, to take the proposals to the people. But

that is very hard on this reservation. This reservation is too big and the villages are too scattered to get to the people. Communication has always been a problem because you can't get to the people unless you drive out to their homes, and that takes all day.

"There is another problem in getting the word to the people and that is that the Councilmen who do come to the district meetings, or to the main meetings in Sells, never write anything down to take back to the people. They think they will remember everything that is brought up in the meetings, but they don't. They lose a lot of it, they forget a lot that goes on and that they are supposed to take to the people.

"Another problem in getting the ideas to the people is the rush that everyone is in. Washington says one thing and wants it done the next day, and you can't work that way with the people. Everything was such a rush here that, although they wanted a separate committee to work on the CAP, they didn't have time to form one, so they gave it to the Education Committee. Then the Education Committee has got to try and get through to the people what this is all about. Most of the people can't grasp it right away, although they try. This means that things have to be explained in English and Papago, and that people have to be around who not only can understand Washington English, but who can put Washington's words into Indian. That is hard to do, to be able to speak Washington in Indian and have the people understand you. People don't understand, and they ask to have something repeated, and it is said again in the same way, and they still don't understand. We have this problem of communication, and it will always slow down things that are coming from the Government."

f. Summary

(1) *Development—Origin of the Idea of OEO—CAP on the Reservation.*—The reservation's first contact with the idea of OEO came through radio and newspaper announcements and transcriptions of speeches made by President Johnson and Sargent Shriver.

Steps in the Development of CAP.—The first formal introduction to OEO came in mid-April 1964 when Dr. Robert Roessel of the Indian Education Center at Arizona State University spoke with the Tribal Chairman. The initiation of OEO activity occurred when Dr. Roessel attended a conference on education on the Papago Reservation and asked the Chairman of the Papago Education Committee what action had been taken on CAP programs. The Chairman said he had heard of nothing concerning CAP for the Papagos. It was reported later that news of OEO had been sent to the BIA and had been disseminated throughout the BIA and PHS, but to no one on the Tribal Council. Roessel came to the reservation in September of 1964 for several meetings. The Education Committee was appointed to prepare a plan to elicit needs and wants from people. Meetings were held in quick succession at Sells and at several other places on the reservation. People expressed interest in CAP. Then came the information that CAP was limited in its jurisdiction, and interest waned.

The Tribal Council delegated responsibility to formulate CAP programs to the Education Committee. When the Education Committee made initial reports, the Council passed a resolution that the Education Committee continue as the official CAP Committee.

The new CAP Committee requested assistance from Dr. Roessel for proposal preparation.

Role of Agencies in CAP.—The relationships between agencies existing on the reservation prior to the inception of CAP have remained unchanged. Each maintain its former jurisdiction and continues programs and plans which were underway at the inception of CAP. The BIA Ten Year Plan has been temporarily shelved, although some elements are now CAP components. Individual staff members of agencies were asked for suggestions on specific proposals and were asked to contribute some buildings and equipment. Contact has been directly with lower-level members of agencies. Members of the PHS have given services required by Operation Head Start and Pre-School for health examinations prior to admission.

CAP operates independently with little cooperation or exchange of ideas with other agencies. The BIA has cooperated when buildings have been needed and PHS has given medical attention. The missions have also offered buildings.

Off-Reservation Agencies.—All programs on the reservation as the result of

planning and actual operational activity by members of the Indian Education Center and the Indian Community Action Center at Tempe, and members of the Education faculty of Arizona State University. Members of the Department of Education were instrumental in the planning and execution of the Education Survey, the Pre-School program, and the Parent-Child Centers.

Role of Tribal Government.—The former Tribal Chairman, Eugene Johnson, was not involved in initial meetings. Councilmen were not involved in the Development of CAP. The Tribal Council is notified monthly of proposal development and program progress.

Contact with the district councils is maintained by CAP. The Director, Tribal Chairman, and other members of the administration staff attend district council meetings, upon invitation, to explain the proposals and programs of CAP and the role of the particular district in CAP.

Significant OEO Policies.—Indian leaders originally thought that they could propose any program which would be ultimately beneficial to the Tribe. Then a clear statement of the types of things which would be funded was made available. OEO requested that the proposals be rewritten on new official forms. Insistence upon a rapid succession of program proposals, as exemplified in the initial request for swift action, nearly resulted in control and development of programs being lost by the Reservation Community Action Agency. The Papagos need time to become skilled at the planning and operation of programs, and OEO should be prepared to wait until such skill develops.

(2) *Level and Kind of Participation—Problem Areas.*—Communication is impeded throughout the reservation due to distance and isolation. The Papago have many sparsely populated villages rather than several large population centers. It is difficult to plan programs that will encompass all areas. People who have not been involved in specific CAP projects tend to lose interest.

The Papago Reservation presents a cross-cultural problem somewhat analogous to a underdeveloped colonial state. All development plans and programs up to the present have been imposed by an outside bureaucracy, with slight attention to gaining Papago acceptance beforehand. Moreover, no substantial number of Papagos were directly involved in the general money economy until about 1945, before which subsistence farming and livestock provided the Papago economic base.

The colonial analogy may be carried further in the case of the tribal government. The Tribal Council organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 has no real power at the local level. It is an imposed institution which has not been completely integrated into the Papago social organization. Papago village leaders and village councils remain the locus of decision-making and political power. This village-level organization was only partly recognized in the district council system under the BIA.

If Papagos are to take part in planning and carrying out their own Community Action programs, recognition must be made of the Papago social organization and the Papago decision-making process. The implications of this recognition are:

1. General consensus must be reached by the village councils in order to achieve maximum feasible involvement of the people.


2. Allowance must be made for a very much alive sentiment of Papago nationalism which, if ignored for the sake of bureaucratic expediency, will impede attempts to gain Papago support for programs.


3. Allowance must be made for the time required for reaching consensus by the village councils.

4. The problems involved in translation of OEO materials into Papago for non-English speaking members must be recognized. This is a problem not only in translation of sentence but of concepts.

5. Another significant aspect of Papago colonial status of the total lack of trained administrators. Recognition should therefore be made of the pressing need for making available modern administrative training for Papago leadership in terms of reservation developments.

6. The importance of the village can be recognized in a very practical way. This is in the area of travel allowances. At present there are 145 miles of paved roads in 2.7 million acres. The majority of the villages are accessible only by 450 miles of unpaved gravel and dirt road, two-thirds of which are not recommended for passenger cars, especially in wet weather.





PAPAGO RESERVATION, ARIZONA

C. PINE RIDGE RESERVATION

1. Historical and Cultural Background

The Teton Dakota Indians, known generally as the Sioux (last syllable of a French corruption of the Ojibwa name for them), migrated from the northeastern woodlands around the middle of the 18th Century, probably due to population pressure. The seven tribes comprising the Teton Dakota, or western division of the Dakotas, moved in two steps. The Oglalas and Brulé subtribes moved westward to the Missouri by way of the Blue Earth River in Minnesota and the James River in North and South Dakota. The Minneconjou, Sans Arc, Two Kettles, Hunkpapa and Blackfeet Teton Dakota moved westward on a route parallel to, but north of, the Oglala and Brulé. The first step took the Teton Dakota from eastern woodlands into high grass prairies, and required rapid culture change to adapt to the new conditions. During this trek they acquired a few guns and horses, apparently by trading with the tribes that had had contact with whites.

The Teton Dakota were held back for years by the Arikara, who held the region of the Missouri Valley in the path of the Oglala and Brulé. When smallpox decimated the Arikara, the Teton Dakota broke through them and were able to overcome the neighboring Cheyenne with ease. In extending their control over the region of western Nebraska, South and North Dakota, and eastern Montana and Wyoming, the Dakota had to overcome the Pawnee, Kiowa, Crow, and Mandan. They developed a culture borrowed in part from neighboring Plains tribes and an economy based on the large buffalo herds.

Among the institutions borrowed by the Teton Dakota were military societies, an elaborate system of chieftaincy, councils, and camp policemen, all with their rites, ceremonies and well defined roles. It is questionable whether these foreign culture elements were we assimilated, however. Wissler's uncritical descrip-

tion of them (as recalled by Pine Ridge Reservation Dakota in 1912) is reviewed by Feraca (1966), who points out that military societies disappeared during the early reservation period among the Dakota, although they were maintained until recently among the Cheyenne and Arapaho. Regalia and other externals seemed to have been adopted without the formal roles they symbolized, according to Feraca. Far more important to Dakota social organization was the older system of kinship-based bands, or *tiyospaye*.

In the pre-reservation period, a Teton Dakota tribe, such as the Oglalas, would usually stay together for only a few summer months, when they held the annual Sun Dance and large buffalo hunts. During most of the year they travelled in bands of extended kin, the *tiyospaye*, which roughly translates as "they live together." These bands shared available food and resources: when one member went hungry, all were hungry. The band chiefs were often the poorest men in terms of material possessions, because they carried personal responsibility for the welfare of their bands, and their influence depended on their generosity as well as bravery. Mekeel (1936) reports that the Teton Dakota tried to live by four virtues: bravery and generosity, and less important, fortitude and moral integrity. These virtues were woven into every Dakota institution. Whenever a missionary or administrator has tried to reform some cultural element, unaccountably strong resistance has resulted, according to Mekeel, because of the threat to deeply held personal values.

First contact with whites brought many guns, knives, iron pots and axes to the Dakota, but did not disrupt their lives. Fur traders, first French and later American, engaged in mutually profitable exchanges with the Dakota, and often married Dakota women and entered tribal life. However, when whites began migrating to the West Coast, first by the hundreds and, after discovery of gold in California in 1849, by the thousands, the Dakota reacted to the threat they posed to the buffalo herds by raiding their wagon trains.

Thirty years later, after first sporadic and later heavy fighting with United States troops, and after three separate treaties, each more disadvantageous to the Indians than the last, the Teton Dakota found themselves wards of the United States Government. The last great buffalo hunt was held in 1882. In 1889 the Great Sioux Reservation was broken into five separate Teton Dakota reservations. The Oglala and part of the Brulé were settled at Pine Ridge, in southwestern South Dakota.

2. Recent Conditions and Present Context

The Pine Ridge Indian Reservation covers an area of roughly five thousand square miles, and is inhabited by close to ten thousand Oglala Sioux. The political organization, under an Indian Reorganization Act constitution ratified and approved in 1934, has been from its inception at variance with the true social organization. This discrepancy and its consequences are fundamental to any understanding of Pine Ridge.

The Boundaries of eight reservation districts recognized in the original constitution were primarily administrative. They followed the rather arbitrary pre-existing "boss farm" (a term used by the Oglala Sioux to indicate farm districts, once administered by BIA sub-agents) boundaries. In addition to these eight districts, three communities—Pine Ridge, Oglala Junior, and Red Shirt—have been given Council membership, although the constitution has not been amended accordingly. The eleven present election districts and their Council representation are: Wakpamni (2); Pine Ridge (5); White Caly or Oglala (2); Oglala Junior (1); Red Shirt (1); Wounded Knee (4); Porcupine (4); Medicine Root (4); Eagle Nest (3); Pass Creek (3); and Lacreek (3).

Tribal elections are held every two years. In addition to district representatives, a five-man Executive Committee is elected. The President and Vice-President are elected at large, and the Secretary, Treasurer, and fifth member are elected by the incoming Tribal Council, and may be Council representatives. After election, a Council member has no official, and frequently no unofficial, responsibility to his constituents. The districts, and some communities, have their own councils, but they have no official power and few funds. On the 1966-1968 Tribal Council only about one-sixth of the Tribal Councilmen belong to their district councils. Although in theory the district councils pass resolutions on to their Council representatives to be voted on, according to both Tribal and district councilmen, this seldom works in fact. A number of allegations were made by Indians living in the districts that Tribal Council representatives had

voted against the best interests of the majority of their constituents for reasons of personal financial gain.

A few Indians stated that it was customary for a man to be elected to the Tribal Council, disappear from local affairs, and suddenly become wealthy. They maintained that Councilmen use their influence to secure long-term tribal loans for themselves and their relatives, and participate in other benefits as well. One experienced Sioux politician reasoned that a proposal to reduce the number of Tribal Council representatives to twelve was a bad idea, because twelve would be too easy to bribe. Many Indians complain that the Tribal Council serves the interest of a relatively well-to-do segment of the Tribe. Tribal regulations allow cattle operators who are enrolled in the Tribe to lease land from fellow Indians at a lower rate than the landowners could get by leasing to the highest bidder. A small percentage is taken from individual lease payments by the Tribal Council to finance programs that many landowners claim to get no benefit from. There is a group of landowners who for the last few years have been actively working to bring about the abolition of the Tribal Council by public referendum.

It would be unfair to assume, however, that most Tribal Council representatives feel no responsibility to the people who elected them. The Tribal Council, as the official governing body of the Oglala Sioux, can deal with Government agencies and private organizations who have goods and services to offer the Sioux. Candidates for the Tribal Council are selected largely on how well their constituents think they will perform at getting goods and services that will benefit their districts. A Councilman should be able to acquit himself well with whites, both to be able to get things from them and to act as whites expect people to act, so as not to "give the Tribe a black eye." For example, an incumbent politician whose public drunkenness had, in the opinion of many Sioux brought dishonor to the Tribe, was not returned to office, though he was respected for his generosity in many areas.

Many, perhaps most, of the "real" leaders on the reservation—those people whose opinions are sought and respected in local affairs—have never run for tribal office. For one thing, the role the Councilman is supposed to play is distasteful to many traditional Sioux. For another, the style of democracy that requires a man to stand before his people and argue for their votes goes against their ideals of modesty and reticence. Many Sioux, both "traditional" and "progressive", disdain the Council because it lacks the power to stand up to the BIA. Some blame the Councilmen and cite old leaders who, they claim, would not have been so acquiescent. Some blame the constitution, which they say makes the Council a rubber-stamp of BIA. Perhaps most important, until recently, the stakes have not seemed high enough to be worth the trouble. Because the Council has no power, little of significance comes of tribal politics, and few people get very excited over it. This situation may change, however, since the Council may gain at least partial control over the local Community Action Agency (Office of Economic Development (OED)). In the 1966 Tribal Council election, reportedly voter turnout was some 25% higher than usual, and almost twice the usual number of candidates ran for office.

Malan and Schusky (1962), state that in 1956 the average annual income of Pine Ridge Reservation family heads was \$1,110, and even this low figure is inflated by a small number of individuals who had made land sales that year, giving them an annual income for that year of over \$10,000. More recent income data is unavailable, but it seems unlikely that income levels are appreciably higher. The Wright-McGill fishhook snelling plant at Pine Ridge town and other reservations locations now employs about two-hundred people, at \$50 a week, nine month of the year. Recent Government construction, first of public housing, then of the building that houses the post office and community center has created many temporary jobs. As of 23 March 1966 the OED was employing nearly 250 people, most of them at \$1.25 per hour. However, during the same period mechanization ended many farming and ranching jobs near the reservation. Malan and Schusky (1962) report that of the 48% of heads of families on the reservation who were employed during the year, half of these worked as unskilled farm labor. Unofficial estimates by welfare workers in Pine Ridge indicate that almost one-quarter of these jobs have disappeared in the last ten years. Of 125 Pine Ridge Sioux interviewed by HSR researchers, 85% thought that life was harder in 1966 than ten years ago. All but four of the rest thought it was about the same.

Subsistence at perennially low income levels is made possible by the surplus commodities which all but a few Pine Ridge Sioux receive, and by certain other benefits. The PHS hospital in Pine Ridge town provides free medical attention for residents of Pine Ridge town. One-third of the families on the reservation receive some form of welfare payment, according to estimates by a BIA welfare official. Half as many more are eligible for welfare payments, but are too proud to take them, according to the same official.

Subsistence is nonetheless an art. Relatives help one another in time of need, so, that goods and services are shared. If someone drives into Pine Ridge, his car is usually jammed with relatives and friends taking advantages of the ride to take care of their own business, or to visit friends. If one family has unexpected expense, such as having to finance a wake for a deceased member, members of the extended family customarily contribute whatever money, food and help they can, though perhaps going hungry later on. "Relatives first" often makes the Sioux undependable workers because, when called on to do so, they seldom hesitate to miss work to help a relative in need. Some white shopowners near the reservation reported that the Sioux learn very quickly, and are usually dependable on the job, but with no notice they may fail to appear for work for days or months at a time.

Many families leave the reservation in summer for ranch and farm labor jobs in Nebraska, or sign on migrant labor crews as far away as Washington State. Young men often leave and return to the reservation during the summer months to visit relatives on weekends or to live off their earnings for a week or so before looking for another job. Nearby ranchers complain that young Sioux are very undependable, but that men over thirty usually stick with a job. Men too old to compete for these jobs stay home and raise gardens, if they can get together enough money in the spring to buy seed. Among families living in Oglala, Oglala Junior, Payabya, and Calico, approximately one in five raises gardens. The ratio is much lower in Pine Ridge town, where there is little land available for gardening, and where the problem of stealing is greater. The ratio seems to be higher as one goes east on the reservation. People living in greater isolation from town were generally found to put more effort into gardening and home repair. As one man living in a community an hour's drive from Pine Ridge put it, "out here you have to learn to make do."

3. Impact of the Community Action Program

a. Early History of CAP

Neither the idea nor the phase "community development" is new at Pine Ridge. In 1957 and 1958, mass meetings were held in many areas of the reservation to discuss needs and solutions to Pine Ridge Reservation problems. These meetings were organized by state agricultural extension workers, primarily C. D. Allen (who from December 1965 to June 1966 was the Director of The Pine Ridge Office of Economic Development) and Everett Jordan (presently Community Development Specialist), working in cooperation with community and tribal leaders. Participation was reportedly excellent, and many ideas were generated in these meetings. Many of the ideas were written down in hopes that a Government agency could be persuaded to give the economic backing most of the programs needed. The following resolution is an example of one community's ideas. The first two projects were intended to produce building materials to be used locally for self-help housing.

RESOLUTION

In order to foster and promote Community Development & Organization within our Indian people, it is basic and necessary that work program and projects be started on the Pine Ridge Reservation. It is apparent, that outside industries will not be able to come on to the reservation, due to road conditions, lack of freight facilities (railroad) etc. Work programs and constructive projects started by the Oglala Sioux Tribe, may be an incentive for outside industries to come in, as well as a Rural Development program.

Whereas, we of the Medicine Root Area, Kyle, S.D., organized in late 1956, and going into our second year of our Development program, are fully aware of the success or failure of our program, if work programs are lacking. We have started from the grass-roots and have made a good showing, and for the posterity of our program, constructive projects and work programs are essential.

Be it therefore resolved, that the Superintendent and his Department heads and the Oglala Sioux Council, give our proposed projects, due consideration:

- (1) *Sawmill Project*.—within the North Buffalo pasture.
- (2) *Cement Block Project*.—equipment to be rented from a local resident. Purchase of cement mixer and cement will be necessary. Agricultural Engineer specialists from the State College will run tests on sand and gravel pits within our area.
- (3) *Weed Control Project*.—due to heavy infestation of creeping jenny in our cultivated areas, a weed control project is necessary. Specialists from the State College will assist. Two areas have been selected for 1958 weed demonstration plots.
- (4) *Stock Water Development*.—plans have been made to repair our stock water dams, namely, Kyle, Red Water and Two Crow dams. Stocking of game fish, seeding of wild rice, trees, and recreation and picnic areas. Irrigation set-up has also been proposed, and one dam to be set up as a Game Refuge.

Be it further resolved, that each Department Head of the Pine Ridge Agency, that is concerned with any of the above proposals, conduct a field survey and make cost estimates and recommendations, if the projects are feasible.

The foregoing resolution was duly approved and adopted this 14th day of October, 1957, by the Resolution Committee, and presented for your consideration.

(S) CHESTER RED KETTLE.

(S) NORMAN UNDER BAGGAGE.

(S) ISAAC BRAVE EAGLE.

KYLE, S. DAK.

Among other projects suggested were those proposing Health Aides to teach sanitation and good health practices in Indian homes, a Day Care Center for Indian infants, Home Improvement aid, aid in starting individual and community gardens, and Indian craft projects.

The Tribal Attorney, Richard Schifter, was enlisted to help interest Government agencies in funding, but nothing come of this at that time except letters of encouragement. According to both Mr. Jordan and Mr. Allen, failure of the meetings to bear immediate fruit occasioned a good deal of cynicism among the participants. A mimeographed schedule of events, "Highlights of the Kyle Fair, 1958," prepared by the Kyle Fair Committee, contains the following as part of the program:

August 27—ceremonial fire to be ignited by Kyle Association resolutions that were disapproved—4 resolutions.

August 28—fire to be ignited by Law & Order resolution, work project, family survey forms.

August 29—fire to be ignited by Kyle Development program, that has "stalelated" into a slow death.

Under the supervision of Martin Pulliam and Isaac Brave Eagle as narrator. An appeal to the Great Spirit, that our future proposals, demands and needs be heard.

However the ideas generated remained alive, both on the Pine Ridge Reservation and in the office of Mr. Schifter. Tribal Council minutes for the years before the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act contain items such as the following:

March 1, 1963 Resolution 63-32: Whereas, the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council realizes the necessity for development of the tourist trade on the Reservation, and Whereas project proposals are being prepared for submission to the Department of Commerce for grants and loans under the ARA and Public Works Acceleration Act for construction of White Clay Recreation and Camp Area, Fort Philip Kerny Tourist Center and a permanent Sundance Arena,

Resolved, That \$100 be used to print a tourist brochure.

(S) PAUL APPLE, *Tribal Secretary*.

According to members of the Executive Committee of the 1962-1964 Tribal Council, Mr. Schifter kept them apprised of the likelihood of passage of the Economic Opportunity Act, and the implications of this Act for the reservation.

In 1965 the Tribal Council reportedly tried unsuccessfully to obtain funds for a Day Care Center. When the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act appeared likely, Mr. Schifter discussed plans for a Health Aides project with members of the Executive Committee. Twelve other plans, including a Day Care

Center, were discussed to select those that were both most necessary in the light of current reservation needs and most likely to be funded under the expected Economic Opportunity Act. The Executive Committee, in consultation with Mr. Schifter and representatives from the BIA and PHS at Pine Ridge, decided to try initially to develop proposals for a Day Care Center, Community Health Aides, and a Neighborhood Youth Corps activity. Tribal Council minutes for 13 May 1964 show that on that day Mr. Schifter sketched the outline for Day Care Centers to the Council, and asked whether the Council approved. The response was almost unanimous approval. He also described an NYC program, and the Health Aides plan, and the Council approved both. A member of the Executive Committee stated that because of the need for haste in preparing applications for funds, project plans had to be designed "behind closed doors" without participation by the people.

Mr. Schifter contacted a child development specialist, Dr. Harold Abel, to discuss the Day Care Center plans. Dr. Abel urged the inclusion of Nursery Schools, which would be of more benefit than the Day Care Centers, which were designated merely to look after the children.

According to Tribal Council minutes, on 24 June 1964 Mr. Schifter gave a brief report to the Tribal Council concerning President Johnson, the Poverty Program, and opportunities for the Tribe. From the minutes of 25 June:

"Mr. Richard Schifter explained the various phases of the Anti-Poverty Bill and it was the recommendation of the Council that Phase 1a and 1b be acceptable to the reservation for a possible program."

In early August of 1964, Dr. Robert Roessel reportedly visited the Pine Ridge Reservation to discuss the "War on Poverty" for the first time. The Council was not formally in session, but a special session was convened to hear him speak. No minutes were taken, but according to a number of observers, Dr. Roessel explained that the Community Action Program was to be unlike any Government program that had gone before. It was to belong to the people. A community could write up a request for a project to develop itself, and OEO would provide the funds and skills to meet the request. Building materials and supplies were to be made available through the OEO. The program would hire members of the community to carry out the community's plans. Reportedly, when Dr. Roessel finished speaking, one of the non-Council members among those who gathered asked him if what he had described would really happen, because what he had said sounded almost too beautiful to be true. Dr. Roessel is said to have replied that not all of the plans could be put into effect at once, that the projects would have to be done in phases, but that OEO would help the Indian communities in every way possible.

It is possible that the specific remarks attributed to Dr. Roessel were not made by him. Whatever he said in fact, from all accounts the effect of his words was to create near euphoria. Dr. Roessel also spoke upon this occasion and on subsequent visits, to reservation leaders and at district meetings. Word of OEO spread quickly, and in many, if not all, areas of the reservation, expectations were high. On Dr. Roessel's recommendation, the Tribal Council formed an OEO committee, with representatives from the largest communities on the reservation.

Individual communities organized themselves to devise plans to submit to Washington. The plan of Oglala Junior, a "full-blood" community, describes and budgets over twenty projects, including cattle and farming enterprises, adult education, on-the-job training, self-help housing, tourist development, and sanitation.

The proposals written by Oglala Junior are similar to those written by the White River and Kyle communities. The people of Kyle reportedly desired: (1) equipment to irrigate home and communal garden plots, and equipment for a small community cannery, so that wild and garden products could be preserved for domestic consumption; (2) equipment for a small sawmill, so that tribal timber could be selectively used for homes for young families; and (3) sewing machines and instruction in dress-making.

Oglala Junior submitted its proposals to OEO in Washington on 24 August 1964. They were rejected on the grounds that proposals must come through the CAP being set up under the sponsorship of the Tribal Council to cover the entire reservation. The other proposals were apparently given to the OEO committee, who in turn handed them over to the Community Workers when that component was funded. Apparently some were later forwarded to the Vermillion office of the Consortium, but reactions from Vermillion, if any, are unknown.

On 16 November the Tribal Council approved Resolution 64-53:

"The Ad Hoc Committee has directed the preparation of an application for funds under Title IB, known as the Program Outline and Budget for Work Training Programs. * * * The Council has carefully considered the CAP and the Program Outline and Budget for Work Training Programs and is aware of the obligations of the Tribe under each * * *."

The Resolution goes on to adopt and approve CAP, and directs the attorneys to negotiate for programs. The same month, Mr. Schifter submitted a discussion draft of the initial component requests (subsequently CAP Grant 181) to OEO in Washington.

CAP Grant 181 was approved on 19 January for a period ending 30 October 1965. Components approved were the Community Worker program and the Community Health Aide program.

b. Development of CAP Components

(1) *Community Worker Component.*—The Community Worker component was funded on 16 January 1965, effective in early February, for a total of \$34,282.85. The Executive Committee chose C. D. Allen to be the first Community Worker in March. With his help they selected the other two Community Workers and three Community Worker aides. One Community Worker, Gus Nemitz, was working in the State Welfare Office in Pine Ridge at the time he was hired, and had had extensive experience in recreation activities. Everett Jordan, the third worker, was working off the reservation when hired, but had been an extension agent at Pine Ridge for many years, and had been involved with Mr. Allen in the mass meetings of 1957 and 1958.

Intended pay-off of this component was high: The Evaluation section of the Pine Ridge CAP Application (attachment 7.2) suggests that "one should be able to observe projects and programs undertaken in the communities which had only been dreamed and talked about." The Scope and Content section of the application mentions as likely Community Worker projects organizing recreational programs for youngsters, adult and juvenile programs centering around community buildings, adult education classes for men, homemaking classes for women, and helping to coordinate CAP programs and other OEO programs under Title I through V. It makes the point that "The scope of the service which each Community Worker will be able to perform will be limited only by his time, ability, and imagination." To these a fourth might have been added: lack of funds to implement these diverse activities. The initial request for \$7,000 for materials—including those for home demonstration activities, recreational equipment, and educational materials—was cut to \$1,500. More important, as it developed, was the inability of the program to offer anything but advice to the adults who had been talking and dreaming about community projects and program for years.

Messrs. Allen and Jordan and their aides began discussing community wants and needs with Sioux they had known as extension agents. They explained the existing OED programs, and according to interviews with Sioux with whom they talked, they echoed Dr. Roessel in saying that OEO had to go by stages and would probably be able to hire more adults for community projects later. Mr. Nemitz and his aide conducted a recreation interest poll, and began searching for ways to acquire recreation equipment.

Mr. Nemitz was able to persuade a nearby Air Force base to donate \$2,000 worth of excess recreation equipment to the Sioux, and some manufacturers cooperated by donating balls and bats. Mr. Nemitz and his aide organized a softball league with eight teams, and held sports workshops through the schools. According to their calculations, over one hundred children participated on an average day in recreational activities held at seven reservation day schools. In addition, Mr. Nemitz and two VISTA workers organized a "Teen Canteen" in Pine Ridge. The Sioux are traditionally fine athletes and programs are popular, both with the children who participate and with adults. Athletic excellence is not simply recreation at Pine Ridge, but a personal virtue, and everyone seems to respect Mr. Nemitz as a good coach. Interviews indicated that some adults felt OEO should have more programs like the recreation program, that gave people something and helped them enjoy themselves. At the same time, others noted that the children had been playing ball long before the OED lent a hand.

It soon became apparent that Mr. Allen, as ex-officio Director, had very little time to work in the field. He had the responsibility to consult with the Tribal Council, help select CAP employees, write reports to OEO and, in consultation

with other people, design new programs and fill out CAP applications. These duties were complicated during the initial months by lack of an office. Mr. Jordan continued meeting with people in the districts, in his words "trying to sell the OEO," but this became increasingly difficult. "After a while we realized all that OEO talk was just campaign promises," one rural Sioux put it. This is a stronger statement than most would have made, but the sentiment behind it was widespread.

"Report of Community Workers, September 1965" is a five-page mimeographed document prepared by personnel of the Community Worker component, explaining existing programs which were being conducted at that time by the Community Health aides, Community Development, the Nursery School, and the Neighborhood Youth Corps. After describing what these programs were doing and what they expected to do, the last page of text requests cooperation:

"At the present time, our young people are realizing the benefits of the program, and our acceptance of the present programs, will eventually bring into reality, a workable adult program, and the other worthwhile benefits that will be forthcoming under the Anti-Poverty Program. The program has some very good basic points, and we should give the program a chance, and it may prove itself to be the makings of a long-range rehabilitation program.

"We, the adults, should also take into full consideration that this program may be our last one, and for the benefit of our younger generation, we should cooperate with the sponsor and the entire working personnel of the Office of Economic Opportunity organization."

Probably the greatest direct benefits of the initial field work phase of the CAP program were that many people were encouraged to apply for OED jobs, volunteer supervisors for the Neighborhood Youth Corps were contacted, and suggestions were elicited from communities for local NYC work projects. Indirectly, the dissatisfaction the program aroused as a result of not being able to live up to the people's expectations may prove to have positive value. Political activity in the last tribal election was reportedly greater than during previous elections, with almost twice as many candidates as usual running for office, and a voter turnout, despite a blizzard, of approximately 50% of the eligible voters. The tribal representatives elected are generally hostile to the OED, and are trying to find ways to exert control over the OED. The OED lends a real issue to tribal politics, and the hope of real power. Although they could quite possibly use the power unwisely or selfishly, the situation carries a built-in corrective: people will watch the Council more closely as its activities become more important, and political sophistication and involvement is likely to continue to improve. An important factor in this trend is the presence of Community Workers and Worker aides in the districts. They are in a position to feed information about reservation affairs into their work areas, and this new information source is bound to increase the pressure communities are able and motivated to put on matters that affect them.

Eight new Community Worker aides finished training and were in the field only a month before the end of the project research period. It was therefore impossible to assess their impact with accuracy. The need for these additional aides is quite clear, however, and was recognized by the Community Workers not long after the program was initiated.

It is a fact of Sioux life that strangers, including fellow Sioux from other parts of the reservation, are regarded with distrust. Therefore, even if it were possible for three Community Workers and three Community Worker aides to overcome logistic problems of covering a work area of nearly five thousand square miles, with poor or nonexistent roads, the human problems would be exceedingly difficult. A number of Sioux interviewed in Wounded Knee, where Community Worker Everett Jordan makes his home, said Mr. Jordan used to work closely with them, but that now he was always off someplace and no one saw him much. They spoke with reproach, and seemed to take his frequent absence from the community as a sign that he had lost concern for their problems. Undoubtedly, this was also due in large part to his inability, through lack of resources, to do very much about their problems. The new complement of Community Worker aides, one in each reservation, seems already to be increasing the effectiveness of the Community Worker program.

The Community Worker aides have been engaged, since their numbers were augmented, in contacting and establishing cordial relations with all the families in their districts, and in conducting an economic survey of the reservation. Since each district has an average population of close to one thousand, this is an

ambitious undertaking. At present, the program design calls for each aide to visit each family in his district at home at least once every three months. In addition, to economic survey forms they must fill out, they keep daily worksheets indicating numbers of people contacted and project undertaken. The Community Worker aides seem able to keep in close touch with problems within their districts. They are aware of local wants and needs, and occasionally can be of help.

For example, a Community Worker aide knew that a well travelled rural road required repair. People living on the road had complained about it to no avail. Because the Community Worker aide knew someone in the State Roads Department, he was able to have the road repaired, although in this particular instance, the Community Worker aide happened to have a contact in the Roads Department before entering upon CAP activities. It may be noted that the program Director is careful to see that aides get to know individuals in the Public Health Service, tribal offices, Bureau of Indian Affairs departments, and OEO components so that they can communicate local situations to the people whose influence could correct or improve the situation. Operating in the other direction, they try to inform their districts about policies and new opportunities that exist. This comes back to "selling OEO," which remains an important part of their activities.

The drawbacks already mentioned still apply, however. The aides hear again and again that people need jobs, pumps for their houses, help in setting up garden and livestock projects, and other things impossible to implement with present resources and program designs. Most local grievances involve factors far beyond the scope of the personal influence of any aide, and almost of any single individual. One Community Worker aide said he was approached by some fifty people who wanted him to tell the people in charge that they didn't want the kind of "low-cost" housing that the Public Housing Authority was going to build in their community. Rents are \$65 a month and up, more than most Sioux can afford, the houses are too close together to suit most rural Sioux, and they want to live on their own land, according to both the Community Worker aide and Oglala residents interviewed by project researchers. In this as in most cases, the aide's knowledge of the problem will have no effect. The program stops short of suggesting to the people ways they can make their collective opinions matter.

Since the new Community Worker aides started work in the field they have been handicapped by the need to fill in when problems developed in the NYC volunteer supervisor system. During a Community Worker aide meeting, it was brought out that every aide had at times spent five hours a day supervising NYC workers. This situation will be discussed more completely under the NYC section.

(2) *Community Health Aide Component.*—The Community Health Aide component was approved 16 January 1965, effective early February through 30 October 1965. Mr. Verrone, a PHS associate, arrived at Pine Ridge in February to train the Health Aides. His salary was paid by PHS and reimbursed by OEO.

Health Aide trainees were selected by a committee composed of representatives from the PHS, BIA, OED, and the Tribe. (The OED representative was Mr. C. D. Allen, who at that time was a Community Worker. By virtue of his long experience as a state agricultural extension worker at Pine Ridge, and by tacit agreement of the Tribal Executive Committee, Mr. Allen had been Acting Director of the CAP from the program's inception.)

Three Health Aide team leaders were selected, together with nine Health Aides. They began training under Mr. Verrone in March and completed training in early July. Training sessions included occasional lectures by members of the Tribe, the BIA, and the OED. During training, one Aide dropped out, and one was asked to leave before graduation. The graduating Aides were introduced to the Tribal Council on 14 July 1965. The team leaders gave a brief report to the Council on their training and duties. A second group of one leader and ten Aides began training in July, and were graduated in September.

When the training period ended, Mr. Verrone was transferred elsewhere. The Aides were left under the supervision of a PHS nurse, but it soon became apparent that the young, inexperienced Aides needed a full-time, qualified supervisor.

In early October, an extension of the program through November 1965 was requested. The request was granted on 29 October.

On 31 October 1965, the PHS assigned Miss Pacheco, who had previously been with the PHS in northern New Mexico, to Pine Ridge to take over supervision of the Community Health Aides. PHS administrators had hoped that her salary would be reimbursed by OEO, as had Mr. Verrone's, but OEO refused to do this unless Miss Pacheco resigned from the PHS and became an OEO

employee, which she declined to do. She is, however, a member of the OED staff, so that there are no problems of coordination between the PHS and OED in managing the program.

After graduation, one team of Aides began field work operating out of the community building at Kyle, covering the Kyle and Porcupine areas. A second team operated out of the Manderson school, covering Manderson and Wounded Knee. The third team, operating out of a formerly vacant day school near Oglala, covered Oglala, Oglala Junior, Slim Buttes, and Payabaya. Initial contacts were primarily with patients referred to them by the PHS hospital in Pine Ridge. The Aides talked to the people about sanitation and health problems, stressing medicines and health practices necessary to prevent and cure disease.

Under Miss Pacheco's direction, the Health Aides began making up and following monthly activity schedules. Each Aide is responsible for certain families in her area. Interviews are conducted with families in their homes, and folders kept on the health problems of each family. Originally, each Aide was supposed to make nine home visits a week, but because of the time necessary to write reports—and most of all, because of transportation difficulties—there is no longer a required number of visits. Interviews last from fifteen minutes to an hour-and-a-half.

Miss Pacheco works closely with the Aides, and holds weekly training sessions with each team on first aid, sanitation, and health education. In addition, she gives them pointers in good grooming and tries to install self-confidence. They are often reminded that they must set good examples in their communities. On training trips, Miss Pacheco sometimes takes them to expensive restaurants so that they will develop ease in varied social settings. Most of the Health Aides seem to retain strong family ties, however, and it is questionable whether many of them would leave the reservation in search of the nurses aides jobs their training might qualify them for if the CAP programs were to end.

The Community Health Aides program is one of the most popular individual components, both with the Tribal Council and the reservation population. It is one of the components that grew directly out of suggestions brought up at the mass meetings of 1957-58, and though virtually no one interviewed except OED staff members made the connection between the present Community Health Aide program and the 1958 suggestion, the program seems to meet what has apparently been a long-felt need at Pine Ridge, where Sioux have to wait in an uncomfortably alien environment for long hours to see doctors who often do not understand them. Many Sioux said they liked the Health Aides, who talked with them in their homes, in the Lakota language, except in a few communities where Lakota is not normally spoken, and who brought medicines (usually disinfectant soap, bed bug spray, and antibiotic salve). Many were clearly flattered by the attention. One Tribal Council representative expressed pleasure that "they are finally sending people to our homes, so they will understand our needs." The implication seems to be that if "they" know how bad things really are, "they" will finally do something about it. Though the Health Aides grew up on the reservation and usually live in one-room log houses, like most of the houses they visit, they are in the minds of people part of the powerful but usually indifferent world of bureau officials, doctors, and "Washington."

Other Sioux were less enthusiastic. One respected community leader said, "Sure, those girls came around and talked to me. They could talk all day and it wouldn't change anything. We still have to scratch for a living." Many people feel that the Health Aides are too young to know much, and certainly too young to be advising adults. (The same criticism is often leveled against the PHS doctors, about whom three older Sioux remarked that they come here fresh out of school to practice on the Sioux.) It may be noted that those people who were most critical of the Health Aides were often among those who were aware of the OEO when it was first being discussed, and were disappointed that it did not create mass jobs, or develop farms and ranching cooperatives.

Public Health Service officials at Pine Ridge are enthusiastic about the Community Health Aide program. They feel that by direct health education, outpatient interviews, and the construction of garbage pits and fly-proof privies in selected houses by NYC enrollees supervised by Community Health Aides, health standards on the reservation are being raised.

(3) *The Ranger Corps Component.*—The Ranger Corps component was requested in October 1965 and approved December 1 effective through 30 June 1966 for a total of \$45,050.

James Brown, previously Assistant Head of South Dakota Fish and Wildlife Service, was hired to direct the program. Position for Ranger trainees were advertised in the post offices and reservation general stores. 127 men applied, and Mr. Brown eliminated ninety-seven of these applicants. He gave the rest a psychological test ("mainly because they expected it") and a physical examination. Their police records were examined, with attention to recent drunkenness or disorderly conduct. The first group of ten Ranger trainees was hired on 8 February.

The trainees live in a dormitory set up in the building used by the OED. On Weekends they frequently go on training trips. The three-month training period includes daily lectures on such subjects as game management, first aid, tourism, and tracking. Trainees lead seminars themselves and are given pointers in public speaking. Much of the training is done in cooperation with the Consortium at Vermillion, and cooperation has been excellent since good communication has been established. (The first two letters requesting training aid reportedly went unanswered.) Vermillion has provided necessary books, and arranged and paid for many training trips and lectures by specialists. The original component application requested \$3,000 for training, but OEO reduced this to \$1,500. This cut would have severely hampered the program, according to Mr. Brown, if Vermillion had not made up the difference. The intensive training will equip the Rangers to qualify for many state, Federal, and private jobs.

Mr. Brown asserts that the program has been hampered by certain other unwise budget cuts, and that had OEO consulted an expert in conservation, the cuts would probably not have been made. For example, the plan to reduce transportation costs by allotting each Ranger \$20 a month to keep a horse is impractical in view of distances to be covered and the impossibility of keeping the necessary string of horses on \$20 a month per Ranger.

The first group of Rangers went into the field in May. During the remainder of the period of this study they worked primarily at making a wildlife inventory. This will allow the program, in cooperation with the Tribal Council, to plan and implement the restocking of game animals and fish. The Rangers also maintained a tourist booth in Pine Ridge town, and are rebuilding an abandoned camp ground at the Oglala reservoir. They sell hunting licenses to non-tribal members. State hunting licenses were sold haphazardly on the reservation before the Rangers arrived, but the State has no jurisdiction and no one seems to know where the money from them went. Money from the sale of licenses now goes into a special tribal fund, which the Rangers will use for conservation purposes.

The Rangers have organized an Indian powwow singing group, which has received favorable publicity in some large off-reservation newspapers. Mr. Brown heard of a number of jobs for Indians as extras in a motion picture production, and recruited Pine Ridge Indians to fill them. He persuaded US Forestry and local officials to modify signs on a major tourist route near the reservation so that they point directions to the Pine Ridge Reservation rather than to certain small towns.

Two of the first ten Rangers who showed special interest and aptitude in particular areas were able to receive additional training. One Ranger studied reptiles and reptile-handling at the largest "reptile garden" in South Dakota. Another entered a two-month training program in pulpwood production given by a Black Hills firm. Following the training he will become a crew leader for the firm, and will hire and train ten Pine Ridge Sioux to work under him.

The Ranger program has encountered no major problems so far. The Rangers like their work, which is mostly outdoors and carries the status of a uniform and a good deal of independence. More than two hundred men applied for the second group of ten jobs advertised in April. The Rangers have received good cooperation from the Tribal Council, the BIA, and other agencies and firms on and off the reservation. However, interviews indicated that few people understood what they were doing. Many expressed anger at the low number of people employed, and allegations were made that most of the people were hired away from other jobs. One incumbent Tribal Council representative who attacked the OED during his campaign for reelection claimed that most of the first group of ten Rangers had worked for Wright-McGill fishhook snelling plant, and that the people who really needed the jobs could not get them.

Actually, only two of the first twenty Rangers had jobs with Wright-McGill. The manager of Wright-McGill criticized the OED for stealing his employees, and when the second Wright-McGill employee was hired by the Rangers in the second group the criticism apparently went to the Tribal Council. During an OED staff report to the Tribal Council, Tribal President Johnson Holyrock cautioned Mr. Brown against hiring Wright-McGill employees without consulting the manager, and one outspoken tribal representative strongly attacked Mr. Brown, saying that the Tribe owned a lot to Wright-McGill and did not want his firm to leave the reservation because of Mr. Brown and the OED.⁴

After a fairly heated exchange between a few tribal representatives and some of the OED staff involving the issues of OED project director autonomy over their components, and the legality and wisdom of the Council dictating to tribal members that they cannot move up to better jobs, one Councilman ended the confrontation by explaining to everyone that the ex-Wright-McGill Ranger in question had quit Wright-McGill because of a difference with the manager. The incident is important, however, because it involves the more general problems of need versus qualifications as the main criteria for OED employment, and the desire of many members of the Tribal Council to tighten control over OED activities. These issues will be discussed in Section d. (Problems in Implementation of CAP Components).

(4) *Nursery School Component.*—Funding of the Nursery School component was first requested on 14 May 1965 and approved 30 June for \$157,765. Budget changes reduced the component director's salary from \$15,000 to \$8,640, and travel expenses from \$27,546 to \$19,015. Consumable supplies were reduced from \$9,155 to \$1,830 on the advice of an OEO education specialist.

Dr. Harold Abel (the child development specialist who helped with Day Care Center plans) had helped to design the component in the form in which it was submitted to OEO, and upon funding was officially retained as a consultant. The position of Director of the component was advertised, but there was difficulty finding a qualified person. Dr. Abel finally located Miss Marilyn Cole, who was approved by the screening board. She arrived in Pine Ridge on 29 August. Ten teacher aides had already been selected by the staff of the NYC component, which at that time consisted of two VISTA workers. The aides had already begun an eight-week session at the Indian Community Action Center in Tempe, Arizona.⁵ Two aide trainees were dismissed there, but the rest graduated successfully, according to Miss Cole.

After the initial group was in training in Arizona, OEO established another branch of the Three-University Consortium at the University of South Dakota at Vermillion, and directed the OED to arrange for any further teacher-aide training to be done there. Another memorandum from OEO required that all aides hired thereafter be over twenty-one years of age. (A request that the minimum age requirement for aides be waived was refused on 27 August 1965.)

Difficulty in finding a qualified director and qualified teachers (who were also selected by Dr. Abel and approved by the screening board) delayed opening of the Nursery Schools. Another difficulty that caused delay was the problem of suitable buildings. The component application said that arrangements for space for the Nursery Schools would be made in the community buildings. The Tribal Council was willing that the buildings be used to house Nursery Schools, but there proved to be a resistance to this plan in the individual communities. Furthermore, work, such as the installation of plumbing, was needed on many of the buildings before Nursery Schools could be operated in them.

Some communities were reportedly reluctant to surrender partial control of their community buildings. The psychological value of the issue may be appreciated when one considers that the community buildings were virtually the only things that most communities had control over, that they were gathering places for community events, and that from the point of view of most Sioux, everything of value they ever had, individually or as a tribe, was taken from them by force or guile by whites. Some communities demanded rent for the buildings. Others agreed that the buildings be used on condition that the Nursery Schools pay all utilities and maintenance costs.

⁴ By way of background, the Wright-McGill fishhook snelling plant has been on the reservation for some five years, and continues to pay minimum wages despite promises of salary increases when they first came. They have reportedly hinted a number of times that the reservation needs them more than they need the reservation, and many tribal representatives have heeded this warning.

⁵ A branch of the Three-University Consortium located at Arizona State University.

HSR researchers observed two community meetings in Porcupine in early February 1966 where the issue of whether or not to let the community building be used as a nursery school was extensively debated. The Nursery School Director explained the program, stressing the points that trained people would care for three- to five-year-old children for half a day, that the children could play with toys and do many interesting things, that they would get hot lunches, that attendance was voluntary, that the community could still use the building to hold meetings and social events, and that the Nursery School would pay all utilities and maintenance bills for the building. Arguments voiced in opposition to the plan were that the children would learn nothing useful, that three- to five-year-old children were too young to go to school, but rather should be with their mothers, and that the community building was for the community, not for outsiders. Arguments in favor of the Nursery School reiterated the points made by the Nursery School Director, and added that the community would lose nothing by letting the Nursery School start; parents who did not like it could withdraw their children, and the community could evict the Nursery School if the arrangement proved unsatisfactory. The meetings were well attended, estimated attendance at each was over fifty, with more people attending the second meeting than the first. The final vote ran approximately two to one in favor of letting the Nursery School use the community building.

The basic problem of building space is by no means solved however. Some communities seem to assert authority by making frequent complaints over details of building maintenance to the Nursery School teachers, and a number of communities are exploring more profitable ways to use their buildings. The Wright-McGill fishhook snelling plant may rent some of them to expand its operations. In the face of this possibility, Dr. Abel and the OED staff are exploring other buildings to house the Nursery Schools, but except for churches and trailers, there are few available.

Nursery Schools opened on the Pine Ridge Reservation in the following order:

Allen -----	November 1965.
Kyle -----	December 1965.
Wamblee -----	Do.
Pine Ridge I -----	Do.
Red Shirt (Independent) -----	January 1966.
Manderson -----	February 1966.
Porcupine -----	Do.
Oglala -----	Do.
Pine Ridge II -----	Do.
Wounded Knee -----	May 1966.
Holy Rosary (summer) -----	June 1966.

Many schools had difficulty operating through the winter. Because children had to be transported to most of them over long stretches of seasonally bad roads, schools frequently had to shut down when snow was heavy. Very often parents were not notified when schools had to be shut down because of weather conditions. A number of times HSR observers saw families who had walked through the snow to be with their children, only to be confronted with a school which had been closed for an indeterminate period. Such problems as burst water pipes, electrical failures, and furnace trouble have plagued the program. Some Sioux drivers hired to drive the children to and from school claim that, despite wages of \$1.85 pr hour, they lost money, because of high automobile insurance costs and the rapid wear on their cars caused by high mileage over bad roads.

Teacher-aid training at the Consortium in Vermillion, South Dakota (the Indian Community Action project) is unsatisfactory in the view of Dr. Abel and Miss Cole. There are no children for the teacher-aides to work with, and the classroom instruction alone is said to be of relatively little value. Also, Miss Cole reports that it is hard to find qualified teacher-aides over twenty-one because most Sioux women of that age have children to care for.

Most children seem to enjoy the Nursery School. Play experiences are almost totally unstructured. Children can play with games and toys, watch guinea pigs, or work at any of a variety of puzzles graded in difficulty. There are rest periods, story telling, and outdoor play stressing muscular coordination. Verbal ability is encouraged by the teachers and teacher-aides. Many mothers, perhaps most, also like the schools because they take care of the children for half a day and give them hot lunches. Few parents know anything about the theoretical benefits of the Nursery Schools and not many parents seem deeply committed to them.

Dr. Abel and Miss Cole are of the opinion that very early training and learning is non-conceptual, but involves all the senses, coordination of minor and major muscle systems, and early social experiences, involving both verbal and non-verbal interchange. Though learning at this stage may be non-conceptual, it is perhaps more important to the development of the child, and hence of the adult, than later learning, because the openness of the child to later experience, including learning experience, is in large part determined by the richness and variety of stimuli he receives before he is five. Dr. Abel states that the Nursery School component frankly aims at changing Sioux culture. Before establishment of the Nursery School component, Dr. Abel feels, young Sioux children had a very limited range of experience, bounded by the rather drab confines of the backyard, a few farm animals, and cars. Sioux children are discouraged from developing verbal skills because they are expected to be quiet in the presence of adults, and do not acquire the habit of asking questions. Neither Dr. Abel nor Miss Cole ventures to predict exactly how Sioux culture will be altered (they frankly admit they are not experienced with Indians and do not claim to be experts on Sioux culture), but they feel that post-nursery-school children will do considerably better in school since the "wall of silence" described by many teachers of the Pine Ridge Reservation will probably never develop among them. Therefore they will be better equipped, both by education and by temperament, to find employment.

It is of course impossible to predict the outcome of this experiment, at least without administering a carefully designed schedule of personality tests to a large sample of Sioux children. However, a few issues should be mentioned tentatively.

Erik Erikson, whose study of the Oglala Sioux in *Childhood and Society* incorporates both psychological and anthropological data, questions the theory (advanced by MacGregor) that the personality of the Dakota is conditioned by repressive forces set in motion early in the child's life. Erikson writes:

"My conclusion would be, as before, that early childhood among the Dakota, within the limits of poverty and general listlessness, is a relatively rich and spontaneous existence which permits the school child to merge from the family with relative integration—i.e., with much trust, a little autonomy, and some initiative (1963:163)."

Erikson sees the silent shutting-out of teachers in late grade school as the result of a value crisis where the pupil must choose between his family, where generosity and mutual support are esteemed, and the school and other external influences which try to encourage individual achievement relative to one's peer group. Murray Wax, in a monograph entitled, *Formal Education in an American Indian Community* (1964), attacks the functional relevance of early cultural deprivation by pointing out that there is indeed a rich variety of stimuli for Sioux children, but that they are not perceived as such by most educators. Furthermore, Wax states, Sioux children are very verbal when among their peers, and have a penchant for elaborate stories and oratory.

Assuming the validity of the points made by Erikson and Wax, a more fundamental cause than poverty of verbal experience for the withdrawal reportedly characteristic of Sioux youths in the classroom would seem to be the incompatibility of the value systems of white educators and Sioux families. Early childhood experience has a strong bearing on values, and the Nursery School purveys values as well as sensory stimuli. The child learns something of respect for property, neatness and order, and "manners." He learns to talk to adults, to ask questions, to share his experiences with them, and to enjoy and seek their praise. All of these are either counter to or different in emphasis from the way he is expected to behave at home. Whether this is likely to provoke the crisis of contradictory standards that some observers feel is largely responsible for the passivity and emotional instability of Sioux youths, at an earlier age than usual, is conjectural.

The possibility that the Nursery Schools are aggravating a values crisis, rather than alleviating it, is of course only one among many, and the purpose in exploring the matter here is not to devalue the Nursery School idea, but to suggest that deliberate cross-cultural personality change has many pitfalls. The more powerful the techniques, and the more severe the psychological ills of the subject group, the greater the need for full consideration of the dynamics of those ills and the probable emergent patterns—before cures are administered.

(5) *Central Office Component.*—On 21 October 1965 the Pine Ridge CAP re-

quested a Central Office component to facilitate conduct of CAP business. The component was funded in the amount of \$24,899.

C. D. Allen and other Community Workers had wanted to run their program without being tied to an office, especially because of the psychological connotations of an office in Pine Ridge town. They soon realized this was impossible, however, in view of the volume of administrative matters and the needs for storage space, secretaries and a good filing system. The Central Office component was the result.

(6) *Medicare Alert*.—The Medicare Alert component lasted six weeks and employed a staff of ten tribal members, all but two of whom were over sixty-five years old. The 1964-66 Tribal Council granted the OED Director authority to hire whomever he chose, in view of the need for haste.

Upon completion of the program the OED sent a report to the Indian Desk in Washington. In June the Indian Desk requested another copy of the report, and it was sent again. Ten days later the OED received another request for the report, and it was sent by registered mail.

A staff member of the Shannon County Welfare Board reported that some Indians were signed up both by Medicare Alert workers and Shannon County Welfare Board social workers. Until the mistake was discovered they were listed twice with Medicare. There was reportedly no cooperation between the efforts of the Welfare Board and Medicare Alert.

(7) *Homemaker Aide Component*.—The Homemaker Aide program was submitted to representatives of the Consortium at Vermillion and rejected. It was resubmitted through the Tribal Attorney and approved in January 1966, through June 1966, with funding of \$22,410.

The OED staff screened 150 applicants for Homemaker Aide jobs and, with State Extension Agent Bessie Cornelius, selected five. The program design was largely the work of Mrs. Cornelius, and she functions as the project Director although she still, as of mid-July, was a State Extension Agent. The Aides were trained both at Vermillion and by Mrs. Cornelius at Pine Ridge, completing their training in early July 1966. Five additional Aides were expected to begin training soon.

The program intends to give advice to homemakers in wise use of clothing and commodities, furniture repair, money management, grocery buying, sewing and crafts, and family relationships.

On 6 July 1966 an application was submitted for twenty-eight additional Aides. Though the program was not fully launched in the districts when HSR field research ended, the history of the Community Worker components suggest that this program has little chance of affecting many people unless considerably more than ten Aides are used, since impact depends significantly upon the cultivation of personal relationships between the persons giving and receiving advice.

(8) *Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC)*.—The Neighborhood Youth Corps was funded 20 June 1965. OED Director C. D. Allen had contacted people in Government agencies, tribal offices, and churches to act as volunteer supervisors for teams of NYC enrollees even before approval. When funds arrived, the program was already behind schedule since, as submitted on 15 December 1964, the proposal called for operation to commence in mid-January 1965. Every attempt was made to go into operation rapidly. One person contacted earlier reported to HSR researchers that Mr. Allen arrived one day to announce that funds were available, and to ask how many enrollees his organization could use and how soon they could be put to work. Other field informants indicated that there was a very sudden demand for tasks requiring assignment of teams of NYC enrollees. At the same time, large numbers of NYC enrollees had to be recruited. Announcements were made describing job qualifications, and reportedly all applicants who fitted the formal requirements were hired. Volunteer supervisors were recruited from communities by the Community Workers with the advice of some Tribal Council members, and ideas for work projects were solicited from Tribal Council members and at community and district meetings. Suggested work projects were selected by Mr. Allen in consultation with two VISTA workers, Eileen Jennings and Beryl Akers, who managed the NYC until a director could be recruited. Reportedly, the first teams of enrollees began work at the end of July.

There was considerable misunderstanding among the supervisors about their work. A few expected to be paid, and quit in a few weeks when they learned they were "volunteers." Some felt that their communities, not the Tribal Council,

should get credit for their work. (Credit for their work counted as part of the Tribe's contribution of 10 percent of the cost of CAP, in goods and services, but the communities were initially expected to pay for any materials used to teams of NYC enrollees working on community projects. Actually, this requirement was soon dropped because no communities had the funds to buy materials. Paint and tools were donated or lent by the BIA or the Tribal Council.) In many cases supervision was not sufficiently close. One youth who had been an NYC enrollee in the summer of 1965 reported that he and his entire team spent most of their workday with no supervision, and played most of the time. (Their supervisor, a Government employee, had a heavy work load of his own.) Observers reported that five or six enrollees were dropped off to paint one of a dozen or so school bus shelters, and that one enrollee would slowly paint the shelter while the rest lay around doing nothing.

The NYC program secured a full-time director, a counselor, and a staff supervisor toward the end of July 1965. Enrollees began receiving psychological tests and occasional counseling sessions, aimed at directing them back to school, to the Job Corps, to relocation training, or to the Armed Services. The intention was to make the enrollees look realistically at their future prospects in the light of their school records, test results, and work experience.

The NYC Director feels that the main benefit of the program is in making the enrollees aware of their future prospects, or in his words, "programming" them into the best alternatives realistically open to them. He realizes the program can give very little work training at present, though he is working on plans to improve this situation. At present, the wages and the work are primarily a means to the counseling, in his view. Due to the large number of enrollees, individual enrollees can usually have only a few personal counseling sessions. Most of their non-work time is spent in small groups, attending lectures. An HSR researcher attended one, a lecture given by a staff member of the BIA Employment Assistance Branch. His theme was that the more education a person has, the more he is worth. During his twenty-minute talk, which was direct and well prepared, the fourteen enrollees sat impassively looking at their hands or out the window. In another session observed, twenty or so enrollees watched a movie that showed a well dressed suburban youth develop his passionate interest in small rockets, with proper education, into a career that culminated in his own aerospace company. The theme was that one's boyhood interests can lead to good adult careers, when pursued with dedication. Since the Sioux boys' main avocations are sports and "bronco busting," and their identification is with the life of the cowboy, one may speculate on what lesson they drew from the film.

Though adult respondents in communities that had NYC work projects often criticized the inefficiency of the enrollees, the enrollee observably accomplishes many worthwhile tasks. Churches were painted, ball parks cleared, a large outdoor dance ground was built in one community, and a community building repaired and repainted in another. Women interviewed were a good deal more enthusiastic about these accomplishments than were men, who resented the lost opportunity to work.

Application for refunding was made in September 1965 to the NYC area office in Kansas. The original schedule had called for the program to run through November 1965. However, some necessary information was omitted from the new application, and it lay dormant in Kansas for months. By the time the local NYC staff realized what had happened, the US Department of Labor had run out of funds. The program managed to continue operating until the end of February 1966 on the funds that had accumulated due to the late start. More and more enrollees had to be laid off, however, and by the end of the first two weeks of March 1966, all 136 enrollees, and three staff members, were out of work. At that point the program was refunded. This locally unavoidable situation seems to have done much to hurt the reputation of all the OED programs. Many families had to come to count on the NYC checks, and deeply resented their loss. To many people, it indicated that the OED could not be relied upon, and some of the people interviewed by HSR researchers spoke as if deliberate deceit had been involved.

One criticism often voiced about the NYC program was that by employing school drop-outs, the NYC encouraged pupils to drop out of school. The original grant contained funds for in-school employment, but by the time these arrived in June 1965, school had recessed for the summer. The second funding came in mid-March 1966 and many students were then hired on an in-school basis.

A related criticism was brought up in a Council meeting in June attended by members of the OED staff. The Tribal President said that a number of needy youths who had just graduated from high school had been refused NYC jobs. He and other Council members thought this set a bad example to other students, since it seemed to punish them for graduating while rewarding their friends who had dropped out or failed. The NYC Director replied that the NYC philosophy was to help those first who needed help the most, and that they were aware of the problem and were working on it.

As of July, the NYC staff included a director, a counselor, two supervisors, and a secretary, all full-time, and an accountant who also served as accountant for the CAP programs. A third supervisor was being sought. Most of the earlier problems still cause difficulty, however. The need to find adequate work tasks for more than three hundred enrollees (as of July 1966) creates strain on the volunteer supervisors an often light workloads for the enrollees. A CAP Nursery School teacher said that she agreed to supervise five enrollees assigned to keep her school swept and clean. With that many working twenty hours a week, they reportedly "get underfoot." One BIA branch foreman said that he would like very much to teach the fundamentals of his trade to the NYC workers that he had agreed to supervise, but that there were too many of them and they usually did not stay on the job long enough. With a little training, the foreman thought they would be useful to him and to themselves; but as it is, he said, there is not much for them to do. Another BIA official said that a girl assigned to him as an office worker could become a good secretary if her bad spelling were corrected. He told members of the NYC staff that he would be glad to assign the girl spelling lessons if they would provide a spelling book. They said program guidelines allowed no purchases of this sort. (A VISTA Volunteer who was present offered to try to borrow a spelling text for the purpose.)

At a meeting for volunteer supervisors, a number of them raised the issue of their inability to provide the enrollees with useful work skills. One man asked what the enrollees were supposed to be learning. An NYC staff member replied that learning to keep regular hours was very important training. He said that the enrollees soon found that they would be docked for hours missed, and that if they were absent from work too many times without good reason, they could be dismissed. (The NYC Director stated that absenteeism was a problem among the enrollees. He reported that they periodically go "psychologically beserk" and disappear from the job for days, letting off tensions that have built up. Absenteeism was reportedly highest around Christmas time.)

Some Sioux adults complain that NYC wages have increased the drinking problem among reservation youth. Though the complaint may be largely motivated by a desire for an adult work program to replace the NYC, it seems to have basis in fact. Of fifty-five people arrested on the reservation for being drunk and disorderly over the Fourth of July weekend, forty were NYC enrollees. In June the NYC staff requested of the BIA Law and Order Branch that NYC enrollees who were arrested be treated as special cases and that the NYC be allowed to mete out any punishment given.

The Chief of the Tribal Police Force reported that petty theft had been cut in half since the NYC program started. Police officials feel that giving the youths something to do, coupled with enough money to reduce the likelihood of theft, has helped to keep them out of trouble.

Another clear benefit of the program has been that some enrollees were encouraged to save enough from their wages to buy back-to-school clothing. (Many enrollees elect to let NYC set up savings accounts for them, with parental permission.) Of six enrollees the HSR researchers knew well enough to be assured of frank answers, two said they bought school clothes with their savings accounts. (The six enrollees made it clear, however, that they thought the counseling and lectures were a minor annoyance.) Some fortunate enrollees are learning skills that will make them employable. Reportedly, a few enrollees assigned to the PHS hospital in Pine Ridge town have been trained as laboratory technicians.

It is too early to assess how successful the NYC program will be in achieving its primary goal, steering youths into productive lives. Clearly, many youths resist being "programmed." One had agreed to go to Job Corps camp in order to keep working on the NYC, then managed to miss necessary appointments, forget birth certificates, and fill out forms incorrectly for over a month to delay going. Many youths agree to go back to school but fail to do so or manage to have themselves suspended, meanwhile working in the NYC as long as they can "get away

with it." The NYC Director feels, however, that school statistics next year, when the in-school program is operating, will show that many enrollees have been steered back into school.

Even if this proves true, the program must overcome many culture-based obstacles. For example, Indian youths beyond the seventh grade form stronger peer groups, which functionally counteract alien values or advice from non-peer group members, specifically teachers.⁶ Rejection of concepts of "self-improvement" derived from the outside white world is widespread. Resistance to moving off the reservation to find work also remains high. The BIA has been trying to implement a relocation program for Pine Ridge people since 1951, with notably little effect on the total number of Indians at Pine Ridge Reservation who remain below the poverty level. Reportedly, 40% of Pine Ridge Sioux selected by the BIA Employment Assistance Branch in 1965 for jobs off the reservation have already returned. At this time, however, neither the NYC nor any other OEO program seems likely to create mass employment opportunities on the Pine Ridge Reservation for those enrollees now being urged to complete high school education.

(9) *Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA)*.—The Pine Ridge Tribal Attorney, Richard Schifter, had learned of the VISTA program before the Economic Opportunity Act was passed, and the Tribal Council and C. D. Allen cooperated with him in requesting that VISTAs be assigned to the Pine Ridge Reservation. The VISTAs who initially came to Pine Ridge had been trained in Albuquerque, in a few specific skills such as first aid, and had been given some general instruction in community organization. However, they had not been told specifically what they were to do at Pine Ridge.

The VISTAs had expected that housing arrangements would have been made for them, and as it turned out, they arrived in the midst of discussion of two relevant issues. First, the Tribal Council wanted them to live in the districts, but members were worried that they might be offended by the rough living conditions, the poverty, and drunkenness—and would form bad impressions of the Tribe. At the same time, they were worried about hostility that might be directed at the white outsiders by members of the communities.

The second issue was housing. The President of the Tribal Council had arranged, before the VISTAs arrived, for the Tribe to buy between fifteen and twenty-five second-hand trailers. Apparently this had been done on the understanding that VISTAs, Nursery School teachers, and probably other outsiders, would soon be arriving and would need housing. It was felt that the trailers could be placed wherever they were needed, and it was intended either that the Tribe would collect rent for them or that the rental value of the trailers would count as part of the Tribe's required contribution toward CAP. However, the trailers arrived in Pine Ridge in bad condition, and for months after the VISTAs had arrived, problems arose involving repair of the trailers and hooking them to utilities. The VISTAs in the meantime stayed in vacant rooms in the reservation "Old Folks' Home."

The Tribal Council was unsure of what might be done with the VISTAs, and asked the OED to assume responsibility for them. However, the OED Director and all other staff members were busy running the CAP components, and the VISTAs received almost no instruction. VISTAs who were interviewed said that they did almost nothing for a month, and were completely unable to get advice on the situation from VISTA officials in Washington. Mimeographed replies saying, in effect, "we have received your letter; we will respond when we have time; good luck," constituted a standing joke among the VISTAs at Pine Ridge.

Individual VISTAs gradually found tasks to perform. Two began working in the OED office and proved of great assistance in helping start the NYC and Nursery School programs. Among other things, they helped to contact volunteer supervisors for the NYC, and interviewed and selected (with final approval of C. D. Allen and the screening board) the first ten Nursery School teacher-aide trainees.

Another VISTA helped with office work for the tribal "Old Folks' Home," and became a good friend of many of the elderly Sioux there. Two more worked with BIA day schools in remote communities, on projects such as arts and crafts instruction. One VISTA moved into a deserted house in a remote community to try to institute community organization. However, though the Tribal Council and the OED Director had given approval, some members of the community were

⁶ On this point, see Wax, Murray, Rosalie Wax and Robert Dumont (1964).

suspicious of him. He could not explain to the satisfaction of its members what he was doing there and was asked to leave.

VISTAs who were interviewed complained that they could get no support from the Washington office of VISTA, and no one at Pine Ridge could give them advice on what to do. The OED Director said that the VISTA program created more problems than any other. A number of VISTAs resigned before their terms were up. One created a controversy between the OED and the 1966-68 Tribal Council because the Tribal President seriously objected when she was not granted an extension by VISTA in Washington. Though she was very popular with elderly Sioux at the "Old Folks' Home," and with members of the Tribal Council, the OED Director recommended that she not be retained. She reportedly would not pay her rent, and created various other difficulties.

When the 1966 Tribal Council assumed office, many of its members were concerned about OED's refusal to permit the extension of this VISTA worker's tour of duty. They were particularly angry about the Tribal Council's powerlessness in the situation. They also objected to the OED using VISTAs for its own purposes. Some Council members, as well as rural Sioux, felt that VISTAs would not be respected as long as they had to be pampered with trailers, running water and electricity, and that they were being paid for jobs that Indians could do just as well. Based on VISTA literature and a VISTA film, they felt that VISTAs were supposed to "work with the people," rather than with Government agencies that could afford to hire a staff.

When a VISTA representative arrived to discuss arrangements necessary for more VISTAs to be assigned to Pine Ridge, the Tribal Council liaison representative to the OED said that the Tribal Council wanted more control over the VISTAs, and specifically proposed a training program for VISTAs to be organized and run under the auspices of the Tribal Council. The VISTA representative made it clear that there were strong budgetary reasons for allowing the VISTAs to remain officially under the OED, but he thought the training program was a good idea and could very likely be put into effect. All parties apparently accepted the compromise, but the issue of who would have final decision-making power in the case of a clear disagreement between the OED and the Tribal Council was left unresolved.

c. Opinions and Attitudes Regarding CAP

It is impossible to create a conceptual model of the social and attitudinal variations within the Pine Ridge Reservation which does justice to their complexity. Roughly ten thousand people live over a five thousand square mile area, most of them in small communities. The concepts of sociological fullbloods and sociological mixed bloods, referring to relatively unacculturated and traditional Indians, on the one hand, and to Indians relatively acculturated to white values, on the other, are useful to denote cultural differences, and a number of communities and factions think of themselves as being "fullbloods" or "mixed bloods." These are loose concepts, however, and though for some program administrators the participation or non-participation of Indians in their programs may seem to divide the reservation into two rather clear groups, these groups do not exist as social entities.

Attitudes toward the OEO and its programs seem to have less to do with the program than with general preexisting attitudes toward Government programs, ideal and actual. Theoretical future benefits from the OEO were generally not appreciated, except by relatively acculturated employed Indians. Both unacculturated and acculturated Indians tended to evaluate the worth of the OEO as a direct function of its success in satisfying their felt needs, and as an indirect function of their initial hopes regarding the likelihood that it would be truly helpful.

The relatively unacculturated Indians were very pragmatic about what they needed, and therefore what Government programs should help them to get. The main felt need was for jobs. People interviewed in the White Clay and Wakpamni Districts—in particular in Calico, Payabya and Oglala—tended to see a need for more industry. (The Wright-McGill snelling plant has employed men from those communities for a number of years.) In more isolated areas, there was general interest in cattle cooperatives and community gardens. However, both industry and ranching were mentioned in all areas, excluding Pine Ridge, where ranching was not suggested. Other felt needs mentioned frequently were self-help home improvement and truly low-cost housing, well-drilling, and irrigation projects.

Employed and relatively acculturated Indians also stressed the need for jobs, but in discussing them they were more abstract. They spoke of the need for more and better education, and for civic virtues such as better cooperation between people, responsibility, and dependable work habits. They were hopeful that the OEO programs would help raise reservation standards. Since they themselves did not need jobs, they participated in the programs indirectly—by sending their young children to nursery school, for example. Some expressed the concern that the program would end, creating problems for other Government agencies, and some who worked in other agencies thought that their agencies should have control over some of the OEO programs. This was most true in the case of the Nursery School program, which was coveted by personnel of the BIA and state schools.

With exception of employed acculturated Indians, the overwhelming majority of Sioux interviewed did not feel that the OEO programs were helping them to meet their most important needs.

The strongest statements of dissatisfaction came from sociologically mixed bloods who lived in the districts, many of whom were or had at one time been Councilmen. Initially high expectations that the OEO programs were to be "what the people wanted" seem to have given way to anger. They sometimes stated that the War on Poverty had been "taken over" by a group of whites in Pine Ridge who were drawing immense salaries. Some objected that there were Indians competent to run the programs, and that outsiders need not have been brought in. One man stated that the program was a "racket." HSR field researchers discovered that in one district a campaigning Councilman, subsequently elected, was going from house to house with a copy of the OED newspaper (called at that time *I'm Nameless*, later renamed *War Cry*) pointing out articles that introduced different component directors and stating the (alleged) salary of each.

More traditional Sioux who were interviewed generally did not express strong resentment of existing programs, though the majority expressed indifference to or unawareness of the programs. There was a tendency to speak of "Government programs," and to fail to differentiate among them except to specify those considered more or less beneficial. OEO programs were linked together in the minds of a minority of people. The programs were not seen as significantly helpful; that is, they provided few jobs and did not improve the general subsistence level by creating irrigation works, gardens, or other concrete benefits. Some Sioux offered the opinion that Government programs were getting worse. The WPA was generally regarded favorably because it put large numbers of adults to work and created roads and irrigation systems.

There was some evidence that expressions of unawareness or indifference in fact covered resentment. HSR researchers noted that members of the communities covered intensively often shifted initial noncommittal responses to strong indictments. There seemed concern for the feelings of the researchers, whose personal allegiances were at first undetermined.

There were indications that the growing circulation of the OED newspaper, *War Cry*, increased awareness of the OEO programs, as well as the tendency for Sioux to think of them as related. Respondents often referred to facts they had read in the newspapers; but significantly, material recounted had to do with numbers of people to be hired and dates of operation of particular components, and not with the intentions or theoretical benefits of the components.

Specific criticisms of the programs, when they were made, focused on numbers and types of people employed. Many heads of families objected that the programs hired mostly young people. (The NYC has hired more individuals than all the other components combined. The second and third largest in numbers employed are the Nursery School and Health Aide components, which hire mainly girls in their twenties. Family heads raised many objections to this, on grounds that young people could not work as well as older people, that it made the young people wild, that they wasted the money, and that it encouraged young people to be disrespectful of their parents. A major factor behind these objections seems to be that parents strongly resented being made financially dependent on their children, and that this undermined their authority and self-respect. This issue is more important here than would be the case among whites since among the Sioux authority is more a function of age.)

Other objections heard from the rural people were that the programs stayed in Pine Ridge town, and that people were hired who either had jobs or had close relatives who had jobs. Since the number of people hired from Pine Ridge town

compared to the number hired outside the town is actually lower than the corresponding population ratio, the first objection cannot be taken at face value. It is important, however, because it expresses the perception that the programs benefit other than the rural people.

An implicit notion in both this and the second objection—that the program is hiring people with jobs or people whose family members are employed—is that the OED is not helping those who need help the most. The idea has also been voiced by at least two Tribal Council representatives, who publicly criticize the OED on the grounds that it is not employing the most needy. Investigation was not able to trace the idea that the OED should or would employ those who most need help to any statement made by or ascribed to the OED staff or any OEO representatives to the reservation. It seems likely that the idea grows out of the Sioux value placed on helping those who badly need help, reinforced perhaps by experience with welfare, which “rewards” the most helpless. Considering that the OEO program can employ only a small minority of the employable adults on the reservation, it is likely that the OED staff will continue to hire applicants felt to be the most reliable, as evidenced in part by past employment. The majority of the reservation adults will probably continue to find fault with the programs on this score.

With few exceptions, cooperation between the OED staff and other Government agencies at Pine Ridge has been good. Though officials of other agencies may privately question the likelihood of OEO's success, they have seldom refused to provide services and facilities when requested.

(1) *The Bureau of Indian Affairs.*—William Nye of the Resources Development Branch of the BIA served as liaison to the OEO in Pine Ridge. He sat in on meetings with members of the Tribal Executive Committee, Tribal Attorney Richard Schifter or his representative, and Dr. Ogden, liaison man for the PHS, when project ideas were discussed. According to other persons who attended these meetings, BIA approval was needed and secured to use an office building to house the OED, as well as two buildings once used as day schools that now house Nursery Schools, and part of a teacherage which houses a Community Health Aide field office. The Ranger Corps requested and received permission to develop and reopen an abandoned campground that falls within BIA jurisdiction. Profits from the campground will go to the Tribal Council for further resources development under Ranger supervision.

There have been two reported cases of friction involving BIA departments, one very minor, the other possibly significant. Both seem to involve personalities rather than organizational considerations. The “head” of the BIA Law and Order Branch felt that the Rangers should receive police training under his department and function in part as an auxiliary police force. The Director of the Ranger Corps resisted the implications of this, and though he did not reject the proposed training out of hand, he refused to allow a training period as long as the BIA man felt necessary. The matter was dropped.

More serious were problems with principals of BIA day schools. The principals, as well as other BIA and PHS personnel, were asked to supervise small teams of NYC workers and had agreed to do so. As described in the earlier section on NYC, there were difficulties with this system of volunteer supervisors, but the school principals had more difficulties than any other group of professionals in accommodating themselves to NYC procedures. A special briefing session for the principals in June 1966 cleared up many misunderstandings, but not long afterwards one principal ostensibly fired an NYC worker under his supervision, though it had been stressed that this could not be done.

According to two informants, the same principal aided a group of Sioux in his community in drafting a resolution asking C. D. Allen to resign as OED Director. The resolution was defeated when brought to district meeting vote. Though the rumor is unverifiable, it indicates at least that some Sioux in his community feel that the principal was actively hostile to the OEO and its personnel. The same principal at a public meeting of parents of Nursery School children, attended by an HSR researcher, remarked how lavishly funded the Nursery School was compared to the kindergarten, and suggested the two be “put under the same roof.” (Literally speaking, they already are.) Many reservation principals would like the Nursery Schools to be under their jurisdiction, and seem to feel that the Nursery Schools are overfunded. Some complain that children who have gone through nursery schools are too advanced for kindergarten, but no moves have been made to revise the kindergarten curriculum accordingly.

BIA officials at Pine Ridge told HSR researchers that they stand ready to help the OEO in any way, but that will not act unless asked. Privately, some of them express doubts about the beneficial effects of the OEO, rumors of a new source of jobs may rule people back to the reservation who were managing to get along elsewhere. Hopes are more easily aroused than satisfied. If Congress cuts OEO funds, the BIA may be left to pick up the pieces.

(2) *Public Health Service.*—Like the BIA, PHS had a representative at the meetings that planned the initial OED components. Dr. Ogden was especially active in planning and implementing the Health Aide component, earlier discussed. This component was the main sphere of cooperation between the PHS and the OED.

Initial cooperation was impeded by a letter to Dr. Ogden from the PHS Area Director's Office in Aberdeen, urging local PHS units not to cooperate with the OEO. The letter arrived before or during the period the Community Health program was being planned. It was apparently sent to the directors of PHS hospitals on Indian reservations with Aberdeen's jurisdiction. However, the letter was countermanded by higher PHS officials in Washington.

The PHS has been involved with the Nursery School component, since children of nursery school age require special medical attention. Emergency treatment is given to Indian Nursery School children brought to the hospital in Pine Ridge, but because of PHS regulations, no medical attention can be given to white Nursery School children. Also, because of insufficient funds, the PHS was unable to set up special clinics for Nursery School children to deal with ear ailments, which are widespread among Pine Ridge children and often lead to permanent hearing defects. The Nursery School Director therefore requested funds to provide medical insurance for white children, and to set up, in cooperation with the PHS, special prevention clinics for all Nursery School children. A PHS pediatrician wrote a letter explaining that the health services in question were very much needed by the nursery school age-group, and that at present the PHS was unable to provide them, though it stood ready to help if OEO granted the necessary funds.

d. Problems in Implementation of CAP Components

(1) *Paucity of OED Job Opportunities.*—127 men applied for the first ten Ranger jobs available. Over two hundred applied for the second group of ten. One member of the OED staff estimated that for every person they were able to hire, ten had to be turned down. OED staff directors seemed to agree that this was the fundamental cause of criticism of the OED, and they felt that if they could put truly large numbers of adults to work, participation in and enthusiasm for all of their programs would greatly increase.

In addition to generating criticism, this mass discontent has other detrimental effects. When a man who has pinned his hopes on a program from Washington hears that a massively funded program is operating but learns that he himself can get nothing from the program, he tends to lose confidence in himself, feeling that whatever hopes he allowed himself had been betrayed, and resenting the people who were hired. Patently, the harshest critics of the OED program were people who had had the highest hopes of employment through them. Respondents told HSR researchers that the program components were being "hogged" by people who did not need them.

(2) *OED Focus on Youth.*—The Nursery School program care for children from three to five; the NYC hires school drop-outs and in-school students; the Community Health and Nursery School programs hire aides who are usually between twenty-one and twenty-seven. Almost half of the Rangers and Community Worker Aides are men in their twenties, and only the Homemaker component hires women primarily of middle age. The practice of hiring young people for aide jobs seems to be based on the theory that they are less set in their ways and therefore easier to train. The enthusiasm for training shown by the older Rangers, Community Worker Aides, and the Homemaker aides seems to belie the importance of this principle, at least when applied to the Oglala Sioux.

The practice has the further disadvantage that Siouix authority is closely linked to age, and employing the children of parents who are unemployed creates much interpersonal tension. Some parents and grandparents refused to let their children participate in the NYC until they felt driven by economic necessity. NYC supervisors were very concerned about the problem of parents getting drunk on the wages of their NYC-employed children. Drinking occurs, but has seldom been a problem, among adults employed by the OED program.

At least five different tribal and community leaders told project researchers that parents felt humiliated by being financially dependent upon their children. The many criticisms adults made of the rebelliousness and irresponsibility of the young people who suddenly find jobs suggests not only the bitterness of those excluded from employment, but the OED hiring practices are aggravating pre-existing tensions between generations. It would be misleading to assume that these tensions are due to a struggle between reactionary oldsters and their more modern progeny. Though there are cases when this may apply, there are as many where the issue is youthful lack of respect for unemployed parents or lower sense of personal integrity.

Sioux culture, much more than white, values age. Advice is given by older men who are the "true" opinion-makers within communities. At dances and community meetings, young people attend but are expected to keep respectfully silent when elders speak. There is, therefore, a certain incongruity in training young people as aides and giving them the responsibility for teaching sanitation methods, proper ways to care for children, and the need for community cooperation.

(3) *Engaging Community Leadership.*—During the four- or five-month period prior to the funding and operation of components, community discussion and interest in possible OEO programs was reportedly high in some of the Pine Ridge communities and resulted in many concrete proposals. These were either rejected, deemed infeasible by the Consortium at Vermillion, or incorporated into reservation-wide components. (According to members of the OED staff, members of the Consortium at Vermillion told them that the only programs that would be funded would be reservation-wide ones.) The initial enthusiasm abated. As one member of the Community Action Advisory Board remarked, "since these are not their own programs, they are not too much interested." The Community Action Advisory Board became defunct after a few meetings because Sioux members appointed by the Tribal Council felt it had no function, and stopped attending. The fifth member of the Tribal Executive Council who is responsible for liaison with the OED has urged the formation of another such board and has submitted a list of suggested members.

The staff of the NYC program in May 1966 considered the merits of setting up a NYC advisory board of respected members of the communities wherein NYC operates. The idea was deferred because the members of such a board would quickly sense they were being used as a rubber stamp for approval of issues already decided—unless they were given true decision-making power. The NYC Director was unwilling to risk such an arrangement. At the end of project field research, Tribal Council members were discussing plans to create an advisory board for the entire OED, with supervisory powers over OED activities.

Many factors make formal or informal cooperation with informal leaders difficult. Most important, their viewpoints on the purposes of the programs generally diverge from those of the OED staff or of OEO administrators. They can be expected to press for concrete benefits such as jobs, and be disinterested in theoretical long-term benefits. Individually, they are concerned with benefits to their communities and kin, and would feel, correctly, that their status in the eyes of their own people would depend on their success at delivering (or seeming to deliver) these. Therefore, they would probably try to put personal pressure on staff members to hire their relatives, just as members of the Tribal Council allegedly have. Most of them would be unfamiliar with planning and action based on memoranda and official requirements. The two viewpoints involve two fundamentally different ways people relate to one another. One of these involves relationships that are highly personal and kin-based; the other involves the assumption of roles, not in relation to a group of friends and relatives, but based on written or unwritten patterns of behavior demanded by the particular job or social role involved. The former conceptual stance is that of the informal tribal leader, while the latter is that of the OED administrator.

Faced with the need to "sell" the programs, to recruit and select applicants from the population, and to enlist the cooperation (or at least acquiescence) of the communities in many matters, OED staff members have tried to do their jobs without provoking unnecessary personal hostility, jealousy, and misunderstanding. Though they feel their primary responsibilities are to their programs, they usually go to district meetings when asked to do so. (Some tribal representatives and district committeemen maintain that OED staff mem-

bers avoid the meetings and try to keep their activities as secret as possible.) They occasionally go to meetings voluntarily to explain their programs, but in general feel that "public relations" is the responsibility of their aides and the Community Workers. One component director said that he tried to be aware of factions and politics enough to avoid the charge of playing politics in his hiring. Generally speaking, component directors seem to try to avoid criticism by being as fair as possible and by hiring applicants with the best school and employment records.

There is little social interaction between members of the OED staff and tribal members who are not OED employees. Tribal members were seldom observed visiting the OED offices, and OED professional staff seldom visit Sioux social events or homes. Without person-to-person contact with OED leaders, cemented by mutual favors and compromises, tribal members feel the programs "belong" to the staff, and not to them.

(4) *Excessive Paperwork.*—Another factor, as important as the cultural differences which prevent person-to-person contact between OED staff and tribal members, is the heavy workload on the OED staff. The staff must administer OED programs, which involve such special problems as inadequate office space, bad roads and great distances, extreme weather conditions which can paralyze transportation for weeks, overlapping Government and tribal bureaucracies which slow down action, and inexperienced employees who often need continuing on-the-job training. Beyond this, OED requires frequent reports and official forms. The OED Director during the HSR field research period said that at least a quarter of his time was spent on paperwork, the function of which was to keep Washington informed. He estimated that another quarter was spent on internal recordkeeping. Initially, he spent much time developing his contacts with tribal members, but gave this up when he got behind on his reports to Washington.

(5) *Inadequate and Confused Communication.*—Since there is no official policy statement on types of programs that are or are not acceptable, the only way a CAP staff can learn the current thinking of the Indian Desk is through submitting plans and awaiting acceptance or rejection. Rejections, however, carry insufficient information. Does "deferred" mean that the same program resubmitted in three months without change will be likely approved, or that changes are necessary, or that the program is wholly unacceptable? "Insufficient funds" may conceivably mean that funds allocated for the program in question have already been distributed to other reservations. However, if CAP directors are in a race for funds, they need to know the rules of competition. When should an application be submitted to have best chance of approval? When an application is rejected, precisely why was it rejected?

The terms are confusing not only because of their imprecision but because of the possibility that they cover factors not mentioned. Not long after the OED received a letter from OEO/Washington stating that the Pine Ridge Nelson Amendment request had been deferred due to lack of funds, the head of the Indian Desk, also from OEO/Washington, reportedly said in a speech before the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council that there were still funds available for Nelson programs and that he did not why Pine Ridge did not have one. Members of the Consortium at the University of South Dakota at Vermillion reportedly told members of the OED staff that the real reason the OED was having trouble getting its proposals granted was that the tribal lawyer, through whom most proposals have been submitted, is in disfavor with the Indian Desk at OEO.

A member of the Consortium at Vermillion said in a speech before the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council that tribes who submit their programs with aid of the Technical Assistance people at Vermillion tend to be more successful in getting their programs funded, because the Technical Assistance staff knows the thinking of OEO/Washington, and can help design programs that will have the greatest likelihood of funding and will also argue in favor of the programs as designed.

The hints of internal politics involved in program selection observably did much to undermine the morale of the OED staff, who came to the obvious conclusion that they were in official disfavor. The resignation of C. D. Allen as CAP Director in July 1966 was due in large part to this. The Tribal Council too is confused by the situation. Tribal Council President Johnson Holyrock told a member of the HSR field team in mid-July that, after listening to the OED staff, representatives from the Consortium at Vermillion, and the Indian Desk at Washington, he and the Council knew less about what was going on and what Washington really wanted than they did when they took office—which was nothing.

(6) *Unilateral Modification of Proposals.*—Directors of CAP components stated that modifications made in their proposals often created difficulties. In some cases they agreed with the cuts made, but in others the modifications were clearly made through ignorance of local conditions. Unwise cuts in travel allowances that failed to take into consideration the bad roads and extreme distances to be covered on the Pine Ridge Reservation were invariably mentioned. Similarly, with telephone allowances, which do not take into account the fact that most of the area covered by these programs is beyond the local call zone of the OED office.

Mr. William Cuny of the Consortium at Vermillion mentioned in a speech before the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council that members of the Consortium had been able to explain sections of the budget of a Turtle Mountain proposal to officials in Washington who were going to cut the sections in question, and thereby prevented the budget cuts. This kind of person-to-person dialogue is desirable, but obviously not always possible, either for the Consortium or for tribal lawyers, who in the case of the Oglala Sioux have been performing a function similar to that provided by the Consortium. Mr. Cuny's remark indicates, however, that such clarification of considerations behind the details of program design is sometimes necessary.

One member of the OED staff said that at first they had been scrupulously accurate in estimated costs of their programs, but that since they had come to expect a few constricting cuts in every proposal, they were seriously considering padding to absorb such cuts. One OED staff member said that sometimes they are consulted about budget cuts before they are made, but that more often they are not.

(7) *Needs for Economic Development.*—The difference in title between the Office of Economic Opportunity national agency and the Office of Economic Development local agency is revealing. Though nationally the need may be to prepare people to qualify for the opportunities open to them, local employment opportunities do not exist. The Pine Ridge Reservation has had no economic base other than Government money since buffalo hunting was outlawed in the 19th Century. The BIA, through its Employment Assistance Branch, has been encouraging Sioux to leave the reservation since 1951, with notably little success. (According to BIA statistics, roughly 40% of those selected and trained for relocation return.) Various factors reduce the likelihood that OEO will be able to increase the practicability of relocation as an answer to poverty at Pine Ridge. The primary one is that ties of kinship and community are very strong; the reservation is home, and though individuals make forays outside for short-term jobs, they seldom stay. For OEO to alter this situation, it would have to break strong community and family ties, which would be difficult even if desired. Also, even if all people employed by the OED later moved off the reservation, its programs still employ (as of July 1966) only one-twentieth of the reservation population.

At present, only one OED program (the Ranger component, which will hire eighty men to manage wildlife resources and aims at developing income from tourists) is designed to directly improve the long-range economic base of the reservation.

Furthermore, there seems to be very little cooperation with the one agency that is designed to develop local industries, the Economic Development Administration. During July 1965, a representative of the EDA paid a brief, unannounced call on the OED. He said he was in Pine Ridge for a few hours, and he had spent them looking unsuccessfully for the Tribal President, who also knew nothing of his visit. He mentioned that the EDA was negotiating with a moccasin factory to locate on the Pine Ridge Reservation, which the OED has been unaware of. The Director of the Community Worker component, who are not present at the time, told us later that he would try to secure EDA cooperation in a craft cooperative being organized by a VISTA volunteer.

e. Summary

In January 1965, OEO began its effort to lift from poverty the Oglala Sioux, a group which has seen perhaps more Federal programs come and go than any other tribe. Some anthropologists have in fact tried to derive the characteristic world views of succeeding generations of Oglala Sioux from the programs in operation when they grew up. Each new policy change strengthens the Sioux's strong conviction that they are a people wronged, and, according to former BIA and state agricultural extension workers, makes the next program harder to "sell." Yet from reports, those Oglala Sioux who heard what OEO intended at

Pine Ridge were jubilant, because finally Washington was going to start a program that was to be their program—funding their ideas and hiring them to carry them out.

Enthusiasm and interest quickly changed to bitterness and indifference when ideas submitted by the Sioux communities were passed over in favor of “pre-packaged” programs that created relatively few adult jobs and did little to meet felt needs for industry, for cattle and farming loans, for low-cost housing, improved roads, and wells. The new Tribal Council elected in 1966 was notably more hostile to OEO programs than the previous one, and the deposed Tribal President felt he had been defeated for reelection because people associated him with OEO.

The local administrative agency for the OEO programs, the Office of Economic Development, has put together a staff of dedicated professionals, and as of July 1966, hired approximately five hundred members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. (Of these, approximately 350 are NYC enrollees.) Those hired, excluding the NYC enrollees, are usually not the poorest, since the staff professionals try to select the most qualified personnel they can find. They are below the Federally set poverty income levels however, and nearly half of them are “sociologically fullblooded.” Apparently most of them are keeping strong family and community ties, so that, unlike most employees of other Government agencies, they are not necessarily being drawn into what amounts to a socially separate community of whites and employed, acculturated Indians. At the same time, there seems to be a good deal of resentment against them, and the reproach is often voiced that OEO is not hiring those who need help the most.

The OEO program seems to be affecting the Pine Ridge Reservation in four ways. First, it is raising the subsistence levels of the families of those employed. Many of them have bought gas stoves, made home improvements, and eat better food than they did before. Second, at a time when “short-term” jobs are becoming harder to find, it is giving salable skills to approximately one quarter of the people it hires, and is giving decent wages and familiarity with basic work requirements to most of the rest. Third, the programs are providing services to the reservation population as a whole, including individual health attention, management of game resources, tourist promotion, nursery schools, and home management advice. Some of these are generally appreciated by the people they serve, but most are seen as either minor conveniences, or else are not recognized as relevant to their lives and needs. Fourth, the OEO programs have become a great popular and political issue on the reservation. The people whose hopes were raised by expectations of OEO help often feel they have been done out of something, and though they generally felt the same way before OEO was created, the tangible existence of OEO has evoked much anger and frustration.


In the latter respect, OEO is not unlike the BIA and PHS, but there are differences. Many people are convinced that OEO is “supposed” to be their own program, so the frustrations are more direct, and are in part channeled into political attempts to gain control of the OED. Also, the OED programs are opening up lines of communication within the reservation, both by their employees, especially the Community Workers, and by the need to gain community cooperation in some matters. When the Director of the Nursery School program had to secure permission to use community buildings to operate her schools, the spirited participation of community members in two public debates witnessed by HSR observers was probably due in part to their pleasure at having a Government official ask for and need their approval for anything.

In the final analysis, poverty can be significantly reduced on the Pine Ridge Reservation only by either moving two-thirds of the present population off the reservation (BIA estimates indicate that the land, used with maximum efficiency, could only support one-third of the population), or else by giving the reservation a lasting economic base. The first alternative will probably never be more than a partial solution. It has, as already noted, been an official policy of the BIA at Pine Ridge since 1951, but approximately 40% of those carefully selected, trained, and helped to establish themselves elsewhere return; the ties of family and community, as against the problems of competing for a limited supply of jobs in an unfamiliar environment, insure that few people will leave the reservation permanently.


In many ways the OED programs are creating pressures both to leave and to stay. By attracting able, educated people, who have left the reservation, to return to take higher staff jobs in the OED, by putting money into the reservation communities in the form of salaries, and by providing social services, the

OEO increases the holding (and pulling) power of the reservation. By equipping Sioux who are presumably the most able members of their communities with skills they cannot use on the reservation when OEO leaves (unless industry or other Government programs replace it), by trying to instill the values of the larger society in its employees, by operating programs like the Nursery School and the NYC that try to prepare the younger generation of Sioux for lives they could not lead on the reservation with its present lack of an economic base, the OEO makes it more difficult for Sioux to remain where they are.

Though local criticism and attempts to influence the programs in ways that may not be to the liking of OEO officials will probably continue and increase, to end the OEO on Pine Ridge would be one of the worst setbacks the reservation could receive. If OEO ends its effort there before an economic base has been developed, the hopes as well as the frustrations the program has aroused would be extinguished, leaving the reservation in a sense poorer than it was before.



PINE RIDGE RESERVATION, SOUTH DAKOTA



D. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO

1. *Historical and Cultural Background*a. *Pueblo History*

(1) *Early Times*.—In examining the impact of the "War on Poverty" on the Santa Clara Pueblos⁷ and their response to CAP operations, historical continuities stand out as significant determinants of present-day realities. The high degree of intra-community cooperation engendered by centuries-long experience in an economy of scarcity and the closely guarded retention of religious and cultural values in the face of repeated attempts to replace these with various Western-world substitutes has given the Pueblos considerable unity and organizational strength in exploiting the opportunities afforded by CAP. Since this is not a usual circumstance in the Indian world today, a rather comprehensive survey of Pueblo history and culture is relevant to this study.

For more than two millennia agriculture has formed the basis of Pueblo subsistence, and compact villages have been characteristic. The pueblos are usually adobe construction, and the houses are either connected to form one or more plazas or, as at Taos, are consolidated as a single multi-story apartment house. One or more *kivas* (secret ceremonial chambers) are found in each village.

The people of the pueblos reside in the semi-arid regions of the Southwest, supporting themselves by subsistence agriculture based, most importantly, on cultivation of maize, but also on native foods such as beans and squash, and some plants introduced by the Spanish. Hunting has always been secondary to agriculture and no domesticated animals other than the dog were kept in early times. Rain has always been important for subsistence, particularly in the West (i.e., Arizona), and occupies an important place in ceremonial activities and religious beliefs. In the East (i.e., New Mexico), where agriculture was dependent upon irrigation, water is sacred, but of less ritual importance than in the West.

The Pueblos have been the object of anthropological research for decades and a vast literature has been assembled. In this brief sketch only an outline of the most significant characteristics can be noted. Many of the recent social and cultural changes will be considered in the sections of this report dealing with social and political organization, particularly as Santa Clara is involved. It may be noted that Santa Clara, as one of the most progressive of the Rio Grande Pueblos, may indicate the path that more conservative villages will follow.

The Pueblo way-of-life is highly distinctive and uniform throughout the territory occupied—the Colorado Plateau of northern Arizona and New Mexico—though varying in certain important aspects of social structure and in large part related to ecological differences. Similarity among Pueblo patterns is manifested not only in obvious and external characteristics, but in the manner in which the institutions are integrated and in the distinctive ethos or world view that has been in part described by Ruth Benedict in *Patterns of Culture*.

The pueblo of Santa Clara is one of six Tewa-speaking pueblos in the Espanola Valley of the northern Rio Grande in northern New Mexico, the others being Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, San Juan, and Tesuque. The Tewa share the major cultural features of the Pueblos in general and the eastern Pueblos in particular, the latter manifesting differences in kinship, social structure, and religious emphasis that are related to the somewhat different ecological setting.

The history of the Pueblos may, for present purposes, be considered a single history until recent times when specific incidents and situations become relevant to understanding of the existing social system.

In the post-glacial period the region to which the term Greater Southwest Culture Area has been applied became the home of the people of the Desert Culture, a culture adapted to the gathering of edible plants and small game animals of this arid and semi-arid environment. With domestication of plants and increasing command over the limited resources of their ecological niche, distinctive cultures began to emerge.

The Pueblos, including the Tewa, belong to that tradition known as the Anasazi, divided into the Basket Maker and six stages of Pueblo culture. Widespread and catastrophic droughts were common, the Great Drought of A.D. 1276-1299 being responsible for the evacuation of large areas and widespread readjustments of population.

⁷ Pueblo (capitalized) refers to the people; pueblo refers to the community dwelling.

Archeological evidence indicates that the Tewa began moving from the Mesa Verde-McElmo area to the northern Rio Grande River about A.D. 1200-1300. The major area of settlement was the Española Valley, and to both north and south were villages of the related Tiwa and Tewa dialects of the Tanoan stock. The new settlements were in the tradition of nucleated villages, with one or more plazas, *kivas*, and connected houses or apartment houses forming the boundaries of the plaza. Adjustments in agricultural techniques were made, with the development of community irrigation systems a fundamental characteristic.

(2) *First European Contact.*—European exploration of the Pueblo territory began with the expedition of Francisco Vazquez de Coronado in 1540. The brutality and ruthlessness with which Coronado's party treated the Indians immediately gave the Spanish a reputation that later exploration and colonization did little to ameliorate. Subsequent exploration occurred in 1580 and 1582, and in 1598 Juan de Oñate established a colony, with several hundred Spanish settlers, in the Española Valley. In 1610 the provincial capital was established in Santa Fe, but La Canada, in the Española Valley, remained an important colonial center.

In A.D. 1627, the Spanish Crown granted a royal charter and land grant to Santa Clara that has since provided the legal basis for the reservation, the original Spanish grant having been confirmed by Mexico upon the achievement of independence in 1821-22, and by the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican War of 1846.

Dozier, 1961: 94-186) divides the processes of history social and cultural change of the Rio Grande Pueblos into four periods: (1) Spanish Exploration and Colonization, 1540-1700, (2) Stabilized Pluralism, 1700-1804, (3) Anglo-American Intrusion, 1804-1900, and (4) Anglo-American Dominance, 1900-present.

The period of Spanish exploration and colonization was important for the introduction of new traits and for the establishment of a pattern by which the Pueblos have handled the successive alien influences. The relationships between the Pueblos and Spanish largely reflected the forces of exploitation and repression by the Spanish through the instruments of the Church and State.

The Franciscan Order was responsible for the mission to the Indians of New Mexico. Never present in large enough numbers to live in all of the villages, and with a policy of frequent personnel shifts that discouraged the learning of the indigenous languages, the Franciscans were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to destroy the traditional religion and leadership. Mission buildings were constructed, ostensibly as training centers for the Indians, but also as places where the friars could live in comfort. Indians were employed in crafts such as weaving and smithing, and as servants and herdsmen for the mission animals, but no attempt to introduce literacy was made. The aim of the Franciscans was elimination of traditional religion and the imposition of Catholicism. "*Kivas* were raided periodically and masks and prayer sticks burned. Pueblo religious leaders were whipped and hanged as witches if they persisted in carrying on native religious practices. Failure to attend Mass and other church services was dealt with promptly and severely" (Dozier 1961:126). As a result of missionary repression, the native religion went underground, concealed behind a still persisting wall of secrecy. Christian ritual and belief were, to some degree, accepted, but remained linguistically and conceptually distinct from the indigenous patterns. This pattern of separation has been termed by anthropologists "compartmentalization," and has persistently characterized Pueblo integration of alien traits.

The secular authority of the Spanish Crown was vested in the Governor-General and Captain-General of New Mexico, subject only to the Viceroy of New Spain. The Governor's power rested upon the *encomenderos*, citizen-soldiers with rights to income from lands and stocks tended by Indians. The *encomiendas*, quasi-feudal estates, and the forced labor of the Indians for the Governors and others, was normally unpaid, although there is no record of actual enslavement of the Indians. Aside from the *encomiendas*, Indians were required to work in weaving shops established in Santa Fe and the villages, to collect large quantities of piñon nuts for sale in Mexico, to build wagons and carts, and to be servants and muleteers on the caravans to Mexico. In addition to the "normal" exploitation of the Pueblos, the officials were "arbitrary in the conduct of government, openly immoral, crass, and entirely unscrupulous" (Scholes, quoted in Dozier 1961:128).

Shortly after the imposition of Spanish rule, the Spanish system of civil government was imposed upon the Tewa Pueblos. Unknown to the Spanish (and

later, American) authorities, the officials of this government were appointed by the priest of the native religion and owed their primary allegiance to the native tradition; the officials functioned as executive officers of the priests while publicly carrying out the orders of the Spanish Government. In short, the overt government of the pueblo masked its operation (Dozier 1966: 172-5).

Spanish repression led eventually to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 and the expulsion of the Government, soldiers, missionaries, and colonists. In 1693 the Spanish returned, and by 1696 had pacified the Pueblos. The inability of the several communities of Pueblos to cooperate with each other was a major factor in reconquest.

The period of "Stabilized Pluralism," from the return of the Spanish to the advent of Anglo-American influence, witnessed a change in Spanish attitudes toward the Pueblos. The *encomienda* system was not reinstated. The friars were concerned more with the welfare of the Spanish colonists than the repression of Pueblo religion, and the secular government was forced to concentrate its attention upon the raiding Apaches and Comanches. While the missionaries attempted to suppress native traditions sporadically during the early 18th Century, they were not persistent and did not receive cooperation from the secular government. Traditional ceremonies thus resumed and participation in church activities became minimal. Resentment toward the missionaries continued and in this period the Franciscans were relieved of mission responsibility for New Mexico, which became part of the diocese of Durango, resulting in still further decline in missionary activity.

Spanish colonies established in the 18th Century over time assimilated Indians from a variety of Pueblo and other tribes. To Pueblos, to whom the repressive system of the pueblo was unacceptable, the Spanish town was a place of asylum. Relations between the Pueblos and the Spanish colonists tended toward peaceful coexistence, but each retained its cultural characteristics.

"Outwardly these relations were pleasant and amicable, but they never developed into more intimate understandings. The Pueblos reserved the inner core of their culture to themselves and effectively warded off influences which might have disorganized and disrupted the tightly integrated Pueblo way of life. . . . For later periods we have detailed information on the "boundary maintaining mechanisms" that were employed to preserve pueblo culture; it is clear, however, that they were developed during the century in review here."—Dozier 1961: 147.

There was some degree of intermarriage between Spanish and Pueblo, but this invariably involved the Pueblo moving to the Spanish town and becoming assimilated, and two distinct social systems coexisted.

(3) *Anglo-American Period.*—The period of Anglo-American contact (1804-1900) was, at the beginning, characterized by the arms-length amicability that characterized the end of the 18th Century. The Spanish population was "little interested in changing or modifying the life of the Pueblo Indians, and the clergy, too, had withdrawn from intensive missionary work" (Dozier 1961: 153). With the advent of the Anglo-Americans there was little change; they identified themselves with the Spanish upper class with similar relationships to the Pueblos. The independence of Mexico in 1821-22 wrought few other changes in relationships. Relations between the Spanish and Pueblos remained amicable, but some Spanish encroachments upon Pueblo lands were to become significant after the cession of the Territory of New Mexico to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848.

The legal relation of the Pueblo Indians to their pueblo land holdings was unclear until the Supreme Court in 1913 held that their lands could not be alienated. Population pressures of the Spanish and Anglo communities had, in the last half of the 19th Century, become significant and a source of conflict between the Hispanic element and the Pueblos. The developing tension was further increased by the favored treatment given by the U.S. Indian Bureau to the Indians—the rural Spanish people lived under conditions very similar to those of the Indians, and became resentful of the Pueblos receipt of educational facilities, health care, etc. With the increase in number of the Anglos, the perception of the class system also changed. The Spanish had been divided into two classes, the *ricos* and the poor. The people of the pueblos were ranked under the poor Spanish. Now the poor Spanish and the Pueblo Indians were ranked together, with the Indians receiving favored treatment. It may be noted that roots of contemporary New Mexican ethnic rivalry lie in this period.

Protestant missionaries entered the pueblos subsequent to the Mexican War, producing rivalries with the limited number of Catholic priests. Schools were established in some cases, but the missionaries had little effect: The Pueblo Indians remained nominal Catholics and practiced the traditional religion in the secrecy that still enveloped it.

Tourists began to come toward the end of the century. Many anecdotes from this period exist, such as the one regarding a woman of Pojoaque Pueblo who exclaimed, "What curious people these Americans are; one has just bought the stone which covered my chimney. What could he want with it?"

The most profound changes occurred in Pueblo culture in the period of Anglo-American dominance (1900-present), more than in all the preceding three centuries. Economically, two major innovations were introduced that seriously affected the farming subsistence economy of the Pueblos. A credit system was introduced at the end of the 19th Century with the establishment of numerous Anglo trading posts, and a later shift began to a cash economy with the arrival of tourists in cars, wage labor for the Indian Service Construction programs, military service and dependents, allotment cheques, and the availability of wage labor in the vicinity of the Pueblos.

The Indian Bureau agents, until 1928, placed great pressure upon the Pueblos to become variants of the dominant American form of society. In addition to encouraging education, there was also pressure for the Indians to surrender the native religion and other tradition that were "un-American." With the enactment by Congress of the Indian Reorganization Act and the appointment of John Collier as Indian Commissioner in 1934, a new policy of tolerance began. But as Dozier, himself a Tewa of Santa Clara, points out:

"The new regime permitted traditional authorities to relax controls that safeguard Pueblo ceremonial life. But the Pueblos *have not abandoned these controls*. The conservative communities are ever prepared to tighten social control mechanisms in the event of any threat to their indigenous way of life. When there are repeated violations of Pueblo patterns of behavior which endanger the ceremonial activities of the community, the War Captains and their assistants, the Pueblo gestapo, are alerted and an iron curtain descends over the pueblo. Within the village all but the rigid conformists are suspect and any deviant behavior is dealt with promptly and severely by a variety of social control measures."—DOZIER 1961: 170-1.

b. Pueblo Culture

Among the Pueblos a distinct division of labor exists: agriculture and religion are mainly the concern of men, as hunting and warfare once were. Women are concerned chiefly with household activities, including handicrafts such as pottery making.

Each pueblo is politically autonomous, a closely knit group in which community solidarity is of extreme importance and the individual subordinate to the group. As portrayed by Benedict, the growing child is so thoroughly indoctrinated with the culture of the group that by the time he is an adult he is overwhelmingly concerned about community welfare and sees himself primarily as a part of the community. Others, including Dozier and D. Eggan, have pointed out the tensions involved in a society with such rigid controls, and the consequent escape of many Pueblo Indians to non-Pueblo communities.

Governments of the pueblos are typically theocratic, with the heads of priest-hoods often constituting the councils, as at Zuni. Among the eastern pueblos, except for Santa Clara, the leaders of the religious groups, the *caciques*, appoint the governor, officers, and council. In all cases it is the governor who has primary responsibility for dealing with "outsiders." Martilineal organization and clans, important in the Western Pueblos, are not present in the East, where the bilateral⁸ extended family is the basic social building block. In the East, the great division of the pueblo is into moieties (from the Old French work for half), named, among the Tewa speakers, the Winter and Summer. The moiety organizations are responsible for ceremonial activities at appropriate times of the year, and are—or were—responsible for the government of the pueblo during half of the year. Though general kinship affiliations are bilateral, the moieties are primarily patrilineal, but membership can be changed and need not be hereditary, and each is headed by a *cacique*. Various secret ceremonial and/or medi-

⁸ A "bilateral" kinship system recognizes relatives on the father's and mother's side equally.

cine societies are associated with the moieties—in the East (the irrigation area) the medicine curing societies being most important.

Pueblo culture is integrated by the native religion and ceremonialism, which permeates all aspects of life. As Dutton (1965:13) sums it up:

"With the Pueblo Indians their religion transcends all else. It is the very core of their existence. All aspects of Pueblo life—the arts, crafts, and industries, social structure, and religion—are inextricably interwoven, thoroughly integrated. From the simple tenet that Man must live in harmony with nature, the Pueblo Indians developed a rich dramatic art—poetry, legendary, song, and dance—by means of which religion is given outward expression. They perform sacred rites in their fields, prior to the planting, and conduct appropriate ceremonies throughout the season. . . . Their hunts are ceremonially ordered and conducted. Many of the designs on their pottery and other works of art are derived from motifs connected with their ceremonial life. And they build their dwellings and sanctuaries or kivas following religious traditions. Through religion all else is given significance. There can be no understanding of Pueblo life apart from its religious beliefs and practices."

Among the Eastern Pueblos, few of the major religious ceremonies are open to the public, in contrast to those of the Hopi of the West. The numerous attempts to replace the native religion with a Western one, over a period of more than three centuries, by Spanish and Anglo-Americans, forced the traditional ceremonies underground. Only a few festivals, which in fact, are not part of the original religious system, but reflect the impact of Roman Catholicism, are celebrated openly. An example is the festival of the saint's day, which belongs to the Hispanic tradition.

Pueblo religion places the strongest importance on the cooperation between man, nature, and the supernatural. The performance of proper rituals influences supernatural beings to cause nature to provide the necessary elements (particularly water and sun) for the crops so that man may live. Interdependence of the three is always stressed. Symbolically, this religion also stresses the importance of the social cooperation upon which existence of the pueblo depends. The relationship of the Pueblo to his natural environment is of constant concern. Individuality is obviously, in this context, a potential source of discord and little leeway is permitted to the individual. Various forms of pressure, including charges of witchcraft and physical coercion, are applied to the deviant. The Pueblos conceive of the universe as an orderly, cooperative system and feel that social cooperation is necessary for its continuation.

While intervillage cooperation does not exist in economic or political activities, it does in the area of religion, regarding the revival of certain ceremonies or the training of certain individuals for religious society membership. Also, Taos Pueblo is "custodian" of Blue Lake, residence of some of the supernatural beings, on behalf of not only the Pueblos but of all mankind. Similarly, Santa Clara is "custodian" of a sacred mountain residence of supernatural spirits, and other pueblos are responsible for other such places. Indeed, there are now pending cases before Congress and the Indian Claims Commission in which this element figures prominently.

For three-and-a-half centuries, Roman Catholicism has been embraced, at least nominally, but in the post-World War II period, several Protestant denominations have made their appearance. The introduced religions always kept, physically and conceptually, distinct from native tradition. Because of this compartmentalization, the Pueblos see no inconsistency in performance of Christian rituals on Sunday and the native ceremonies at other times. In like manner, they see no inconsistency between accepting grants for CAP components and at the same time maintaining extreme social and ideological distance from the outside world.

In 1964, the OEO programs were introduced, becoming active in 1965. The concept fostered by OEO of truly Indian-generated plans and projects, if carried through as originally intended, may in the course of time lead the Pueblos to relax their long-held stance of suspicion and secrecy toward the outsider, reduce their compartmentalization, and open up a new world for them. In the meantime, as noted earlier, the traditional cohesiveness and discipline within each of the Pueblo communities has made it possible for these people to utilize the CAP components in their own interest to a degree not often found elsewhere.

Further consideration of the changes of the present century are taken up in the following section on the social, economic and political organization of Santa Clara.

2. Recent Conditions and Present Context

a. Eastern Pueblos

The following brief description of the socio-economic and political organization of the Eastern Pueblos pertains to the Tewa in general. Following the general description is a section indicating recent changes that have occurred in Santa Clara.

The Tewa kinship system has become bilateral: Except for the ceremonial patrilineal moieties, there is no other indication of a lineage principle in which the maternal or paternal descent line is emphasized. The kin group includes equally, or on the basis of preference, the relatives of the father and of the mother. The household is an extended household, the members of which reside in one house or in several adjoining smaller houses. A male adult, preferably, of prestige and influence, is the head of the household, and the members tend to display solidarity on most issues.

Tewa Pueblos are marked by a dual division into Winter and Summer moieties. According to Dozier (1966:173) the moiety function originally included: (1) the maintenance of a ceremonial calendar, (2) organization of ceremonial activities, (3) the coordination of purificatory and cleansing rites conducted by the medicine societies, (4) the coordination of communal hunts, (5) the coordination of warfare ceremonials, (6) the organization and direction of planting and harvesting activities, (7) the cleaning and construction of irrigation ditches, (8) the repair and construction of ceremonial *kivas* and the cleaning of the plaza, (9) the nomination of secular officials for ordering the community and to be the officials of the civil government system. It is clear that religious, political, and economic activities are inextricably linked.

The moieties consisted of a chief or priest, the *cacique*, two assistants who were also the War Captains, and others. In the past, the moieties each bore responsibility for ceremonial activity and government for the appropriate half of the year. It remains true today, as noted earlier, that in all of the Tewa Pueblos, other than Santa Clara, that the *caciques* appoint the officers and council of the government.

In the early 17th Century the Spanish system of civil government was imposed, as noted earlier, requiring appointment of a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Sheriff, and other officers. The constitutions adopted by the Tewa Pueblos under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 continue this pattern, with some variation. In general, in the 20th Century as in the 17th, the officials and council members are overtly responsible for civil authority, but as appointive officials designated by the native priests they may also continue to exact obedience to the native traditions. As Dozier (1966:174) puts it:

"Although the Governor is considered by non-Indian neighbors, tourists, and representatives of the United States Indian Bureau to be the head of pueblo, in actual fact he and the other civil officials function as executive officers of the native priests, carrying out publicly the orders of the latter. The Spanish imposed system thus became a useful tool which masks the activities of the native priests and serves their interests rather than furthering the goals of outside administrators."

b. Santa Clara

(1) *General Background.*—The reservation of Santa Clara Pueblo consists now of some 45,000 acres, indicating that another 45,000 acres have been expropriated in some manner, since the original Spanish grant of 1627 assigned 90,000 acres. Other lands are claimed by Santa Clara, but it is expected that years will elapse before disposition of the claims. The pueblo is located on a mesa, near the mountain bearing the name of the pueblo. As far as can be ascertained, the population lives entirely within the town, there being no known individuals or families living in separate homesteads outside of the town. The current resident population is about 550, with an additional 150-200 enrolled tribal members living in other communities. The figure of 550 compares to an estimated 440 in 1934, 354 in 1926, and 187 in 1889. The rapid growth in population is shared by the other Tewa Pueblos, while local employment opportunities remain small.

The original Santa Clara Pueblo settlement pattern of linked or adjoining households surrounding a central plaza has changed since last century, due to the end of the raids by Apaches and Navajos and to the increase of population. The plaza remains, but with portions of the oldest buildings in disrepair. The

village now extends over a much wider area, and houses, each usually occupied by a nuclear family, are more widely spaced than formerly. An electric power line passes over reservation land, and telephone lines pass near the village. Many households possess telephones, and the village receives revenue from the telephone and power companies for the use of the land on which the lines are constructed.

The pattern of the extended family household as a territorial unit appears to be giving way to the nuclear household. The increase in population has meant that new houses had to be built. They had, for reasons of space, to be located where possible, not necessarily in close proximity to other relatives, although this is still preferred. The responsibilities and privileges of kinship are still, however, of great importance, and not restricted to members of the nuclear household.

The houses are furnished in a modified white American fashion, distinguished particularly by the presence of Navajo rugs and Indian artifacts, some gathered as souvenirs of visits to other tribes. Relatively few products of local handicraft origin are to be seen. Even the black polished pottery for which Santa Clara is justifiably famed is comparatively rare. Television sets, radios, and other electrical appliances, such as stoves and refrigerators, are found in many homes. Couches, chairs, beds, and tables are of commercially available types. A few of the houses are now made from cinder blocks, rather than from traditional adobe. Within the last few years the Indian Health Services has provided a modern water supply, and the plumbing is modern. But while there have been many changes, the plaza receives its ceremonial cleansing, and the *kivas* are not only in good repair but are used with customary frequency. With the exception of two BIA school teachers, who are not considered fully welcome, no Anglo-Americans reside in the village.

(2) *Economic Conditions.*—Irrigation agriculture, with maize, beans, and squash as major crops, is beginning to decrease in importance except for the older members of the community and as part of the symbolism of their religion. With the decline of the traditional dependence upon nature, important consequences are certain to occur in the religious sphere and, since all traditional life is interwoven with religion, in other spheres as well. In view of problems and land tenure, especially the customs of inheritance leading to fractionalization of lands, it is improbable that agriculture will again become important. Moreover, the increasing costs of mechanization and the relatively low profit are factors which may be considered to be working against agriculture as a viable base for the economy.

Many families have cattle that graze reservation lands, but none of the herds have more than twenty animals. The cattle are maintained to provide meat for family use from time to time. The aridity of the region and the small size of the reservation preclude the possibility of large-scale development of significant reliance upon cattle.

In sum, the traditional subsistence system has given way to participation in a cash economy and reliance upon wage labor. The handicraft products of the pueblo are now intended for the market rather than for home use. Hordes of tourists provide this market for them, and other markets have only begun to be explored. While, at Santa Clara, handicrafts are not a major source of income, nevertheless a fair portion of pueblo cash does come from such sales. The tourists are beginning to attend the ceremonials held near the sacred cliff dwellings at Puy'e every August, and they are also visiting the camping and fishing area in the beautiful canyon belonging to the pueblo. It is hoped that plans being made will bring a greater number of tourists to the ceremonials and to the camping sites. Even under these economically advantageous circumstances, it is carefully arranged that activities for the tourists occur at some distance from the village itself, so that privacy and the secrecy of serious religious rites may be maintained.

The major form of income is now wages. Santa Clara is only twenty miles from Los Alamos, and twenty-five miles from Santa Fe. The town of Española is situated within the limits of the original Spanish land grant. However, less than three-quarters of the adult male population is employed. It is estimated that almost two-thirds of the employed population of Santa Clara works in Los Alamos for the Atomic Energy Commission, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories, the Zia Corporation, or supporting activities. Others are employed in Santa Fe, including the Governor of Santa Clara who works for an electronics

firm there. A few Santa Clarans are employed in Española, but the small and relatively undeveloped status of that community does not provide, as yet, abundant opportunities. Almost all of the employed are in unskilled or semi-skilled work. Of the 150-200 enrolled members of the Santa Clara Tribe who do not live in the pueblo, most have left because of employment opportunities elsewhere, superior to those available locally. Many of these are the young adults, the loss of whom is particularly important. In a few cases, a high degree of education and specialization has prevented employment nearby (e.g., one Santa Clara tribesman is professor of anthropology at the university of an adjoining state).

Actual statistics are almost impossible to gather, but Ortiz' 1964 study of Tewa commuting works employed at Los Alamos provides information of the importance of that community to the area economy. As of 1 August 1963, fifty-three residents of Santa Clara, representing forty-five households, were employed in Los Alamos; of these, thirty-one were male and twenty-two female. The median age of those employed was forty, and almost all had been employed since the immediate post-war period. There has not been significant expansion of this labor market. The women were employed as maids in private homes in Los Alamos. The men were employed as janitors, custodians, guards, building craftsmen, machinists, and the like. Very little opportunity for employment is present on the reservation proper.

The number of persons employed gives only a slight indication of the total economic effect of that employment. Income at Santa Clara goes not only to the support of nuclear households, but to extended family households in many cases, as well as to the support of aged kinsmen and other close relatives in need. The pattern of generosity within the kin group does not appear to have significantly lessened in recent times.

Other traditional attitudes affect economic activities. Ortiz (Tewa Commuters: A Study in Industrialized Effects, n.d., p. 13) writes in connection with employment attitudes:

"... one final factor of importance regarding their place in Los Alamos remains. This is the fact that those Tewas who are in occupational slots which will permit them to advance rarely do so, by conscious choice. The examples presented were all from those employed by the LASL (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory), since the AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) total is negligible, and the ZIA (a private corporation responsible for the 'housekeeping,' i.e., maintenance, engineering, etc., for the AEC and LASL) employees and maids are in rigid occupational roles which permit them little or no opportunity for advancement. The husband of one husband and wife unit, who has unusual artistic talent, was informed by the personnel office that he could advance to a position of greater responsibility if he would put forth the extra effort of which he was certainly capable. He indicated he was happy to remain right where he was. Another young veteran who also performed his duties almost flawlessly, was confronted with the same choice and with the same results. Others who have shown unusual promise have been offered the opportunity to go away for advanced training, at the expense of the LASL. With no known exceptions, these offers have been rejected. One of them remarked to me: 'I don't want to have to boss anyone.'"

(3) *Education*.—In connection with employability, it is pertinent to touch upon the contemporary education system and the Santa Clara Pueblo attitudes toward education—its goals and purposes.

The BIA maintains an elementary day school at the pueblo, of modern design and with modern facilities. Santa Clara children may attend the BIA school or the public school in Española, less than two miles away. Secondary education is provided in the Española school system. Advance training is available for those desiring it and capable of performing the required tasks. A BIA school in Santa Fe provides education in arts and crafts, and those who complete the two-year program successfully may be sent to appropriate colleges (e.g., one Santa Clara student may be sent to Paris). Collegiate education is available at the University of New Mexico and at the various state colleges. A number of Santa Clara high school graduates have taken advantage of the vocational training schools also available.

The attitude of the adults of Santa Clara toward education is positive, but tinged with regret. They believe that education is good and necessary to enable the children to live in the modern world, but are regretful that a high degree of education and specialization almost requires that the successful individual leave

the pueblo. They would prefer to see all members of the pueblo live there and commute to their jobs, but on the whole understand that this is not possible. A few are aware that a continuation and strengthening of current trends will lead to the end of traditional pueblo life, and regretfully accept this as inevitable. Most, however, do not seem aware of the long-range consequences.

The positive attitude toward education of the Santa Clara Pueblo is indicated not only in their statements regarding it, but in the school enrollment figures. Nearly all eligible children have been enrolled in the Head Start program. In the age range sixteen-twenty-one there are a total of three high school dropouts compared to five high school graduates who are expected to enter college in September 1966. The contrast with the northern reservations is striking: the long-term town dwelling pattern that provides the Pueblo Indian with a background of discipline and cooperation, and the ability to see clearly the reward for the long period of work required, doubtless being among the pertinent factors.

The reluctance of the individual to stand out from his tribesmen, noted in connection with the rejection of potential opportunity to advance in employment, is also clear in the school systems. The pueblos, children and adults, are embarrassed if public attention is given them, whether for outstanding achievement or failure. The children who is criticized or praised in class withdraws emotionally. He may, with the understanding approval of his family, actually drop out. Cooperation in the school is valued and considered appropriate. Cooperation on homework and tests is considered right; refusal to help someone in need is wrong, however this may be judged by the teacher.

The Tewa have a linguistic problem in that most children do not learn English until they begin school. In fact, the first year in the BIA school is often devoted to learning sufficient English so that the child may begin the ordinary school program the following year. In the few families in which there has been intermarriage with non-Tewa-speaking Indians, Spanish, or Anglos, the children speak English as their first language. At Santa Clara, however, such cases are still few. The spoken English of the older children and adults is a noticeably different dialect from standard American English. The linguistic experiences at home and in the pueblo are not helped by the heavy Spanish accent of the majority of residents and teachers in the adjoining town of Española where the Santa Clara children attend high school, and where they may attend the elementary school. One factor in the enthusiastic adoption of the Head Start program is connected with the opportunity of the children to learn English before entering school.

While the positive attitude of the people of Santa Clara toward education may be gratifying to interested observers some of the consequences are disadvantageous in terms of Pueblo welfare. The higher the degree of education and skill, the less is the probability that the individual will be able to find employment nearby and the greater the probability that he will be forced to move elsewhere. The individuals most needed for leadership and guidance, and who have the most to contribute to a society undergoing rapid and drastic social change are those who generally leave. No specific statistics are available on the demography of Santa Clara, but there are reasonable grounds for believing that absentees are largely in the twenty-fourty-five age category. Ortiz (in "Project Head Start in an Indian Community," 1965) provides statistics from neighboring San Juan that indicate still more critical emigration of this age group and hence a more clear cut problem of leadership. The availability of commuter employment in the Santa Clara area has prevented the emigration of many of the better educated from becoming critical.

Above all, the people of the pueblo want employment opportunities on the reservation itself, or within commuting range. To that end they have initiated programs to bring increasing numbers of tourists to the reservation, and are continuously considering other possibilities. New Federal programs that offer any prospect of utility are eagerly examined, to the extent that they can be understood. It is impossible to overstress the desire of the people of the pueblo to have employment opportunities within commuting distance of the pueblo.

(4) *Political Structure.*—The present four-party organization of Santa Clara's political structure owes its origin to events which began in the latter part of the 19th Century. Certain members of the Winter moiety advocated a separation of religion from secular activities. They objected, in particular, to pueblo officials designating the specific days for planting and harvesting, arguing that this should be a matter for family decision. Participation in the maintenance of the irrigation system should not be mandatory upon all, but only upon those owning lands

irrigated by a canal. Participation in the traditional ceremonial, they believed, should be voluntary. Limitations on movement from the village should not be subject to official approval nor should everyone—men, women, and children, be required to work on communal projects. By 1894 these objections were shared by the majority of the Winter moiety.

This majority was considered progressive, while the Summer moiety continued to be conservative in religious and cultural conformity to custom. Traditionally each moiety was responsible for the pueblo for half a year, but, in 1894, when the Summer (conservative) moiety took charge, it refused to give up office when its part of the annual cycle ended. Instead the moiety appealed successfully to the Indian Agency in Santa Fe to be recognized as the *de facto* government of the Pueblo. The Summer moiety held the pueblo offices until 1934, although the progressives of the Winter moiety refused to accept the legitimacy of the "new" government, cooperating in specific public works, refusing to cooperate in others. The progressives were sufficiently strong in numbers to be able to resist the various strong pressures to conformity of the conservatives, but inter-moiety cooperation came to an end, and with the end of cooperation there came an end to many of the communal activities and groups that depended upon both moieties. Such activities included the large plaza dances and ceremonies; the purging of the village from evil by the medicine curing ceremonies; the annual ceremony for ridding the village of witches, etc. Social control, formerly a village function, was placed in the hands of the extended family, who also became fully responsible for the cultural education of its children without the availability of village solidarity to reinforce desired patterns.

In the early 1930's this state of affairs was aggravated by religious disputes concerned with succession to the religious leaderships and the governorship. The BIA was called in to mediate the dispute and to help find a solution to the problem of a legitimate government. Eventually the progressives of the Winter moiety convinced the (now somewhat more progressive than they had been) members of Summer moiety, to agree to a plan of secularized government. This was followed in time by acquiescence of the conservatives of the Summer and Winter moieties. A vote was taken, and the secular government was approved by a great majority. Later, a constitution and bylaws were adopted and given Interior Department approval in December 1935.

The Santa Clara constitution gives recognition to four "political parties," colloquially referred to as factions. The parties are, in their origin, based upon the Summer-Winter moiety division, with each moiety divided into progressive and conservative wings. With solution of the political problems by the adoption of the new constitution, the terms conservative and progressive have apparently lost their original meaning. It has not been possible to find any principles or attitudes that distinguish the four parties, although it is clear that they disagree with one another from time to time on specific issues or on choice of officers.

(5) *Economic Outlook.*—Santa Clara's progressivism has been noted in connection with the adoption of secular government with attendant decline in the direct and indirect authority of the religious leaders. It has been apparent, too, in the Santa Clara emphasis on education and in the relatively large number of residents who have obtained and retained employment within commuting range of the pueblo. It is also to be seen in the present attitudes toward the Christian religions and sects. While Santa Clara has been nominally Roman Catholic since early Spanish colonial times, no Protestant groups had been permitted entry. Since World War II a southern Baptist mission and church has been present, and a member of the pueblo is a Baptist missionary (now at the mission at Taos Pueblo). Some members of Santa Clara have joined other Protestant churches, including at least one Mormon. The prayer that opens council meetings is usually one that is acceptable to all Christian faiths, carefully worked out by a number of councilmen, or the prayer is rotated among members of the different churches. There appears to be complete toleration of the Protestants, in contrast to the situation in other pueblos where they are not welcome.

The people of Santa Clara appear to be adjusting to modern life more satisfactorily than many of the other pueblos. Although HSR research was of relatively short duration, it is possible to suggest that there is less drunkenness, illegitimacy, and early termination of education, than at many of the nearby pueblos. One example may be the following instance of putting a ceremonial dance to economic use.

In 1957, at the urging of the then Governor of Santa Clara (Juan Chavarria), ceremonial dances, open to the public, began to be held at the ancient cliff dwellings of Puy'e, a few miles from the pueblo, but on reservation land. Initially, the ceremonies attracted only a few tourists, who were charged admission, but over several years there has been a great increase in attendance. Larger numbers of Indians participate, not only from Santa Clara but from adjoining villages. Work to restore the cliff dwellings, comparable to Bandolier National Monument, was initiated and, currently, Neighborhood Youth Corps workers are repairing the trails and several old buildings. The buildings were abandoned after a fire in the 1930's, but can be renovated and used for the sale of refreshments and for sale of native handicrafts to tourists. The Puy'e ceremonial thus provides a source of income and an outlet for the "nativistic" movement and inter-tribal solidarity. Attendance at the 1965 ceremonial was over three thousand, and left a profit of more than \$1,000, not including sale of native crafts by individuals.

Since the Santa Clara council views tourism as economically of potential importance, attention has been given to development of Santa Clara Canyon, some distance beyond Puy'e. The Canyon descends rapidly from the mountains, cut by a beautiful stream in which rainbow trout abound. The Canyon has been popular with tourists, and the facilities have been slowly expanded in recent year. The stream is kept well stocked with trout, the road has been kept in good repair, and picnic areas that include shelters, fireplaces, fire pits, water pumps, and rest rooms have been, and are being, developed. Advertising brochures have been printed for several years in succession, and additional advertising of the tourist attractions has been used with good results.

Santa Clara is one of the many reservations that places hope for economic development upon tourism, and, unlike many others, actually has excellent resources in an area where tourism is an important state business. The continuation of many of the arts and crafts, together with development of the tourist attractions and facilities will be of increasing economic importance.

Some consideration has been given to development of other resources as well, in connection with the BIA Ten Year Plan. Some of these items are spoken of as projects to be developed in the immediate future. Occupying attention is the possibility of the development, for business purposes, of areas on the main highways through Española owned by the Pueblo. Involved is construction of buildings with stores and offices available for rent or leasing, and the potential for members of Santa Clara to go into business. One view is that increased business activity in Española would increase employment opportunities, regardless of ownership of the business.

Also under discussion in connection with the Ten Year Plan is the possible development of a food cooperative and the establishment of stores in those of the Northern Pueblos that do not have them. It is possible, through cooperative buying, for supplies to be purchased at prices lower than in the stores of Española, and the stores would employ local people.

Santa Clara Reservation lands include a large area of tuff, a material of considerable value in the construction industry. Suggestions have been made for the establishment of a factory to process the tuff, making it available for commercial purposes. The profits of the factory would accrue to the Pueblo, and primarily members of the Pueblo would be employed. The opportunity would also exist for individuals to obtain training for supervisory, clerical, and managerial work, although the Pueblo antipathy to being a "boss" is likely to create problems. This proposal is, however, highly speculative at this point; the Pueblo has the resource, but the problem is for the Santa Clara Council to take the initiative in its development. For this it needs technical advice on funding, and organization.

The Pueblo has been interested in the construction of a multi-purpose community center for some time, as the present building is inadequate to Pueblo needs. Funds may now be available under the Economic Development Act to construct such a building, which would contain pre-school facilities, library, Council meeting room, and, also an area that could be used for manufacture of some as yet undecided product and for on-the-job training.

The economic potential of the reservation is greater than for most nearby reservations. The present Governor is an aggressive and intelligent man who is attempting to provide the leadership necessary for the economic develop-

ment of the Pueblo. He is supported by the people and political factionalism does not appear, directly, to hinder economic development.

3. *Impact of the Community Action Program*

The history of the development of the Santa Clara Community Action Program is the history of two Community Action Agencies in chronological sequence. What began as the program of the Santa Clara Pueblo became the combined program of the northern Pueblos of Nambe, Picuris, Pojoague, Santa Clara, Taos, and Tesuque. For purposes of this discussion, attention is first focussed on the Santa Clara CAP, and then upon the organizational problems of Northern Pueblos CAP which was just being established at the time of the HSR field research.

a. Sequences of Events

Initial concepts leading to the establishment of the Santa Clara CAP may be said to stem from the 1964 visit of Dr. Robert Roessel (then a member of the President's Task Force for the War on Poverty) to Santa Clara and other New Mexican pueblos. At that time when the Economic Opportunity Act (EDA) was in process of becoming law, detailed interpretations were not available, and neither policies nor regulations had been established. Roessel's purpose was to stir interest sufficient for the development of specific CAPs. From discussion between HSR researchers and various Indians, it is clear that he believed the EOA would provide for it. The CAPs were to be Indian-developed and were to provide for Indian needs as perceived by Indians, a welcome change from the imposed programs of the past. That subsequent developments were not as promised has not been held against Roessel, it seems clear that the history of plans abandoned and promises broken had led the Indians not to believe all that they heard.

The beginnings of the OEO coincided with the development of the reservation Ten Year Plans of the BIA, which meant that the attention of tribal officials was focussed on feasible economic projects. Advantage could be taken of the OEO programs in terms of the perceived needs and resources of the specific reservation.

With respect to many of the reservations of New Mexico, it was alleged by field informants that there was no initial collaboration of OEO with BIA, and that various statements by OEO officials have kept the two agencies from cooperating in a manner advantageous to both. It was further alleged that officials of at least six of the New Mexico pueblos were told by the OEO representative that they were not to request cooperation of the BIA in preparation or administration of their proposals and that if they did, they could not expect financial help from OEO. Since many, if not most, tribes have ambivalent attitudes toward the BIA, problems arose. The Pueblos are concerned and apprehensive about possible termination of Federal responsibility, and the BIA, whatever other feelings they may have regarding it, is their link to the Federal Government. On the other hand, they did appreciate the lack of paternalism on the part of OEO. While there have been changes, in many cases the lack of coordination between OEO and the BIA is apparent in the lack of knowledge of and failure to encourage use of BIA information and facilities. Thus CAP and VISTA volunteers at one pueblo spent several months unknowingly repeating a survey that had been done recently by the BIA, which would have been pleased to release the information upon request.

There are two histories of the inception of the Santa Clara CAP. One is that which the researchers found repeated by all of the Santa Clara residents with whom they discussed it. The other was from outsiders who had been involved in the program. The "official" version holds that it was entirely the product of the pueblo. The Tribal Council is said to have developed the ideas for the components after discussion with all interested members of the pueblo and discussions among themselves. The Council, and particularly the Governor and other officers in consultation with the Council, then wrote up the proposals and submitted them to Washington for approval. The proposals were returned for resubmission as forms had, in the meantime, been developed for this purpose. Utilizing the new forms, the Governor and other officers, in consultation with the Council, did resubmit their proposals. The proposals were once again returned this time for corrections, and again the pueblo officials rewrote them in satisfactory form. Some proposals were accepted, others rejected because of legal technicalities, funding problems, and other considerations of prac-

ticability. It was repeatedly asserted that no outside help was obtained in preparation of the proposals.

According to other sources external to Santa Clara, the development of the CAP was somewhat different. The Tribal Council discussed the possible programs, as the EOA had been presented by Roessel, and began to develop a variety of components. In fact, all of the proposals eventually submitted derive from the Council discussions, but some were not submitted, e.g., a proposal to drain stagnant waters areas for insect control, and the installation of electric lights throughout the pueblo ("because the kids . . . get into dark corners and breed.") The raw proposals developed in Santa Clara were refined by Corinne Locker, of the Association for American Indian Affairs of Santa Fe, W. A. Williams, Jr., later to be CAP Director, and with the assistance of the United Pueblos Agency of the BIA, then under the superintendency of Walter Olson. The refining process eliminated the proposals most likely to be unacceptable on legal and other grounds, and provided appropriate wording for the others. These proposals were submitted to Washington, then returned for rewriting on the newly developed OEO forms. They were again returned to Santa Clara, again rewritten and submitted, and approval was granted to certain of the proposed components: Administration, Police and Ranger Training, Pre-School (year-around Head Start), and NYC. The necessity for constant rewriting almost caused the Council to refuse to have anything further to do with OEO.

The time consuming demands for writing and rewriting of proposals, submission of reports and additional information constitutes a motif found not only at Santa Clara but at other reservations. Field information indicated that presentation of the OEO programs as a panacea for Indian problems and the stated position that no help was to be obtained from BIA were extremely detrimental. It was felt that the CAP cannot solve, by itself, the primary problems of the Indian populations, and that the cooperation of many agencies would be necessary for long-term goals to be achieved. Several pointed out that Santa Clara does not have members who are capable of writing the proposals and reports demanded by OEO. The subterfuges necessary for the pueblo to have outsiders assist them caused unnecessary difficulty. The supporting documentation for the proposals was obtained through Locker and Williams from the local, state, and Federal agencies and institutions relevant. It was pointed out that it would have been impossible for the pueblo itself to have done this in a reasonable period of time.

The application forming the basis for the accepted components was submitted to OEO 21 December 1965, with supporting documentation following.

Upon approval of the application and funding of the approved components, W. A. Williams, Jr., was appointed Program Director. Williams had worked with the pueblos intermittently for more than twenty years, and was well known to the Governor and other officers of Santa Clara. The CAP office was then situated in the community building of the pueblo.

During the summer of 1965 the Pre-Employment program in Police and Game Warden Training was carried out at the pueblo. Ten men selected from the pueblo underwent training in a variety of activities connected with law enforcement, conservation, game management, and tourist control under the tutelage of specialists from the BIA sections of Land Management and Law and Order, the State Department of Game and Fisheries, the Federal Park Service, and other officials of concerned agencies. After completion of the two-month program, the ten graduates were appointed, in effect, deputy sheriffs for the pueblo. One was later elected Sheriff of the pueblo, and later became CAP Community Director for Santa Clara. Two others were appointed Rangers for the pueblo, concerned with management of the cliff dwellings and the canyon area, together with supervising tourists and campers.

The Pre-School or Head Start program was initiated in the summer of 1965 with Mrs. Margaret McConnon as Teacher-Director. An addition to the community building was constructed by the NYC, providing space for the Pre-School Program and training in construction skills for the NYC enrollees. The Pre-School program had begun with demonstrations for the parents of the eligible children by Mrs. McConnon, and reaction was intensely favorable. Since inception of the program, all eligible children have been enrolled and attendance has been consistently high, even though attendance is not compulsory. The approval given by Santa Clara to the Pre-School program was a major factor in interesting the other Northern Pueblos in having a similar program for themselves.

Local approval for the Pre-School program was given for a number of reasons, as described by the pueblo officials and parents. The children of Santa Clara normally spend their pre-school years with only their kinsmen and have no experience with others, hence are very shy when they begin school and often do not have success commensurate with their potential. For most of the children, Tewa is the language spoken in the home and English is not learned until they begin school. Under such conditions it is often necessary for the children to spend one or two semesters in a "pre-first grade" class to learn sufficient English to do the normal work. Moreover, they tend to speak English with a noticeable accent and their ability to think in English is sometimes limited. The officials and several parents have pointed out that the children in the Pre-School program learn to get along with others, overcome their shyness, learn English, and are otherwise better prepared to enter the regular school system. To repeat, approval of the Pre-School program was enthusiastic. It may be noted that in Santa Clara at the time this research began, approval of the Teacher-Director was strong.

The Pre-School program, at the time of the study, included one Teacher-Director, four teacher's aides, one cook, and one assistant cook. The Teacher was a college graduate and had post-graduate work in pedagogy, including training in the Montessori method. The teacher's aides had received training of several weeks duration through the Consortium at the Arizona State University in Tempe.

Problems arose in the re-funding of the Pre-School component, to be effective June 1966. The submitted proposal made reference to the use of the "Montessori Method" in the program, an expression that apparently was not favorably received by the OEO personnel who review the proposals. The latter refused to accept the proposals, as far as can be ascertained, on the basis that the Montessori technique does not fit well into the educational practices approved by modern educators. Indeed, an official at Washington OEO is alleged to have expressed the opinion that three-year old children are limited in their learning capacity—at a time when the US Office of Education is beginning to spend substantial sums for research and preparation of teaching materials for the three-five year age category. Aside from the question of how well the educational experts in OEO know the different Indian psychological or personality types, the different societies and cultures, this way clearly a rejection of a program earnestly desired by the people of the pueblo. OEO has maintained that programs should stem from the people of the community and not be imposed by the Government in terms of what is thought to be good. The attitude was expressed by several people connected with the Santa Clara CAP and Pueblo that "you can get anything you want from the OEO—as long as they think its good for you." OEO has thus, apparently, partially assumed the position which various officials have ascribed to the BIA.

As a result of the rejection of the proposals embodying the term "Montessori Method," the proposals had to be written and were eventually approved. This was a time-consuming process, and as a result the hiring of teachers for the 1966-67 school year was difficult; recruiting was delayed until funds were committed, and after most teachers had already signed contracts for the year elsewhere.

The rejection of the proposal was interesting also from the point of view that the pre-school method used only aspects of the Montessori method; it was, in fact, a combination of methods adapted to the particular student group. The program had been investigated by a number of evaluation groups, and had been highly praised. It was deeply wanted by the parents of the pueblo, and yet almost rejected by OEO.

A number of individuals and teams of varying competence visited the Santa Clara Pre-School program. The number of evaluators and the haphazard manner of the evaluation has made the people of Santa Clara suspicious of such activities. This suspicion, an HSR researcher was told, had for some weeks fallen on him.

While the Neighborhood Youth Corps is not formally a part of the CAP, it is administered locally as a component, and hence must be considered in the context of the CAP. The CAP Director and staff are responsible for the preparation of the proposals, as well as the administration of the program.

The NYC was initiated in the summer of 1965. Enrollees were placed in a variety of positions, including several working in offices and two in one of the Santa Fe museums. Several were placed in the school office in Española, and others in various firms in Los Alamos—several of the latter group secured per-

manent employment through the placement. Larger numbers were engaged in the construction of an addition to the pueblo community center, for use as the Pre-School classroom, and others repaired the fences in the area being developed for tourism.

The NYC program was suspended on 1 December 1965 because of lack of funds, with the statement that it would be reinstated 1 January 1966. The promise was not kept. It became necessary to submit an application. The proposal was returned, with the comment that it was to be forwarded through the appropriate state agency, which was done. The State eventually received the NYC allocation and in turn allocated the funds to counties. Since Santa Clara and the other members of the Northern Pueblos CAP are Federal reservations, they received no allocation from the State.

An additional application had to be forwarded to the Dallas Area Office and, eventually, Washington. On 18 April 1966 the Program Director received a telephone call from the Washington office of the NYC informing him that the application had been approved, and advising him to begin work. Since the CAP staff was prepared, NYC enrollees began work the following day. A day later, the Director was informed that the approval notice was wrong; the forms had not been signed. Finally after one more day, through utilization of the influence of Senator Anderson, approval was obtained and made retroactive to the day when the enrollees began work, but even after this approval the actual funds were not available for distribution to the NYC employees until a week after they should have been paid. This constituted a series of embarrassing moments for one Community Director who had been lecturing to the NYC enrollees on the necessity for paying debts on time and establishing credit.

The matter was still not quite closed, however. The NYC approval was limited to the period 18 April to 30 June 1966, the end of the fiscal year. The CAP staff was immediately engaged in preparing an application for refunding for the next fiscal year, with a deadline of 1 June for submission. During the period of the field research, 15 April to 31 May 1966, it was clear that at Santa Clara virtually the entire working time of the major administrators of the CAP was devoted to paperwork.

Three of the components initially requested by Santa Clara were rejected. The rejection of the Home Economics proposal was hardly mentioned in the pueblo, but rejection of others created anger and bitterness.

One of those had proposed establishment of a pueblo electronics industry, the aim of which was to provide on-the-job vocational training as well as employment for the people of Santa Clara. The pueblo Governor had thoroughly investigated, with the assistance of his employers and others, the potential of such a program and had found it extremely promising. He had discussed it with the Council and others, and obtained their backing. The rejection was thus a disappointment in that a proposal with important long-range potential was lost, and the Governor was publicly embarrassed.

The other proposal whose rejection created animosity was for the development of an arts and crafts industry. As one pueblo official observed, the traditional handicrafts "are not hobbies," but economically significant in connection with the New Mexico tourist industry. It is estimated that over one thousand tourists visit New Mexico every summer, and they eagerly buy the products of Indian crafts. As they are sold by individuals and through Indian traders, there is no record of pueblo income from this source, though it is substantial. The desired developments would permit more to be manufactured and sold directly by the Indians, rather than the traders, who now receive the bulk of the profits.

The rejected proposals are considered by Santa Clara to be important in solving the major problem of the pueblo: increasing employment opportunity for adults within commuting range of the pueblo. The people note that there are programs for the children of pre-school age, remedial education for those in school, and the NYC for those aged sixteen to twenty-one, but there are no significant programs for adults.

A major change in CAP organization became effective in mid-March 1966 when the Northern Pueblos Community Action Program (NPCAP) was instituted. The NPCAP had been proposed in the early autumn of 1965 as a result of the success of the program at Santa Clara. Other pueblos were interested in having programs at Santa Clara. Other pueblos were interested in having programs of their own, and all were impressed by the Santa Clara Pre-School program. Partly of their own volition, partly at the instigation of the Governor of Santa Clara, the decision was made to unite. Organization and financing were completed and the

NPCAP became operational in mid-March 1966. The NPCAP was constituted by consolidating the CAPs of the seven other Northern Pueblos with that of Santa Clara. It was thought that considerable advantage might lie in making use of Santa Clara's longer CAP experience, particularly emulation of Santa Clara's Pre-School program. The combining of administrative costs was also deemed advantageous since many of the pueblos were too small to support a CAP of their own.

The NPCAP consists of the Tiwa-speaking pueblos of Taos and Picuris, and the Tewa-speaking pueblos of Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, San Juan, Santa Clara, and Tesuque. Of these, only Taos, San Juan, and Santa Clara have sufficiently large populations in the eyes of many Santa Clara officials to support their own CAPs. The other pueblos of the group have populations ranging from slightly over one hundred to about 350-400. Geographically, they spread through the valley north of Santa Fe, a distance of sixty miles.

The organization of the NPCAP is as follows: The highest authority is the Committee of the Whole, consisting of the Governors and councils of all eight pueblos. The Community Action Agency consists of the Governor and one delegate from each of the pueblos, who make policy, direct, consult, hire and fire the CAP Director and Associate Director. The councils of each pueblo nominate the local community director and all other individuals who work exclusively in that pueblo. It is the CAP Director's obligation to interview, evaluate, hire, and fire, upon consultation with the pueblo officials. The CAA is responsible, through the CAP Director, for those individuals who will work with two or more of the pueblos. Each pueblo council is responsible for the program within the pueblo; it recommends and develops proposals, and may reject proposals considered desirable by and for other pueblos in the NPCAP.

The NPCAP submitted proposals for four components: Administration, Pre-School, Remedial Education, and NYC. A proposal for an adult work program under the Nelson Amendment for beautification and other improvements of communities was being worked on. Applications for multi-purpose community buildings were being submitted to the Economic Development Administration on behalf of seven of the pueblos, Santa Clara preferring to act alone on this project. Other projects to be initiated include the establishment of a cooperative for the purchase and distribution of food and related merchandise, and exploration of possible industrial and business development to provide employment for adults.

At the time field research ended the NPCAP was in a critical phase, as many of the officers of Santa Clara wanted to withdraw and reestablish their own CAP. The "crisis" was precipitated by an event of minor significance, but the resulting tensions have indicated some of the major structural problems that must be faced by each of the pueblos and the NPCAP.

The NPCAP-CAA had appointed the Program Director and Associate Director, and had endorsed a specific woman of Santa Clara for the position of Technical Assistant when the funds were available, to work particularly with the parents of children enrolled in the Pre-School Program at all the pueblos of the NPCAP. The CAP Director and Teacher-Director of the Pre-School Program, in the interim, had decided that the Santa Clara pre-school cook was qualified for the position by virtue of understanding of the program, ability to readily communicate in Tewa and English, widespread social contacts in the pueblos, and status and respect in the villages. The cook was offered the Technical Assistant position and eventually resigned as cook. There were, however, objections voiced by the Governor and other members of the Council. The objections were based upon the failure of the Director to have the approval of the NPCAP-CAA, since the latter had already endorsed a different person for the position and was not consulted about the change. There seems, on the other hand, to have been the possibility that two technical assistant positions existed—one new—and that the ex-cook theoretically could have been assigned to the new and un-endorsed position, with approval of the NPCAP-CAA, if such is required under the NPCAP organizational agreement, the interpretation of which was in dispute.

As a consequence of this seemingly minor dispute, the Santa Clara Council terminated all aide positions, elected a cook and assistant cook, and instructed the Community Director to obtain applications for the teachers' aides positions. All aide positions were henceforth to be for a one-year period, a decision rationalized on the grounds that it would distribute employment opportunities—"give everyone a chance"—and develop a reservoir of trained aides in event of sickness of one of the other employees. The CAP Administration was not consulted on this decision, but believes it to be a poor decision since the aide will be terminated

precisely at the time when she will have gained sufficient experience and training to be effective.

The Council further decided that it no longer wanted the Teacher-Director to teach in Santa Clara, although it was reasonably clear that her duties as supervisor of all the NPCAP Pre-Schools would not permit her to teach. Lack of confidence in the Program Director was also expressed, and there was discussion, although no decision was reached, of the feasibility of reestablishing an independent Santa Clara CAP, on the basis of the following considerations:

(1) Each pueblo is and has been politically and socially autonomous for centuries.

(2) The internal political structure of the pueblo leads to a monolithic government by a council that insists upon being involved in and having authority over all matters pertaining to the pueblo.

(3) The social sub-systems—kinship, marriage, religion, and the like, are still interwoven within the pueblo, so that the pueblo is perceived by the members as the primary world. Other pueblos, Tewa and non-Tewa, are known to be similar, but are still "outside." The Spanish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and Anglo-Americans are, in effect, similar to elements of the geographic environment.

(4) The economic system, considered in terms of "poverty," unemployment, traditional handicrafts and occupations, varies from one pueblo to another.

(5) Natural resources and potential for economic development vary (e.g., Santa Clara has the canyon and cliff dwellings for tourist exploitation; tuff for industrial development; and land for business development at the intersection of several routes well travelled by tourists).

More than most American Indians, the governments of the pueblos have had the characteristics of real government. Elsewhere, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 created governments without power or, in R. Thomas' phrase, "powerless politics." This often led to functionless government. The governments of the pueblos, secular or theocratic, have always had functions and powers, and a primary purpose has always been to keep the non-member at an appropriate distance. The actions of the non-member, such as CAP Director or Teacher-Director, involved in the internal affairs of the specific pueblo are consequently to be viewed with great suspicion. In the case of the cook, the Director, an outsider, acted without consultation with the full Council, and however good his intent, violated the principle of Council supremacy. Such a Director, not responsible to the Santa Clara Council, but to the Northern Pueblos CAP, and yet involved in Santa Clara internal affairs, is deemed "dangerous." A member of another pueblo would be equally suspect for fear that he would use his office for the benefit of his own community at the expense of the others.

The NPCAP faces the problem that it is not a "Community" Action Program, but the program of eight separate and distinct communities, as their members perceive them. While the attitudes of the other pueblos are not known, Santa Clara clearly questions whether the advantages of a combined CAP outweigh the disadvantages. Temporary alliances have occurred among these pueblos only in the face of a clearly perceived and powerful threat. There is now no clearly perceived threat—except, conversely, that one pueblo may receive a larger share of the components than another.

Santa Clara Council members argue that certain components are applicable to all pueblos of the united CAP, but that each pueblo has some advantages, problems, and needs not shared by all. Because the CAP is not theirs alone, the CAP Administrative staff is not their employee; it does not work for them. The CAP staff must necessarily first do those things desired by all the Northern Pueblos. Components specifically for Santa Clara must wait until time permits the staff to develop proposals. Many of the Council officers are aware that the amount of paperwork or "redtape" required in connection with such matters as the funding of the original NPCAP and the refunding of various programs. Making routine reports to Washington (where, it is believed, they rest, unread), preparation of the payroll, and maintenance of financial and other records are well understood as leaving the Director and Associate Director little time for development of new proposals. Aware of these problems, or not, the Council members understandably want new programs developed for Santa Clara to take advantage of its resources and to solve its problems. One attitude expressed has been that the Program Director should be responsible for development of new proposals and others should handle the routine work. Another attitude is that

Santa Clara should remove itself from the NPCAP so that its specific needs will be met through its own CAP.

Dissatisfaction with the NPCAP was responsible for Santa Clara's recent decision that applications to EDA would be made directly, rather than through the CAP. The failure of the CAP to provide employment for adults under the Nelson Amendment is cause for dissatisfaction among the knowledgeable members of the community. Santa Clara's desire for business and industrial growth of the local area is apparent, and what is seen as the lack of work by CAP toward this end is a source of dissatisfaction.

The NPCAP staff is aware of the need for the growth of employment possibilities and further development of the potential economic possibilities of reservations such as Santa Clara. The staff is, however, faced with the necessity of securing funding and refunding of the new and continuing programs, under OEO or other agencies, and with routine work of immense proportions required by Washington, as well as training programs, hiring and review of personnel. The Associate Director, who, by all accounts, may become the next Director, is kept busy by the accounting work, for which he is trained, leaving only the Director and administrative assistant to handle everything else. It is thus inevitable that eventually all of the associated pueblos will have cause for dissatisfaction. Santa Clara, having the oldest CAP, has reached this point first.

b. Opinions, Attitudes, and Activities of External and Internal Community Elements

The people of Santa Clara, through their chosen representatives, see a variety of major problems in the future of the reservation. The prospect of termination of Federal responsibility and the future relationship of the Pueblo to the State of New Mexico is, with ample justification, feared. The immediate problem, as clearly perceived and articulated, is to provide employment opportunities within commuting range of the reservation. As seen by the leaders, industrial and business development of the Española Valley is necessary, but will be of highest value to the Tewa only if they have the necessary background for taking advantage of particular opportunities that may develop.

Awareness of the OEO programs was apparently widespread, although of course not complete. In view of the small resident population all adults were fairly closely related to someone directly involved in the CAP components, hence the degree of awareness. While few village meetings were held, this was generally because of the lack of an adequate meeting place, and most information was made available through the meetings of the parties and by the members of the Council. It was asserted by the CAP Director and Governor that there were "a few" people who were not interested nor likely to be interested. They, and others, indicated that there was no pattern to the social background of the disinterested parties, but since the number was small no generalization would be statistically valid.

Meeting most complete approval was the Pre-School program, indicated both by the enrollment of nearly all eligible members of the pueblo and the comments made by Council members and others. In addition to providing the children with initial training in English, the Pre-School program helps those who do not know Tewa, or do not know it well, for improvement here is also noted. The interaction of children of different kin groups tends to increase ability to interact socially and to help overcome the "shyness" that characterizes them and is disadvantageous in school. In the long run, the Pre-School program is seen as providing better adjustment to the school system leading to successful completion of high school and, perhaps, advanced training, and to the best opportunities for employment. The success of the program can be measured in the following year by a comparison of the success of the children in the first grade, as compared to the past, when none attended Pre-School classes. At the time of research, such an evaluation was impossible.

No negative reactions to the Head Start program were heard, from any source. It can be expected that the Remedial Education component, to be initiated in September 1966, will similarly meet with widespread approval, in view of the support found in Santa Clara for education in general.

The program to provide training in police and warden activity was regarded as successful by the Council and several of the participants. It was so felt because of the employment and utilization of several graduates and because people with this training were needed by the pueblo. As it was a ten-week program involving ten men, knowledge and evaluation of it are somewhat limited.

The NYC component is separately funded, but administered as part of the CAP. It is viewed by the Council and the people as an integral part of CAP.

All eligible members of the pueblo—i.e., all residents between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one not otherwise employed—were enrolled. Statistically, twenty-five high school students (fifteen females) and eight non-students (five females) were enrolled, together with seven non-Indians from Española. Of the Indian youths, only three (two girls and one boy) are drop-outs. Several of the NYC enrollees obtained private employment subsequent to the time the above figures were obtained, but employment opportunities were inadequate for the number of high school graduates. It is to be noted that approximately five high school graduates are expected to begin college in September.

The NYC enrollees have been assigned a variety of activities beneficial to them and to the pueblo. Several have worked in Santa Fe, in the museum and in offices; others have been given assignments in the school office in Española; several have been utilized for office activities of the CAP central office at Pojoaque Pueblo. Most, but not all, of the young men have worked on projects in the pueblo. These include such activities as construction of an addition to a community building, providing valuable experience while doing something of long-term value, improvement of the Puy's dwellings, trail repair, renovation of an old building, improvement of the camping area in Santa Clara Canyon, and demolition of a dilapidated unused building. These activities are thought to be of value for a number of reasons: students have learned worthwhile skills, they have been occupied, they have earned money, and have contributed to the well being and the future of the pueblo.

Current funds permitted high school students to work only eight hours per week, and non-students to work only twenty-eight hours per week, compared to higher figures otherwise permitted. This has not, however, been cause for significant complaint. On the other hand, the interruption, for lack of funds at the end of November, and the delay and difficulty in obtaining re-funding have been a source of annoyance to the Council members, at least.

The NYC program, per se, is regarded as good. It provokes criticism indirectly, however. A number of Council members and non-members as well have pointed to the existence of plans for pre-school age children, school children, and youths, but the lack of programs for adults. It is noted that employable heads of families are unemployed, but a child may have an income from NYC, providing for possible generational conflict and lack of respect for the elders. The lack of opportunity for adult employment and the seeming inability of CAP to become active in this area was one reason underlying dissatisfaction with the CAP Director.

Considering the situation as a whole, and getting away from particulars, CAP is not living up to its claims to end poverty, as the people of Santa Clara perceive the situation. Santa Clara is taking advantage of the available packaged components, but this harvest does not contain all the elements needed in the social diet. Santa Clara is anxious to take advantage of all programs from whatever agency available. A common view is that the OEO and other programs may come to an end and they should be taken advantage of immediately. Again, this view underlies dissatisfaction with the CAP Director.

The existence of political parties or factions at Santa Clara has not directly affected the CAP. All factions favor taking advantage of all opportunities, and there is no dissension over the programs. The parties function more as watchdogs over the administrative officers of the pueblo and the CAP. None of these partisan organizations were found to be detrimental to the OEO programs.

The Santa Clara CAP began with a limited program and even more limited administrative staff. In mid-March 1966, the Santa Clara CAP was replaced by the NPCAP and a slightly expanded administrative staff became responsible for the development of similar programs at other reservations and the development of new proposals under OEO, EDA, and other agencies. The administrative staff consisted of a Program Director, Associate Director, and secretary (administrative assistant); a Teacher-Director was responsible for the Pre-School component. On a different level, each pueblo had a Community Director chosen from and by the Pueblo and responsible for OEO programs on the specific reservation, and having supervision of the local NYC supervisor.

The views of the Director and Associate Director provide an interesting contrast to those of the pueblo Council. The Pueblo regards OEO as a temporary phenomenon, as so many Indian assistance programs of the past have been, to be taken advantage of for any benefit available, long- or short-range. Since unemployment of adults is of immediate and pressing concern, everything should be done to provide a solution, however temporary. Thus the Pueblo wants the beautification program under the Nelson Amendment to employ adults, although this

is recognized as temporary and not a genuine solution to the major problem of unemployment. Santa Clarans believe CAP should be developing programs for Santa Clara; the Nelson Amendment would provide employment in their pet projects—development of the canyon camping sites and the Puy's cliff dwellings. The CAP Administration sees itself as responsible for eight reservations, and the development of the basic components as taking precedence over the specific desires of any one reservation. Time schedules, including deadlines for various applications—OEO, NYC, EDA, quarterly reports, monthly reports, fiscal reports and accounting, payroll, consultations and meetings with specific pueblos, limit the time and personnel available for development of new proposals. The application for Nelson Amendment funds was worked on, but requests to the EDA for multiple purpose community buildings were given precedence. The CAP staff tends to be most concerned with programs that will, in the long run, help the pueblo rather than in proposals of limited short-range value.

If the CAPs were genuinely concerned with "community action" as the term has been used in the pertinent literature, the staff would follow the mandates of the community. In the present case, however, the pueblo Councils and CAP staff differ in their degree of sophistication, knowledge and evaluation of what is possible under existing legislation and the realities of Federal bureaucracies. Thus "the people" may criticize the staff for not providing what the latter believes cannot be provided. The ordinary people of the pueblo may see their problems and a solution; the staff may see the problem differently or the solution as not possible under existing OEO legislation.

In sum, one may say that each pueblo sees the CAP from the point of view of its immediate problems and their solution. The needs of other pueblos of the NPCAP are not, on the whole, considered, as they are separate communities. The CAP staff is regarded by each pueblo as that pueblo's agency for obtaining what the Pueblo regards as the solution to the problem. On the other hand, the CAP staff sees the problems often—not always—from a longer perspective and from a better background in legal possibilities. Its responsibility is to eight pueblos, not any one more than the others. The view is that the staff will obtain for the pueblos what the staff thinks is best for the pueblos in terms of what is legally possible.

The CAP staff regards widespread support of CAP as necessary to its success. The local Community Director of Santa Clara sits in on all Council sessions to provide information concerning CAP programs, and, as a member of the pueblo, has frequent formal and informal contacts with the population. The Program Director attends meetings at Council request or when other opportunity or need arises. The limitations of time and personnel, as well as local social structure, have so far prevented large-scale educational or informational programs—or, as it is sometimes termed, "spreading the OEO gospel."

The views of CAP staff and reservation Council vis-a-vis OEO Washington may also be contrasted. Obviously, of the population of the pueblo the officers and Council will have most direct contact and knowledge of the programs and their management. On this level, the Governor and others were disappointed in the rejection of several proposed components considered of long-term value, particularly in view of the "OEO gospel" that CAP was to involve components wanted by and for the community. In fact, they found the OEO programs to be limited to certain types, but the basis for these limitations were never made clear. The CAP staff, more sophisticated and knowledgeable about government came into the situation at a later point, when it was clear that all things were not possible; yet the CAP staff has also been hindered by not knowing the limitations of the possible, and being frequently inadequately informed as to the reasons for rejection, deferment, or inaction with respect to suggested programs.

The CAP staff and pueblo Governor are aware that the involvement of a member of the New Mexico congressional delegation is useful in obtaining decisions from the Indian Affairs office of OEO or the NYC; in the latter case, the intervention of Senator Anderson was apparently responsible for the eventual refunding of the program. The CAP staff is aware of the time-consuming nature of the bureaucratic process—indeed, the staffers were struck by the scant time available for the administrative to "be in touch" with the communities to which they were responsible—but the Councils and people have little occasion to be aware of this problem. The CAP is, hence, sometimes criticised for lack of accomplishment when, in fact, neither personnel or time permits adequate attention to the development of individual pueblo resources.

The relative member of the university consortium for provision of technical assistance to the Indian CAPs (Indian Community Action Center (ICAC) at

Arizona State University, Tempe) is known to the CAP staff, and to greater or lesser degree to the pueblo Council. The latter takes little note of it; the Governor has said that Arizona State University has "some people who know about Indians and their problems," and some who recognize the differences of the tribes. In general, the Pueblo Indians are peripheral to the operations of the Consortium and do not discuss or evaluate it. Those people associated with CAP have mixed opinions. Several visits of evaluators to the Pre-School program have left them wary of evaluations, in general—HSR researchers found that part of the suspicion with which they were initially viewed resulted from lightning fast visits of earlier evaluators, one of who negatively discussed the Pre-School project without having seen either the children or the operation of a class. Objections have also been made to the unannounced visits of technical specialists, as questions could not be prepared for worthwhile consultation. Several indicated that Consortium staff were to be treated pleasantly, but not taken seriously. Those associated with the Pre-School program contributed nothing of value in the way of usable suggestions.

The increasing complexity of the anti-poverty programs, particularly the proliferation of offices, departments, and bureaus involved with one aspect or another make some form of technical assistance inevitable. The CAP staffs must be able to find, without too much expenditure of time and effort, which agencies have responsibility for specific programs—and, of course, what relevant programs exist. Even with a well educated and sophisticated staff, this would now be difficult; with a staff of limited background it is extremely difficult.

Santa Clara has had no CAP Advisory Committee, other than the Council which declared itself to be both "governing body" and advisory council. This action was reasonable in view of the small population of the pueblo, the representation by intent of all factions, the presence of employed and unemployed persons, the social and cultural homogeneity of the population, and the democratic process by which they were elected.

Institutions external to the pueblo, often important at other reservations, include the BIA, PHS-IHD, PHA, and other Federal agencies, state departments of welfare and employment security, and local law enforcement agencies. At Santa Clara, these have been of relatively little significance to the OEO program.

The United Pueblos Agency (UPA) of the BIA is located in Albuquerque, as is the BIA area office, almost one hundred miles away. The only BIA personnel stationed at the pueblo are the BIA day-school teachers. Specific BIA officials visit the pueblo at the request of the Governor or for a particular reason. The BIA Area Director presented the agency position concerning the CAP: The BIA favors any programs that will help the Indians, and regards the CAP as extremely valuable. The projects so far undertaken have corresponded to attempts made by the BIA in the past, that were not continued or widespread because of lack of funds, but which were, nonetheless, valuable. The BIA maintains the position that they are ready and willing to help any reservation in any way possible with respect to the development of CAPs, but considers each CAP to be the responsibility of the reservation. The Area Director implied that many tribal councils were informed that they could not have the assistance of the BIA in preparation of CAP proposals without jeopardizing their eligibility for Federal funds. He regrets that the CAPs have not taken advantage of the information and technical assistance that such agencies have available and stand ready to supply when requested.

The view held by Santa Clara of the BIA is less clear; the inquirer is referred by everyone to the Governor: The BIA is the link of the Tribe to Washington. Whatever the shortcomings of the BIA, it stands between the Tribe and the anticipated depredations of the State and people of New Mexico. It is part of the protective shield of the pueblo. It is recognized that the BIA has not done all that should have been done. There is some awareness that responsibility rests in part upon lack of Congressional authorization, in part upon the cumbersome machinery of bureaucracy. The position allegedly taken by some OEO officials, that the BIA is an enemy to be avoided, is not accepted by Santa Clara which views it as a defense against termination of Federal responsibility that would lead to the destruction of pueblo society.

The Indian Health Division of the PHS brought a water system to Santa Clara, under the Indian Sanitation Act, a few years ago. Other water problems, particularly in connection with the tourist area developments, do not fall under PHS jurisdiction. The PHS maintains offices and an Indian hospital in Santa Fe, about which there are numerous complaints by the Indians. The lack of confidence in the medical services probably results from a combination of factors,

particularly lack of any kind of personal relationships with the staff, the apparent necessity for impersonal rules and regulations, and distance from the pueblo. The PHS does not appear to be directly relevant to the CAP.

The people of the pueblo continue to construct their homes of abode, with some newer ones utilizing a new material—cinder block—in traditional style. There are no public housing projects, none are projected, and the PHA is, like the PHS, largely irrelevant to the reservation.

The New Mexico Department of Public Welfare maintains offices in Santa Fe. It provides categorical assistance programs—Aid to Dependent Children, Aid to the Blind, and Old Age Assistance to people of Santa Clara, but the records are so maintained that it is impossible to determine how many individuals or families are benefited by the programs. The Department of Public Welfare has not entered into agreement regarding the MDTA, and has no intention of doing so, on grounds that the program is too complex to be administratively feasible and for lack of sufficient personnel to administer such a complex program.

The New Mexico Department of Employment Security maintains an office in Española, at which the Lieutenant-Governor of San Juan Pueblo is an official. Employment opportunities are limited, but treatment of the Indians is the same as that accorded to the Spanish-Mexican, or Anglo-Americans. This official does not believe that discriminatory practices against Indians exist, although many Indian opportunities are limited by lack of education or disinclination to leave the local area. The staff of the local employment office includes speakers of all local languages, and the Tewa Pueblos do not show any reluctance to make use of the facilities. It was suggested that field informants generally were of the opinion that there was less anti-pueblo prejudice on the part of the Anglos than anti-Spanish- or anti-Mexican-American prejudice.

Enforcement of law within the limits of the reservation is under jurisdiction of the sheriff of the pueblo, an elected officer of the Council, and other deputized officers (including all graduates of the Police-Warden training component of CAP). Under pueblo and BIA agreements, county and state facilities, i.e., jails, are utilized when necessary, with reimbursement made to the state or county. Such cases are few. Certain major crimes, such as murder, rape, and arson are Federal crimes, but of negligible occurrence. The county Sheriff indicates that there is little problem with the Indians of Santa Clara, and a highly cooperative relationship exists between the important people of the county and the officials of the pueblo.

c. Problems and Summary

As perceived by the people and Council of Santa Clara, the major problem of the pueblo is to develop opportunities for employment for the adult population within commuting distance of the reservation. Attainment of full employment requires, as a foundation, people prepared for the various occupations that now exist or will exist. The Pre-School, Remedial Education, and NYC programs are oriented to preparing the young for the future, however uncertain that may be.

The present programs do not appear to be leading toward a significant increase in employment for those who are already adults, now or in the future. OEO officials are responsible for some degree of resentment for having been evangelists of the gospel that CAP is the panacea for Indian problems; it is now seen that CAP, through the OEO, can only contribute to solution of these problems, but cannot, alone, solve them.

As some perceive, the solution will be through the developing CAP components in combination with the development of the economic potential of the area through other Federal agencies. CAP should be the agency of the pueblo for utilizing the resources that may be available, and must work in conjunction with whatever other agencies have applicable programs, including the BIA, PHS, and EDA.

If the problems are to be resolved successfully, certain obstacles to a genuine, community-involved Community Action Program must be reduced. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

1. More flexible dates for submission of proposals. Community involvement requires time for the pueblo councils to thoroughly discuss proposals with the CAP staff and the people, and to develop a consensus.

2. Reduction and simplification of the requirements for forms, as well as annual, quarterly, and monthly reports, so that the CAP administrative staff will have time and opportunity to develop new programs in collaboration with the

government and private institution involved, and so that consensus on the part of the members of the Council may be reached.

3. Greater flexibility, through administrative directives or legislative changes, permitting the Washington OEO staff to consider the distinctive needs and potential of the applicant tribe. Development of native handicrafts may be economically, or socially valuable to one tribe, but not to another.



4. Greater recognition of the traditions of each tribe, which may be, as in the case of Santa Clara, legally binding upon the pueblo by virtue of the constitution.

5. Provision of technical consultants, thoroughly grounded in knowledge of programs available through other agencies, and capable of assisting local CAP officials in preparation of applications.

6. Maintenance of direct contact between Washington OEO and the local CAP. The Consortium members have, in effect, become area offices without the legal background to provide accurate information.

A Community Action Program cannot realistically provide for 'community action' or community satisfaction unless the program is tied to a genuine community. OEO has not come to grips with the question of "what is a community," but the issue has become clear in the NPCAP. The cooperative venture of the associated eight Northern Rio Grande Pueblos in a CAP, only six months old, is already in difficulty, as described above. Santa Clara Pueblo recognized that it has resources and potential different from the other associated pueblos. It was, is, and intends to be an autonomous, politically viable community. To the extent that the CAP of the associated pueblos prevents desirable developments, the possible advantages of association will be lessened and in conflict with the genuine community which is the pueblo. The northern pueblos do not constitute a community.

The CAP is providing a desirable background for the future, but it will be a success only if expanded employment opportunities develop in the local area. If the OEO programs are not instrumental in bringing this about the consequences will be tragic. The tendency now is for many of the most highly educated and flexible individuals to leave the area for occupational reasons. Because some local employment has been available, a leadership vacuum has not been created. The current emphasis on education, by OEO and the Pueblo, will result in a continuing and increasing loss of the people most needed in the villages, unless employment possibilities increase.



SANTA CLARA RESERVATION, NEW MEXICO

E. TURTLE MOUNTAIN RESERVATION

The Turtle Mountain Reservation is located in central North Dakota near the Canadian border. Formally, the reservation is known as the "Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians," since the Pembina Band of Plains Ojibwa (Chippewa) formed the nucleus of the original group. A mixture with Cree, Assiniboiné, and Metis (mixtures of Indian and French-Canadian) has developed a group with distinct characteristics, however, and it is common to hear the statement that "we are not like other Indians."

1. *Historical and Cultural Background*⁹

The Chippewas (or Ojibwa), a leading branch of the Algonquian linguistic family, during the three centuries immediately following the discovery of America, occupied an extensive territory extending indefinitely back into the hinterland of the northern and eastern shore of Lakes Superior and Huron. They filtered through the Sault Ste. Marie into what are now Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, and moved westward into the present Dakotas and Montana, pushing the Sioux southward in many fierce conflicts over the rich hunting grounds. For more than two centuries Superior was a Chippewa lake.

As the Chippewas spread to the west and south, they tended to break up into loosely defined groups more or less independent of the wide-flung tribes; and just as in the East they had beaten the Iroquois back to the shores of Lake Erie, their western groups came to grips with the Fox and the Sioux and forced them southward to established treaty boundaries.

For a century or more before the establishment of the U.S.-Canadian boundary, the Chippewas and closely related groups had occupied a wide belt on either side of its future location and across it the Chippewas mingled with a closely associated group, the Crees, down to the present.

The Pembina Band was one of the Chippewa bands that moved into the Plains, where they adopted the horse, became buffalo hunters, and generally became culturally a Plains tribe.

The Turtle Mountain Chippewas, originally the Pembina Band, so called because the nucleus of the Band was settled in the Turtle Mountains (really hills) occupied an extensive area with necessarily indefinite boundaries, since the country was not surveyed. It was located in the extreme northeastern part of North Dakota and extended from the Canadian border south to Devils Lake and from the Pembina Mountains on the east, indefinitely westward.

The southern boundary, and to some extent, the indefinite western range, had been in undisputed possession until about 1880. In addition, their claims lapped far over into Canada. Their disregard for the border led to many complications later.

The Chippewas or Ojibwa were also at one time the most numerous tribe north of Mexico. However, they did not often enter the light of history, owing to their remoteness from the frontier during the period of colonial wars. Nevertheless, into their country came the great fur companies, the Hudson Bay and the Northwest, and into their territories pushed the French pioneer hunters, trappers and woodsmen.

As hunting, trapping, and lumbering diminished and river and lake navigation changed, while agricultural enterprises came in, the Chippewas were left stranded as they have been for three generations. Although the Government recognized the claims of the Turtle Mountain Chippewas, no reservation was set up for their use for many years and the Indians were left to shift for themselves, obtaining their living mostly from fish and game within the region. Game was scarce after the passing of the buffalo, and the Indians were often reduced to starvation conditions.

On 3 March 1873, Congress appropriated \$25,000 for the purchase of a township on the White Earth Reservation in Minnesota as a home for the Turtle Mountain Indians. An additional \$10,000 was provided in the bill to enable the Indians to move to their new location. The majority of the Turtle Mountain Band refused to accept this proposition of Congress and these people continued to occupy their former home in the Turtle Mountains since they felt that their claim to the territory was valid and that they must continue occupancy of the lands to protect their interests. Those Pembina who did not move to White Earth are still known as the "Bronchos."

⁹ The substance of this section is freely adapted in part from materials obtained from the US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Turtle Mountain Agency, on the early history of the Chippewa.

Final settlement of the claims of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians was provided for in a treaty made 2 October 1892, which was amended and approved by Congress 21 April 1904. By the terms of this treaty the Turtle Mountain Band ceded claims to all territory except two townships within the Turtle Mountain area. The treaty further provided for a cash payment of \$1,000,000 to the Tribe for the land ceded (9,000,000 acres). Provisions were also made for the allotting of the reservation and the allotting of such other lands within the Public Domain as might be necessary for the members of the Tribe unable to secure land within the designated reservation.

2. *Recent Conditions and Present Context*

Turtle Mountain Reservation covers an area six by twelve miles, adjoining additional trust lands. The population estimate for the reservation proper as of March 1966 was 7,131. Total number of Indians in Rolette County is considerably in excess of this. The area in which the reservation is located is far from any commercial or industrial center, the Dakotas as a whole representing an industrially undeveloped area with little to encourage such development.

The present complex social system of the Turtle Mountain Reservation has not been analyzed hitherto, although such analysis might be considered urgent in ethnological terms. Forest and Plains Ojibwa have been studied, but the Ojibwa are a minority of the reservation population. Of the 7,131 individuals on or near the reservation, it is estimated that only twenty to two hundred are full-blooded Indians. The majority as noted above are mixed bloods, or Metis—combinations of Ojibwa, Cree, Assiniboine, and French-Canadian plus some Scots, Irish, and English; if any one element is dominant, it is possibly the French-Canadian. The comments that follow must be viewed as tentative, based upon limited observations over a limited period of time by individuals not primarily concerned with examination of social structure per se.

The elements that went into the formation of the Turtle Mountain Band were combined under the following socio-economic conditions. The Plains Ojibwa, after moving from the forest areas, adopted many of the characteristics of Plains Indian culture, as did the Cree. The Assiniboine underwent similar adjustment. The French-Canadian element, however, entered as a consequence of the fur trade. Historical events of the 19th Century seriously attenuated the fur trade in areas adjoining these Indian groups, impoverishing the French-Canadian trappers, while virtual extermination of the buffalo and expropriation of Indian lands put an end to the economic base of Plains Indian culture. No replacement of this base other than the "hunting" of Government programs has so far evolved.

The smallest unit of Turtle Mountain society is the nuclear family (father, mother and minor children) living in independent households. Among more Indian-oriented members of the reservation, the nuclear family household is located in the vicinity of other closely related households. The groupings probably represent kindreds (groups of nuclear families linked by sibling ties). There is no evidence of the persistence of totemic groups or clans, nor of any organization beyond this level. The less Indian-oriented Metis are said to place emphasis upon kinship ties, but to a still lesser degree.

The present economic status of Band is poor. As estimated seventy households depend upon agriculture for subsistence in whole or in part. Seasonal farm labor was, in the past, more important than at present, as the increasing mechanization of farms tends to render unskilled labor superfluous. Seasonal construction work remains, but is limited. The low level of local or regional employment has been the cause of thousands leaving the reservation. An estimated six thousand enrolled members live away from the reservation.

The only developed political institutions of the reservation are those established under the tribal constitution, pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Under the present constitution, adopted in 1959, the tribal government consists of a Tribal Council (including a Chairman, elected by the entire reservation, and eight Councilmen, two elected from each of the four districts established for this purpose), and a Chief Judge and Chief of Police who are not members of the Council. In addition, each of the electoral districts has a three-member "sub-district council," the members of which are elected from the district. The function of the sub-district councils is to meet prior to the monthly Tribal Council meeting and to convey local proposals to the Council. In the event of the death or resignation of a Council member, the sub-district council concerned selects his successor.

Within the last few years, the Tribe attempted to join the United Nations as a sovereign government, claiming that it was legally independent. At another time it attempted to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union. While these attempts were less than successful, they are indicative of the frustrations of life on this reservation and the tenor of tribal responses thereto.

The spirit of tribal independence has sometimes worked against the group. The BIA tends to be regarded as an enemy, and close contact with it is not maintained. This led to the loss of funds available for construction of a new tribal office several years ago, when the Council failed to act to obtain BIA funds then available for that purpose. The BIA established a committee, consisting of BIA, PHS, tribal, and county and other interested parties, to consider the development of reservation resources, but little interest came from the reservation.

Within the reservation population, it is said that there is a weak system of factionalism, tending to revolve around personalities and largely based upon emotional appeal. It seems clear that the factions are based upon kin support of relatives, and support of "friends." The number of factions varies, depending upon personalities and issues rather than upon principles. Only a small percentage of the population is said to vote in tribal elections, making it possible for politicians to be elected with the backing of limited numbers who actually vote. The replacement rate of Council members is said to be high as a consequence (and symptom) of dissatisfaction with the general state of affairs, and the failure of new Council members to create new conditions. In the most recent election, one candidate for Chairman was said to have campaigned solely on the basis of complaints about the incumbent Council members.

The political situation obviously reflects the frustrations of reservation life: lack of jobs, inferior housing, and absence of development. It must be acknowledged, however, the Turtle Mountain has extraordinarily limited developmental resources, and that the tribal government altogether lacks the capacity to deal with these constant problems.

While Indians constitute the majority of Rolette County's population, the white minority effectively controls the politics of the county, and Indian representation in county offices is extremely limited. The "Indians" of Turtle Mountain, while quite thoroughly mixed with whites genetically, constitute a separate and distinct social system from the adjacent or even overlapping white population. The latter is entirely concerned with agriculture or supporting services. Of north European extraction, particularly Scandinavian and German, it is largely Protestant and unsympathetic to the French Catholicism of the Turtle Mountain Band. Relationships between the two groups are scarcely cordial. Charges of police brutality and discrimination are common, although it is not known to what extent the charges reflect reality or symbolize the fears and frustration of the Turtle Mountain community.

3. Impact of the Community Action Program

The Turtle Mountain CAP was established through the offices of the reservation, but it has responsibility for a program that is supposed to cover the entire population of the county, including its significant non-Indian minority.

The estimated population of the county (Rolette) was 10,641 in 1960, of which well over half were Indians. Estimates of the Indian population vary from 5,352 to 7,131, largely with different definitions of Indian status. Poverty, as measured by white urban standards, was characteristic of the Indian population, but also widespread among the whites. Of 2,150 families on the reservation or adjoining lands, only 864 had incomes in excess of \$3,000. Although seasonal labor accounts for variations in the number of persons employed, it is estimated generally that at least 1,000 of the employables are unemployed, and that about 5,000 individuals are in whole or in part dependent upon public support.

Employment opportunities on the reservation are limited. Aside from the CAP, which is in process of becoming the largest employer, the major employment opportunities exist with the BIA Agency. The Bulova Company plant in Rolla, at the edge of the reservation, employs 112 Indians, 70% of its working force. The tribally-owned Chippewa Authentics (manufactures non-authentic Indian artifacts) employs twelve. Some very limited employment is available in the private businesses of Rolla and Dunseith, which cater to the rural agricultural population. The entire State is predominantly agricultural, and the largest cities are commercial rather than industrial, offering only the most limited opportunities for either whites or Indians. The Dakotas are states that export population, and their population growth is extremely low. Building and road construction is

limited, and, as noted above, seasonal employment in agriculture is giving way to mechanization.

Tourism is insignificant, although the reservation is near the International Peace Garden Park on the Canadian border. Major traffic arteries do not pass near the reservation, and local attractions are limited and must, in any case, compete with other not too distant vacation areas of Canada and Minnesota. While great emphasis is placed, verbally, upon tourism development, it is clear that such developments will have only the most limited effect upon the economy.

The limitations of opportunity on the reservation are well known, and an estimated 50% of the enrolled membership of the Tribe is resident elsewhere. This exodus occurs because of opportunities elsewhere. Many do not want to leave, however, and will not do so under present circumstances.

The foregoing indicates the socio-economic circumstances in which the Turtle Mountain CAP was instituted. A Community Action Development Committee was established in 1964. After discussions which took into consideration the Tribal Council and the various public agencies related to the anti-poverty or developmental programs, a plan was submitted to OEO on 15 February 1965. Approval was granted effective April 1965, although the program did not become operational until June.

The Committee's proposals initially provided that the Program Director was to have a degree in social work. The Committee Director was, however, anxious to have the job and influenced the Tribal Committee to alter the proposal so that no educational requirement remained. The Director pointed out the need for a "grass roots" program and expressed the belief that he, with a ninth-grade education and background as a bricklayer, but with experience as Director of the Development Committee, ideally fitted the needs. Approval for the person nominated for the directorship was obtained from OEO in late May, and the administrative component began operation in early June.

In connection with the directorship, several informants stated that it was expected that the Director would be approved only on a temporary basis, and the Council and others were extremely shocked when his appointment was recognized as permanent.

The "legal governing body" of the CAP is the Tribal Council, which is democratically elected by reservation voters although there is question as to what percentage of the potential electorate is actually represented.

The Development Committee existed until the inauguration of the CAP. It was to be replaced by an advisory committee. A special requirement set by OEO was that the CAP Advisory Committee include representation of the white community of the county, which was also to be served by the CAP. Legally, the Advisory Committee is to include representation of the major agencies, institutions, or other groups involved in the anti-poverty program, as well as representatives of the poor. In fact, however, there is no evidence that an advisory committee is in existence. At the time of the field research, the CAP Director indicated that when he needed advice he went to certain friends who would be helpful on specific problems, and that he would tolerate no group or individual telling him "what to do."

While the Tribal Council was the legal governing body of the CAP, it knew nothing of the operations of the program. Council members, apparently unaware of their legal position of strength, complained that they were not consulted. The Tribal Chairman complained that the Director brought him papers to sign, but never told him the contents of the papers.

In actual practice, the Turtle Mountain CAP was an autonomous entity, the policies of which were established by the Director. Hiring and firing were done by the Director personally, without consultation with the Council or the non-existent Advisory Committee—a procedure that evoked an "aide's rebellion," which was, however, immediately suppressed.

The Director was assisted by a staff, including several assistant directors and an educational coordinator, whom he had chosen. With the exception of those for which professional requirements were mandatory, few had adequate background for the administrative work required or the qualifications for the salaries established. Of the professionals, minimal state requirements were met.

Figures on the number of sub-professionals, or aides, were not available, but these included a number of categories appropriate to the CAP components. Salaries began at the minimum of \$1.25 per hour (\$26000 per year), and were to be increased to \$3000 per year. It is interesting to compare these figures with the levels for North Dakota in general, and the local area specifically. Unskilled

labor is generally paid \$1.00 per hour, bricklayers \$2.00 per hour, heavy-duty truck drivers \$1.40 per hour, and experienced clerk-typists \$160-\$190 per month. Teachers with degrees, certificates, and experience are fortunate to earn \$4800 per year.

Agreement is widespread on some of the major problems facing the reservation. All sources—Council, Cap Director and BIA included—agree that lack of employment opportunities is the greatest problem. The drop-out rate from the schools is a matter of general concern. Housing is extremely poor, the dwellings being inadequate for the extreme weather conditions and lacking water and sanitation facilities. What is usually called "alcoholism," probably an inaccurate term, has been a major problem for years. Juvenile delinquency, involving fighting, vandalism, and illegitimacy, is common, although figures were not available.

The CAP addressed itself to some of these major problems. Insofar as unemployment is concerned, the CAP has provided some jobs for the unskilled and is becoming the largest employer on the reservation. The number of such positions is totally inadequate for the population involved, however. While CAP is concerned with the problem of unemployment, it can itself do little. Anything of significance requires the cooperation of many agencies. Considering the limited resources of the reservation, much planning and effort will be required if large numbers are ever to have adequate employment at home. Even if jobs were available, the population is presently lacking in the necessary skills. CAP attention thus is focussed on education and training as preparation for opportunities, wherever they may exist. The Pre-School Program, Remedial Reading, Guidance Counseling, and Recreation components fit in this category. They also provide opportunities for the hiring of aides to assist the professionals—it is impossible to say whether the programs were justifications for the jobs, or vice versa. NYC applications were made, and this program can be seen as allied to the other educational programs. A multi-purpose community building was requested from EDA, for there is no adequate building of this kind in the main population center of the reservation.

The success of these components in achieving their objectives could not be evaluated since they were still in their first year of operation.

In connection with the Educational and Recreational programs, the CAP requested allowances for purchase of buses to transport students. While this is one of the small reservations, distance are normally too great for walking, particularly in view of the extreme weather conditions. Enrollment in such programs as Pre-School and Recreation was severely limited by inadequate transportation facilities.

It was reasonably expected that the success of the Educational and Recreational programs would have a secondary effect in the reduction of juvenile delinquency and aimlessness. Sufficient time has not elapsed to make any evaluations.

The problem of inadequate housing is being treated by the CAP, through the Community Service component, and by plans of the Public Housing Administration (PHA). The Community Worker component, with ten aides, is responsible for making minor repairs to existing homes, which would make them more weatherproof. Funds for major repairs were lacking, and the number of workers inadequate to contend with the vast number of sub-standard houses. The PHA was planning the construction of low-cost housing, but it is not possible to see any significant alleviation of the housing situation in the foreseeable future.

A separate program for on-the-job training of adults was instituted under Title V of the EOA. The office of the Title V program is located in Rolla, and there was little contact between the Title II and Title V programs, in large part because the two Directors were antagonistic leaders of different factions.

The proposals for the second years include, in addition to continuation of the previous year's components, the following:

1. Youth Service Center
2. Credit Union
3. Home Economics
4. Manual Arts
5. Library-Study Hall
6. Legal Aid
7. Gardens and Small Fruit Production
8. Transportation


Supplemental proposals were probably submitted, and the disposition by OEO was not known at the time the field study ended. In connection with the components noted above, one, that concerned with "gardens and small fruit production," is apparently the offspring of an earlier program that left thousands of jars of chokecherry jam unsold and unmarketed.


Evaluation of the first components was, in general, difficult because of the limited time they had been in existence. Certain complaints are, however, worth recording. Teachers' aides complained that they were doing the work of the teachers, and that they had had no training of any kind. They felt inadequate and uncertain as to their work. Attendance at training sessions in which they would be given *adequate* instruction would be valuable, at least in giving them a sense of confidence.

The Community Worker aides were reported as doing very little. The Director is quoted as telling them, when they asked for pay increases to 400 per month: "What do you want more money for? You don't do anything but sit in the boiler room and drink coffee!" Others said of the Community Workers that they were given little supervision by the Director.

The Community Workers' aides, in addition to making minor house repairs, were utilized for the distribution of questionnaires by the CAP Administration to the reservation population. The questionnaires asked for evaluation of the CAP and suggestions for new components or activities. The Community Worker aide was, in short, used as a community contact mechanism—or as some local skeptics put it, "to spread the OEO gospel."

It was indicated earlier that the Tribal Council was not consulted by the CAP Director in connection with proposals or operation of the CAP. There was no CAP Advisory Committee, and coordination with relevant agencies, such as the Title V office, the BIA, and the PHS, was less than minimal. The use of impersonal questionnaires was apparently the only mechanism by which the community had communication with the CAP. There was, in short, no provision made for other community involvement. However, a program analyst for OEO in Washington told the Director he had one of the three best Indian Community Action Programs in the United States. Field observation tends to confirm that, while certain formal requirements of CAP organization (e.g., existence of a CAP committee) appear to be missing, the CAP Program at Turtle Mountain is being carried on with energy and considerable efficiency. Nevertheless, the economic limitations of the area present a real challenge in terms of long-range planning for Turtle Mountain's future viability.





TURTLE MOUNTAIN RESERVATION, NORTH DAKOTA

F. WHITE EARTH RESERVATION

The Ojibwa or Chippewa Indians of Minnesota reside on seven reservations in the northern half of the State. Six of these are "open" reservations (open to white settlement). One is "closed" (Indian settlement only). The six "open" reservations, including White Earth, are organized as the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe under the Indian Re-Organization Act; the single "closed" reservation, Red Lake, constitutes a separate autonomous band. White Earth Reservation is located in the northwestern portion of Minnesota, about 250 miles northwest of Minneapolis. It is on the southwestern edge of the great forest which extends far to the north into Canada but lies partly in the prairie bordering on the Valley of the Red River of the North.

1. *Historical and Cultural Background*¹⁰

Evidence of historical linguistics indicates that the northern and central Algonquians, the former including the Ojibwa, had spread through the northeastern United States and much of Ontario and Quebec about 1500 years ago. The Ojibwa and their closest cultural relatives, the Ottawa and Cree, were then restricted to what is now western Quebec and Ontario. They were hunters and gathers, with social organization adapted to the exploitation of game and other resources of limited quantity. Density of population among the Ojibwa was low, and the size of the social group limited by the natural resources. Linguistic evidence indicates that the social group was small, with cross-cousin marriage providing for the alliance and cooperation of bands over generations. This form of organization persists in northern Ontario and other areas, somewhat modified as a consequence of contact with Europeans, particularly through participation in the fur trade.

The 16th Century voyages of discovery led to the establishment of New France and the domain of the Hudson Bay Company, with a primary economic interest in fur obtained by barter from the Indians. Items of European manufacture were desired by the latter for their efficiency, value, or interest, and included muskets, metal traps, iron pots, tea, sugar, beads and whiskey. To the demand for fur can be attributed, in part at least, the westward movement of the Ojibwa, the first

¹⁰ This section is intended to provide background for an understanding of historical factors which have continuing relevance in the present situation of the Ojibwa of White Earth Reservation. It does not purport to provide a comprehensive history. It highlights social and cultural changes that have characterized the Ojibwa, and notes the degree to which important socio-cultural features pertinent to CAP operations have continued.

losses of aboriginal culture, and the development of family hunting and trapping territories. While initial contact with Europeans was undoubtedly through intermediary tribes, direct relationships soon developed.

In 1640 Jesuit missionaries reported a number of "Ojibwa" bands at, and to the north of, the Sault Ste. Marie, generally accepted as an indication of the extent of westward migration. The name of the bands reported, the Ouchipoué, was eventually applied in corrupted form (i.e., Ojibwa or Chippewa) to the entire group. In succeeding generations the Ojibwa moved west to Lakes Winnipeg and Winnipegosis, and southwest into the northern peninsula of Michigan. The latter migration is relevant to White Earth. The southwesterly migrants moved into an area more hospitable in terms of exploitative potential where they were able to profit, as middle men, in the fur trade between the Europeans and the Sioux. The initial peace between the Ojibwa and Sioux soon turned to hostility that was not effectively ended until the reservation era, and not ended formally until many years later.

The long period of Ojibwa-Sioux warfare had significant consequences with respect to Ojibwa demography and socio-political organization. The Ojibwa, moving south and west into Wisconsin and Minnesota, invaded the Sioux lands. In a state of continuous warfare, every Ojibwa hunting party travelling into disputed territory was also a war party. The more abundant natural resources, combined with the defensive and offensive values of larger numbers, led to the growth of larger bands, prominence of war leaders, and the development of village chiefs.

Development of chieftainship had been affected by the fur trade and, later, by representatives of the American Government. Fur traders and Indian agents alike preferred to negotiate with one chief rather than a council of all adults of the tribe, and a kind of leadership concerned with "external affairs" developed.

The increasing numbers of whites in the area led to demands for the expropriation of the recently and hard-won lands of the Ojibwa, and the 19th Century land cessions were substantially affected by economic developments. The Ojibwa had long had a symbiotic economic relationship with the whites in the fur trade which had developed into a credit system in which items were obtained by the Indians who paid the traders in fur at the end of the trapping season. In the 1830's an economic depression in the eastern United States ended this credit relationship, and with it came an end to the demand for the beaver hat, greatly diminishing the outlet for the only major exportable Ojibwa product. This sudden change in "balance of payments" created a drastic problem for the Ojibwa, magnified because of the game shortage resulting from increased population and exploitation for trade. Under these conditions, great land cessions were made, conveying most of northern Minnesota to the whites in return for what then appeared to be valuable annuity payments.

By 1867, the final cessions were made and the White Earth Reservation was established by statute as the primary home for the Minnesota Ojibwa. Not all Ojibwa moved to White Earth, and the holdings of those who refused removal and consolidation were eventually formalized into the other six Minnesota reservations.

In 1869 Ojibwa movement to White Earth began. Population eventually grew to almost ten thousand, with numerous bands represented, primarily of Mississippi and Pillager affiliation. It was during the reservation period that the developing political and governmental institutions were abortively terminated. The chiefs of various types, the councils, and other groups with political influence, were no longer functional. They continued to exist with form, with much attached prestige, but with disappearance of meaningful roles, and government gradually became a function of the Indian Agent.

The reservation era brought about the following major changes in Ojibwa social organization at White Earth:

1. The end of bands as autonomous political entities.
2. The end of a viable indigenous economic base of Ojibwa society, and of related aspects of culture.
3. The end (with the introduction of schools) of exclusively Ojibwa familial socialization of the young.
4. The end of Ojibwa religious institutions and beliefs through the complementary (and sometimes identical) inroads of Christian missionaries and the schools.
5. The decline of the Ojibwa language, through insistence of school authorities that it not be used with the young, and because of the utility of English in relating to the non-Ojibwa population of the area.

6. A decline in the effectiveness of social control, resulting from inadequacy of traditional methods of social control in coping with problems posed by an expanding population, and due as well to the decline and demise of the control functions of the Midiwiwin (the Grand Medicine Society) and to usurpation of authority by "outsiders."

The Dawes ("Allotment") Act of 1887 made possible the allocation of lands to individuals, and permitted the sale of individual lands by "civilized" Indians (i.e., those who could sign their names) or by those who claimed white ancestry. The presence of a railroad in proximity to the rich forest brought in timber speculators in the 1890's. Most of the land of the reservation was soon in their hands, and by the mid-1920's the forest had almost been denuded of valuable timber. With these events, deterioration of the economic base of the White Earth Ojibwa society was complete.

Notwithstanding these significant changes in Ojibwa ecology over more than the past century, however, strong elements of traditional social structure remain, and there is ample evidence that what might be viewed as the Ojibwa modal personality type has not changed drastically.

The 1920's and 1930's saw the removal of the Indian Agency to Bemidji, an end to the boarding school educational system that had been initiated in the 1890's with BIA operation of the school system, and the advent of BIA control of law enforcement. The educational, law enforcement, and welfare systems were transferred to the State, and in turn to counties too poor and disinterested to be effective.

Following passage of the Indian Re-Organization Act of 1934, the six "open" reservations of Minnesota Ojibwa organized as the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, with reservation councils responsible for local government. In 1963 a new constitution was adopted. The long period of relative insignificance of tribal and reservation government, and in turn its transformation, are particularly pertinent to understanding the problems which CAP has encountered at White Earth.

2. Recent Conditions and Present Context

The following outline of the social structure of the White Earth Ojibwa is intended to provide further context for examination of the development of the White Earth Community Action Program. It covers not all aspects of the social system, but those identified as most relevant in the course of field research. In view of the persistence of certain characteristics of social organization from pre-reservation times and the redevelopment of some earlier characteristics in the new reservation context, a brief statement of the old social system is needed initially.

a. Early Ecological Adaptation

The social structure of the Ojibwa in the period of their westward and south-westward movement represented a social adjustment to the environment and its exploitation. The resources of the northern forests, with limited technology available, did not permit great density of population; indeed, except for recent white settlements, the area remains today one of the most sparsely inhabited regions of North America. The pattern of settlement was adapted to the exploitative patterns of the seasons: largest groupings (the band) occurred during the spring and summer, when attention was directed to tapping sugar maples, fishing, and some hunting. Late summer and early autumn saw some dispersion for the harvesting of wild rice, followed by hunting as the major activity. Winter, the season for trapping, saw the utmost dispersal.

The nuclear family (husband, wife and children) remained together throughout the year, and was, as long as conditions permitted, in close proximity to several other such units, usually related through father-son or brother ties. A number of such groups, occasionally up to one hundred, constituted a named band. Kinship was bilateral (relatives of both mother or father were equally recognized). Parallel cousins (the children of one's father and his brothers, or of one's mother and her sisters) were classified as siblings, while cross-cousins (children of one's father's sister or mother's brother) were conceptually and terminologically distinct. Preferential bilateral cross-cousin marriage may be seen as an adaptation to low density of population, with small, local bands widely distributed, providing continuing sets of alliances among small family groups.

The responsibilities and privileges of kinship were extended further through the totemic groups (known also as clans or gentes), membership in which

brought classification as sibling. The totemic groups were patrilineal (membership was inherited through the father) and exogamous (marriage with a clan sibling was not permitted).

The basic cooperative group was the nuclear family, but there was always the possibility of forming a larger group consisting of related families as conditions permitted. Wider cooperation, when needed or desired, was possible through the mechanism of kinship. The band was not itself an organization with a readily definable function, but, since almost all members were related, it was the group the members of which might cooperate, and, aside from totemic values, intermarry.

Social and political controls were not highly developed, nor were they necessary in such small bands that were, for most of the year, divided into smaller kin groups. A man recognized as having stronger supernatural powers than most, often a shaman or medicine man, served as leader when necessary. Social control was maintained largely through fear of witchcraft, harm befalling those guilty of hostile acts or thoughts. Sickness was seen as a consequence of witchcraft, and often the cure involved, in effect, public confession of possible "sins." Interpersonal and intergroup hostility, to which fears of witchcraft relate, appears to be a marked characteristic of all Ojibwa groups. The fear and avoidance of individuals and groups not immediately related may have been functionally related to maintaining social and spatial distance under natural conditions in which interdependency had to be discouraged. It has, under other conditions, operated to prevent cooperation where such was desirable.

Among the southwestern Ojibwa of Minnesota and Wisconsin, the 19th Century saw the rise of chieftainship. Ecological conditions had permitted, continuous warfare the larger populations had demanded, and whites had insisted; that various types of chiefs be developed to deal with specific, recurring situations. Among the most important to develop were village chiefs, war chiefs, medicine society chiefs, and those who, like medieval heralds, dealt with the representatives of white society. It is incorrect to regard the Ojibwa leader (*ogema*) as a king or president in the Western sense, since his authority was dependent upon his followers and their acceptance of his leadership. Lack of confidence was expressed in refusal to follow and, in one case, a major chief (Hole-in-the-Day) was killed by his followers as they were dissatisfied with a treaty he had concluded on their behalf.

As indicated above, the settlement on reservations under the jurisdiction of the Indian Agency brought an end to the power of and need for the chiefs; the political superstructure collapsed with the decline of power and eventual death of the last of the pre-reservation leaders. The need for cooperation on a level above that of the kin group ended, except as it was organized and directed by the Indian Agency, and, to considerable degree, the system of social relations continues to resemble that prior to the development of chieftainship. Indeed, it is possible to see 19th Century developments as a superficial structure erected upon an unaltered base; the effect of the reservation was to bring about a return to the aboriginal base.

b. Present-Day Social Adjustment

That the present social structure of the White Earth Ojibwa is a product of the foregoing becomes clear from description of the present situation. Relevant demographic and economic statistics will be found at the beginning of the section pertaining to the CAP itself.

The reservation is a social rather than a territorial community that exists as a social system separate and distinct from the white communities that now lie within or adjacent to the original limits of the reservation. It exists as a single community only with respect to outside threats to the entire Ojibwa population of the reservation, or to take advantage of programs or opportunities of direct value to that population. The white population is separate, and though there is some social interaction, most of it is economic or political, for the White Earth Ojibwa are neither economically nor politically autonomous.

The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, of which White Earth is a part, is made up of six "open" reservations as noted, with a tribal government (the Tribal Executive Committee, or TEC, and tribal manager and staff) having responsibility for matters pertaining to two or more reservations, as well as to those of general tribal concern. Much of its activities have been concerned with management of property owned and/or administered by tribal authority and with responsibility for prosecution of claims. Each reservation has a governing council, or

Reservation Business Committee (RBC), responsible for matters of local reservation concern. The Chairman and Secretary of each RBC are members of the TEC, which elects the President and other officers from its membership.

Aside from mutual interest in tribal resources and successful prosecution of claims before the Indian Claims Commission, the six reservations or "bands" (as they were known until adoption of the new constitution in 1964) have little of enduring common concern. Each is suspicious of the possibility that one reservation may benefit more than others from tribal activities, though all reservations may share a suspicion that their own elected representatives and tribal officers are using their positions for individual gain.

Each of the six reservations is "open" in the sense that at least some land is occupied by whites. This leads to terminological difficulties: To the whites the reservation is a tract of land that belonged to the Ojibwa, but one that has been largely alienated and is now largely occupied by whites. Thus, the whites make up part of the population of the reservation. To the Ojibwa themselves, on the other hand, the term reservation refers primarily to the Ojibwa population, and to either the land originally allocated to them or to their present holdings. In another sense it refers to the Ojibwa Band or bands situated around the Indian Agent's facilities provided in exchange for the cession of their ancestral lands under treaty. The Indian Agency has been replaced by the PHS Indian Health Division, separate school systems, the Indian Road Service, a BIA Agency office at Bemidji, and now the CAP. In the usage that follows, "reservation" refers to Ojibwa residents within the old territorial limits, or to the land itself depending on context. The term is not used here to refer to the white population except as specifically noted.

The Ojibwa population of White Earth is made up of descendants of the Mississippi and Pillager Bands recognized in 19th Century treaties, together with those of the Pembina Band that are not at Turtle Mountain or elsewhere. A century of intermarriage has blurred distinctions, which now exist primarily in terms of formal enrollment on tribal records for purposes of distribution of claims settlements. It is recognized, however, that one village (Pine Point) is primarily made up of descendants of Pillagers, and the descendants of the Pembina Plains Ojibwa are still occasionally distinguished as "Bronchos."

A substantial number of enrolled members of the White Earth Ojibwa live elsewhere. It is estimated that the present White Earth Ojibwa population is about 2350, including some three hundred living in predominantly white communities immediately adjacent to the reservation. This compares to a population of more than 9300 indicated by the 1950 census. Most of the decline occurred in the early 1950's.

Large Ojibwa populations are also found in many cities. White Earth Ojibwa are found in particular in Minneapolis, St. Paul, Kenosha, Waukegan, Peoria, and Los Angeles. The largest members are in Minneapolis-St. Paul, and there is some evidence that they form a social "reservation" within the Twin Cities. The change in the tribal constitution was almost defeated by the "city vote," and the same group challenged, in a Federal court, the validity of the referendum and its results.

The Ojibwa population of White Earth Reservation is divided among the three villages of White Earth, Naytahwaush, and Pine Point (each with somewhat more than five hundred residents in slightly more than one hundred households), the community of Rice Lake (with about two hundred residents scattered in the vicinity of the lake), a few small hamlets (such as Elbow Lake), and a number of families and individuals living in relative isolation at the numerous lakes. Each village has a village council, but these sometimes become inactive.

The distribution of population in the villages is interesting, and White Earth village may be taken as representative. Here the village is spread out along one major and several subsidiary streets. From the northern edge (at the approximate location of the Episcopal mission) to the southwestern end of the main street the distance is approximately two miles—for a village of only some 550 residents. The houses are widely spaced, exceptions being cases in which a house has been built near another by a close relative or where a house was built in the center of the village when the population was much larger. It is also found that kinsmen tend to be located as closely as housing permits. Several villages in fact have sections known by the names of their predominant families.

The White Earth communities may also be described from another point of view, to which the systems of social relationships is central.

Individuals are rarely found living alone in separate households, and if this occurs and continues, it is normally because of the death of an elderly spouse. A young surviving spouse normally remarries.

The normal household is that occupied by the nuclear family of husband, wife and children. This group sometimes includes unmarried adult children, an elderly parent or the husband or wife, or other close relatives. Special circumstances may lead to two closely related nuclear families occupying the same house indefinitely, but visiting relatives seem always welcome, as are reservation residents visiting kinsmen in the cities.

While the nuclear family household is independent, it is normally located near the households of close relatives, particularly those of the husband's parents or brothers. This larger group of kinsmen includes cousins (especially first cousins) as well, and corresponds generally to what the anthropologist terms a kindred. The term kindred will hereinafter be used to refer to the bilateral kin group consisting of the nuclear families and households of elderly couples, their siblings if living, and those of their children and grandchildren. Locally, the term "clan" is sometimes used for the kindred. Politically, it may be a "faction."

The primary cooperative group is the nuclear family, and next the families of closest relatives or members of the kindred. Cooperation takes a variety of forms, aside from household routine. A man and wife form the preferred team for harvesting wild rice, for example, since it is felt that "this keeps the money in the family."

Cooperation is also extended to kinsmen in need, involving the sharing of food or drink when one has an adequate supply and another does not. To the extent that "Indian generosity" is present, it tends strongly to be between kinsmen. If a man has a business or occupation in which he can hire employees, it is usual for him to give preference to close kin, then to more distant kinsmen, and then non-kin. People expect this and go to a fortunate kinsman when in need. It provokes bitter feelings and charges of nepotism, however, if public funds are utilized, despite general acknowledgement that first responsibilities are to kinsmen.

The degree of cooperation or hostility between and within kindreds varies in accordance with external conditions. Generally, jealous and hostility prevail within a given kindred until threatened from without. Then, the threatened kindred closes ranks and its members cooperate for the duration of the threat. The outside threat may arise from a more distantly related kindred which will, in turn, cooperate with the first kindred if yet another challenge comes from a still more remotely related group. Cooperation and hostility become especially significant in discussion of economic and political relationships. Each kindred tends to act or react as a bloc vis-a-vis other hostile kindreds in the manner described, but otherwise may have conflict within, and such kindreds tend to separate into new kindreds as they increase in size.

Inter-personal and inter-group hostility has long been recognized as a cultural characteristic of the Ojibwa in Ontario, Manitoba, and Wisconsin, and it is also found at White Earth. Husband-wife conflict is not unknown, and divorce or separation is recognized by many as the solution to marital disharmony. Conflict with consanguineal kinsmen, usually under the influence of alcohol, sometimes occurs. Bitter gossip concerning individuals or groups is common, and the tendency is to believe the worst—unless it concerns one's own kin. Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Tests of similar groups indicate a high degree of suppressed hostility, which occasionally becomes manifest, particularly when over drinking.

Marriage relationships are not based on any explicit preferential rule, but some preferences are clear. Marriage with first cousins is normally prohibited, and not fully approved with second cousins. It is also found that intermarriage between certain kin groups is rare, but higher between others. Marriage with whites is approved and not uncommon. If the man is Ojibwa, the usual residence is in the Ojibwa community, although there are one or two exceptions. Residence after marriage tends to be at the husband's parental home or in an independent household, but in any case in proximity to the husband's family.

Cross-cousin marriage, noted earlier as a northern Ojibwa characteristic, no longer occurs. Kinship terminologies taken from the oldest resident indicate clearly the former existence of the system, but many of the schedules show confusion concerning cousin terminology, and none remembers the time when cross-cousin or first-cousin marriages occurred. The totemic groups, which once were

kinship extensions within which marriage was prohibited, have virtually disappeared, and most of the younger people do not even know their totemic affiliation.

Within each village it is possible to see kindreds associated by intermarriage and long-term cooperation that appear to be the cohesive groups of descendants of aboriginal or pre-reservation bands. Indeed, if a sociogram were made, it would likely show two or three major groups of this sort within each village, and little interaction between them.

Frequent reference is made in the villages to "factions," usually as obstructions to village cooperation. Members of the Ojibwa community often refer to the "fact" that much could be obtained for the village "if people would just cooperate." They, and the whites, refer often to the opposition of factions to some individual, or to vicious gossip that attaches to some prominent person. It is said of the factions that "they don't want people to get ahead" or "they want to keep people down." The factions are, on the whole, recognized as having a base in the kin groups, and are often referred to by the name of the prominent family of the group. There are no "political platforms" or principles to separate the factions. Rather, they are concerned with personalities and the fear that one faction will take advantage of its position for gain at the expense of others. The factions tend to be negative or opposition parties based upon kin interests and may be seen as giving voice to deep-seated interpersonal hostilities characteristic of the Ojibwa. The factions represent the local form of "persuasive factionism," wherein composition changes with issues and personalities.

Certain cultural characteristics relate to the kin-based organization of the Ojibwa community of White Earth, and to the past and present subsistence activities—the latter discussed below.

Not only are kin ties important in relationships among White Earth people, but such relationships are highly personal. The impersonal relationships of a large-scale organization or bureaucracy are alien, and neither understood nor desired. Laws, regulations and rules of government are not seen separately from the individuals administering them, and such rules are at best accepted, though rarely understood. A PHS physician is "good," for example, if he has personal relationships with many people. He is "bad" if he has few such relationships and is inflexible in enforcement of rules—irrespective of his possible legal freedom of action. Government officials—such as welfare social workers, teachers, or CAP officials—are impersonal but important parts of the environment, and are not widely influential unless their inter-personal relationships are personal in character. The official who maintains impersonal relationships is subject to accusations of self-seeking disinterest or hostility.

c. Economic Patterns

Subsistence patterns were formerly based upon exploitation of the natural environment and its seasonal products. While moose and elk are no longer present, and deer, beaver, mink, and other animals are of very limited value, white society—as seen by the White Earth Ojibwa—may be considered a present-day analogue of these resources.

The game animals have largely disappeared, but deer hunting is marginally important, and a few still hunt and trap fur-bearing animals in season. The harvesting of wild rice in the early autumn is important to all. In the white man's environment, seasonal work has been important: construction, particularly of roads in the warm weather; planting and harvesting of potatoes and sugar beets in summer; cutting pulp wood, and the like. These are mentioned here in connection with a cultural feature that is perhaps a by-product of a seasonal cycle and seasonally limited goals. This feature includes a time perspective different from that of the middle class whites, the relative absence of long-term goals, lack of expectation of accumulation of financial resources, and what has been termed a "feast or famine" approach to life. There is also a tendency not to grasp general or underlying principles—although it would be more accurate to say that they often fail to grasp principles or to apply them in the manner in which they are perceived and considered in the white milieu.

The importance of personal social relationships, this seasonal time perspective, and a feeling for discrete detail rather than general principles, have important bearing on the design or operation of programs among these people.

Social class structure is not conspicuous within the Ojibwa communities of White Earth. In several villages there are individuals who are permanently employed, others who are seasonally employed, and others who are completely dependent on welfare. The fully employed represent one end, the unemployed the other, of a group without clear segmentation. The division between "full

blooded Indian" and "mixed blood," so prominent at some reservations, is not here articulated. Perhaps this has been due to the fact that many full blooded Ojibwa, at the turn of the century, signed statements (with an "X") that they were part white in order to sell allotments—and also to a long history of intermarriages, beginning with the French fur traders. The terms "black Indian" and "white Indian" are sometimes heard in one village. They have no precise definitions of these terms and appear as much epithets as descriptions. There are some families which no one assigns to either category, and some members of a family may be termed one, some another. In general, the term "white Indian" refers to those who are employed, do not get into trouble, maintain clean and orderly homes, are better educated, and have a higher white "blood quantum." The term "black Indian" tends to refer to those who are unemployed, frequently in trouble, less well educated, with more Indian blood, and who live in a particular section of the village. A few also say that the latter is a term used by Roman Catholics to refer to Episcopalians, but there are too many exceptions to make this acceptable. In no case is any one of the characteristics noted the determining characteristic, and the terms have considerable elasticity and ambiguity. They do reflect, however, two major geographic divisions of the village concerned, and these geographic divisions do tend to include populations which have some of the characteristics noted.

d. Political Structure and Public Services

Political organization at the village level is variable. In all villages, and in Rice Lake Community, there have been village councils, the one at Naytahwaush having been most effective. The Council at White Earth was inactive for several years, was reactivated in the winter of 1965-66, but is apparently again inactive. The pressing problem of village government is the lack of responsibility and authority without which there cannot be meaningful government. A volunteer fire department, having definite responsibility and public moral and financial support, has been extremely successful at one village.

Village school boards exist at two villages. At another, the board is shared by the Ojibwa village and the adjacent white village. At the two with independent school boards, the boards are made up of Ojibwa elected by popular vote, although only in rare instances and under special circumstances do more than a very small number vote. High school students attend schools in Waubun, Mahanomen, Park Rapids and Detroit Lakes, where they participate with whites on a large scale for the first time, as the schools are located in white communities. This will be discussed at greater length in connection with the CAP.

Inter-village contact has declined in recent years as a consequence of the conversion of the hospital at White Earth village to an out-patient clinic in 1961. Previously, visitors to patients visited relatives and friends while in White Earth town, and were often accompanied by others in an informal "public transportation system." The hospital, then, was a covert center of a social network. With its closing, the number of inter-village contacts and the quantity of information disseminated decreased. Moreover, the closing of the hospital was viewed as a unilateral abrogation of Federal treaty, unjustified and further evidence of bureaucratic perfidy and disinterest in the people.

Township boards exist as agencies of the three Minnesota counties in which the reservation lies, and each has a representative from an Ojibwa village. One hears little of the functions or activities of these boards.

The constitution approved by the Interior Department in 1964 established Reservation Business Committees to replace the former reservation Councils, and a Tribal Executive Committee to replace the previous tribal executive.

The White Earth RBC consists of five members—a Chairman, a Secretary-Treasurer, and three Committeemen. Several of the present incumbents had been members of the earlier equivalents of the RBC and had been reelected to their new positions.

The Chairman and Secretary-Treasurer of the RBC are ex-officio members of the Tribal Executive Committee (TEC), and both White Earth members held office in the TEC. The TEC is concerned with matters pertaining to all the associated reservations, and with those of concern to more than one reservation. The activities and interests have, in the past, been concerned primarily with management of tribal-owned or operated lands, including permits for timber cutting and leasing land, and prosecution of the claims against the Indian Claims Commission. Matters of concern to a single reservation are left to the jurisdiction of the local RBC.

Government under the Indian Reorganization Act has been only nominal. The tribal, reservation, and village governmental units have been without the usual accouterments of government, lacking police, judicial, and taxing powers. The schools operate with curricula established by the State, with teachers hired according to state certification criteria, with funds collected by governments over which the Indian school boards, where they exist, have no control. The high schools are operated by systems in which the Indians have no more voice than ordinary citizens, and, in actual fact, less. The police and judiciary are under state and county control, with personnel drawn from the white communities, operating with laws based on middle class urban white behavior. Taxation is by Federal, state and county agencies, in which the Indian has little voice. Rules concerning hunting and harvesting of wild rice are made by the State Conservation Department. Complaints of prejudice and discrimination may be reported to the Governor's Commission on Human Rights, the State Commission Against Discrimination, or the Minnesota Advisory Commission to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, but without noticeable results.

To the extent that the TEC, RBC, or village councils have any authority, they can exercise it only with approval of other governmental agencies, principally the BIA. Even the CAP, which the Indians have been told is "their program," must conform to Federal requirements, and its components are limited to what the operational authorities of OEO authorize.

It is not, then, without good cause that the people of the reservation assert that the TEC and the RBC do little or nothing for them, and have not contributed to establishment of a sound economic base for the population. TEC and RBC responsibility, authority, and resources are too limited for the tasks involved, though this is seldom recognized by many people.

Criticisms of the RBC are on the order of accusations of inefficiency, incapability, self-interest, and even dishonesty. The comment most frequently encountered is that the RBC does little or nothing of value, but uses limited tribal income needlessly. Another common statement is that the RBC does not really represent the people, and judged by the number who make the statement, it is likely to be true, notwithstanding the fact that its members are elected and reelected. Never has a formal charge or evidence been presented to indicate that the RBC membership is dishonest.

The significance of the charges is to be found in some of the information given above:

1. Kinship is important, and one's first responsibility is to assist relatives. Hence it is accepted that an RBC member will give preference to aiding a kinsman rather than non-kin. A charge of nepotism, true or not, will be widely believed.

2. People elected to the RBC tend to be above average in economic status. Their economic positions become *prima facie* evidence that they have "lined their own pockets" with tribal or reservation funds, irrespective of any valid evidence.

3. Widespread inter-personal and inter-group hostility leads to suspicion of malfeasance or subterfuge on the part of the successful, and to ready acceptance of any articulated charges against the individual, regardless of evidence.

4. The success of an individual is believed to be at the expense of those less successful. Gossip leads to statements by some that "they don't want anyone to get ahead."

5. Negative comments made about most of the successful are widespread and lead to the refusal of some to "try to get ahead" or to participate in civic or political activity.

The charges made against persons involved in political activity are thus symptomatic of the structural features and tensions of social life rather than statements of objective fact.

Before offering summary comments on the political system, brief attention to demography is necessary. A distribution curve of White Earth population will show that there are high numbers of children, adolescents and old people. The category of young adults shows an unusually low frequency, and an investigation indicates that many of these leave to find employment, few with high school or college educations remaining on the reservation. Those with skills and abilities indicated by graduation from high school or attendance at college, who return to reservation villages, are almost invariably employed in Government jobs (now including CAP) which prohibit political activity. The legal prohibition is, of course, reinforced by local attitudes and accusations

that such leaders are invariably dishonest. The consequence of extraordinarily limited employment opportunities is lack of the kind of leadership that would be an important factor in developing a viable reservation community.

The charges of the non-representative nature of the RBC members may now be considered in context.

The RBC is the major link between the Ojibwa of the reservation, the tribal government, and the various governments and agencies of the white man's world. The type of person elected to the RBC is, to some degree (more than most) knowledgeable about the white man's world and has demonstrated some aptitude for operating in it. He is socially the descendant of the pre-reservation chief who dealt with the fur traders, the Army, the Indian Commissioners and Agents on behalf of his band. Not necessarily the best hunter, warrior or medicine man, he was best in his ability to talk and negotiate with the agents of the white man—and so the RBC is chosen now. The member is subject to criticism for being successful or different, as noted above, but is nevertheless essential for those very qualities. Dissatisfaction may be increased by an implicit recognition that there are few individuals who are interested in, or capable of, assuming the responsibilities of RBC membership.

It seems reasonable to assert that the RBC members are chosen, in effect, as a "ministry for external affairs." An equivalent ministry of the interior exists but on an informal level as there is neither formal organization nor, at present, the basis for internal government.

The CAP came to White Earth with an RBC already in existence. Politicians with only the trappings of government, they were suddenly given responsibility for administration of the largest Government program in White Earth history. A government without substance was given substance and the opportunity to be genuine. With this context we may turn to the advent of the CAP.

3. *Impact of the Community Action Program*

BIA census figures indicate an Ojibwa population of 2050 living on the White Earth Reservation, and approximately three hundred living in predominately white communities adjacent to the original reservation boundaries. This total of 2350 compares to a figure of 9300 in the 1950 census—a decline indicative of movement in search of employment, since few have moved by preference.

The extent of Indian poverty at this reservation is indicated by a few of the available statistics:

1. Of 512 Indian families, 371 (or 72%) had incomes of less than \$3000.
2. The BIA estimates the average per capita Indian income is approximately \$700.
3. Of a labor force of 664, 125 were employed in full-time, permanent positions, 137 were seasonally employed, and 402 (60%) were unemployed.
4. 87% of houses were classified as sub-standard by the BIA.
5. 80% of students did not complete high school.

Thousands of rural whites are nominally included in the White Earth CAP, but are marginal. In general economically better situated, there are many rural poor among them.

During the preceding years, visits by representative of the State Legislature and state commissions, the governors, and representatives of the Federal Government had been made periodically. The visits and studies were frequently followed by the preparation of a plan for improvement of Indian welfare or the development of a viable economic base for the reservation, but in no case had anything of substance materialized.

a. Formative Period Preceding CAP

With this history, a representative of the President's Task Force visited the reservation in the late summer of 1964. Forest Gerard, of the PHS, was accompanied and introduced by Robert Treuer of the BIA, whose assistance was utilized by Gerard elsewhere. The meeting at White Earth was held at White Earth village and had been given some advance notice. Fewer than forty individuals attended the meeting and the resident anthropologist noted that there were more white observers present than Indians. Gerard presented a straightforward account of the legislation about to be enacted. When questioned, he answered honestly, often indicating that a question could not, at that time, be answered definitely. Discussion between the anthropologists and various Indians indicated that little faith was placed in still "another plan," and that results would have to be seen.

With a history of numerous unfulfilled plans, little enthusiasm was generated in the reservation for a Community Action Program. Robert Treuer, of the Minnesota Agency of the BIA at Bemidji, was detailed by the BIA to assist the reservations in developing CAPs. It is due largely to his efforts and work with the reservation committees that plans for CAPs were eventually completed and submitted to OEO in the fall of 1964. After the applications were submitted, OEO published appropriate forms, which were forwarded with the returned applications to the RBC in early February 1965. The applications were rewritten on these forms, in accord with new instructions and with help of an OEO official, and were again submitted to OEO in February.

The period of January-February 1965 was apparently frantic, as the proposals were being rewritten in order that they might be, at OEO's request, approved for public announcement on Washington's birthday. Supporting letters had also to be obtained, relevant to the non-Federal share and support of the various social organizations of the area. On 17 February, while all members of the TEC were in Bemidji for a conference, they learned the Minnesota Ojibwa proposals "were in trouble." The TEC authorized an immediate trip to Washington for the President and Treasurer of the Tribe, who were accompanied by the BIA liaison man. In Washington, visits were made to the offices of both Minnesota senators and the Vice-President, as a result of which commitments for funding were obtained and formal announcement to this effect made in early March.

Several points are clear from the evidence pertaining to the origin of the White Earth CAP: (1) great pressure was placed upon the reservations to apply for a CAP; (2) pressure was placed to ensure application at an early date; (3) target dates were sufficient to prevent "community involvement" in the inception of the CAP; (4) administrative features in Washington almost caused abandonment of several applications; (5) the CAP was locally identified with the RBC; and (6) the value of Congressional pressure in overcoming bureaucratic inertia became clear.

The funding of the White Earth CAP became effective as of April 1965, but the CAP was not effectively operational until the beginning of June. The delay was due to the necessity of "getting organized"—hiring the initial minimal staff, particularly administrative, and making final arrangements for use of physical facilities.

An instance of early confusion for which the CAP has been incorrectly blamed may be found in the onset of the Head Start component. The CAP Director assumed office in early June, at which time Head Start was already operational. The sequence of events was as follows: First, the Head Start component at White Earth village was applied for by the School Board, after members had learned of it and had seen a demonstration in Bemidji. By the time Head Start was approved, a "political revolution" had changed the composition of the Board and the new members were largely ignorant of the nature of the intended program. In addition, the late date of actual funding made it difficult to secure the services of a teacher, although the Board did eventually obtain one. The inadequacy of the Head Start component can be blamed on the personnel turnover of the Board, and the late date of financing. When Head Start began, the new CAP Administrative staff was assuming office and was largely concerned with learning its responsibilities and "getting organized." It was not until later that the CAP became aware that it was the sponsor of Head Start, but the opportunity for control had passed.

Before considering the initial organization and development of the CAP, it is worthwhile to consider the problems of the reservation, as viewed by different segments of the population, and the publicly stated aims of OEO and its local representatives relative to problems of "the poor" on the reservation.

The overwhelming majority of articulate members of the Ojibwa communities are virtually unanimous in pointing to the following aspects of White Earth problems: The most important problem is unemployment, and the lack of employment opportunities in the vicinity of the reservation. While this is also a problem for white communities on and near the reservation, that is of little concern, if known, to the Indians. The majority (60%) of the Indian labor force is unemployed, and large numbers have left the reservation to obtain jobs in the Twin Cities and elsewhere. It is felt that nearly all who have left would return immediately if jobs were available, as they do return when unemployed, when sick, for vacations, and for many other reasons.

Those who have left include many of the best educated in terms of years of education or developed skills. One RBC member pointed out that of the thirteen

Ojibwa members of her high school graduating class, she is the only one remaining within the territorial limits of the reservation, the others having left because of lack of opportunities at home. Of the better educated who remain, many are employed in Government positions which prohibit political activity. Others, successfully earning a living, profess no inclination to become involved in civic or political activity. The total number of such individuals is limited, although it is by no means true, as one Benedictine missionary put it several years ago, that "only the riff-raff remain."

If the vast majority of the reservation population sees the need for bringing business and industry (i.e., employment opportunity) to the reservation, many recognize that employment opportunities can only exist for those with specialized skills and advanced education. Fewer recognize the "infrastructure" necessary to the establishment of a modern industry, however. In this regard, each of the three major villages is connected to major highways by paved roads, and electric power and telephone lines reach them as well. One of the major problems is, surprisingly, in a land of lakes, lack of water for industrial purposes (as well as, in most communities, for household purposes). Fuel—gas, coal, or oil—must be brought in from considerable distances. The population of western Minnesota and the Dakotas is sparse; large populations as potential consumers of any product are some distance away.

Some, including many of the CAP staff, see a problem in the lack of skills of the Indian population. There are some skills present, and the manpower inventory undertaken by the CAP is presumably measuring this aspect. Most often such skills as they exist are not used, as opportunity is not available. It is true, however, that very many are truly lacking in skills and education and almost all are lacking in motivation to leave the reservation.

Many whites believe that the answer to the economic problems of White Earth lies in termination of Federal responsibility and assimilation of the Indian population in the cities. This is not in fact an answer, as the skilled workers and many others of the Indian reservation have lived elsewhere but prefer the "poverty" of the reservation to life in the white man's cities—after having experienced both. In spite of pressures to leave, the population has remained constant for the past ten years. Of those who have left, almost every one (the researchers could identify no exceptions) would prefer to, and would, return to the reservation if employment were available.

It is not only that the White Earth Ojibwa say that they want to remain; they do so. Even those who have left return at every possible occasion—vacations, sickness of a relative, baptism of a child, the wedding or funeral of a kinsman, hunting season, and so on. Many who live in the Twin Cities return home for the weekends. The city is never "home"; it is a place to work for lack of opportunity at "home." Those residing away when in large numbers tend to form a reservation community in the city, or, if in smaller numbers, to associate with Ojibwa regardless of reservation affiliation. Genuine assimilation is certainly not common. The result of this pseudo-assimilation in practice is the termination of Federal responsibilities. When the Indian moves to the city, he goes to an alien society and culture; the northern rural white moves into a part of his own culture and follows a long tradition of movement.

Articulation of the reasons for desiring to remain or return to the reservation is difficult to obtain, but the significance of kinship and the reservation as a refuge from the pressures of white urban society appear to be important. Frequent reference to the clear air, the lakes, hunting, and fishing, when considered in terms of the derogatory remarks made about the cities—bad air, crowded conditions, strict schedules, monotony of work and impersonality—indicate some of the differences in values between Indians and whites. One might also point to personality differences between Ojibwa, on the one hand, and urban white Americans and non-Ojibwa Indians on the other, as registered in psychological projective and other tests. To ignore such differences in social relations, values and psychology is to invite failure of any project. To say that the Ojibwa should adopt white urban American characteristics ignores the questions of how and why.

A major problem of the White Earth Ojibwa communities is the need to overcome factionalism and to build community solidarity. It is customary to see kin groups and/or factions as obstacles to unified community organization and action, but there has been no attempt to utilize them constructively. Community organization is seen by many of the more sophisticated as a prerequisite to community advancement and successful projects, though a few see it as an end product in

itself. The former regard the community as capable of achieving much, but it must be recognized that the community has extraordinarily limited resources and that it is lacking in the basic responsibility and authority of government. Desired results must be obtained through the agency of the Federal Government, and for this a few knowledgeable people must negotiate. The community can do little more than provide moral support and participate in the results. The failure of tribal and reservation government to accomplish much, and the numerous but never implemented Federal and state plans and proposals, further reinforce an attitude of indifference that is characteristic of many White Earth Ojibwa.

Many, particularly among the CAP staff, agree that apathy must be overcome and enthusiasm generated. Apathy and indifference are, however, to be expected when the social group has little control over its destiny. It is clear that the villages, the reservation, and the Tribe can do little to influence the future except as their leaders are able to utilize whatever Federal programs become available. In a sense these leaders are still leaders of the hunt, bringing back game in the form of program benefits. Apathy or indifference are most likely to disappear when there is ample evidence that involvement and activity will bring satisfactory rewards.

The definition of community is a problem not fully recognized by local CAPs or by OEO. In the case of White Earth, the "Community" Action Program includes Ojibwa in three villages, one "community," a few hamlets, and isolated households. The villages in turn contain major divisions that within themselves have many correspondences to the pre-reservation band. Moreover, the CAP also pertains to a number of whites living in White Earth Reservation, many of them poor, who have few relationships with the Ojibwa population and certainly no sense of identification. One may question whether this provides a social base for a viable CAP. One may further question whether the newly organized "white" CAP of the area surrounding the reservation has a chance of success as a "community" program, since it involves a number of scattered, small population centers with different economic bases in three different counties, interpenetrating parts of White Earth Reservation as well.

The early statements of the senior officials of the Federal Administration, the OEO directorship, and the higher levels of the Federal bureaucracy indicated the necessity of community involvement to bring an end to the causes of poverty. Community involvement was seen to include maximum participation of the poor, and the Act itself required advisory committees with such participation for development of CAPs. It was clear that this was not designed as a WPA-type project merely to provide employment, but was intended to strike at the "roots" of poverty by providing the motivation and mechanisms for people to rise to middle class standards. It is also clear that the program was aimed at combatting poverty in urban slums, near most of which jobs are available for those who become motivated and have sufficient skills to obtain them. It is not clear, however, that reservations or poor rural white areas were primary concerns, for in the latter, jobs are not present and motivations and skills are thus largely irrelevant.

b. Sequence of Events after Funding of CAP

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the history and development of the White Earth CAP may be now more meaningfully discussed.

Following funding in April 1965, arrangements were made by the RBC for initial hiring of administrative employees with the aid of the BIA and state employment service. In June, the CAP Director took office.

A native of Naytahwaush and a recent college graduate, the Director was widely known on the reservation and had far better understanding of local conditions than an outsider would have. The Director of the recreation program was also a college graduate and a native of Naytahwaush, where he had taught school. The first social worker was white and professionally trained. He was joined in July by a second individual with advanced training in sociology and experience as a social worker and college instructor. As already noted, the Head Start program had been independently organized through appropriate school boards.

A number of informants with whom the researchers talked reported that the Director and Recreation Director were engaged by the RBC largely on the recommendation of a BIA official, but these statements lack confirmation.

By the summer of 1965 initial staffing was almost completed. Hiring procedures had been organized by mid-summer. Notices were posted of vacancies and applications taken at the CAP office. These were reviewed and recommendations made by the CAP Advisory Committee (CAPCom) sitting with the RBC. The RBC then made appointments. The then-resident anthropologist noted that at

these CAPCom meetings consideration was given to candidate's kinship affiliations, his personal habits and needs, and his ability to perform the job in question. Consideration of family need and qualifications for job performance were often in conflict, and only in some cases typists, for example, was it made clear that minimum qualifications had to be met.

Criticisms of these RBC appointments became widespread immediately, but these are more appropriately interpreted after consideration of the CAP programs.

Head Start was a summer program, initiated and initially administered by the school boards. While it will not be dealt with in detail here, it is noteworthy that a sociologist, evaluating the program in the summer of 1966, interviewed a number of families who had not enrolled their eligible children. Some of these families believed that nine or ten months of school was sufficient, and that to add two months of "school" in the summer was "too much." Some thought the children should be free in summer but that a Head Start program during the regular academic year would be useful, since young children would then be in the company of their siblings. These comments reflect the attitude of some toward year-around monotonous activity, and again reveal the emphasis placed on kinship in all such matters. A further consideration is that many women want to have their children around them. Head Start activity for the summer of 1966 was planned and administered by the CAP.

In the first year of operation Administration and Social Work were combined into one component, consisting of a Director, two Social Workers, an Administrative Assistant, and eventually two clerk-typists. They were assisted until February 1966 by two VISTA volunteers ("the VISTA girls"). Two other VISTAs were stationed at Naytahwaush and Rice Lake, with considerable independence from the central CAP.

The Administrative and Social Work component is best treated as a unit. It was responsible for the entire program, including routine procedures and reports, payroll, liaison with the RBC and CAPCom, and relations with BIA, PHS, welfare and employment departments, various other Federal and state agencies, educational systems, banks and businesses, etc. It was also responsible for preparing new proposals, in collaboration with all relevant government, public, and private institutions, organizations, and individuals. The VISTA girls were of particular value, since, having no organizational "slots," they were available to do what had to be done. Valuable services noted were publication of a CAP newsletter and making contacts throughout the community, in which they were instrumental in disseminating information and obtaining feedback on community reactions and needs. It is clear that the CAP Administration must have mechanisms for knowing of the attitudes and wants of the inarticulate members of the reservation.

The initial scope of the Social Work portion of the component had been two-fold. There was to be responsibility for young people, with particular attention to "drop-outs," as this is regarded as a major problem. This was felt to be preferable to intensive casework, which would have taken place in a vacuum since the entire social situation was working against their efforts. New values inculcated were irrelevant to Indian realities. They concluded that social work concerned with social organization was most likely to be fruitful, and that casework would only mean referral to appropriate welfare agencies. One Social Work aide was employed from the poor of each community.

The Recreation component was directed by a young resident of Naytahwaush, with assistant directors for each of the major communities, and aides from the local communities. The activities included seasonal sports such as baseball and basketball, dances and movies, attempts to develop arts and crafts, etc. The reservation population regarded this component as desirable, since the high schools, with their recreational programs, were considerable distances from the Indian communities, movie theaters were at least fifteen miles, and other recreational opportunities were lacking. Delinquency and vandalism were attributed to boredom of the young.

The Study Hall component was directed by a woman—part Ojibwa—residing in a nearby white community. The component provided for a schoolroom or library room at Pine Point, to be used for evening study or reading by students or adults under the supervision of an aide. The aides were chosen from among "the poor." This component was directed toward living conditions which made reading or study difficult: lack of electric lighting, overcrowded conditions, poor heating in winter, excessive noise, etc.

The Remedial Education program was in the hands of the school system, one teacher at each of three schools being hired for this purpose. One position was not filled. The component was established in recognition of the fact that the average reading level of Ojibwa students entering the high school system was approximately three years behind the white average. Since reading ability of course relates to success in high school studies, it was hoped that this component would be a factor in reducing drop-outs.

These four components—Administration and Social Work, Recreation, Study Hall, and Remedial Education—were approved and became operational in the first year of the CAP. It should be noted—as it was by many Ojibwa—that the CAP was oriented to the pre-school and school-age population. To the extent that adults benefitted, it was through employment as aides. One component, Home Management, had been rejected.

Three operational components utilized school space, and were programs which could have been easily administered through the school systems with less expense and equal efficiency.

The initial CAP program was designed to provide operational components rather than an immediate plan for alleviation of all problems. It was "safe," oriented toward the young, and involved support for education as its principal feature. Its results were anticipated as more children completed school and went on to successful futures. It was not yet necessary to consider that to the extent the program might be successful, the greater would be the eventual exodus from the reservation and the smaller the number of potential community leaders remaining at White Earth—unless, of course, employment opportunities were simultaneously increased.

If the first year the character of the program was an indication of what was believed to be readily acceptable, proposals submitted for the second year may be indicative of felt needs of the community based upon more serious consideration of what is necessary and desirable after more realistically evaluating possibilities under the EOA.

Consideration of proposals for the second year began immediately after the CAP became fully operational. Intensive study, ending in December 1965, led to the writing of proposals that occupied the entire CAP Administrative staff during the month of January 1966. The following components were requested:

1. *Administration*.—Expanded to include an Assistant Director for Administration.
2. *Social Work*.—Made a separate component. Emphasis was to remain on community organization (but see below).
3. *Recreation and Cultural Enrichment*.—Program to be somewhat more varied.
4. *Study Hall*.—Each study hall was to be supervised by a certified teacher, assisted by aides locally employed.
5. *Remedial Education*.—Continued in the context of the local schools.
6. *Credit Union*.—To provide for savings and loan facilities.
7. *Building Skills*.—To provide training in building construction trades and to provide badly needed housing. While approved by OEO, this component has not yet been acted upon by other agencies involved and is not expected to be operational until the summer 1967.
8. *High School Equivalency*.—To provide instruction and facilities for adults to complete high school, or the equivalent as determined by standard tests.
9. *Beautification—Nelson Amendment*.—To provide short-term employment on projects for the beautification of reservation lands and development of areas for recreation and tourism.
10. *Home Management*.—To provide training and assistance in maintaining homes. This component has not become operational due to a scarcity of home economists in the area.
11. *Legal Aid*.—To provide legal assistance for the poor of the CAP area. Because failure to fully understand the attitudes of the local legal associations, this component was deferred. The RBC then questioned its necessity.
12. *Head Start*.—A refunding of the previous summer's program, under CAP sponsorship.

A continuing interest in the educational and recreational needs of the pre- and school-age residents is apparent in the proposals for the second year of operation. In addition a number of components pertinent to the adult population were proposed and accepted. Of these, several were oriented toward education, informal or formal, and several toward increasing employment opportunities. The expanded program also provided additional jobs for the poor as aides. At

the end of field research in July 1966, 109 persons were employed by the CAP, including administrative staff and teachers as well as non-professionals employed from the reservation population.

In terms of long-range benefits to the reservation in general, the projects planned under the Nelson Amendment would perhaps enhance possibilities for tourist development while providing short-term employment for adults. The Building Skills component could have the greatest impact if the several Federal agencies involved were sufficiently coordinated to make the component operational. This component would provide training in locally scarce skills sought by employers within commuting range of the reservation, as well as providing badly needed housing.

c. *Attitudes and Opinions*

The reactions of the Ojibwa of White Earth to specific CAP components may be considered before analysis of the program as a whole is made.

(1) *Administrative and Social Work Component.*—There was extremely widespread criticism of both aspects of this component. The Director was widely liked. It was generally believed that he was doing a good job within the limits of possibility, and the more sophisticated recognized that the program was limited by law and Washington policy. However, there was a very widespread belief, especially in White Earth village, that the CAP Administration was dominated by the RBC, or specific members of it, and that it was this factor which placed limitations upon plans and activities of the staff, and particularly upon the Director. There was little confidence in any quarter regarding the social work phase of the component. The original plan had been for one social worker to be concerned with the young people, particularly with respect to the drop-out problem, the other to be concerned with the problems of the elderly. The social workers had concluded that work on community organization was more urgently needed. Members of the RBC and the general population lacked understanding of the nature of this new form of social work, being familiar only with the limited public welfare and casework services which had previously been available. Common complaints were that the social workers were rarely seen and that nobody knew what they did. These complaints were heard from RBC members, the well educated, and the poor—in White Earth village, the center of administration, and in the other villages. The social workers were rarely seen in Pine Point or Rice Lake, and only occasionally among the people of White Earth or Naytah-waush. In White Earth, they were said to spend most of their time in the office or "on trips." Contacts between the needy and the service agencies were almost exclusively through the Social Work aides, drawn from the poor. The social workers were little known, and one was disliked.

These criticisms of the social workers were valid within limits. The Director's activities were restricted by limitations of time. Since a new program was being instituted and organized, new proposals had to be prepared while the original program was being organized, relationships had to be established with local groups concerned in any way with the anti-poverty program, and working relationships among the RBC, CAPCom and CAP staff had to be developed. In view of the amount of paperwork required, the social workers frequently had to be utilized for administrative purposes, and during the period in which the new proposals were written the social workers devoted all their time to this activity. Attendance at meetings, conferences and training sessions also cut deeply into their time on a number of occasions. In practices, the social workers had little direct contact with the population and, as already noted, the form of social work which they advocated—social organization—was misunderstood and unappreciated, leading to numerous complaints that they were not doing their jobs (i.e., the traditional casework). Unfortunately, it must be admitted that in addition to not doing traditional social work, neither were they carrying on an effective program of community organization.

Another very common complaint was that too great a percentage of OEO funds was devoted to the salaries of the non-poor administration—Director, component directors, social workers, remedial teachers, and secretaries, and that not enough poor were hired. Several had calculated that about 40% of money for salaries—a reasonable approximation of the actual figure—went to the administrative and professional staff. Related was the allegation that the administrative and professional staff were being paid salaries greatly in excess of area standards, without obtaining people of outstanding quality. The criticism may be partially valid. Salaries in this area are lower than in urban areas, the

CAP salaries tend to be considerably higher than those for similar positions outside of CAP, and the people hired are sometimes of less than highest professional quality. The term "OEO Gravy Train" is widely heard among the better educated Ojibwa and whites who have some knowledge of the situation.

Questions of nepotism and favoritism in hiring practices are pertinent at White Earth and will be discussed in connection with the CAP as a whole.

(2) *Recreation Component*.—The recreation staff consisted of a director for the reservation program, and four assistant directors each assisted by aides. Each village had a resident assistant director and aides, and provided a program of seasonal sports, occasional movies, dances, and arts and crafts programs. Criticism of this component at White Earth village had to do with the limitations of the program: insufficient activities for all age categories other than adolescents; no activities for girls; participation of too few of the possible participants; favoritism in selection of teams to engage in off-reservation competitions, etc. It would be unfair to overly stress shortcomings, however. Even the most critical individuals accepted the value of the program, and in fact wanted a larger program rather than curtailment. The local justice of the peace publicly observed that since inauguration of the recreation program vandalism in the village had been reduced to a minimum.

Several individuals, including several former members of the School Board, indicated that the Recreation Director was inadequately prepared for his job, as he was an elementary school teacher with no training for large-scale recreational programs. He was criticised by others for lack of aggressiveness and lack of supervision of training for the aides.

At Pine Point, Rice Lake and Naytahmaush there were different criticisms. The settlement pattern at Rice Lake is such that few families are closely located and community centers are lacking. In this community the only obtainable building is made available through the Episcopal church, but the religious affiliation is sufficient for some to refuse to participate and few people live within walking distance, especially in bad weather. Elsewhere, there were criticisms that the component was inadequate in respect to frequency or variety of program, that the local assistant directors and aides were inadequately trained for their jobs, that some of the local staff were poor workers, and that in several instances aides had been publicly intoxicated.

Several attempts were made to institute arts and crafts programs. Several seem to have had initial success, but interest in each case dropped and the programs lapsed. Recently, several dances were scheduled by this component in conjunction with the newly established Job Corps camps nears the reservation. The Job Corps trainees are, however, predominantly Negro, toward whom there is considerable prejudice, and resulting conflicts have terminated this program.

In some limited areas of the reservation there is only vague awareness that this component exists, but, generally speaking, participation is widespread. The program is desired by almost all who know about it. They wish to see it expanded to provide a better coverage for both sexes and all age groups, greater variety of activities, and inclusion of more people.

(3) *Study Hall Component*.—This component was developed to provide situations in which school students and others could do homework, study or read. Two schools, a library, and a church building provide the space. A supervisor, without training in education, and aides, chosen from the poor, staff the program which is intended to provide an alternative to overcrowded, noisy, poorly lighted, homes. Criticism of the program was widespread. The aides on duty were chosen because they were poor. They lacked the educational qualifications necessary to help the students—who were often better educated than the aides. Quiet and discipline were said not to be maintained—a probably valid criticism, since the aides were not trained in educational techniques and undoubtedly have the permissive Ojibwa attitudes toward the young. In addition, attendance was generally low.

These and similar criticisms were given recognition by the CAP staff at an early date, and the new proposals included sufficient funds for staffing each study hall with a properly certified teacher. It is expected that the program will now be much better received, although quarters at two locations are relatively inadequate. Given adequate space, quiet, and assistance, this program will probably provide a valuable support to other educational programs and develop at least some community support.

Some attempts have been made to provide opportunity for study of Ojibwa and general Indian history. There has also been some interest in reviving,

through this component, the fast-disappearing language. It is too early to determine whether interest is sufficient for successful programs of this type, though they are believed to have value in instilling pride in Indian background.

(4) *Remedial Reading Component.*—This component was designed to cope with the inadequate reading skills of White Earth students, who averaged fifth-grade reading ability at the time they entered the predominantly white high schools. It seems beyond question that this inadequacy is a major factor in high drop-out rates in high school. The program is entirely in the hands of the schools; the teachers have state certificates in remedial education and work in the school system. The program is little known to the general public, however, since only the student and his family are aware that he is receiving this educational bonus.

Results of first-year efforts in this remedial program were available from two schools, indicating a considerable increase in reading ability on the part of participants—ranging from a one- to three-year improvement. One of the participating schools was without a Remedial Reading program because of a conflict over choice of a remedial teacher, but the program will be operative there in the forthcoming academic year. In general, the program appears highly successful thus far, if not widely publicized.

(5) *New Components.*—Newly authorized components are too recent to be given consideration. The Home Management component is not operative for lack of a qualified home economist to fill the professional position. The Building Skills component, perhaps of the greatest in long-term importance, has been approved by OEO, but not by the various other Federal agencies who must participate in this operation. The Legal Aid component was not authorized by OEO because it had requirements unacceptable to the legal profession. The RBC then concluded, for reasons unknown, that the component was not needed.

d. CAP Problems at White Earth

(1) *Fundamental Problems.*—As seen by the general population, the most important local problem is unemployment in the vicinity of the reservation. While the CAP publicity, nationally and locally, has emphasized that CAP is a local community's program to solve its problems, it is generally agreed that CAP and the RBC are not coming to grips with the key problem at White Earth—viz., development of business and industry to provide general employment. There is widespread conviction that CAP efforts should be devoted to this problem. There is, moreover, conviction that the RBC, independently or through CAP, is not doing all that could be done to solve it. With respect to the RBC, some question the good faith of members as well as their competence to deal with such problems.¹¹

While the jobs made available to the poor are highly valued, it is universally held that the number of such jobs is inadequate to needs, since only a minor fraction of the unemployed are affected by CAP as far as employment is concerned. Indeed, more attention is given to the number of jobs created than to the goals of the projects for which the poor are hired. Many consider that CAP jobs are the "make-work" sort, less valuable than those of the WPA in the 1930's because they show no tangible results. It is felt that CAP jobs will last only as long as Federal financing and the specific programs continue, and that they do not provide training or experience of particular value in the normal labor market. Experience as a recreation or social work aide, without specialized training or education, is of little lasting benefit, according to thoughtful people at White Earth.

That some jobs have been brought to the community is favorably regarded by all, but the program "does not go far enough!" Criticism is made of comparatively high salaries paid to the professional and administrative staff, as indicated above, and many believe that these funds would be better spent in providing jobs for the poor. The professionals, they say, would be employed anyway, regardless of CAP. Many people are also convinced there is too much paperwork (which they term "Mickey Mouse work"), requiring too much of the time of too many people. Observations by project researchers would tend to support this view.

Inquiry was made of the two stores in White Earth town to determine the impact of CAP presence on this aspect of local economy. The storekeepers agreed that there were some increases in sales, but not of great significance. While CAP salaries are earned in the reservation communities, they are mainly spent in

¹¹ These statements reflect public opinion, which is often ignorant of what can be done by which organization in terms of legal and financial limitations. It is clear, however, that OEO-CAP publicity oversold itself to many people.

adjacent white villages and cities. The local stores stock only basic items, sold at relatively high prices because they do not benefit from large-scale purchasing. Nearby stores carry a wider selection of items, a greater variety of brands, and tend to have lower prices. The white towns of Detroit Lakes and Mahanomen have the lowest prices and the greatest variety, and as a bonus provide a visit to the "big city." In consequence, CAP salaries quickly leave the reservation communities, and the normal by-products of increased employment do not long adhere to the locality.

If the major CAP objective is assimilation, as some, particularly whites, believe, it is far too early to judge the effectiveness of the CAP approach. If the objective is, as most Ojibwa believe, a viable economic base for the reservation, CAP has not really come to grips with it. If the objective were simply to provide a WPA type of employment, then the CAP has been inefficient.

Some comments pertinent to the community's involvement in CAP are also appropriate at this point. Initial national OEO and local CAP publicity, through talks, meetings, newsletters, etc., emphasized to the White Earth Ojibwa that CAP was their program, to carry out their wishes and plans, to solve their problems. In the summer of 1965 a considerable number of them knew of the program and were interested. By the time the field research of this study began in February 1966, interest had become more widespread but was highly critical. In the ensuing months it became apparent that alienation from the program had set in and that it was regarded as a tool of the RBC. This attitude was perhaps most widely held among the poor.

The change correlated with the following developments: (1) withdrawal of two VISTA girls who had published a newsletter and had established wide contacts within White Earth village; (2) increasing organizational complexity of the CAP office; (3) decreasing contact of the CAP Administrative staff, especially the social workers, with the ordinary people; (4) routinization of CAP activities; (5) increasing belief by the people in the limitations on CAP potential; (6) decline of importance of, and decreasing attendance within, the CAPCom; (7) increasing importance of the RBC.

The OEO has emphasized the necessity of involvement of the poor, though with noticeably decreasing fervor. In this connection, it is of some relevance to indicate the attitudes of the "poor" Indians employed by CAP. The "poor" tend to regard themselves as fortunate to have "jobs," even though the programs in which they are employed may be temporary. Employment opportunities are limited, so that with adequate dissemination of information pertaining to available jobs, more than enough applicants enter the competition. But these jobs are regarded as fortuitous, terminable either by the end of the program or at the whim of the RBC. Job holders do not think it wise to make their personal views of the program vocal, for fear of consequences, specifically loss of jobs. Several of the poor employees, who have nevertheless been somewhat outspoken, live in fear that they will be dismissed. The poor, employed by CAP or not, along with other segments of the population, tend most strongly to regard the CAP as the property of the RBC. The poor particularly view the RBC as controlling both the CAP and the reservation—and they fear the RBC.

Another problem somewhat related to job insecurity is lack of job descriptions or clear definition of roles. OEO publicity in the past emphasized "participation of the poor." On the other hand, the RBC has made it clear that the staff is to avoid controversial issues, and was later supported in this by OEO Memorandum 23. At the same time, responsibilities of many of the aide positions are unclear. Supervision is frequently inadequate, and supervisors are also unclear as to job specifications. As a consequence, aides fear that they can be fired with relative ease with no method of appeal. The aide positions regarding which this seems most significant are those concerned with Social Work, Recreation, and Study Hall—activities traditionally associated with institutions in which the Indian was treated as a passive recipient. It is not probable that positions available under the Nelson Amendment, the Building Skills component, and other activities with more clearly defined requirements will provide for easier adjustment. It is generally true that neither the Social Work aides nor the poor population with whom the aides work understands what the aides are attempting to do. While the problem of job insecurity does not involve all aides, it is nevertheless surprisingly widespread. That one employee was dismissed for so-called "immoral behavior" during off-hours is well known, and provides some substance for existing fears.

Underlying the insecurity of CAP employees and alienation of the population in general are traditional suspicion, hostility and fear of hostility. There is certainly no demonstrable evidence that RBC members are antagonistic to the poor, capricious in their behavior, or irresponsible. Rather, what is important is that fear, hostility, and suspicion are fundamental aspects of life in this community, and must be taken into consideration if the CAP is to be meaningful.¹²

The preceding paragraphs indicate that little has been done in developing genuine "community action," and that forces within the Ojibwa will, largely unrecognized, pose great difficulties. Some question exists in fact as to the extent that the CAP staff was wholeheartedly attempting to develop community action. An HSR field researcher states:

"... one of the most obvious aspects (of local CAP activity) is the de-emphasis on community action in favor of dealing with a pocket of poverty in an atomistic and atomizing way. Public relations talk concerns itself with selling the program to the "poor," but the technique of the sales pitch is to make contact with the individual, and then to deal with him as such. One hears staffers talk of saving even one individual from poverty, as though the job of the staff were to lay bait for persons already predisposed to bite and to dismiss the other fish as deficient in appetite."

In concluding this portion of the report, it may be mentioned that the WPA is remembered as a "golden age." Everyone worked, problems were minimal, and long-term tangible good was accomplished. To the extent that the CAP jobs correspond to this ideal, they are wholeheartedly approved. Work under the Nelson Amendment component is apparently rewarding in this sense.

(2) *The Problem of Nepotism and Favoritism.*—From the beginning of hiring for CAP administrative, professional and sub-professional positions, charges of nepotism and favoritism were rampant. It is advisable to restate several characteristics of White Earth Ojibwa social structure and culture because of their relevance to an understanding of this particular phenomenon.

The social groups most important to the White Earth Ojibwa are kin-based. Kinship is highly important in Ojibwa human relations concepts. A man should help his relatives and share his good fortune with them. The statement that "blood is thicker than water" is extremely meaningful in this context. It is expected that a man will help a relative before helping strangers, and would be severely criticized for doing otherwise. A man "in business" is expected to give preference in hiring to kinsmen, and no criticism attaches to the practice. Moreover, in a society this small that has been intermarrying for generations, every individual has many kinsmen. Although the importance of kin ties decreases with relative distance, at White Earth first cousins, nephews and nieces, as well as more immediate family, are of great importance. Second cousins and their children are of less importance, but not by any means disregarded.

If, however, a man hires a kinsman while utilizing public funds, he is severely criticized, even though he may be acting in accord with the Ojibwa principles described.

Since the web of kinship relations at White Earth is known to everyone there, any person hired by the School Board, the CAP, the RBC or the TEC is considered by others from the point of view of relationship. If there is any degree of relationship between an employee and the person who hires him, it will be considered nepotism by an outsider, for the group is always ready to believe the worst of anyone not closely related. A relative of a degree too distant to be normally significant may be chosen for his qualifications, but this will not avoid the allegation. Contrariwise, a relative may be chosen because he is most competent for the job, but charges of nepotism will still be raised. On the other hand, relationships would also be utilized by the critics themselves, were they in power, and all other things being equal, their own kinsmen would be given preference. In short, it may be expected that anyone in position to do so will practice a little "honest nepotism."

As indicated earlier, the members of the RBC and similar organizations are those who, within limits of the political system, are considered best able to negotiate with the world of the white man and his governments, Federal, state, and local. In general, RBC members are economically more successful than most, more socially adept and, hence, different. To be different is to invite criticism,

¹² It may be noteworthy that Ojibwa Rorschach protocols from other reservations quite consistently show profiles that, interpreted by urban American standards, exhibit paranoid tendencies.

and a person who is different must be very careful to avoid the appearance of being different if suspicion is to be minimized.

The RBC consists of five members, elected on a staggered basis. Most of the members (during the period of research) had been members of the Reservation Council under the prior constitution, and were reelected under the new constitution. Very few people vote in White Earth elections since, on the whole, the governments have traditionally been powerless to deal with major problems, and interest in elections is consequently difficult to generate. Since few vote, a majority is not difficult to obtain. As each major kin group may form the basis for a faction, perhaps in alliance with another kin group, each village and the reservation as a whole are potentially divided into as many parties as there are kin groups, and the principle of "divide and conquer" is implicit in the system. An individual from a large kin group, who may be allied by marriage or patronage to some other group, is in a favorable starting position.

Of the five RBC members, two are related as aunt and niece. Three live in predominantly white communities adjacent to the reservation. Four are of higher than average economic status, and live in houses with all modern conveniences. Four are members of large kin groups. Three are women, two of whom are married to whites. Other characteristics could be listed, but these are sufficient to indicate the ways in which they are "different." It would be incorrect, however, to assert that because they have adapted more successfully than most to the white man's society, they have lost their Ojibwa cultural identification. They decidedly have not, but just as decidedly they are atypical, in fundamental life style, and cannot be said to fully "represent" the people.

Tentative analysis has been made of kin relationships of the CAP staff and RBC, by one of the researchers and by OEO. The findings of the latter resulted in a request that two members of the RBC staff resign, or that certain close relatives resign from the CAP staff. One report indicates that almost 20% of the 109 CAP employees (as of mid-July 1966) were related to members of the RBC. The number is, of course, far smaller if one considers only individuals living in the same household. The number increases as one includes those in other households—siblings, nephews, nieces, first cousins, etc. As the closeness of relationship decreases more RBC and CAP employed individuals are found to be related—as is to be expected in a relatively small intermarrying population. A breakdown of relationships, and testing by statistical methods for significance, would be desirable to indicate the full significance of kinship on hiring practices. On the basis of a variety of specific cases and from statements by RBC members, however, it is clear that many were hired because of close relationship and the desire to help a relative.

The most important consequence of nepotism does not have to do with the ability of the individuals to perform specific jobs. The important consequence of actual nepotism is that credence is given to the suspicion of nepotism, confidence in the RBC and the CAP is undermined, and the CAP is seen as controlled by individuals who do not have the good of the reservation in mind.

OEO-CAP Memorandum 23, dated 3 March 1966, prohibits employment by CAP of any member of the family of the legally constituted governing body, meaning in the case of White Earth, the RBC. The most recent interpretation of the term "family" indicates that the nuclear family residing in a single household is meant.

Hiring practices of the CAP should also be briefly considered at this point. Initially the CAPCom made recommendations to the RBC for hiring. The CAPCom consisted of members from all communities, including representatives of the poor who knew the applicants from their communities and discussed them in terms of need, qualification and personal characteristics before making recommendations. This was one of their most important functions. In March 1966 the RBC established a sub-committee consisting of the CAPCom Chairman, the CAP Director and the RBC Chairman, as a screening board to make recommendations to the RBC for hiring. One of the most important functions of the CAPCom was, unwittingly, surrendered. At approximately the same time the RBC appointed two whites to sit with it as the "legal governing body" of the CAP, since OEO wanted the white population included in the CAP representation. Neither of the two appointed has been articulate on any question, although they are "rural poor" and could potentially influence decisions. Throughout the existence of CAP, the RBC has clearly and repeatedly articulated that it is the legal governing body, that others can only give advice, and that only the RBC makes decisions. This position was publicly upheld by an OEO Indian CAP

analyst at a meeting in Bemidji in April 1966, effectively reducing the potential influence of the CAPComs and the CAP Staffs.

(3) *Communication Problems.*—The importance of effectively communicating with the "poor" Indian population was generally recognized among the CAP staff as a major problem if an effective CAP were to develop. Instruments for communication included the membership of the CAPCom, a weekly newsletter, community meetings for particular occasions, and, presumably, dissemination of information through CAP employees. Notices were posted in stores, post offices, and other places.

While almost everyone at White Earth village knew of CAP or some of its programs, the same was not true of the other villages. At Pine Point, for example, many did not know of the existence of CAP, a number did not know of the Recreational program, and very few know of the Study Hall or Remedial Reading as part of the CAP. The CAP Social Worker was rarely in Pine Point, and seldom for any length of time, the Social Work component was scarcely known. Visits of the CAP Administrative staff were few and ineffective. The situation at Rice Lake was slightly better. Naytahwaush and White Earth, especially the latter, as the center of the CAP Administration, were best informed about CAP and its activities.

It can be argued that sufficient information was distributed so that anyone interested in the program could readily learn of any activity or job vacancy. However, this overlooks certain problems of communication, and the attempt to develop interest in the CAP.

Many of the "poor" from the "west side" of White Earth, for example, do not frequently visit the center of the village when weather is bad. Many are marginally literate and do not notice the posters, and, for this group, reading is not a habit. Association with people from other parts of the village, unless they are kinsmen, is limited, so that discussions in which the knowledge of many people is disseminated are rare. For the "poor" conversations are likely to be with others with similar characteristics. In a society in which personal relationships are the only important ones, impersonal communication naturally has limited results.

What is required is personal contact with the poor. This contact must not be solely through aides selected from the poor, as in Community Worker components, but by responsible members of the CAP Administration. Indiscriminate contact with the poor is too time-consuming to be productive, but long-term repeated contact with informal opinion leaders among the poor may be extremely significant. The contact must be on the "home ground" of these opinion leaders—CAP administrators must come to them. Summoning the poor to a meeting in the formal atmosphere of a school does not provide an environment in which the poor are comfortable; it can only be rationalized as administratively convenient for contacting the largest number of people, regardless of significance. Significant communication with the elements in question cannot be accomplished without time and effort. Personal relationships must be established between the administrative staff and key members of the local communities.

If the school auditorium provides an environment of unease to many Ojibwa, it is also important to recognize the implicit symbolism of many of the appurtenances of official life. An interview or discussion with a man behind a desk, dressed in the expensive symbols of middle class, in a building symbolic of impersonal and unrepresentative government, present preliminary obstacles that make many of the "poor" exceedingly reluctant to make contact.

In passing, it may be noted that the amount of communication of all forms between CAP and the population has decreased, especially since the resignation of the VISTA girls. The newsletter was temporarily suspended, but eventually reinstituted, smaller and less informative. The social workers had, at the same time, virtually ceased to have contact with the people, except through aides and in public gatherings. It is duly noted that the increasing amount of paperwork and other administrative routine left little time for the Director to mingle with the poor in the communities, and the social workers were apparently needed to help in administration. With the increased administrative staff, which now includes three assistant directors, increased communication may be possible.

(4) *Inadequacy of the Staff.*—Complaints concerning inadequate training, lack of work, absenteeism, irresponsibility, and even drunkenness on the job were encountered. This combination of complaints was rarely focused on any one individual, of course; some complaints were widespread, but there was also recognition that most people employed were attempting to do a good job.

A sample of these complaints may be considered. The former Director was highly regarded by almost everyone, and was considered to be doing a good job, though "limited by the RBC." It was considered that he was a recent college graduate without managerial experience, but a person who could learn rapidly. There were complaints that the professional staff was overpaid, but the complaint was directed to the Government rather than the individuals. The Recreation Director was regarded as a good person, but lacking in training and experience for leading a large-scale recreational program. There were complaints that he did not adequately supervise his staff, particularly at the outlying villages. There appears some justification for this complaint, but weather conditions and distances are mitigating factors. There is also a great reluctance among many Ojibwa (and other Indians) to set themselves over others, to criticize, or to give orders, and sanctions are likely to be invoked against those who do.

The Director of the Study Halls was unknown to most people, but the aides were often charged with not enforcing quiet and discipline. The complaints were undoubtedly justified, and have their base in lack of training and of clear-cut roles, as well as the prevalent attitude of permissiveness toward children. The complaints were apparently recognized by CAP, since in the second year of the program certified teachers will be in charge of the study halls. There were no complaints about the Remedial Reading staff, teachers assisted by aides operating within the various school systems.

Several aides, particularly in the outlying villages, were said to devote little time to their jobs, and a few were said to have been drunk while on the job, providing a bad example to the children. Partly, such cases were due to inadequate supervision, for reasons indicated earlier, and partly to the fact that many of the individuals employed as aides were known "risks" who were being given the opportunities to "improve themselves." Moreover, their job descriptions were often extremely obscure.

More widespread were complaints of inadequate training. It is true that aides were not the products of advanced educational institutions, and that their entire training was obtained on-the-job or in training programs under the auspices of the Consortium branch at the University of South Dakota. Lack of time, administrative responsibilities, and weather and distance, are factors preventing intensive training—to which can be added, in varying degrees, questions of the ability of the staff to provide the necessary training to people with culturally different backgrounds. Training sessions under the auspices of the Consortium were of little, if any, value. No aides who had attended such sessions were able to say that they had learned anything of value. One researcher concluded that training was, in the understanding of the Vermillion branch, the same as attendance, and that no attempts had been made to evaluate the training programs.

It must be emphasized that the complaints came from people who were aware of CAP and the relation of the particular programs to the organization. There were many, especially in the outlying communities, who were unaware of the programs, and had no complaints. It must also be emphasized that although there were specific complaints, such as noted above, there was also recognition that many individuals performed effectively and honestly, and that steady employment was helping many families in a variety of ways—including development of self-respect, punctuality, responsibility, etc. The programs themselves were regarded as good, although in need of improvement in varying degrees.

e. Views of CAP by Selected Observers

(1) *CAP as Seen by the CAP Staff.*—Since the CAP is staffed by individuals with differing backgrounds, it is natural that they see the role of CAP differently, especially in view of the apparently changing goals of OEO. Some general comments may be made, however, as of the time of field research, bearing in mind that in July 1966 the administrative staff had changed drastically with the appointment of a new Director and three assistant directors.

The original view of the senior professional staff corresponded to the publicly articulated program of OEO. The administrative staff members were concerned to involve the community in the planning and operation of the CAP, to disseminate information as widely as possible, and to have a program genuinely representative of community needs—within, of course, the limits of the law. This attitude continued, but the winter of 1965-66 saw a decline in enthusiasm. Gradually the CAP staff view began to shift to the position that OEO programs had definite limitations, and that the early promise of programs as needed and

wanted by the communities were to be restricted to a set of approved components considered by Washington as "good for the Indians."

Increasing organization of office work was demanded if payrolls and reports were to be completed on time and if an expanded program were to be developed. This efficient organization of the CAP office occurred, but little time was left for the administrative staff to develop contacts necessary in the community for an effective current program. Increasingly, the administrative staff has become administration-minded. People are ceasing to be people, and instead they are becoming "personnel." The people are considered less as individuals or groups with which CAP works, and more as a population aggregate to which CAP provides services that CAP has available for them. The process of dealing impersonally with a highly personal society has gone a long way, and without conscious recognition.

The transformation of people into personnel was a consequence not only of the necessity for developing routines for accomplishment of official requirements, but also of changes in the context of the CAP aside from limitations imposed by Washington. Primarily this had to do with developing predominance of the RBC and the declining significance of the CAPCom. Another factor may have been a natural decline in the "revolutionary fervor" that often is present in a new situation, but disappears as activities become routine.

The sub-professional staff of the CAP tended, almost invariably, to think of themselves as paid employees rather than participants. A few aides became interested and articulate, but were regarded as "uppity" by the poor and at least one member of the RBC—the latter of sufficient power to develop a deep sense of job insecurity in the aides in question. On the whole, the sub-professionals view themselves as employees, fortunate to have steady employment but scarcely believing the program will continue indefinitely, fearful of offending the powers of the reservation, and insecure because of the poorly defined roles associated with many of their jobs. The involvement that was once emphasized became a source of anxiety.

Interestingly, too, first the RBC, and later OEO, indicated that political activity was not to be countenanced. Some of the aides represented potential leadership and force for change, in a community where both are lacking. Yet they were discouraged and even prohibited from playing the part that is (or was) the goal of the Economic Opportunity Act.

(2) *CAP as Seen by the CAP Advisory Committee.*—During the summer of 1965 the CAPCom met regularly and attendance and interest were high. Membership included representation of the major agencies and institutions locally concerned with the anti-poverty program, businessmen, farmers, and officials who could provide valuable advice, and representation of the poor—Indian and white. This desirable condition continued well into the winter of 1965-66, limited primarily by the exigencies of one of the coldest winters in White Earth history. Interest in the CAPCom was indicated by efforts to provide mileage payments to those, especially the poor, who had to travel substantial distances at their own expense. In the spring, the CAP Director had supplied all members with the *CAP Guide* and other documents valuable for understanding the program and helpful in stimulating advice and maintaining interest. During this period, a major complaint was that the poorest members of the CAPCom were least interested, as indicated by poor attendance at meetings.

The CAPCom was informed at its periodic meetings of the progress of CAP and reports were given of monthly operation of the components. When job vacancies existed, the CAPCom acted as a screening committee, making recommendations to the RBC. The latter group made it clear that as the legal governing board, it had sole responsibility for making decisions, however, and that the CAPCom was purely advisory. In mid-winter a decision was made to have a special screening board make hiring recommendations, removing this responsibility from the CAPCom. It was not recognized, until too late, that a major function had been removed, and the removal led to a rapid decline in concern on the part of the CAPCom members. Attendance at meetings began to decline, and it is understood that all meetings ceased by the summer of 1966.

(3) *CAP as Seen by the RBC.*—The initial proposals for the CAP were developed by the RBC in cooperation with a representative of the Minnesota Agency of the BIA, and it was the RBC that was accepted as the legal Community Action Agency (CAA). It was constitutionally the responsibility of the RBC to work for the welfare of the reservation, and constitutionally it was responsible for reservation-wide programs. The RBC was responsible for hiring the administra-

tive staff, and later the aides, for the CAP. It was also ultimately responsible for the operation of the program. It is not surprising, then, that the RBC views itself as the maker of final decisions, regarding which other groups and individuals can only provide advice.

Although the RBC and its predecessor organization had been in existence for more than a generation, it had few significant responsibilities and less authority. The tribal and reservation councils were "powerless politicians." While the RBC had no actual experience in the management of major problems, it was the constitutional entity to which responsibility had to be entrusted. It was a government of some kind, even though lacking the functions and authority of government. With the passage of the EOA, establishment of OEO, and the development of Indian CAPs, the RBC was given both functions and authority. It is hardly expected that the RBC would be able to operate a large-scale and complex program with the efficiency of an experienced body. As a Government official said, they are being given the opportunity to learn by their own mistakes.

Some reservation members and observers have commented upon the extent to which the RBC is concerned, almost obsessed, with the necessity of controlling the CAP. It has been noted that with reference to the CAPCom, the RBC repeatedly asserted that only the RBC had the power to make decisions; to the CAP Administrative staff it was made clear that the RBC made decisions and that the staff was responsible to it. Some residents and observers believed that the CAP professionals had lost all autonomy and were manipulated and directed by the RBC, particularly by the Chairman, and the staff would do nothing to antagonize the RBC or arouse its hostility. The power of peremptory dismissal without appeal was regarded as a potent weapon to ensure conformity.

Much of the criticism of the RBC may be based upon attitudes of suspicion, fear, and distrust noted earlier. Certainly prior to inception of the CAP, as well as later, present and past members of the RBC and TEC were aware of unremitting criticism and suspicion. While this background may to some degree account for the present situation, it is an insufficient explanation. The senior researcher at White Earth believes that while the RBC is genuinely concerned with the welfare of the reservation, it is caught in a conflict of values. The RBC Chairman, particularly, appears to working honestly and conscientiously, but he is now responsible for a major program that provides him with great anxiety, which in turn prevents delegation of authority.

The conflict of values is exemplified in the problem of nepotism, the obligation to assist kinsmen as opposed to responsibility to the entire reservation population. Conflict of personal versus impersonal relationships is also present. It may be seen in the RBC suspicion of the professional staff, in the developing, impersonal bureaucracy of the CAP, and in the fear of the program "getting out of control."

A concern about outside interference in the reservation CAP is also clear. When OEO insisted that whites be represented on the governing body, the RBC appointed two individuals—one a white resident married to an Ojibwa woman, the other a county commissioner—who have yet to voice objections to anything proposed.

In summary, one may say that the RBC members think of the CAP as "their program," rather than the reservation's; that it is their responsibility to dispense the benefits of the program, especially jobs; that some, perhaps all, are anxious about continuation of the CAP, and fearful of someone, "upsetting the apple cart"; and that they are suspicious of someone attempting to assume control over "their program." The concepts of community organization and community action are not comprehended by them, nor are they interested in such developments—other than in the context of a possible fear that trouble-makers will be hired.

(4) *CAP as Seen by Local Whites.*—The White Earth CAP has responsibility for a substantial white population residing within the original limits of the reservation. The RBC, when acting as CAA, added two whites to represent the poor of the white resident population, as noted above, and the CAPCom had many whites as members, including a number to represent the poor whites. In fact, the white population potentially to be served by the CAP is probably larger than the Ojibwa population. While the rural whites are, relative to the Ojibwa, of higher economic and educational levels, the proportion of "poor" is high in comparison to national standards.

Little mention has been made of CAP vis-a-vis the whites—not because of oversight, but because they are rarely thought of by the Ojibwa. The CAP was established by the RBC for the Indian population, without essential thought of

white residents in the area. The Recreational programs, Study Halls, and Social Work projects were designed, proposed, and approved in terms of their value to the Ojibwa rather than to the poor rural whites. It is true, however, with Medicare Alert and new components, such as the beautification program under the Nelson Amendment, that a reasonable number of whites are being employed as aides. There is another CAP, embracing Mahnomen, Hubbard, and Becker counties (the Mahube CAP), however, surrounding and interpenetrating White Earth, which may give necessary consideration to programs for the poor rural whites.

Insofar as whites within the reservation are concerned, it is noteworthy that they form a population, if not community, separate and distinct from the Ojibwa. With some exceptions, the overlap of these neighboring groups is extremely limited. While residing in the same territory, they form separate social systems.

The white poor of the farms, small villages and towns, as well as those interested in their problems, were sometimes antagonistic to the Ojibwa as a consequence of the CAP. They expressed the belief that the Federal Government was discriminating against the whites, or expressing bias in favor of the Indians. Other whites protested that this was another Government "hand out" program that would continue to keep the Indians in a state of dependency, prevent their assimilation, discourage self-reliance, and otherwise be of no long-term value.

Research among the whites indicated widespread ignorance of the Indian population, even among those relatively well educated, with various official responsibilities for Indian affairs. An official of one school system, in which many Ojibwa attend high school, professed the belief that truancy was common because the children were needed to help with household and farm chores. Concerned as an educator with "educating the whole child," he was under the impression that the Ojibwa were farmers. The existence of a separate social system with a different set of values is almost completely unsuspected.

Widespread prejudice against the Ojibwa, or Indians in general, was revealed by the research. Actual discrimination was much less common or was less overt, but exists. Information on prejudice and discrimination against the Minnesota Indian population has been accumulated over the years by the Governor's Human Rights Commission and other state agencies, and in more recent years by the Minnesota Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. It is sufficient here to note that it is widespread. It is also proper to note that while there is prejudice against Indians in general, Indians who behave in approved middle class fashion find fairly easy acceptance. Anti-Indian prejudice is much less deep in this area than anti-Negro prejudice.

What is important to the success of CAP in the long run, is not only the extent of actual prejudice and discrimination against Indians, but the beliefs of the Indians themselves about white attitudes. It is a common belief among the Minnesota Ojibwa that the whites discriminate against them in many areas. Complaints have been filed with appropriate state agencies concerning discrimination in employment, hospitals, housing, law enforcement, and education. The belief is common that the Indian has little chance, and, whether the belief is based on fact or fancy, it poses a psychological and social block to attempted participation in white society. Each instance of discrimination encountered reinforces the belief or fear.

One example may suffice. When the White Earth children complete elementary school in their own villages, they move to high schools in predominantly white communities, ten to twenty-five miles from home. Here most have their first long-term associations with whites. The Indian children enter with several cultural disadvantages. Because of their upbringing, they are less competitive; by virtue of different values learned at home, they place less emphasis on education; because of less than adequate reservation schools, they enter with academic backgrounds inferior to the average white student; thanks to genetics, they look different; because of poverty, most are poorly dressed. The consequent reactions of the white students are often humiliating to the Indian children and, when added to academic difficulties, result in a high drop-out rate. If a Head Start program is desirable here for those entering elementary school, a similar program would seem of unquestionable value as preparation for high school.

(5) *CAP as Seen by the School System.*—Representatives of the school systems attended by students graduating from the White Earth schools were interviewed by one of the researchers. In general, considerable ignorance of reservation life was revealed, but several of the principals and superintendents were reasonably

conversant with the problems posed in education and were sympathetic to the Ojibwa students. A general attitude expressed was that education was the means for "uplifting" the Indians and bringing about assimilation and the end of the reservation, although not all were equally certain that this would occur in the foreseeable future.

Another common attitude held by several educators was that "there isn't much you can do with the Indians," or "it will take generations to change them." Some considered the Indians to be, with some exceptions, uneducable, and based this position on the fact that the educational system had succeeded with very few over a period of many generations. The senior researcher at White Earth suggests that this position is an apologia for "the system" and justification for failing to come to grips with the problem of providing necessary conditions and programs for the students in question. The educators holding this position were, not coincidentally, those who knew the Indian communities and families the least. If successful education at the elementary and secondary levels requires considering each student as an individual, these educators may themselves be a major reason for failure to adapt the system to the local needs.

The CAP programs were, on the whole, viewed as desirable by the educators. There is common recognition that the Indian student is considerably behind his white peers when he enters high school—particularly in reading, writing, and arithmetic. The disadvantage is critical at this point and is probably a major factor in influencing the drop-out rate. Since the major effort of the CAP was directed to improvement of education through the Remedial Education, Study Hall, and Social Work components, and the Recreation component was designed to remedy a deficiency in extra-curricular activities, the approval of the educators was to be expected.

Some educators regarded the existing programs as inadequate, citing a need for improvement in the family and local situations from which the students came. This was sometimes combined with a view that contributing to solution of background problems would contribute to dependency.

(6) *CAP as Seen by the BIA.*—The BIA (Minnesota Agency, Bemidji) was of great assistance in developing the Minnesota Indian CAPs. An official was detailed to work with the RBCs in developing programs that would meet the needs of the population as expressed through the RBCs, groups, and individuals. Meetings were conducted in collaboration with the RBCs at various points on the reservations to obtain views on what was needed. At the end of this phase, the BIA representative assisted the RBCs in drawing up formal proposals for submission to OEO. When these were returned with the newly developed forms, the BIA representative assisted the RBCs in their preparation. When action on the Minnesota Indian CAP proposals was stalemated in Washington, the BIA representative accompanied the tribal President and Treasurer to Washington to assist in the final steps needed for approval. After formal approval of the CAPs, the BIA assisted the various RBCs in locating potential CAP directors and staff.

At this point the BIA withdrew as an active agent in the CAPs. The BIA position had been one of assisting in development to the point that the CAPs were operational, at which point they left the RBCs in complete charge. The BIA believed in the necessity of Indian operation and responsibility, and did not choose to be accused of paternalism or interference. BIA officials, however, made it clear that they were ready and willing to provide any assistance possible at the request of the CAP staff or RBC.

The BIA Minnesota Agency is located approximately one hundred miles from White Earth village, so that visits by BIA officials are made only for specific purposes or on request from the RBC or other groups of officials. The BIA has supplied the CAP with census and other data, and is currently cooperating in the development of the Building Skills component and the proposed construction of housing.

The relationship of BIA and CAP is cordial and cooperative, within the limits imposed by distance and policies. Several of the BIA officials believed that the CAP offers the best opportunity for the improvement of Indian conditions, and expressed hopes that the RBCs and CAPs would take advantage of all aspects possible.

There is a tendency on the part of a number of individuals to maintain a social distance between the BIA and CAP, indicating hostility to the BIA, which is unfortunately blamed for many Indian problems for which it has had little or no responsibility. To the extent that CAP staffs do not utilize the available information and resources of the BIA they reduce the possibility for the betterment of Indian conditions.

(7) *CAP as Seen by PHS.*—The Indian Health Division (IHD) of the PHS maintains an out-patient clinic at White Earth village, and traveling clinics at Pine Point and Naytahwaush, staffed by a physician, dentist, administrator, and other necessary staff members. The local officials are pleased with the CAP and its components, and have an easy cooperative relationship with the CAP staff, housed across the street. Members of each group meet with the other to explain programs and policies, and assistance is given wherever possible.

The PHS provides medical and dental examinations for children in the CAP-sponsored Head Start program, and periodic examinations for all Ojibwa reservation school children. Medical and dental services are supplied through the clinic when possible, or the costs of hospitalization elsewhere are borne by the PHS. It might be noted in passing that some whites have resented the services given to the Indians as a privileged group, and several schools will not permit the PHS to provide examinations in the schools.

The developing primary concern of the PHS is in preventive medicine, and educational programs are maintained in collaboration with the CAP. The PHS, under the Indian Sanitation Act, attempts within the limits of Federal appropriations for this purpose, to provide community water systems and sanitary equipment in conjunction with the community councils. So far, water systems have been installed in the villages of Naytahwaush and Rice Lake, and will eventually be installed in White Earth and Pine Point. Water supplies are of great importance as the major health problems involve communicable diseases of the respiratory and intestinal tracts that would be greatly reduced by good sanitation systems in each household.

Housing is a major factor in the health situation of the community, and the PHS will be involved in provision of water and sanitary systems when public housing projects are developed. The PHS regional office is one of the agencies that will be involved in the Building Skills component.

In the view of the PHS Administrator, the major problem facing the community is obtaining cooperation in the development and support of projects for the community. He pointed to the cooperation at Naytahwaush and Rice Lake, in which community councils obtained data and cooperation from the villagers in developing a workable plan for the village water and sanitation systems. White Earth village was slow in obtaining cooperation, and will be a year or two later than the others in obtaining a water system, although perhaps in greater need of such a system. Many stories circulate in White Earth village concerning the priorities in the installation of water systems. Basically, the stories concern discrimination against the village, the cupidity or influence of various people, etc.

(8) *CAP as Seen by Welfare Departments.*—In view of the large Indian population receiving welfare assistance, it is to be expected that the welfare officials will have strong views on the Indian CAPs. Welfare costs have been a major problem in several counties responsible for the White Earth Ojibwa, since these are the very counties with the weakest tax base—little industry, marginal farming, and large areas of non-taxable land. Reimbursement for Indian welfare is provided by the State, and ultimately the Federal Government, but there are red-tape problems associated with it, and on several occasions in recent years there was a strong possibility that full reimbursement would not be forthcoming.

If the Indians are a problem to the welfare department, the converse is equally true. There is a widespread belief that the counties provide smaller amounts for living expenses to Indians than to whites, and that Indians are poorly treated, often humiliated, when applying for financial assistance. Complaints have been made on several occasions to the Governor's Human Rights Commission, and to other agencies, resulting in investigations. The results of the investigations, if any, have not been made known. It is common for one of the RBC members or one of the informal community leaders to accompany an applicant to the welfare office. The escort is believed to be helpful, and, in any case, is more articulate and provides a feeling of security.

The CAP program was, at the time of research, limited to four components. The response to it by welfare directors was varied. One expressed confidence in the achievement of the long-term goals of OEO, and was prepared to be cooperative if possible. Another expressed the view that the program would be relatively futile, and probably a further contribution to Indian dependency.

A fear was expressed by one that involvement of the Indians in CAP would have the consequence of arousing interest in other phases of public life, and that more people would become aware of possible welfare programs. This, it was

believed, would lead to higher welfare costs. The comment was made by one with little confidence in the Indians or in the CAP.

(9) *CAP as Seen by VISTA*.—The Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA) program was inaugurated in White Earth village a few months before CAP became operational. Two VISTA girls were stationed at White Earth, and later one each was located at Naytahwaush and Rice Lake. The VISTAs at White Earth promptly combined forces with the CAP, publishing a weekly newsletter pertaining to CAP and reservation affairs, assisting in surveys, maintaining communication with the population, etc. With the continuing development of the CAP, they saw their functions largely taken over by regular staff members and, unable to develop adequate roles in the new situation, resigned. It is the researchers' opinion that they performed a valuable function through their independence from any organization and the flexibility in relationships with many elements of the population. A major problem facing this, and other, CAPs is the responsibility for routine operations and emergencies, leaving the administrative staff too little time to associate meaningfully with the "ordinary people," who are always those most easily forgotten. The VISTAs, with no defined roles or organizational associations, were in an excellent position to know the community and the individuals, to hear reactions, expressions of dissatisfaction, and words of approval. In this sense they could have been of great value to the CAP.

The VISTAs at Naytahwaush and Rice Lake were nominally under the control of the RBC and under supervision by the CAP. The Naytahwaush VISTA worked primarily as counsellor to Indian students in the Mahnommen high school, and engaged in a variety of activities with the local children and youth. The VISTA in the more isolated and far flung Rice Lake Community occupied herself with local people, greatly restricted by the weather, the distances between homes, and the lack of a car. Both VISTAs were extremely negative to the VISTA program: training had been inadequate and concerned with survival in hot desert weather, Indians of the Southwest, etc. While VISTA girls were always to be in teams of two or more, the policy was ignored with them. Agreements to provide funds for housing were not forthcoming, causing very considerable embarrassment. Cars for transportation in an area where everything is at least twenty-five miles away were promised, but were never received. Advice for problems arising in the field were requested on numerous occasions, but no acknowledgement, other than an impersonal printed postcard, was forthcoming. Both resigned during the summer, in complete disgust with the VISTA program. The dissatisfaction with VISTA field support was shared by the VISTAs who had been at White Earth village.

Several of the VISTAs were interviewed in the course of research, and their evaluations of the CAP obtained. In general, they were favorable to the program, though occasionally critical of certain administrative staff members and the RBC.

The educational programs of the CAP were regarded as useful, although the Study Hall was a conspicuous failure. The Remedial Reading program was regarded as excellent. The Recreational program was in extensive need of a greater range of activities, and closer supervision of personnel. The Social Work program relied too heavily on untrained aides, and was primarily a referral service of limited value.

Considering the program as a whole, the CAP has not yet come to grips with the major problems of the reservation, and cannot do so. The major problems have to do with employment opportunities that will give meaningful lives to the people, and provide stable families with self-respecting adults as models for the young. The development of a sense of community is also highly desirable or necessary for the future, to override the kin groups and factions that are major divisive forces. Housing is at various levels inadequacy, and some of it is unbelievably bad.

There was general agreement that the CAP had failed to reach large numbers of the White Earth Ojibwa, especially those who were poor and on the outskirts of the villages. Among those in these areas who knew of the program, the CAP was not regarded as their program, but as controlled by the RBC. More attention to communication with the population at large was strongly recommended.

One former VISTA, returning after an absence of six months, said that little had changed—a few people were better dressed, but the community had not changed.

(10) *CAP and the Consortium at Vermillion.*—The branch of the Consortium at the University of South Dakota in Vermillion, generally referred to as "Vermillion," has numerous contacts with the Indian CAPs. The Consortium was established to provide technical assistance and training at the request of the CAPs. All evidence indicates, however, that it has assumed the role of an area office for the Indian CAPs, thus breaking the direct line between the CAPs and the OEO Indian Desk in Washington, generally considered one of the best aspects of OEO management. Moreover, as an area office, there is evidence to indicate that it discourages innovation on the part of CAPs, implying that only "canned components" are available.

Consortium specialists occasionally visit the White Earth CAP and provide training sessions for various categories of aides and other staff members at the University campus or at Minnesota State College in Bemidji. The extent to which some of these specialists have relevant qualifications is open to question, however, and project researchers did not find abundant evidence of the high value of visits by Consortium staff members to the reservation CAP, except that such display of interest contributed to good morale. There was no indication that specific programs (e.g., Remedial Education) were given specialized help or notably pertinent recommendations.

A number of training sessions were held in Vermillion and Bemidji. One such session, concerned with administrative records, was said to have had rather substantial value. The Social Work aides who visited Vermillion stated that the training sessions were valuable, though unable to say in what way. Recreation component aides who attended a training session at Bemidji could not say that they had learned a great deal or how their training was pertinent, though they did find the trip to Bemidji useful.

Evidence from several reservations indicates that the Vermillion branch of the Consortium makes no attempt to evaluate the training, nor has awareness of the specific types of problems existing among the different tribes. "Training" is apparently equated with "attendance" in some instances.

Observation of the reservation situation leads to the conclusion that the Vermillion group is well regarded by some who have had training under its auspices, but at White Earth it has not been possible to fully establish the practical results of attendance at such training sessions.

f. Summary

The CAP and its evolution at White Earth may be briefly reviewed in terms of reservation problems, accomplishments, and organization.

Three major problems may be seen as encompassing the variety of major and minor issues that face the Ojibwa of White Earth:

1. Jobs for adults on or near the reservation. Employment opportunities for the poorly educated and unskilled are very limited. This also applies to the white population, which also suffers from under-employment.

2. Preparation—i.e., education, training, motivation, and development of qualifications for skilled employment.

3. The development of community organization or cooperation on the village and reservation levels.

In connection with the foregoing problems, the components of the original CAP were oriented toward the educational preparation of the young through Social Work, Remedial Reading, Study Halls, Recreation, and the related Head Start program. The components originally proposed were conceived and developed under pressures to meet a predetermined deadline which limited consideration of all possibilities and prevented consultation and deliberation with all elements of the reservation population and other interested parties. The proposals for the second year benefitted from a somewhat longer period for consultation and deliberation, as well as from a better knowledge of the limitations of law and administration. The later proposals continued emphasis on the educational preparation of the young, but considered the needs and wishes of the adult Ojibwa, now given attention in such varied components as the High School Equivalency, Beautification (i.e., Nelson Amendment), Building Skills, and others.

The operational components of the past year have met with varying degrees of success. Evidence indicates that the Remedial Reading component was most successful, proof of which should ultimately be seen in the successful completion of high school by a greater number of Ojibwa children. The Recreational program was successful within limits, but needs diversification to provide more activities for different groups and both sexes, and also would benefit from improved training and supervision of the aides. The Study Hall program was largely

unsuccessful, but the lesson learned indicates a high probability of success in the forthcoming year of operation. The Social Work program was also largely unsuccessful, if viewed as intensive and successful casework or as oriented toward community organization, exceedingly difficult at White Earth. Administration was highly competent, with good organization of routine activities. The burden of administrative requirements, however, often of questionable value, left the administrative staff with too little time to be effectively involved in the community.

It was noted that the most successful components were those that traditionally operate as a part of the educational system. Such components could readily be transferred to the jurisdiction of the school system, leading the CAP staff more time to deal with other essential problems.

The various opportunities offered for employment of the unskilled or poor have been of limited value. People have been employed, and have therefore had more money, but most of the activities associated with the jobs have had poor role definition, with consequent confusion, and/or little relevance to earning a living in private or other public employment. They are, indeed, popularly and correctly considered "make-work jobs," of less long-term value than those provided by the WPA of depression days. The stimulation of interest in community activity has largely been inhibited by fears, only in part justified, or retaliatory measures that may be taken by the RBC, and now by OEO prohibitions upon undefined "political activity" by CAP employees. Moreover, the jobs are themselves considered fortuitous and of short-term duration, as there is little expectation that the OEO program will be maintained indefinitely.

The major problem of provision of "real" jobs within commuting range of the reservation communities cannot be met by CAP alone. The component of probable long-term value in this respect, the Building Skills component, involves the cooperation of a number of Federal agencies, but "problems of coordination" have prevented this component from becoming a reality, so far. The CAP is the only mechanism by which the Ojibwa of White Earth can obtain the cooperation of the agencies that can, in the long run, provide an economic base for a society that has had none since the expropriation of their lands. If the CAP staff continues to be inundated with paperwork, major tasks are not likely to be accomplished.

If the programs directed toward the education of the young are successful, they will continue to stimulate the migration of the educated and the skilled from the reservation, unless employment opportunities can be brought there or nearby. If this major problem is not solved, a continuation of the relative leadership vacuum can be expected to continue, and the poverty of the reservation area will be unrelieved.

The solution of the major problem of lack of employment opportunities will require the cooperation of many Federal agencies, as noted above. The problem will be even closer to solution if the cooperation of private business and industry can be enlisted. To bring about this cooperation will require aggressive and intelligent leadership, and highly competent technical assistance. The proliferation of Government agencies will require technical advisors with an unusual degree of competence and understanding of programs and legal limitations.

An additional set of problems is posed by the lack of nearby employment possibilities of known availability. The educational system to which many of the CAP programs are oriented depends upon the motivation of the student. If the rewards are not obvious, or involve conflicts in values when departure from the reservation is necessary, the motivation may be inadequate. One thinks of the analogy of the rabbit and carrot—if the carrot is too far away to be seen or smelled, it will not be chased. Without parental employment, the father may be an inadequate figure for purposes of identity. This problem is, however, different from that of the urban slum, for the values by which a man is judged are different. If he is a good hunter or fisherman, for example, he may still be important in a positive sense, even though unemployed. To these problems may be added the peculiar form of "alcoholism," if that is even an appropriate term, that is a symptom of frustration, hostility, or withdrawal from harsh realities.

The problem of developing community organization or cooperation is one that has many obstacles, particularly among the Ojibwa. The "atomistic" social structure, the associated kin groups of various sizes, and the lack of established village governments are linked with attitudes of fear, suspicion, and hostility to individuals and groups, internal and external to the society. The hostility expressed about the successful and the different, and the consequent distaste for positions of authority limits the number who can and will "work for the com-

munity." Since little in the past was within the capacity of the villages or reservations to accomplish, patterns of behavior pertinent to intra- and inter-village cooperation have not had occasion to develop. One also questions whether community organization is a prerequisite to, or a result of, action that accomplishes specific goals.

The political system is obviously relevant to community organization or cooperation. The fragmentation of the villages into kin groups and factions tends, together with the attitudes noted above, to limit political interest and activity, and to permit the election of "representatives" with extremely small voting strength, especially as this combined with a general apathy to politics based upon the longstanding limitations of the reservation system. It can be alleged that the RBC is not representative of the population, and it can readily be argued that the allegation is at least partly correct. The number and types that stand for public office are limited, and tend strongly to be those who are articulate and capable of negotiating with the world beyond the reservation. RBC membership does not represent, on the whole, the internal values and social system of the reservation.

The CAP was initiated by the RBC, and was later advised by the CAPCom. The CAPCom did not at any time have distinct functions delegated to it, and its informal role proved abortive. CAPCom has since withered away, and is probably beyond resuscitation. If CAPCom were viewed as part of a system of checks and balances, the other elements of which were the RBC and CAP staff, the system was broken with the loss of any effective CAPCom function. The CAP professional and sub-professional staff has continuously lost autonomy and has become increasingly subject to detailed control by the RBC, a system that may change as the increasing administrative complexity makes the CAP incomprehensible to the community and RBC.


The CAP has failed to "involve the community," and the members of the community do not think of CAP as their program. Responsibility for this situation lies beyond the CAP. To involve the community requires the solution to many problems of community organization noted earlier. The conflict in values that led to extensive charges and a widespread belief in the practice of nepotism on the part of the RBC was a major source of alienation. The lack of involvement to a sufficient degree of enough members of the different kin groups and villages in the development of the old and new proposals reinforced this attitude. The lack of contact between senior members of the CAP (and the RBC), or impersonal meetings held in the impersonal buildings of the government system, led to similar results. The lack of power of the CAPCom, and its demise, lead the observer to suggest that a well chosen, representative CAPCom with definite responsibilities and authority could be an effective link with the public.


A lyrical evaluation of the White Earth CAP (to the tune of "There is Nothing Like a Dame") was composed by an anonymous former CAP staff member. It is worth quoting in full as a peculiarly appropriate summation of this Summary on White Earth.

There is nothing like a job,
Nothing in the world.
There's nothing like a job !
No, there's nothing quite
Like a job !

We have components by the dozens,
We have promises of more,
We have consultants from Vermillion
And Washington and more ;
We have meetings to confuse us and
Ballgames by the score.
What ain't we got ?
We ain't got jobs !

We have Headstarts for our kiddies ;
We have Reading for the rest.
We have Social Work for troubles ;
We have Study Halls to spare ;
We have meetings to refresh us,
And promises of more.
What ain't we got ?
We ain't got jobs !





WHITE EARTH RESERVATION, MINNESOTA

IV. SYNTHESIS OF PROJECT FINDINGS

A. INTRODUCTION

The long conquest of American Indian nations and tribes, and the eventual confinement of Indian activities to reserved areas, have together produced a variety of ethnic group poverty that is unique in this country. Members of other ethnic groupings in America, including Negroes, are, for the most part, seeking their full participation in the American economy as individuals. However, Indian tribes have formed genuine culturally distinct groups with viable social systems, from the beginning, and still do so today. Despite the travails of the past three hundred years and modification from tribal to reservation cultures, recognizable social systems still exist.

The reservations are now governed by elected tribal councils operating on the basis of constitutions that were written under the charter of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. The religions of these tribes have also been altered, through the partial acceptance of Christianity and the development of pan-Indian religious movements. The traditional religious practices were in many instances suppressed by force. Severe dislocations and major alterations in the economic base of Indian activities have been the general rule.

Some of the massive changes in Indian political, religious, and economic life have occurred in the relatively recent past. Suppressions of Indian communities by force occurred in the last quarter of the 19th Century (e.g., the Battle of Wounded Knee at Pine Ridge, South Dakota). The Indian Reorganization Act

was in part designed to redress recent wrongs and give Indians a stronger hand in their own affairs.

The repeated occurrence of major changes in the socio-economic condition of Indians, from early contacts with white society on into the 20th Century, coupled with the lack of consistent patterns in these changes—particularly those changes initiated by the Federal Government—have worked to make Indian societies highly dependent upon the Federal Government for the satisfaction of their basic needs.

Indian poverty—the outcome of centuries of conquest and confinement—embraces the poverty of Indian individuals, and the corporate poverty of Indian reservations as political, social, and economic entities. In point of fact, the poverty of the Indian individual is rooted in the lack of economic viability of Indian reservations. It is the essence of Community Action Programs to try to deal concurrently with both individual and corporate poverty. The concept of Indian-generated community action is what distinguishes these programs from earlier ameliorative efforts.

B. STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS

1. *Integration of Components into Programs*

The attempt to deal concurrently with the poverty of Indian communities and with the poverty of Indian people is embodied in "Community Action Programs"—where "Community Action" refers to the concerted efforts (of individuals and groups), and "Program" refers to the mechanism whereby movement from an existing set of conditions to a more or less clearly defined set of goal conditions is undertaken through a specified series of actions.


The application by a reservation community action agency (usually the tribal council) for a grant of funds from OEO to develop and implement a Community Action Program consists, among other things, of a statement of the extent of poverty in the locality, and requests a set of "components"—each a different sort of action—which is focussed on alleviating specific aspects or outcomes of the poverty situation. In many cases the goal of the component is stated in the application for this component.

The statement, in the application, of the extent of poverty in the locale serves two purposes: it provides, to OEO, certain criteria for evaluating the application and assigning funds to the applicant; and, in part, it defines—or ought to define—the parameters of the problems as seen by the applicant. An application for a particular component often states the goals of that component.

A "program" consists, as noted above, of a series of actions designed to move from present conditions to a desired state. Such a program implies a need for coordination of multiple activities at any one point in time, and ordered progression, through those activities over a point in time, toward the stated goal. This degree of integration of activities is generally absent from Community Action Programs currently operating on the reservations studied. There are advantages, such as flexibility in component design, and disadvantages, such as lack of goal orientation, to be found in this loose assemblage.

2. *The CAP as a System*

On all reservations there is a hypothetical structure for Community Action Programs, deriving from the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act as interpreted and implemented by OEO, which may be diagrammed as follows:



There is a high degree of uncertainty throughout the CAP system clearly manifest in the confusion in each member group concerning how to act in regard to the others. This uncertainty about proper, or appropriate, action is two-fold: how to act *toward* the others, and what action might properly be expected *from* the others. This type of problem could be considered one of "role definition," if this concept may be extended to include organizations as well as individuals.

Role definition, within any human interaction system, is achieved by the establishment of the rights of each of the members, or member-groups, over the others—singularly and collectively—and the duties of each of the members toward the others. When the reciprocal rights and duties of any members are formally defined, then the role of that member in the system has by definition also been defined.

When the CAP system is looked at in this light, certain important relations emerge:

a. Tribal Council

Duties to OEO defined, but not its rights over OEO.

Rights over CAP staff defined, but not its duties to CAP staff.

Right over CAPCom defined, but not its duties to CAPCom.

Rights and duties to Consortium not uniformly understood.

Thus the tribal councils needs its rights vis-a-vis OEO defined (e.g., the right of appeal). It also needs to understand the rights of the CAP staff and the CAPCom over it (i.e., duties of the tribal council toward these two parties). Without these two conditions, the tribal council is structurally subordinate to OEO, while not itself being integrated into a working CAP system on the reservation. The tribal council may direct the reservation part of the CAP system, but it is not an integrated system that is being directed.

b. CAP Staff

CAP staff duties to the tribal council are defined by the tribal council. Its rights vis-a-vis the tribal council are a matter of concern and constant manipulation.

Its duties to OEO are imperfectly understood. Its rights vis-a-vis OEO are formally non-existent.

Neither its rights nor its duties vis-a-vis the Consortium are clear.

Thus, the CAP staff is, structurally, under the domination of the tribal council—for good or for ill. By not having either its rights or its duties to the other parties spelled out (and thus without a well-defined role-relationship to these other parties), it is without allies.

c. CAPCom

Duties to tribal council are largely defined by the tribal council.

Rights over the tribal council are advisory only.

Rights and duties to CAP staff are ill-defined, and often mediated by the tribal council.

Rights and duties to OEO and to the Consortium are ill-defined and widely varying.

Thus, the CAPCom is in the position of having the most poorly defined role in the CAP system. This seems to have worked to the detriment of its effective functioning.

d. Consortium

The Consortium's duties, which are volunteered by the Consortium, tend to be viewed by reservation-located elements in the system as rights of the Consortium rather than duties. The perception of the Consortium's role by the reservation elements, is often confused and ambiguous. Thus the Consortium is frequently asked to do things which it would rather not, and not asked to do what it would gladly do.

The CAP structure, as a unit, does not appear to be directionally oriented—does not seem to have common goals, nor a shared understanding of how to proceed jointly. We find the roots of this in two areas: in the nature of the application—which does not require directional orientation, and in the present mode of operation, which seems not to permit it. Since OEO does not require mutual action by the diverse elements of the system on critical issues, the natural tendency is for those in ascendancy at any point to simply assert their unilateral dominance.

In addition to this lack of integration in implementation, programs are not designed to be self-maintaining. Should OEO funds be withdrawn, the components would collapse immediately. An integrated program is not inherently self-maintaining, but only an integrated program can be made self-maintaining. The characteristics and the advantages of self-maintaining programs will be discussed in a subsequent section.

C. TENDENCIES IN INDIAN CAP DEVELOPMENT

In late 1964 and early 1965, representatives from OEO visited the six reservations studied, among others, bringing with them the promise of the possibility of alleviating the effects of poverty, and the proffered hope of eliminating poverty itself.

Prior to these visits, members of an Indian Task Force had been working together in Washington to lay down guidelines for bringing Indians into the War on Poverty program. The crux of the matter lay, as they saw it, in whether Indians have the ability to identify their own problems and needs and to determine for themselves what ought to be done. The assessment by the Task Force was that Indians, in fact, are capable of this.

On this basis, Drs. Robert Roessel and Forest Gerard visited sixteen Indian reservations. They spoke to the tribal councils, to interest them in the possibility and potentialities of defining their own needs and setting up their own programs. The responses of the tribal councils varied more in the quickness of their replies than in expression of interest: All sixteen tribes developed and submitted proposals.

These proposals, in many cases, were rejected or returned by OEO because they requested funding for programs that were not within the legal purview of OEO, or which were not practicable in the light of fiscal realities, or for some other undisclosed reason. The return of these proposals strained relations between Indian tribal councils and the Task Force, which had to return to the reservations and explain that tribal councils could have those programs they wanted, but within certain limits.

A major problem involved the "realism" of proposals: asking for enough money, but not too much (e.g., Tesuque Pueblo put together a well-conceived million-dollar program package for about three hundred people). The acceptance, by the tribal councils, of the need for "realism" was, in fact, acceptance of OEO guidelines for definition of the situation. The problems of poverty and potential programs were, thus, conceptually limited.

Proposals for components for the first year of operation, submitted by the six reservations following this initial experience, were heavily oriented toward education and toward juveniles. The components funded by OEO increased this orientation by accepting a higher percentage of education than non-education component proposals.

In the first year the chief issues raised by CAP components were: how big would the OEO program become, and who would control it. On each reservation

there were fluctuations in attitudes about how big the program would become, and on each reservation there was marked uncertainty over what the program would mean to the people and to the tribal council.

This uncertainty was manifest in different ways on different reservations. Problems regarding the staffing of components, problems of generating and maintaining interest in particular components, and problems concerning the role of the Consortium and the CAPCom, were surface expressions of an underlying "battle"—basically between the professional CAP staff and the tribal councils—for control of the program.

The issue was not one of control over a classroom or two of youngsters, and a series of ballgames: rather, it had to do with the hopes of the various parties in the struggle for future, large-scale, locally important anti-poverty endeavors. The importance of these hopes as an influence over action was manifest in two ways.

First, the BIA was almost wholly ignored in the first year of operation—not because, in general, the BIA was unwilling to help, and not wholly because the Indians perceived the BIA as unable to help. Indians wanted this program for themselves, and they wanted this badly enough to turn their backs on their traditional external sources of help.

Second, the applications that flowed into OEO toward the end of the first year of component operations asked for a very much broader range of components, not just refunding on a bigger scale of what they had before. In the light of the treatment received by the very first applications from the tribes, submission of a broad range of component applications on the second round stands as a testimony both to the faith in OEO which remains on reservations and to practices OEO has developed during the first year of operation.

However, the working relationships that have developed between tribal councils, OEO, the CAP staffs, and the Consortium have tended to reward "smoothness" of operation and haste, preventing a confrontation with some of the fundamental problems of Indian poverty. In particular, these working relationships have led to a diminution of participation, by Indian people, in the design and planning of programs, at the same time that they have been developing even more program components to be "presented" to the Indian people.

A brief discussion of existing components in relation to their function and impact follows in the next section.

D. ORIENTATIONS OF EXISTING CAP COMPONENTS

The many complications attending submission, funding, resubmission, and refunding of components—specific instances of delays and staffing problems—are illustrated in the narrative accounts of Chapter III. Emerging from these vicissitudes, however, are some general considerations regarding components which are of interest in evaluating present CAP operations. With few exceptions, components are oriented to three ends (with some overlap): (1) education, (2) jobs for CAP aides, and (3) correction of limited aspects of reservation poverty (e.g., home repair).

1. Education

Indian Community Action Programs on the reservations studied, especially in the first year of operation, are heavily oriented toward educational programs. These educational components are important in urban Community Action Programs, where they prepare children from "disadvantaged" homes to compete with better-prepared classmates, and where such components are politically "safe" in the difficult context of urban political-machine conflict with local CAPs. Educational programs are important in rural areas, from which so many people eventually migrate to cities, ill-educated for an urban environment. Further, these programs take on special importance in the rural South as a mechanism for conveying certain attitudes about race relations. On Indian reservations, however, the advantages of an educationally oriented CAP are not as clear-cut.

In the short run, Indian CAP education programs benefit the young by attending to their health and diet (the "hot meal" feature), and these programs may also benefit the mothers by freeing them for employment or other activities. In the long run, educational programs may contribute to the completion of, say, high school: the impact of counseling, guidance and study hall programs toward this end is more admissible than the pre-school programs (the long-run effect of which is as yet unknown). The potential benefit of educational programs is, however, conditional upon the use to which the education gained in put: Education

without jobs in sight after graduation is not necessarily a benefit in and of itself. Education per se could be beneficial if it altered for the positive the value that Indians placed on being Indian. To do this—which is an important educational problem regarding any minority group with a history of subjugation and a currently, socially stigmatized, position—would require an attention to Indian history and values in education programs that is not currently being paid.

2. *Jobs for Aides*

One of the major direct benefits of the Indian CAPs is the jobs that are created for aides. These jobs give a certain amount of experience both in gaining competence in the specific job area and in the general perquisites of job-holdings. They may convey a sense of purpose to people who have had “nothing to do”; and they provide a small cash income. As jobs, however, they are not without drawbacks. These drawbacks lie not so much in the potential long-run in utility of the skills gained through performing the job, as in the characteristic structure of aides’ jobs. There appears to be an operational conflict between the principle of giving poor people jobs, and the principle of getting work done. The outcome of this conflict has been a poorly defined job-description—with neither the aides nor the professional staff being at all clear as to what the aides are supposed to be doing—what the “work” is, what is an appropriate amount of work, and what it is that distinguishes good from poor performance. This lack of definition has introduced into the situation the stress of ambiguity, which not only interferes with job satisfactions gained by the aides, but is poor preparation for future jobs in other, more rigorous contexts.

3. *Components Oriented Toward Elimination of Poverty*

The particular contributions made by non-educational components to the alleviation of various limited aspects of reservation poverty (e.g., credit unions, recreation, and building skills) are important, but equally important is the experience gained by the tribes in managing a program that is partly of their own choosing. Tribal councils have, in general, been limited in their operations—and thus limited in that competence which comes from practice—by their lack of revenues. The Community Action Program has brought Federal funds to Indian reservations without the usual Federal control. These funds are, thus, in one sense, a substitute for the tax base that tribal councils have lacked. This is especially true in the light of the high percentage of Indians on any reservation who are “poor” by Government definitions of poverty. CAP programs can potentially be applied to almost the entire population of a reservation. In this manner, the Community Action Program can fund a tribal council’s development into a stronger local government.

The long-run impact of education, jobs, and “programs” is unclear. Much of value exists in the present organization of CAPs, but a number of problems can be identified both in terms of current operations and further innovations. In the narrative sections of Chapter III dealing with the full background of each reservation studied and the impact of CAPs upon it, a bewildering array of large and small problems demand solution. For many of these, specific sub-conclusions as to solution are apparent from the text. Careful examination, however, makes it possible to collect these scattered problems into fourteen major categories, each of which suggests a unified approach toward solution of the problems within the category concerned. All categories but one deal with improving the operation and effect of existing CAPs, the exception involving cooperation of other Federal agencies with OEO (BIA, EDA, PHS, and PHS) toward the goal of creating self-sustaining reservation economies.

The following sections will set forth these possibilities for enhancing and refining current CAP operations, and will consider the economically based approach, toward eliminating Indian poverty, alluded to above. This will conclude with a brief discussion of alternative post-poverty worlds for the American Indian.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the field data, and highlighted within the narrative accounts of Chapter III of the full report dealing with the course of the War on Poverty on American Indian reservations, three levels of concern become evident.

By far the easiest to identify involves the set of problems relating to the functioning of the OEO Community Action Program itself, as conceived and

implemented. These are problems arising from or involving initial misunderstandings between OEO/Washington and Indians on reservations, technical assistance, criteria for approval or disapproval of competent proposals, funding, inexperience of reservation management groups, staffing, housing, disinterest or disbelief in the value of components on the part of Indians, factionalism, nepotism, desire for approaches not within the legal competence of CAP, intra-reservation communication, and coordination between Government agencies whose joint action would have been relevant.

The second level of concern relates to basic concepts pointing toward innovative actions not presently being attempted, but which might help cut the Gordian knot of Indian poverty in such manner that self-sustaining drives toward economic viability might be stimulated among Indians to a far greater degree than appears to be the case at present. These considerations all center around ways and means of coordinating informal efforts to simultaneously motivate, train, and provide real job opportunities for Indians without requiring relocation, without offending unions, and without creating economic problems elsewhere.

Thirdly, there are questions which arise regarding the acceptance of a pluralistic society in America should flourishing Indian reservations develop—after the War on Poverty has been won—along cultural lines which materially differ from general American culture—and the impact of this upon other American ethnic and ideological minorities. Alternatively, what are the true barriers to American Indian assimilation into the “Great Society,” either through the development of ordinary viable American communities or as individuals? Could steps be taken to make assimilation attractive rather than abhorrent, as it appears to be to most American Indians today?

Each of these levels will be discussed, in turn, in the following three sections. In Section B (Improvement of Existing Programs), cross-references are given to sections in Chapter III of the full report which present data relevant to the problem areas discussed.

B. IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING PROGRAMS

1. External Communications

a. Problems

In all efforts to alter human behavior whether such efforts are looked upon as “influence processes” or as “cooperation in change”—whether arising from and affecting groups or individuals—two-way communication underlies the mutual feedback required to achieve responses approaching the outcomes desired by the stimulating party. In such communication, the goals, values, capabilities, and expectations of both parties need to be made explicit in terms both parties can understand if meaningful action is to result. In the context of relations between OEO/Washington and Indian leadership on reservations, this kind of communication has frequently been faulty or completely lacking. This problem may, in fact, be considered the master problem directly or indirectly underlying all those which follow.

At the inception of the OEO Community Action Program many Indians were “oversold” on the degree of choice and control they were to have over future CAP components. Informality and felt needs were assumed to be appropriate bases for proposals. Only later, in such manner as to dampen enthusiasm for many, did it become evident that prescribed forms and legal constraints definitely limited freedom of choice. This state of affairs undoubtedly arose quite innocently from a natural desire on the part of initial purveyors of the OEO message to arouse enthusiastic interest in their audiences, to underscore the new departure from earlier paternalistic efforts to ameliorate Indian conditions. However, in the light of subsequent events, it amounted to misrepresentation of actual Governmental capabilities and intentions, leading to a rapid drop in initially high hopes on the part of many Indians, with the result that traditionally high hopes on the part of many Indians, with the result that traditional Indian leadership tended to look upon the whole program as just one more dole to be exploited in customary fashion rather than as a true invitation toward revitalization for Indian communities and individuals.

On the other hand, at least two Indian groups were unable to make clear to OEO/Washington the time-consuming democratic processes they required before coming to any binding corporate decision on the nature and degree of involvement they wished to have with the program. Consequently, OEO demands for speed in drawing up proposals had to be met in ways considered superficial or

unorthodox by the Indians concerned, again leading to alienation from any concept that CAPS were fundamentally different from earlier Washington efforts to "help" Indians.

This mutual lack of necessary and sufficient information to make reliable estimates of what the other party can and will do has led to continuing frustrations and implementation difficulties.¹

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—It would seem advisable that a Communications Office should be set up within OEO, the sole function of which would be to facilitate and ensure full exchange of information between American Indian community action agencies and OEO/Washington. Such an office would require personnel who, either themselves or through carefully chosen consultants, would bring together in one place knowledge bearing on the specific social, economic, cultural, and political conditions in each reservation concerned—on all legal, financial, and operational constraints involved in OEO decisions regarding each such reservation—and on the techniques necessary to create and maintain a rapid flow of full information on all relevant points between the appropriate personnel in OEO and on the reservations concerned. This knowledge should be utilized to expedite all procedural and substantive matters arising between OEO and the reservation.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—A survey might be made covering all American Indian reservations having CAPs soliciting information regarding communication problems. What information exchanges have been attempted or requested, between whom, and in what manner? Which have succeeded and which failed? What were the issues involved and the results?

2. Technical Assistance

a. Problems

The Three-University Consortium was set up to give technical assistance to Indians who found it difficult to design components which would embody up-to-date techniques for improving economic and other reservation conditions, or who were unfamiliar with formal applications and other legal technicalities. While a certain amount of valuable assistance and training has been given, the staffs devoted to these efforts have been very small in relation to the number of reservations requiring aid of this kind. They have not addressed, in most instances, the primary requirement of teaching Indian leadership how to relate specific components to the specific needs of their communities.²

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—It is suggested that at least one nearby university for each five reservations with CAPs be designated as members of the Consortium, and that the staffs include persons of high competence having profound knowledge of both OEO realities and conditions on each of the reservations with their jurisdiction.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—A detailed study might be made of services offered and given by members of the present Consortium, methods and frequency of contact with all reservations having CAPs, and Indian reaction to these services and contacts.

3. Approval of CAP Components

a. Problems

A complaint frequently received from reservations studied was that OEO/Washington approvals, deferments, requests for resubmission, and non-approvals of proposed CAP components were never explained to Indian leadership and were sufficiently inconsistent that predictability of OEO response to a given proposal was not possible. This had an inhibiting effect on proposal writing so that imaginative components were seldom requested, the tendency being to propose so-called "packaged programs" known to have been funded elsewhere.³

¹ See III, pp. 59, 68, 71, 100-102, 110-111, 113, 116, 132, 144-146, 155-156, 173-174, 182, 198, 201, 211, 213-215, 244-246, 261-263, 267-268, 308-309, 325-326.

² See III, pp. 75, 77, 119, 188, 262-263, 335, 349-350.

³ See III, pp. 78, 116, 129, 208, 210, 245-246, 248-249, 251, 256, 262, 267-268, 309.

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action*.—A clear-cut policy for approval or non-approval (or intermediate position) regarding component proposals might be formulated, embracing financial, operational, and any other relevant criteria, subject to amendment as changing conditions and particular circumstances might warrant, and clearly enunciated to all Indian leaders concerned. Each action taken by OEO/Washington on component proposals could be attributed to a specific provision of this policy, and the interested parties on the reservation involved should be made cognizant of this relationship in minimal time.

(2) *Suggested Research*.—A survey might be made of all decisions on component proposals rendered by OEO/Washington prior to some specified date, in an effort to determine congruence or conflict between the rationales utilized in making such decisions, both for and against funding, from which data a consistent policy might be developed.

4. Funding of CAP Components

a. Problems

Once approved, components have frequently been prevented from beginning on schedule by delays attendant upon funds reaching the reservation concerned. This has involved Head Start, among others, and a particularly interesting case is found in connection with the NYC at Santa Clara, which though not a component, in the strict sense, was nevertheless administered by the CAP. A hiatus of funds occurred between December 1965 and late April 1966, not because of lack of authorization but because of incomplete information among all the parties concerned.⁴

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action*.—It might be possible to withhold authorization to proceed in the implementation of a component, even though full approval had been granted, until such time as funds for that component were fully earmarked and available, reporting this to the reservations concerned.

(2) *Suggested Research*.—The effects of late or delayed funding on the morale and interest of participants in the components so affected might be studied.

5. Reaction of Indian Leadership and People

a. Problems

Because of the persistence of distrust and cynicism regarding Federal programs, much of Indian leadership continues to consider CAP as one more temporary source of funds and "make work" jobs, to be exploited as such, for relatives and friends. Little or no effort is made to extend the program to those groups on the reservation most out of touch with modern society at-large and in the greatest need. The thoroughgoing development of true community action, and the design of components directed toward revitalization of the whole community economically, socially, and culturally is rarely attempted. To be sure, the almost universal lack of viable economic bases on Indian reservations contributes to the sense of futility regarding such attempts, but leadership attitudes underwrite maintenance of the status quo.

Cultural heritage also plays a part, at least in the Northern Plains area, in that planning far ahead is not part of customary behavior. Indeed, such planning has never materially aided Indians in the past, either under earlier hunting and gathering conditions or in the long association with BIA policies since those times. Indians with this background are simply not accustomed to believing that they themselves can influence their distant future. Tradition and experience reinforce a fatalism which teaches that the immediate gain must be seized, since the future will be determined by external unpredictable forces.⁵

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action*.—An office or agency such as the Consortium, when increased in size and staff capabilities, should develop a training program specifically geared to awakening present and potential Indian leadership to the power of self-sustaining processes in community development. No effort should be spared in presenting a clear-cut model to such leadership of what a viable community requires in the way of education, economic infrastructure,

⁴ See III, pp. 63, 78, 116, 131, 175, 192, 212, 249-250, 259, 262, 310.

⁵ See III, pp. 59, 65, 68-70, 79-82, 83, 177, 200, 208, 260, 276, 278, 326-328, 340.

and employment opportunities, and in convincing leadership that paths are open to fulfilling each of these needs for the specific reservations concerned in minimal time through Federal programs. The specific steps toward such fulfillment with attendant interim incentives both for leadership and the community-at-large should be spelled out with maximum clarity and detail. Above all, it should be made clear to Indian leadership that, beyond the initial steps backed by OEO in coordination with other Federal agencies, the sustaining and implementing mechanisms of government and the business community apply to the whole society, not specifically Indian society, that these forces are not ephemeral and will be available in future as they have been in the past to all economically viable communities in the United States.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—A study might be instituted to determine how best to select and train personnel capable of communicating the above information to Indian leaders coming from widely differing Indian communities, while a complementary study might seek to determine the precise mechanisms necessary to implement the concepts being taught, so that prompt and visible results, in consonance with the teachings, could become a living reality.

6. *Staffing of CAP Components*

a. *Problems*

Three factors present difficulties in the selection and employment of capable staffs for CAP components. Initially, at least, CAP directors were enjoined to employ the "poor" wherever possible. Insofar as this policy was followed, the training and experience of those employed fell somewhat below requirements in a great many cases. Secondly, the penchant for hiring relatives and friends, a more popular policy because of deep-seated culturally acquired precepts, led to equally unqualified personnel being hired, who were not necessarily poor by local standards. Finally, those who in part ignored the suggestion to hire the poor or withstood the temptation to hire relatives and friends in the interests of finding truly qualified personnel often found that qualified people were not willing to come to the reservation to work.⁶

b. *Recommendations*

(1) *Suggested Action.*—It should be possible to design a double approach, possibly implemented by the suggested augmented Consortium. The "poor" on reservations might be trained to understand the realities of the CAP jobs available, as a qualifying factor for appointment, and the recruitment of appropriate professional personnel might be undertaken to fill those posts which require more background than a relatively brief training course could impart.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—Again, selection and training of the teachers would be a prerequisite to training Indian "poor." A study of cross-cultural communications and curricula, in the context of the reservations concerned and the personnel needs indicated for particular components, might precede institution of the courses suggested, and another study regarding inducements and qualifications for professional staff from outside the reservations should precede recruitment.

7. *Housing Facilities for CAP Components*

a. *Problems*

Many components are delayed in starting or are impaired in operation because of the lack of appropriate buildings on the reservation, or because of unavailability of existing buildings.⁷

b. *Recommendations*

(1) *Suggested Action.*—Prior to authorization of components a check might be made of existing reservation component housing facilities, in each case, and of present use of existing buildings, in coordination with all other Federal and local agencies concerned. In the light of findings, negotiations should follow to enable constructing or leasing of appropriate accommodations by the CAA concerned.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—An analysis of space requirements for the whole range of components now being implemented should be correlated with actual space availability on all reservations where such components are being contemplated or are presently in difficulties on this score. Lead times for buildings,

⁶ See III, pp. 61, 78, 118, 128, 130, 185, 188, 210, 214, 246, 261, 282, 327, 334-335.

⁷ See III, pp. 62, 118, 128, 186-187, 210, 257, 282, 322.

instruments for ultimate Indian acquisition of them, and negotiation formulas for leasing might also be developed in cooperation with relevant agencies.

8. *Dissatisfaction with CAP Components*

a. Problems

Indians find two chief problems in connection with presently implemented CAP components. Primarily, they are disturbed because there is so little orientation toward the employment of family heads. Most components deal with children or adolescents. The intent behind this approach, of preparing the next generation for the future, does not impress many Indians. They see it either as one more effort leading ultimately toward acculturation, relocation, and termination (which they oppose), or, if this connection is not made, it conflicts with the philosophy, described earlier, that the future is beyond control and what is needed is jobs and money now.

The other objection rests upon the widely held feeling that many CAP jobs are "make work" operations and contribute nothing that the reservation can use except the wages of those employed, which funds immediately flow out of the reservation to the surrounding white communities where the stores and services patronized by Indians are largely to be found. This means that, should CAP operations cease, the reservation population would be just as poor as before. Many look back to WPA days as having been more fruitful in that people produced things of long-term use, such as roads and buildings.⁸

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—The solution to both these dissatisfactions lies primarily in the realm of the development of economic infrastructure on reservations, which will be discussed in some detail in the following section (V.C., Toward Economic Viability of Reservations). Essentially, jobs for family heads (without relocation) will not be available until such time as methods are developed to motivate and train Indians for modern business and industry, and at the same time induce modern business and industry to the reservations. A more immediate practicable modification of this approach may be to train Indians for, and help establish, service trades and small stores (perhaps cooperatives) on the reservations themselves. This would diminish the outflow of funds from CAP activities, welfare or whatever source, and possibly the well-known "multiplier effect" (to be discussed below) would at long last catalyze the development of self-sustained economic viability on Indian reservations.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—Intensive study of both successful and unsuccessful economic programs for disaster-stricken or underdeveloped areas and countries, from the Marshall Plan on down to such operations as the Cornell Vicos experiment, might suggest appropriate steps to take in developing infrastructure and small businesses on Indian reservations. Due caution would have to be exercised in such studies to take into consideration the cultural differences from the American norm to be found in some Indian communities regarding individualism, aggressiveness in relation to one's fellow Indians, and the like. Many Indians subscribe to a concept similar to the "image of limited good" ascribed to certain peasant societies by George Foster (1965), whereby it is assumed that there is a finite amount of "good things," so that if some Indians profit, others must lose, a condition to which few Indians would knowingly (or, at least, overtly) contribute. This inhibits Indians generally from undertaking proprietorship in most forms.

9. *Factionalism*

a. Problems

The kinship orientation of most Indian groups leads to factionalism, somewhat differently expressed among Northern Plains Indians as opposed to Southwestern Indians, as noted above. The atomistic tendencies of the former lead to what has been termed, in other contexts, the "segmentary opposition of [kindreds]," where the several segments of a kin-group are suspicious and wary of each other at each level of distance in relationship, but unite against common threats or in pursuit of proffered opportunities only available through cooperation. Each segment appears to fear that the other segments at the same level (say, several sets of brothers and their descendants, each set being cousin

⁸ See III, pp. 76, 133-134, 149, 184, 194-195, 201-203, 206-207, 251, 256, 259-260, 266, 282, 310-311, 324-325, 350.

to the other sets) may overstep the bounds of self-seeking, violating the principle of the "image of limited good" alluded to above, which they themselves profess never to violate. Thus, one has groups of people refusing to be "aggressive" in the modern industrial sense, on the one hand, but suspicious of and hostile toward each other, on the other, for fear that one of the "other" groups will take advantage of some situation which may arise. The factionalism bred of this kind of social relation militates against strong policies and incisive responses to development programs.

Among Southwestern Indians, kin-based factions are also present, but perhaps because of the lesser degree of derangement of their original culture by whites, or the greater cohesion developed through facing an environment of scarcity where subsistence agriculture rather than buffalo and other hunting forced long-term cooperation, the divisive aspects found in the Northern Plains are not present in marked degree. The factions are held in balance by powerful indigenous leadership—also standing, incidentally, behind the ostensible leadership which holds the offices created by whites and which deals directly with whites. In the Southwest, factions tend either to mirror each other in cooperation with (or rejection of) outside programs, or to perform complementary roles.⁹

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—A very sophisticated training program may be called for, in this instance, for the Northern Plains Indians. Two approaches appear possible. The "image of limited good" concept might be attacked through an intensive, cross-culturally tailored, exposition of current economic realities in the United States, in their bearing on creating and maintaining economically viable Indian reservations, directed toward leaders of all factions as well as incumbent official tribal leaders. This approach would have to be tied to very concrete evidence of fairly immediate gains, in order to be effective, however.

The second approach would involve an attempt to create among presently atomistic Indian groups the solidarity and cohesiveness of their southwestern counterparts. While culturally transmitted data, ultimately derived from differences in the historic experiences of the tribes of these two areas, are largely responsible for their differences in internal cooperation and cohesiveness, it is possible that institutional inducements toward solidarity might be devised by social scientists in collaboration with interested Indians on the reservations concerned.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—Each of the suggested programs for mitigating the effects of factionalism in the Northern Plains area would require sound research into Indian value structures. The roots of both the atomism of the North and the cohesiveness of the South, need thoroughgoing analysis—historically, functionally, and structurally—before either approach to modifying factionalism into forms productive of economic strength rather than weakness could be transmuted into meaningful training courses.

10. Nepotism

a. Problems

Closely allied to factionalism on Indian reservations is nepotism, Indian style. Among Indians, this is nothing more nor less than the honorable fulfillment of primary duties. To achieve a position of eminence or the power to dispense patronage, and not distribute this good fortune among one's kin would be a major infraction of Indian cultural imperatives.

Again, there is a difference, of marked importance, in the manner of implementation of this cultural characteristic as between the Northern Plains and the Southwest. Because of the greater structural cohesiveness and historical continuity in the South, as noted earlier, the leaders of most if not all kin-groupings are able to dispense some degree of patronage, so that the existence of kin-groupings works as a mechanism for widespread distribution of benefits throughout a given reservation. In the North, on the other hand, the data indicates that those few kin-groups with more acculturated, aggressive members are the chief recipients of or participants in the benefits of programs, while most other kin-groups are practically untouched. This is not to say that efforts are never made by Indian leaders in the North to involve non-kin, but they

⁹ See III, pp. 81, 94, 203, 243, 260, 277, 282, 313.

appear to be somewhat feeble, are politically motivated when they occur, and the best jobs do often turn out to be held by members of one or a very few kin-groups. Many of the "outsiders," while admitting this to be a natural course, given Indian concepts of kin loyalty, nevertheless, resent the prevailing state of affairs and assist in the process by refusing to cooperate or learn about such opportunities as may in fact exist.¹⁰

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—The maintenance of kin-group loyalty in the Northern Plains area is so thoroughly a part of Indian belief and custom, even after a century or more of reservation existence, that efforts to "train it away" would almost certainly prove futile. If, on the contrary, it were considered a potential source of community strength as it appears to be in the South, much might be done toward utilizing this element of the social structure in creating economically viable reservations. Programs might be administered in a given reservation, with specific knowledge of the kin-groupings borne in mind, so that an equitable distribution of jobs and opportunities could be effected through careful utilization of this feature.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—Distribution practices, involving kin-groups, utilized in the Southwest under the guidance of the indigenous power structure might be studied so as to gain insight on how best to impart balance into the more atomistic kin structure of the Northern Plains.

Independent study of the kin-groups in selected northern reservations might lead to a new concept of what constitutes a community in the CAP context. Many kin-groups live in geographical contiguity, forming small settlements. Research might be instituted to determine the feasibility of orienting components to such communities rather than to entire reservations.

11. Needs Beyond the Scope of CAP Components

a. Problems

The chief effect of CAP components as presently constituted, if carried out in optimal fashion in terms of their stated ends and participated in by most Indian families, would be, under present reservation conditions, to markedly increase relocation possibilities and consequent acculturation processes. Indians generally appear to oppose such an eventuality and would prefer components leading ultimately to an economically viable reservation where Indians could maintain old associations and their own patterns of existence.

None, or very few, of the components so far authorized point in this direction, chiefly because OEO, alone, is not geared toward the development of economic infrastructure, and the establishment of small businesses or toward attracting light industry (or any other kind) to a reservation. This sort of activity would pose problems of training and implementation only approachable through the joint action of a number of Government agencies. Cooperation and coordination of this kind is only beginning to develop, so that in most reservations Indians feel that their real needs are being overlooked.¹¹

b. Recommendations

Both action and research required to develop reservations economically to the point where employment opportunities would correspond to the number of employables (taking into account population growth statistics) are best treated in the next section which deals with an innovative approach toward the elimination of Indian poverty. Perfecting present CAP components would appear to lead to combining temporary amelioration of some of the conditions of poverty with the development of inducements and capabilities toward leaving the reservation.

12. Intra-Reservation Communications

a. Problems

Partially caused by the atomistic kin-groupings, already amply alluded to in the Northern Plains area, but also arising from the heavy administrative and report-writing duties imposed upon present CAP staffs in both areas studied, many of the more outlying, isolated, small communities are hardly touched by OEO programs. Except for occasional and sporadic contacts made here

¹⁰ See III, pp. 44, 102, 208-209, 313, 328-331, 339.

¹¹ See III, pp. 133, 212-213, 243, 253, 256, 266-268, 275, 278, 281, 284, 311, 324-326, 348.

and there by VISTA workers, these communities are not involved with CAP. Some members of such communities have not even heard of its existence.¹²

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—Either CAP staffs should be relieved of some of their paperwork so that they will have more time to consider and implement publicity for the program throughout their reservations, or a special and additional group within CAP staff should be authorized on each reservation whose sole function would be to communicate with all members of the reservation no matter how isolated. Some components should be designed to specially attract and involve these isolated communities and individuals.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—The values and needs of the more isolated, least acculturated Indians on designated reservations might be made objects of special study so that involvement of these Indians in CAP components might be encouraged and made more likely, in complementation to attempts to ensure their knowledge of the existence of such components. A survey of the numbers of such isolated Indians on reservations having CAPs might be made to indicate where this particular problem may be most pressing.

13. Coordination of Government Activities

a. Problems

As indicated in the descriptions of a number of problems above, coordination between such Federal agencies as OEO, EDA, BIA, PHS, and PHA not to mention state and local agencies—school boards, law enforcement agencies and the like—would be of inestimable value in launching programs which could strike at the roots of Indian poverty. Economic development, housing and other construction, provision of CAP component space, and many other aspects of the War on Poverty would be facilitated, were such cooperation the rule rather than the exception.

There is, additionally, another point to be gained by such cooperation. A number of instances have been reported of surveys being conducted under OEO auspices to gather information already collected by local BIA agencies. Considerable expense and time would have been saved had there been any merchanism in existence to acquaint either or both of these agencies with the other's activities.¹³

b. Recommendations

(1) *Suggested Action.*—An office should be set up in each reservation or at the appropriate branch of the consortium (as augmented), the specific duty of which would be to determine the functions and capacities of each agency concerned with Indian affairs on each of the reservations in question, and to co-ordinate their activities. The administering body established for this purpose should not be one of the Government agencies involved, and, therefore, it is suggested that it be formed and directed under the auspices of the proposed enlarged consortium.

(2) *Suggested Research.*—Studies of jointly administered Governmental projects leading to greater economic health in Indian communities might be undertaken, so that instances of successful combinations of effort would be recorded for future use.

Should all of the recommendations suggested in the foregoing section be undertaken and prove insightful, CAP programs might then be working as well as could be expected in terms of their present goals; and some innovative beginnings might then be under way toward tackling basic economic problems. These problems are intricate, however, and are difficult to disentangle from labor and employment.

C. TOWARD ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF RESERVATIONS

One of the most important problems facing Community Action Programs on Indian reservations is their almost total dependence on continued external funding. The programs as currently conceived and operated depend on OEO not only for funds to initiate them, and to nurture their early development—which is the case with almost all community development projects anywhere

¹² See III, pp. 40, 68, 77-78, 82, 122-123, 139, 148, 153, 156, 176-179, 192, 209-210, 255-256, 261, 280-281, 320-321, 323, 332-333, 349.

¹³ See III, pp. 50, 54-59, 72-73, 73-74, 132, 136-137, 213, 245-246, 282, 326.

in the world—but these Indian CAPs are also dependent upon OEO for their continued existence. Without external support, these programs would come to a complete halt.

In the light of the past history of relations between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, this situation becomes especially grave. The Indians are very much aware of past inconsistencies in Governmental treatment of them. Whether well-intentioned or not, at any point, Indians have been hurt by these inconsistencies and are well aware of this. It has been found, on all six reservations, that there is widespread unwillingness to take the objectives of OEO seriously. Rather, there is the established belief that CAPs will not last long, and that individual Indians should just take what they can get while it lasts. This attitude blocks a full commitment by most Indians to the goals of community action. The continual dependence of reservation CAPs on external funding by OEO may be a major causal factor in the unwillingness of Indians to commit themselves to reservation programs.

As CAPs are now organized, one of the major direct beneficiary groups is that constituted by the CAP aides. These aides benefit most directly from the wages they are paid. What they do with this money is thus of critical importance in determining the character of the benefits Indians receive from CAPs. In brief, the money received by CAP aides is spent on themselves, their families, and their relatives; but, in spending the money, little or nothing is purchased from other Indians. At best, the Indian may make his purchases from a reservation store, but these stores are almost wholly supplied from non-reservation sources. The implications of this merit examination in slightly more detail.

Indian societies are generally kin-based. That is, networks of relatives are the more important of the social-organizational frameworks which condition the activities of individuals. With regard to economic goods, these kin-based frameworks operate in a distributive fashion, tending toward the equalization of the relative amount of goods possessed by individuals across the society at any one time, and for any individual over a period of time. A man who shares with his relatives when he has and they do not, and who is the later recipient of their sharings, is, in his eyes, acting in accordance with his values. To the observer, he is equalizing, over space and time, the distribution of goods.

This process of sharing, while contributing to the equalization of the distribution of goods, does not affect the total amount of goods in circulation. The total payroll of Indian CAPs benefits the reservation by no more than exactly what is put in. If, for example, \$10,000 is paid in wages by OEO, then there is only \$10,000 more on the reservation (minus what may be lost thereby from other sources, such as welfare). This is not the case when a payroll is brought in, say, to a small non-reservation town. Money introduced into the average town from an external source adds to the amount in circulation by a factor of approximately three (if the town accords with the national average); that is, every dollar brought in increases the dollars in circulation by approximately three. This occurs as the result of investment, credit, and purchases made reciprocally within the area—otherwise known as the multiplier effect.

The problem with Indian reservations in this light is that there is almost no place or manner for an Indian who receives money to spend it in a way that will benefit other Indians on the reservation. Money that comes into the reservation—from OEO, from the occasional factory, or the like—can stop once at best on the way out of the reservation, in the local general store, perhaps, which is usually supplied from outside the reservation.

The situation confronted is that OEO programs are not the sort that continue operating by their own momentum after initial funding, and that money that is currently coming into the reservation from OEO and other sources is not being dispensed through the reservation in an additive fashion.

It is suggested that a method for dealing with both these problems concurrently be considered—a method which entails a program of diversification of economic activities on reservations.

In essence, such a program might consist of the establishment of Indian-owned and operated businesses that cater to the needs of the Indian market: both the production of goods for, and the offering of services to, Indians. This in no sense would “solve” the Indian poverty problem, nor should it be a replacement for programs currently offered. Rather, it might serve to enhance the benefits from the other programs (particularly that aspect of the component programs which entails the payment of wages) and it would provide at least one OEO-induced program that would be self-maintaining.

The initial orientation of an economic diversification program might be toward the establishment of various "services" on the reservation—welding, automobile repair, shoe repair, and the like. The particular services on any reservation would be determined by an analysis of current expenditures for items considered "necessary," and an appraisal of which of these might be locally provided. This appraisal could also determine the feasibility of producing goods for an Indian market (e.g., the establishment of sawmills, or the growing of produce for local sale).

Personnel to operate these ventures are in part available from the pool of BIA-trained people who have returned to the reservation from relocation areas, especially in the light of the possibility that many of the returnees came back not because they were "failures" at their jobs, but because they valued the particular qualities of their reservations. Others would need to be trained, and all would need technical assistance in business management—a set of problems distinct from selling the goods or performing the services of the businesses themselves.

Problems of training personnel to participate in a program of economic diversification are related to problems of motivation. Granting adequate motivation, training is not difficult. Evidence now available supports the contention that the prime motivation to participate would be the conviction that benefits could be gained relatively quickly. Indeed, one problem with CAP programs as they now exist is that the benefits to be gained appear to many Indians to be very distant when contrasted with the immediacy of the poverty pressures they face.

The advantages of a program leading to economic diversification can best be expressed by examining the relation of this sort of program to others which attempt to bring industries which cater to a national market to Indian reservations.

In the first place, there are economic and political difficulties involved in bringing in "outside" industries. The Economic Development Administration (EDA), which can help finance such moves, is legally entitled to aid only those plant expansions which may entail operations in a new area, and to assist in the establishment of new business organizations in poverty areas. EDA cannot enable a plant to move from one location to another on the grounds that such a move would simply shift unemployment from one area. Furthermore, industries that move from place to place are usually labor-intensive in their operations rather than capital-intensive, and except for those cases where a firm may move to a more favorable tax climate, are usually seeking the cheapest labor they can get. An industry looking for the cheapest possible labor, is perhaps not the best arrangement for relieving Indian poverty.¹⁴ However, there are times when any job is better than none, so that the situation is somewhat ambiguous.

Secondary, the attractions of Indian reservations for these "outside" industries are limited. This is not only due to problems of the lack of basic economic infrastructure—water, electricity, sewage, transportation, and the like—but also to the relative unattractiveness of reservation social amenities—schools, housing, and medical facilities—in the eyes of the management personnel who would come into the area with industry.

Thirdly, external industry does only a limited amount of good for the reservation in general. Other than the people on the payroll, and those in the distributive networks who share in the payroll, there is little benefit to the reservation. This might be solved by having most of the available Indian labor force on some one payroll, but the unlikelihood under foreseeable conditions of bringing in industry on this scale is demonstrable.

A program of economic diversification, however, would seem likely to multiply the benefits to be gained not only from OEO funds, but also from the payrolls of such industries as currently do operate on (or might in the near future come to) reservations. Toward this end we suggest a program of research to further investigate the feasibility of, and to develop models for, diversification of economic activities on Indian reservations, and to lay down guidelines for feasibility studies on selected reservations.

Following the development of models embodying economic diversity on Indian reservations, it would be suggested that efforts be made to explore the appropriateness of, and the willingness for, cooperation from other Federal—and perhaps state—agencies. There are, furthermore, branches of OEO that would properly be

¹⁴ We may note that all industries operating on the six reservations studied, or in the vicinity of these reservations, but employing a high proportion of Indian labor, paid on a piece-rate rather than hourly-wage basis.

concerned in helping to implement this program (e.g., Title III, "Special Programs to Combat Poverty in Rural Areas"). It seems obvious that the extent to which a program of economic diversification can be implemented depends upon the degree of cooperation from other relevant agencies, and the ability to coordinate these joint endeavors.

D. THE POST-POVERTY WORLD OF AMERICAN INDIANS

All agencies and interested individuals consulted by HSR staff members on the question of post-poverty models for American Indian life refused to speculate on this matter, replying, in effect, that Indians themselves will have to determine their future. Without questioning the sincerity or essential propriety of this kind of reply, a problem does arise in this context since there are at least two very different roads out of poverty for American Indians, one leading toward viable, ethnically and culturally separate communities, the other toward individual assimilation into American society. Designers of programs to eliminate poverty should take cognizance of which road is envisioned, in the interests of effectiveness.

This is not by any means to suggest that one or the other of these two roads is the correct or feasible one. In fact, the main point of this epilogue is to call for the intentional provision of alternative paths to voluntary community pluralism or assimilation. However, it appears essential to recognize which kinds of components lead in which direction if real progress toward either goal is to be achieved.

Project Head Start, for example, when properly implemented and fully accepted by and for reservation children, is in reality a first step toward assimilation. The thrust of this project is in the direction of enhancing the likelihood that participating children will be able to function well within the standard American school system. Should this prove to be true, more Indian children are likely to graduate from high school, and thereby to have learned the techniques and behavior patterns associated with the non-reservation world. They will thus be more likely to find jobs "outside" and relocate.

On the other hand, projects such as the *Vh-Thaw-Hup-Ea-Ju* (Coordinated Reservation Plan—See III p. 54ff) being undertaken at the Gila River Reservation, which involves economic, social, and community development along with government and management considerations, leads mainly in the other direction. If successful, the reservation will provide a viable setting wherein Pima Indians can continue to live together and in accordance with their own behavior patterns, rooted in the past, modified by reservation experience, and different from the American norm.

There would seem to be no reason why both paths should not be entered, although flourishing enclaves with value structures differing from the norm have not been common in the American past. Other minorities, both ethnic and ideological, might be intrigued by a successful evolution of Indian communities along these lines. The general impression derived from both the literature and the empirical data acquired in the course of this study is that Indians prefer this path—leading to viable cultural pluralism. They do not particularly, seemingly with rare exceptions, wish to leave the reservation and assume the white man's ways.

There is some question as to the cause of this great affection for reservation life (entirely apart from the ordinary pull of birthplace and kin felt by many who are not Indians). One would surmise from some accounts that there is an innate compulsion among Indians to go back to the reservation in the manner of the salmon drawn to its point of origin. In reasonable terms, however, could it not be that the Indian returns to the reservation so faithfully because he is usually far less acquainted with the ways of the outside world than other men, and, furthermore, enters a world almost uniformly unfriendly and cold, indifferent to his wants and idiosyncracies? If a thoroughly successful effort to educate and acculturate could be envisioned, combined with an equally successful effort to provide a welcoming and sustaining environment in the outside world, perhaps a fair number of Indians would lose their reluctance toward taking the step of relocation and assimilation. Perhaps not. At any rate, previous efforts in this direction have not been sufficiently coordinated or intensive to produce the conditions whereby this hypothesis might be tested.

Given existing conditions, Indians, on the reservations studied, frequently appear to be aware of the unstated bias toward assimilation of a number of CAP components, and under these conditions, to reject them as anything other

than a temporary source of funds or diversion. It is conceivable that integrated programs avowedly pointed in each of the directions discussed above, and presented to Indians, as such, for voluntary choice, might generate far more enthusiasm than the present offerings with no attendant clear conceptualization of ultimate outcomes.

To achieve any success, with such a two-fold approach, description of these outcomes would have to be phrased in terms of immediately perceivable benefits, in order to meet the present tendency on the part of Indians to think in terms of immediate gains rather than long-term goals (at least in the Northern Plains). Programs geared toward assimilation would have to be made much more powerful than they are now in the directions noted above, while those intended to create economically viable reservation communities would require the coordination of many Government agencies.

Before undertaking this double approach toward a truly voluntary, yet clearly directional set of ways out of poverty, a number of surveys and research projects would be in order. Those bearing upon the economic development of reservations have been touched upon earlier in this report (See V.C. Toward Economic Viability of Reservations). For the facilitation of assimilation for those who want it, comparative applications of studies of the role of voluntary associations in easing the path toward urbanization of tribal groups in other parts of the world (e.g., West Africa), studies of acculturational educational processes undergone by immigrants and minorities elsewhere (e.g., Yemeni Jews in Israel), and studies of employment patterns bearing on the easy absorption of newly trained groups of people (e.g., practices of U.S. employers in relation to recent high school graduates) would all be of value in expediting the War on Poverty in relation to the American Indian.

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A DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS

A REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY CONTACT NO. OEO-1257,
 DECEMBER 1966

The conclusions and recommendations in this report are those of the contractor (Kirschner Associates) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Economic Opportunity or any other agency of the United States Government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF RESEARCH PROGRAM

This report presents the results of a research project designed to describe and evaluate the neighborhood service center concept and program on a national basis. The purpose of this project is to provide data, analyses and recommendations about neighborhood service centers for Office of Economic Opportunity officials who formulate and administer national policies concerning the Community Action Program.

The emphasis of this project is not to describe and evaluate particular neighborhood service center operations in terms of their efficiency or effectiveness. By utilizing specific cases as examples, however, it is intended that the presentation herein will reveal the facts, relationships, attitudes, procedures and problems which bear significantly on the extent to which the goals of the neighborhood service center program are and indeed can be achieved.

This project is considered to be an evaluation of neighborhood service centers and thus relies heavily on the perceptions, judgments and values of the contractor. An effort has been made, however, to provide in the text and appendices full documentation for statements and sufficient evidence so that independent evaluations can be reached. It is hoped that this presentation is useful to administrators who may utilize this report in ways not fully anticipated when the project was undertaken.

THE TIME SETTING

The Economic Opportunity Act was signed into law two years prior to the time the field research for this project was completed. This Act, and especially Title II—Urban and Rural Community Action Programs, was devised as an attack that is supposed to deal not only with the manifestations of poverty but with its causes. Fundamental changes in society and the relationships of the poor to their environment were suggested by this legislation. Emphasis was placed on education, on employment opportunities and on basic human aspirations and relationships. Further, a new and, in many respects, unique administrative structure had to be devised *de novo* for the implementation of the goals of the Act.

Community Action Programs and neighborhood service centers, both viewed as among the most innovative of the OEO concepts, are less than two years old. Many have been in existence for even shorter periods. It might therefore be said that it is presumptuous as well as unscientific to attempt an evaluation so early in the history of a program which is designed to make changes that can occur only in generations. It is, of course, obvious that an evaluation at this early date can not be completely authoritative and indeed it is possible that inaccurate estimates or trends will be made. Nevertheless, administrators are faced with decisions that must be made today. It is obvious that these decisions can be made more intelligently if they are based on accurate information as well as perceptive analysis. Thus, one can not avoid the necessity for making evaluations even with less than perfect knowledge and timing.

It is emphasized, however that all of the conclusions and recommendations presented in this report must be viewed in the appropriate time focus. As indicated, the program is still very new and there is evidence that there are very marked changes taking place almost constantly and in almost all areas in basic relationships, attitudes, accomplishments and problems. Thus, this report is a picture at one point in time of a fast-moving program in its early stages of development. This suggests that firm judgments should be tempered by limitations of perspective.

BACKGROUND

The community Action Program is conceived as a means of mobilizing available public and private resources for a coordinated attack on poverty at the local level. The key word of the designation is "community" for it distinguishes this program from the somewhat standardized national programs authorized by sections other than Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act. Community Action Agencies (CAA's) have been formed in counties, cities, and towns throughout the country to implement the community action program. The CAA's differ from one to another in almost every significant respect but neighborhood service centers are a conspicuous and generally important feature of every local anti-poverty program. It is important to understand neighborhood centers because they are

vital elements of most anti-poverty efforts and Community Action Program activities. This report consequently considers centers in the context of their CAA relationships and strives to describe the essence of these relationships.

The neighborhood service center concept is variously interpreted in different communities. Even though Washington CAP officials have demonstrated that they adhere to certain general views of the roles and activities of neighborhood service centers, they have attempted to encourage diversity on the theory that local requirements should shape the purposes, organization and operations of centers. Consequently, neighborhood centers differ in name, organization, goals and activities.

In view of the variety and diversity associated with neighborhood service centers, it is appropriate to consider what common characteristics unite them into a group that is worthy and possible of special study. Neighborhood service centers, variously known as centers, outposts, boards and councils, all have a distinct though not necessarily uniform, relationship to the CAA. In almost all cases they are funded by the CAA, report to the CAA, and have some type of integral relationship with the CAA. CAAs are organized to deal with community-wide anti-poverty programs but centers tend to concentrate on a particular geographic area within the total community. The centers are conceived as organizations that relate directly to the people in a neighborhood, that have intimate ties with these people and that represent these people as well as serve them. It is the "grass roots" aspect of the anti-poverty program, and it is fundamental to the philosophy that the poor shall be better served and more effectively represented. It is hazardous to attempt to describe in more detail the common elements of neighborhood service centers because exceptions become too prevalent.

Because centers are the contact points with the poor in most communities and because the centers have been considered as the logical places for the maximum feasible participation of residents and members of groups served, centers have been targets for criticisms of all types. This report is viewed neither as a confirmation nor refutation of the charges of critics. It is written to provide facts and informed judgments on a complex and delicate subject of very central importance to the war on poverty.

II. RESEARCH PROGRAM

CENTERS RESEARCHED

Officials of Washington CAP selected twenty neighborhood service centers in seventeen communities to be considered in this research project. These centers were chosen to be a representative sample of the then approximately 175 centers in operation. The centers were chosen to represent each geographic region of the country and to illustrate also what were considered to be typical examples of the major different types of approaches, organizational arrangements and problems. As the contractor does not have knowledge about the entire "universe" of centers, no judgment can be offered as to the reliability of the sample. Two additional comments may be offered on this subject: first, those centers investigated do represent a great deal of variety in almost every sense; and second, some CAA directors indicated their feelings that the centers being studied in their communities were not typical.

Generalizations about the neighborhood service center program are offered in this report. It must be remembered that these generalizations are based solely on the research carried on at twenty centers as well as less intensive observations of four other centers. Of the centers studied in depth four are located in rural areas, eleven are in metropolitan cities with populations in excess of a million people and five are in medium size communities. Attachment I describes the twenty centers studied and those with knowledge of other centers would be in a position to judge if these centers appear to be a reliable sample of a larger universe. To repeat, the analysis, conclusions and recommendations are based solely on investigations conducted at twenty centers.

STAFFING

This research project was designed and supervised by our central staff. The field work was conducted under central staff direction by eighteen university-associated professionals having intimate knowledge of the areas in which they worked. Most of the data in this report and many of the judgments are based

upon field reports submitted by our field research associates. Thus, this project has the benefit of utilizing persons having considerable insights into the communities where the research was being conducted. On the other hand, the personnel biases of the researchers inescapably influenced the reports they prepared. The central staff has made every effort to sift out these biases but it would not be charge of this project visited centers in four different communities to obtain some point of view.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Before preparing a detailed research design the central staff members in charge of this project visited centers in four different communities to obtain some insights into the basic operations and problems likely to be encountered. Using these visits as background, preliminary research designs were prepared and were tested at four centers. The field tests of the design revealed the need for modification of the initial instruments. The initial approaches were subsequently modified and utilized throughout the project including the four test areas. Appendix I is a copy of the instructions and questionnaires utilized in the project. It is to be noted that different questionnaires were developed for each of the major categories of respondents and in addition the field research associate was responsible for completing a report containing factual materials as well as his judgments based on the research he had conducted.

During the course of this project interviews were conducted with forty-six CAA board of directors members, forty-two CAA staff people, thirty-three center board members, twenty-one center directors, over one hundred other center staff members, eighty staff members and officials of other agencies relating to the center program and almost two hundred clients of the centers. In total, more than five hundred interviews were conducted with persons having some direct relationship with the center program. A definite pattern was provided for the interviews but it was not rigid. It was designed to provide respondents with the opportunity to express themselves fully on certain subjects rather than to have them choose their answers from alternatives offered to them. Thus, while the interviews were designed to obtain responses that could be analyzed on comparative bases, individual expression was not precluded. All persons interviewed were encouraged to respond freely and they were assured that no statements made would be identified with them. It is for this reason that the names of none of the communities, centers or individuals are mentioned in this report.

An average of over eighty hours was devoted to the field work for each center. Within this period the field research associates familiarized themselves with the project and pertinent background materials, arranged for interviews, traveled to various offices to conduct interviews, observed center activities and interviewed appropriate persons and wrote necessary reports. In view of the range of activities to be accomplished within a relatively brief period, it must be understood that all areas of inquiry were not pursued with equal intensity. Effort was concentrated on those areas which were judged to be most significant to the philosophy, operations, problems and achievements of the centers.

As previously indicated, almost two hundred persons regarded as clients of centers were interviewed. These two hundred persons tended to be those with knowledge of the center and already having some relationship to it. They do not represent a sample of the total market for services in the neighborhood. Thus, when interpreting the results of these interviews it is important to recognize the bias inherent in the sample. In addition to these interviews, there were less-structured meetings with neighborhood people selected at random. These informal interviews took place to obtain at least some idea of the views of neighborhood residents who might have no relationship to the center.

In addition to utilizing interviews as a means of obtaining information, opinions and attitudes, the field research associates spent time attending meetings as well as collecting and analyzing written reports. The central staff has also reviewed and analyzed all these data. These data have been coded, manipulated statistically and analyzed also on an impressionistic basis. Thus, it is felt that this final report represents a very careful review of the information made available to us and an honest attempt to present it completely, usefully and accurately.

THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT

It was mentioned previously that this research project takes place at an early date in the history of neighborhood service centers. It was not surprising to find, therefore, that there were extensive and fundamental changes taking place while

we were pursuing our field inquiries. In addition, the field research took place during the summer when there were severe riots, demonstrations and other violent mass actions in some of the areas where we were working. It is felt that in certain cases the unusual circumstances served to illuminate problems, relationships and other aspects of center operations. It is suspected that in other cases the tensions and suspicions of those interviewed resulted in answers that were somewhat less than candid. For the most part, however, our personnel received the full cooperation of all those contacted and it is believed that responses were truly revealing of facts, attitudes and viewpoints. Therefore, the information presented in this report is considered reliable and can be utilized confidently as a basis for judgments and plans concerning neighborhood service centers.

III. CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

To understand neighborhood service centers one must have some knowledge of the conceptual and organizational environment in which they exist. This section of the report is designed to provide the type of background information which is well known to those intimately involved with OEO operations but which may not be known to all those who may be concerned with the content of this report. The focus of this section is only on those factors of the environment which appear to relate most directly to the goals, activities, problems and accomplishments of neighborhood centers.

Neighborhood service centers are members of the CAP family and thus this section is focused on describing the aspects of CAP's that are relevant. The materials are arranged to present the basic conceptual framework for CAP's and neighborhood centers and then the organizational devices utilized to carry out these concepts.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 broadly defines a community action program to mean a program which (1) mobilizes and utilizes public and private resources of an area in an attack on poverty; (2) provides services, assistance and activities of sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of poverty through developing employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn and work; and (3) which is developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served.¹

This broad legislative mandate proposes significant changes in prevailing attitudes, institutions and modes of operation with respect to the past. The traditional concepts of dealing with poverty are regarded as inadequate and new ones have been proposed in administrative interpretations of the basic legislation. These concepts are reviewed below under separate headings but they are all closely related under the broad goal of changing the basic relationships of poor people to the society in which they live.

One clear legislative and administrative emphasis of the program is on involvement of all groups, including the poor and minorities, which are concerned with the elimination of poverty. Pre-existing efforts are believed to have been fractionated, narrow and inadequate to the magnitude and complexity of the problems confronted. Moreover, they have been conceived and executed with little or no active participation of the groups to be served. The CAP approach is to be comprehensive in scope and involvement at the local level.

There are a number of corollary concepts to the one above. First, the capabilities of existing organizations are to be integrated into the program. Second, the overall program control is to be such that the traditional relationships of these organizations to the poor are modified by operation in the context of the CAP. Third, that the relationships among groups concerned with poverty will be reorganized and re-focused to provide a more comprehensive and enlightened approach.

Another clear emphasis of the legislation and its subsequent administration has been on the thought that the local community should develop its own solutions to its own problems. The emphasis is away from professional guidance

¹ Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Title II, Part A, Sec. 202.

and direction from federal officials. Not only has the emphasis on local community initiative and operation been given lip service but, for the most part, the federal guidelines have been so general that local planning has been mandatory. Without regard to the merits of the case for local autonomy within very broad constraints, it is clearly being emphasized in the CAP.

Traditionally, the poor have been regarded as outcasts from society. Charitable impulses have governed the provision of services to those whose resources and capabilities were inadequate. The CAP is based on the concept that the poor, who may be disadvantaged through circumstances largely beyond their personal control, are to be considered a part of society and that they are entitled to the benefits that our society can offer. Thus, they are to be encouraged to participate in programs on a basis of equality with the persons and institutions that have heretofore largely controlled their destinies. An entirely new concept of the status and role of the poor is thus suggested and promoted by the CAP.

Without exploring in detail the rationale for the concepts outlined above and without discussing fully their implications, it can nevertheless be seen that rather fundamental changes of outlook and operation are envisaged by the community action program. Novel institutional and organizational arrangements have been designed to implement these concepts and the existence of neighborhood service centers is one prominent feature of these arrangements.

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Variety of organizational form is evident in the CAP's studied in this project. Nevertheless, there seem to be some general patterns that have been devised to carry out the basic concepts of the program. First to be considered are the community action agency aspects.

The CAA is the organization that is supposed to represent broadly the community in its dealings with the federal government on the one hand and with local groups or persons providing or receiving services on the other. The CAA is viewed as the pivotal organization in the program. The CAA operates some programs with its own staff, delegates programs to other local organizations and involves itself in a coordinating role with other programs not funded by OEO. Typically, neighborhood centers are grass roots extensions of the CAA and are operated with staff selected and paid by the CAA and within programs and concepts devised by the CAA.

Policies are generally established for CAA's by a board of directors composed of a membership which is supposed to represent all elements of the community including the poor and minority groups. Prominently represented on most CAA boards are municipal government, traditional private social service organizations, business, religious groups and spokesmen for minorities. In every few cases do the poor either in theory or in fact control the boards. The boards not only represent different community interests but they tend to establish the patterns of relationships among these interests, and these patterns tend to be pervasive throughout all local CAP activities. Thus, if there are to be close and effective relationships between a CAP activity and a city department, for instance, these relationships are generally arranged at the highest level, that is, the CAA board or executive committee.

The board not only is responsible for policy; it generally selects the CAA director and the person selected is usually a reflection of the dominate interests on the board. There are cases where weak boards and strong directors co-exist and the latter are the dominant forces. However, the relationships between the board and chief executive appear to be traditional in this type of organizational arrangement.

The CAA director has been observed to be the most important figure in the operations of the CAP. He is generally responsible for program formulation and for management of the affairs of the CAA. He also is generally instrumental in shaping the nature of the relationships with the neighborhood service centers and their programs and focus.

As previously indicated, the role and activities of neighborhood centers are shaped most significantly by officials at the CAA level. In some cases, centers are considered to be essential to the entire CAP effort and all CAP programs are funneled through centers to the neighborhoods. The centers play an important role of recruiting clients and workers for CAP programs in these cases. In other communities, CAP activities are operated independently of neighborhood centers, and centers are concerned with a limited number of programs

they administer directly. Thus, center activities, as previously indicated, are largely a function of administrative decisions made at another level.

At the neighborhood level there exist advisory councils composed of local people with an interest in anti-poverty work. These councils play a number of roles. First, they usually elect some of their members to represent the poor of the neighborhood on the CAA board and this "inter-locking" of directorates provides a certain measure of communication and coordination between the two levels. Second, the councils are supposed to represent the views of the neighborhood people to those managing the centers so that the programs coincide with the desires of the local people. *Third, the councils often represent the center to the people.* In some cases, the neighborhood councils actually control center policies, programs, budgets and personnel selection. More commonly, the councils are merely advisory, and control of center activities is largely lodged with the CAA.

In certain rural areas there are no centers as physical entities but field workers from the CAA perform center functions of reaching the poor and assisting them. More typical to the urban setting is a center with a physical presence in a neighborhood. These centers generally have a director, some professional staff and some non-professional workers from the local neighborhood. Large centers with many employees—and some have as many as 200—are usually organized along functional lines traditional to established social agencies. Thus, there may be departments dealing with employment, welfare, health, education, children, etc. In smaller centers, the organization tends to be less formal and compartmentalized.

The organizational innovation represented by the centers is the fact that they tend to decentralize services into neighborhoods where they are needed and they emphasize reaching out to the poor people of the area. Centers vary in their relationships with other organizations, the particular role they may emphasize, the degree of participation of the poor and other significant matters. A constant factor, however, is the focus on reaching the poor of the neighborhood. In achieving this goal, most centers employ people from the neighborhood known variously as community workers, organizers or representatives. The job of these people is to reach the poor, to advise them of the center's programs, to interest them in participating in center activities and to provide them with or direct them to the services and assistance they need and want.

The neighborhood centers are also important organizational features of the "community action" (as distinguished from service) role of the CAP. Community action is considered in a subsequent section of this report which indicates the variety of activities considered to fall within this rubric. At this time it is sufficient to indicate that there is a concern with involving the poor people more actively with the institutions that shape their environment. The neighborhood centers are the focal point for the organizational efforts that result in the participation of the poor.

The paragraph above are not to provide conceptual and organizational details since these are to follow in subsequent sections. Here, an effort has been made to sketch broadly the fundamental concepts and organizational arrangements within which all center activities take place. It is to be remembered that neighborhood centers are a significant feature common to almost every CAP. Thus, although the observations in this report are based on research at only twenty centers, to the extent that these twenty represent the entire "universe" of centers, the findings are believed to have a wide relevance to the conduct of the community action program. More detail on specific center operations is provided in the descriptive materials included in Attachment number 1.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD CENTER

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that all generalizations are but partial truths. This discussion of the role of neighborhood centers is no exception. The diversity in setting, form, and function exhibited by these local centers is spectacular. In part this can be attributed to the extremely general legislative mandate authorizing the community action program phase of the war on poverty. The guidelines set forth in this Washington legislation are provocative but notably vague and unspecific. Areal resources are to be mobilized in ways that will permit a variety of different attacks on poverty, including the development of employment opportunities, pro-

grams to improve performance skills and motivation, and efforts to promote "maximum feasible participation" of the poor. From such general cues as these we find the entire neighborhood center program developing.

Although one would expect program and organizational variety to characterize community responses to this vague and general mandate, the picture becomes even more kaleidoscopic when the different kinds of environmental setting are contemplated.¹ For example, the twenty centers investigated in this study are scattered from east to west and north to south. They are found in the largest metropolitan areas as well as in intermediate size cities, small towns and rural areas. This means that the size range of their target populations is enormous—from a few thousand to over two hundred thousand. In terms of population composition over two-thirds of the centers have substantial Negro majorities. A few centers also have large proportions of Spanish-speaking minority group people. Yet, important as they are, such differences are likely to mask another, and perhaps more important, kind of diversity—namely, the diversity found among the poor themselves in each locale.

The simple fact is that poor people are not a homogeneous group any more than are rich people or those with moderate means. There are great differences which can affect how the centers relate to this poverty "market." For simplicity's sake one might think of the poor as comprising three more or less distinguishable subgroups. First are what might be called the "respectable poor." These are the easy-to-reach poor. They have skills or genuine skill potentials and are motivated to improve their lot. All they need are opportunities, and they will pull themselves out of their dependent, poverty status. Second are what might be called the "problematic poor." These are the poor who may or may not be motivated to improve their lot but who suffer disabilities that keep them in a poverty status. Their disabilities may be physical, psychological, intellectual, vocational, social or a combination of these. Whatever the situation, they require more service attention than the "respectables." Third are the "disreputable poor." These are the so-called hard-to-reach poor—the "sociological basket cases." These are people suffering demoralization. They have few if any skills and no motivation to try to develop any. Without intensive treatment (the success of which cannot be assured) these people are probably unsalvageable and will require service of a custodial character. Needless to say, neighborhood centers must mount different programs to serve the clientele represented by these three distinctive poverty subgroups.

In spite of this picture of real and potential diversity sketched above there are some common elements that serve to identify neighborhood centers as members of a distinctive class of phenomena. One of these is the simple fact of their existence as a *local* neighborhood enterprise. Indeed, it has been said that the one really innovative feature of the whole war on poverty is the effort to involve the poor in a participative role through the neighborhood center kind of organization. Another element common to all centers is that they are of quite recent origin. None of them had been operating more than a year and a half at most when investigated in this study. With such a brief history behind them none of the centers can be expected to exhibit much sign of organizational maturity. A third element common to all centers is that they are engaged in service and/or community action functions. Perhaps a few words to clarify these functions would be in order here.

As used in this report service activity refers to client contact by a more or less specialized functionary who tries to meet some need of the client. It suggests the idea of an individual with particular problems who need help. This concept of service is distinguished from that of community action which involves efforts to mobilize people in the community (like the poor) to engage in collective action aimed at resolving some problem or issue. In short, service has an individualized focus; community action has a collective focus. It is, of course, realized that there are marginal cases where this distinction becomes a bit hazy, as, for example, when a community action effort is mounted to force improvement of a service facility. However, most neighborhood center activities can be unambiguously classified in one or the other of these two categories. Let us now turn directly to an examination of the general patterns of activities exhibited by these centers.

THE SERVICE ROLE

The first observation to be made about the twenty centers examined in this study is that they all are engaged in providing service type help to the poor, but

¹ See Appendix I for community data and Attachment 1.

the range of such service type help is extremely broad. Some centers offer a very limited complement of services, specializing, for example, in employment counseling or homemaker programs or headstart efforts for preschool children. Other centers offer a much "richer service fare" with perhaps a dozen or more specific, distinctive services available to their clientele—truly multipurpose centers. In this regard, there seems to be a slight tendency for centers in the smaller communities and rural areas to offer the more diversified programs. One might expect this to be the case in view of the fact that such locales do not normally have the number and variety of special service agencies, both public and private, usually found in the larger community. It should be noted, however, that the great majority of centers offer several services to their clientele. The highly specialized center is unusual.¹

A second general observation about the twenty centers studied is that there are wide differences in the ways the services are provided. That is to say, in some locales the effort is almost exclusively a referral type of service. In such situations center personnel function as information agents, advising their poverty clients as to the services they are eligible for and the best way to secure such help. This may also involve the counselors accompanying the clients to the service agency offices or in other ways following up the referrals. In other situations the centers operate as outpost sites for the actual dispensing of services. In other words, clients go to the center where they receive right on the premises the services they require. In point of fact, most of the centers engage in both types of activity. Only one center was reported as exclusively referral in function, and only one center was reported as having no referral follow-up. Where the center is functioning as an outpost site it is common for outside agency personnel like employment counselors or public health nurses to dispense their services at the center. This, of course, points up the need for the center personnel to be on working terms with the various service agencies in the community. It should also be noted here that where the center has professional members on its staff, services are provided by them at the center. All but five of the centers in this study have recognized professionals as members of their employed staff.

A third general observation about the twenty centers studied here is that the overwhelming bulk of their service functions involve what might be called traditional services. That is to say, very few of the services being provided by the centers are "new inventions." Rather, they have been around for quite a long time as a sort of pharmacopoeia of public and private responses to various problems and ills of the society. What is innovative here is the "packaging" of these nostrums in neighborhood center programs. This may, of course, involve introducing to poverty areas for the first time particular kinds of service which were in effect previously unavailable to some population groups needing them. In such cases the proffered services are "new" to the client and possibly the area. Perhaps we can summarize this point by saying that with respect to services for the poor, the neighborhood service center effort represents an organizational innovation rather than a substantive one.

A fourth general observation about these twenty centers is that most of the employed personnel in most of the centers have picked up the rhetoric about "coordinating" services for the poor and helping to "organize the poor to help themselves." However, evidence of success in these two major endeavors is very skimpy. To do the first job requires considerable sophistication in organizational matters as well as highly trained counselors. Both of these requisites are in short supply everywhere. Furthermore, because of the deliberate effort in the poverty programs to use untrained neighborhood people wherever possible, the shortage of highly trained counselors here is particularly acute. The second job, of course, is a community action type of function which requires more extensive discussion.

THE COMMUNITY ACTION ROLE

Perhaps the most general statement to be made about community action, which represents a fifth observation about the twenty centers viewed as a whole, is that clear evidence of effective work in this phase of center programming is simply not to be found. What does appear to the field investigator is a potpourri of rather fitful actions which are often ill-timed and unplanned. In an effort to provide some semblance of order to a discussion of the community action phase of the neighborhood center role the following categories of community action are examined separately: action to modify existing services, action to create new

¹ See Appendix II.

services, action to change the face of the neighborhood environment, and action to change the political or power structure of the community.

With respect to the first category listed, the kinds of actions engaged in tend to be focused on changing the rules governing the provision of services—especially employment and welfare services. Technically speaking, not all of the efforts aimed at altering the rules represent community action. However, the potential of genuine community action can and does lie behind much of the rule changing effort. For example, in one community the standard service agencies initiated their own review and reappraisal of policies and regulations so as to preclude militant action by center personnel and their clientele.

To illustrate the kinds of issues involving rules, we might consider employment service. It is standard agency procedure to limit the employment possibilities for young men who have a police record. However, in many poverty areas the proportion of youth with police records is very high. Consequently, employment counselling in accordance with traditional agency practice can have little effect in the area. In a few communities efforts have been made to alter the traditional practice either by erasing records of arrest for minors or by trying to persuade employers to hire youth who have had a brush with the law. In these efforts center personnel have played important roles. Unfortunately, however, the cases of this are infrequent. The usual pattern is one in which center service policy is tradition bound. In regard to employment this means that the emphasis is almost exclusively on fitting the poor to the needs of the employer and his job rather than trying to modify the job situation so that the poor can qualify for it.

With respect to action designed to create new services it should be recalled from earlier comments that very little specific service activity of the centers is new in the sense of being "newly invented." However, for particular areas and their populations the introduction of certain services well rooted in general tradition may represent a real innovation. Examples of this sort of thing would include tutoring programs, day care nurseries, thrift shops, recreation programs, etc. By and large the initiation of such proposals rests with center staff or board members after which efforts are launched to generate widespread resident support. Not infrequently such efforts come to naught—the victims of budgetary vetoes at a higher level in the OEO organization. That is to say, most proposals for new services involve costs which frequently cannot be budgeted. Unless the mobilization of resident support for such new services carries some "clout," they are likely to receive only casual attention from personnel at the CAA level of organization.

The third category of community action listed earlier involves the idea of changing the face of the neighborhood environment. This kind of effort usually focuses on mobilizing residents to clean up and repair their neighborhoods. The thought behind this type of action seems to be that of trying to generate interest among the residents in improving the conditions of their daily life. Pleasant surroundings are presumed to make for spiritual uplift. Such programs were not very conspicuous among the twenty centers studied here. Nine centers had mounted such efforts and all of these were initiated by CAA officials. Our impression is that this type of community action is not a spontaneous thing for poverty area residents. Rather it is a middle-class concern reflecting dismay primarily at the symptoms of the poverty "disease."

The fourth and last category of community action refers to changes intended to alter the political power structure of the community. This is far and away the most controversial aspect of community action. As might be expected, very few of our centers are involved in this type of community action, for in a sense it constitutes the act of biting the hand that feeds one. It also requires some sophistication in leadership which is not in long supply. What there is seems to be linked up with protest groups in the civil rights movement. This also helps to account for why this type of community action tends to be a big city kind of phenomenon. One of the typical targets of such action is slum housing. It is a "natural" cause around which to rally the poverty area residents because it is a gnawing irritation that is very conspicuous. Furthermore, it involves "bad guy" symbols against whom the pent up frustrations of the poor can easily be directed. The question of whether such actions can provide the foundation for a viable organization of the poor that must be reckoned with in terms of political power cannot be answered at the present time.

PERCEPTIONS OF CENTER ROLES

The previous discussion represents the picture of the *actual* role of the neighborhood centers as they have appeared through our research investigations. At this point, however, it would be interesting and instructive to note how different participants in the war on poverty perceive these centers. The most dramatic difference appears between clients' perceptions and those of the administrators and board members.¹ The clients' ideas about what the center is supposed to do are overwhelmingly service in orientation. In their view the purpose of the center is to help people by providing them with the services they need. The idea of organizing the poor to help themselves is not very prominent in the clients' perceptions. This seems to be especially true in the larger cities. On the other hand, when the views of the administrators and board members are examined, the community action function of the center becomes considerably more conspicuous, and relatively speaking the service function idea declines in importance.

This contrast between the perceptions of the client types and administrator types is perhaps to be expected. After all, from the point of view of a poverty client the problem of no job or a sick spouse or an alcoholic brother is hardly something to be resolved by "organizing the poor to help themselves." Yet, by the same token, the administrators' perspectives provide a picture of countless cases of unemployment, ill health, alcoholism, etc., all bound together in a reinforcing network sometimes called the "culture of poverty." To attack such a complex horror armed only with the weapons of individualized service is hardly a tactic that inspires confidence and optimism. Of course, it should be noted here that the kind of community action generally envisioned by the administrative types is not that which threatens the political establishment. In fact, to forestall any such development it is common for the political establishment to try to control the poverty program in the community. Wherever this has occurred and been successful, the neighborhood center programs are almost exclusively service in character with only the tamest kinds of community action in evidence, such as fix-up and paint-up projects.

The perceptions of one other category of OEO participants should be noted before we leave this discussion. These are the public and private agency personnel—the school people, the welfare people, the public health people, the family service people, etc. An examination of their responses to the question of what the functions of neighborhood centers are reveals a very strong service orientation.² This is to be expected. They are, after all, presumably expert servicers. Community action is not only far removed from their routines and interests; it is probably regarded as a bit of a threat, if it is contemplated at all.

In concluding this discussion one final observation might be made which distinguishes welfare agency people from other agency people. There is in the large cities a clear tendency for welfare people to see the center as a place in which clients receive service. On the other hand, non-welfare agency people in large cities clearly see the center as a referral point with actual service being provided elsewhere. One might speculate that this differential perception simply reflects differences in the experiences the several agencies have had in dealing with a poverty clientele.

CENTER ORGANIZATION

It will be recalled that at the beginning of this discussion on the role of the neighborhood center the point was made that the legislative mandate underlying the whole community action program is extremely general and vague. This situation has given rise to an interesting organizational problem involving the neighborhood centers and various established service agencies in the community. Essentially the problem is this: the neighborhood centers are usually *highly unstructured* focal points for service agencies that are themselves *highly structured*. What this means is that a variety of traditional agency routines, regulations, and policies are being brought to bear on an enterprise that has no clearly established ways of dealing with them. In this kind of organizational vacuum it is not surprising to find different functionaries trying to hammer out a *modus operandi* and in the process, frequently creating great stresses and strains. Indeed, it is our belief that a good deal of the trouble attributed to personality factors can be traced to this unsettled organizational situation. Where structure is vague and ill-defined, personality factors have opportunities for free expression not normal-

¹ See Appendix III.

² Ibid.

ly available. There are, however, a number of other observations on the organizational arrangements surrounding the establishment of neighborhood centers that might be mentioned here.

First, to elaborate a bit on the point just presented above, where the initial efforts to establish a CAP involve consultation with an cooperation from traditional agencies, conflict between the neighborhood center operation and the traditional service agencies is minimal. Although this is to be expected, it is not an idle or casual observation. Most of our researchers report conflict and tension between center programs and personnel *and* such traditional service organizations as welfare and education. It is apparent that these types of traditional service organization regard the CAP phase of the war on poverty as a threat to the status quo. After all, from one point of view the very existence of much of the CAP effort testifies to the failure of traditional methods of coping with poverty. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find suspicion at least and more often outright antagonism appearing in the ranks of the service "establishment" when CAA operations like neighborhood service centers loom on the horizon. In this regard, some perceptive CAA boards have with some success tried to alleviate the difficulties by using traditional service agencies as delegate agencies for CAP activities.

A second observation reiterates a point alluded to in passing a bit earlier—namely, that there is a natural tendency for the social and political establishment of a community to seek control over the war-on-poverty effort. There is money and with it power involved in this effort. No astute political organization can permit such a resource to develop capriciously and without direction. Thus, we see efforts by the powers-that-be to bring the CAA and its programs under establishment control. Sometimes this is done by making the CAA a department of the municipal administrative structure and thereby making all war-on-poverty employees in effect city employees. At other times the same effect is produced by the establishment exercising control over the composition of the governing board of the poverty organization, usually the CAA board of directors. In either case, control over budget allocations and the hiring of personnel provides the kind of leverage needed to control and, if necessary, suppress disturbing innovations. As was noted earlier, where the community establishment has succeeded in exercising this kind of control, the neighborhood center program is almost exclusively service in character, with very little community action. This situation seems to obtain most noticeably in small communities and rural areas. However, it also appears in one of the largest communities studied, and signs of it are evident in other good size communities.

A third observation relates to the general nature or character of the center organization. Where the centers are tightly organized with clear, precise functions and status levels specified, the clientele tend to be unresponsive. These are people to whom formal, bureaucratic organization is intimidating. It appears to them to be cold, impersonal, detached, unsympathetic. The difficulty here is not entirely relieved by the intercession of neighborhood organizers—that is, neighborhood residents employed by the center to make contact with the clients. Although these local resident employees can do a lot to "humanize" the large, bureaucratically organized centers, they are not magicians. The fact is that the large centers are not very inviting, especially to the more serious poverty cases—those types labeled earlier as "problematic" and "disreputable." All of this suggests, of course, that the points of articulation between the clientele and the poverty organization should be carefully considered and subtly contrived. This is particularly difficult to achieve in neighborhood centers with staffs of from fifty to two hundred employees.

A fourth observation brings into focus the composition of the governing board of the CAA. This usually is the board of directors, members of which are drawn from all relevant parts of the community. Thus we typically find representatives from public and private welfare organizations, religious groups, municipal agencies, business interests, educational institutions, and the poor themselves. The point here is that of all these representatives, the types most knowledgeable about the problems being addressed, tend to be the poor themselves and the welfare agency people. Since the former have proven to be rather withdrawn and inarticulate representatives, it is the welfare agency people who tend to dominate the business of the board. This means that their traditional service perspective is likely to be the one adopted by the board as policy and program guide. Is it surprising that service innovation is not very conspicuous in the programs of most

centers? Perhaps it should be noted here that in most of the communities studied effective control of the centers is exercised at the CAA level.

The fourth observation presented above leads us rather directly to a fifth which deals with the center proper. In terms of organization most centers have a director, usually hired at the CAA level, a staff of professionals and non-professionals who work under him, and a neighborhood area advisory board. This last feature of center organization typically consists of local area residents, some of whom represent organizations in the area like churches, YMCA's, civil rights groups, etc., and others who represent the people at large. These advisory boards are intended to inform the center director and staff about the needs and wishes of the area residents. Parenthetically, these boards also usually send one or two representatives to sit on the CAA board of directors. This is one of the common procedures for getting representatives of the poor on the CAA governing board.

Two problems frequently arise with respect to the neighborhood advisory board. One is the problem of how adequately the poor are represented on the board. It appears that quite often the representatives of the poor are "company men." That is to say, they are cooperative participants in center programs who can be relied on to support the status quo of the center and not "rock the boat." It might also be noted here that our field researchers report almost unanimously that the participation of the poor in policy and program decisions is very ineffectual both at the local center level and at the CAA board level. This should not be surprising. If one is not very "verbal" in the first place, a formal board type meeting is hardly the setting for putting one's best foot forward. It takes experience to learn how to function in such a setting.

The second problem involves the question of power. As noted in the second observation discussed earlier, control of the poverty program is not an idle task. Such control rests in the hands of those in charge of budget allocations and hiring. Needless to say, local neighborhood advisory boards have little to say about these matters. This means that unless center programs have the approval of CAA personnel they won't be implemented regardless of local advisory board support. When this "fact of life" is finally realized by local advisory board members, it often stirs resentment, disillusionment or both.

SUMMARY

The previous paragraphs and the descriptive materials of Attachment 1 indicate the great variety of roles with which centers are involved. It must also be noted that there are incompatibilities among certain types of roles both within centers and in terms of center relationships with other organizations. The evidence indicates that it is extremely rare to find both aggressive community action and well executed service programs within the same center. The attitudes and organizational arrangements associated with aggressive community action appear to preclude effective service programs most of which involve well-established agencies. It is not surprising that these agencies find it difficult to cooperate with organizations having the mission of radical change. On the other hand, accommodations between centers and traditional agencies are noted in cases where the center goal is principally concerned with services. In these cases centers are concerned with improving services and act as a leavening influence on agencies.

The most appropriate role for centers is not suggested here. However, it is noted that there is a good deal of confusion on this subject which appears to result principally from attempting to combine the mutually incompatible roles of service and aggressive community action in one organization. Last, it is important to recognize that participation of the poor can be effectively associated with either role. One must guard against the romantic and inaccurate concept that the participation of the poor can take place only in an enlightened but drastic effort at rearrangement of the social order.

V. OUTREACH AND PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION

The legislative mandate calling for maximum feasible participation of the poor in community action programs is the guideline for the outreach efforts of the neighborhood centers. In our examination of this outreach effort it soon became apparent that comprehensive, reliable data are not to be found for the centers studied. Accurate records are usually not kept and where there are

some more or less respectable bookkeeping procedures, the results are rarely comparable between centers. The reasons for this are only partially attributable to the disorder, incompetence, and inefficiency that usually accompany the early development stages of new enterprises. Of equal or greater significance in explaining this lacuna is the sheer difficulty encountered in trying to set up a workable, useful scheme of record-keeping for neighborhood centers. So much of the client contact (and meaningful contact) is casual and tangential that trying to capture and preserve it for the record is an almost impossible task. This is not to suggest that no records of value can be kept. Rather, it means that certain important activities of the centers defy easy tabulation and classification.

OUTREACH TECHNIQUES

One feature of the outreach effort which we have been able to investigate relates to the question of techniques employed. In this regard, it is clear that the neighborhood survey involving door-to-door contacts is the most frequently listed technique for getting in touch with the clientele. All of the centers studied used it. However, the variable of community size seems to bear significantly on what supplementary techniques are used. For example, the small communities and rural areas seem to rely almost exclusively on the survey and on referrals from non-OEO agencies. The intermediate size communities use in addition to the survey a rather miscellaneous assortment of techniques including mail and leaflets, telephone, and center-sponsored activities like meetings, parties, elections, etc. The large communities employ the greatest variety of techniques. In these communities the survey approach is followed in order of decreasing frequency by such techniques as mail and leaflets, billboards and newspapers, referrals from clients and area residents, television and radio, referrals from other agencies—both OEO and non-OEO, and center-sponsored activities like parties, meetings, and similar events.

Keeping in mind the caveat expressed at the beginning of this chapter about the lack of comprehensive, reliable data on the outreach effort, one might still have an interest in the kinds of figures that are available. In this regard we were able to secure for ten of our centers (just one-half of the total sample) figures that appear to be roughly comparable. These indicate that the target area population of the ten centers is 361,500 persons. Although this averages out to about 36,000 persons per center, the actual population range is quite great—from 3,000 to 125,000. Projecting from data reporting client contacts in March, April, and May of 1966, it appears that 65,420 persons from the target area were involved in a recorded relationship with centers over a twelve-month period. This represents about 18 percent of the target population.

CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS AND VIEWPOINTS

Unfortunately, we have no reliable descriptive data on what kinds of people these 18 percent really are. We do have, however, some information from interviews with approximately 200 clients secured by our field researchers in connection with their investigation of our twenty neighborhood centers. Although this was not a systematic sample, the interviews do give some picture of clientele characteristics and response to the center operation. For example, these clients were predominantly female. This was especially true in the small communities and rural areas. They also were concentrated in the young adult and mature adult age groups—i.e., between 20 and 65 years of age. The clientele in the small communities and rural areas seemed to be somewhat older than those from large and medium-size communities. With respect to race, Negroes clearly predominated in the large and medium-size places while whites were in the clear majority in the small communities and rural areas. In addition, the clients tended to be married, have families of six or more members, and be unemployed.¹

With these descriptive facts in mind let us now examine rather systematically the responses of these clients to a series of questions about their experiences with the neighborhood center. First, over 70 percent of the clients heard of the center through house-to-house surveys, referrals from other residents, or referrals from non-OEO agencies. The surveys were mentioned most prominently in the small and medium-size communities while resident and agency referrals were most frequently mentioned in the large communities.²

¹ See Appendix IV.

² See Appendix V, Table 1.

With respect to their understanding of the purpose of the centers, the great majority of clients in all the community size classes reported that the centers were to provide services for the poor.¹ As we noted earlier in another section of this report, the idea of community action in which the poor organize to deal with their problems themselves is not very prominent in their thoughts about the neighborhood centers. The poor, however, do understand the idea of services. In this regard our field workers make an interesting observation. They report that most of the clients know about the centers in a very limited fashion. That is to say, their acquaintance with the center is likely to be for the purpose of securing a particular service. Accordingly, they associate the center with that function and nothing else. Thus, the center is known as the place where you can get help with your late AFDC check, or where Mr. X can get a job for eighteen-year-old Johnny, or where you can leave the pre-schoolers when you take on a job as a cleaning woman Thursday mornings, etc.

When asked what the center had done for them or their families between one-quarter and one-third of the clients reported "nothing." This is interesting because most of the clients were contacted either at the center or through center records which indicated that they had received attention from center personnel. Approximately one-third of the clients indicated that they had received service other than employment help at the center. However, employment service was mentioned fairly often especially in the small communities and rural areas.²

When the question mentioned above was turned around, and the clients were asked what they had done for the center, the majority (57%) of the responses indicated "nothing."³ This was particularly true in the small communities and rural areas where two-thirds of the clients reported they had done nothing for the center. Among those who indicated they had done something, volunteer work figured most prominently in their answers.

In an effort to find out what sorts of "facts" about the center were in the minds of the clients, two questions were asked. One asked about who pays for the center. The other inquired about who runs the center and decides what is to be done. Approximately 40 percent of the clients answered the first question by indicating the Federal Government. However, nearly the same proportion replied to the question with a "Don't know" answer.⁴ As for the second question, 47 percent of the clients indicated that they did not know who runs the center. This proportion ran well over 50 percent in the medium and large-size communities and something less than 25 percent in the small communities and rural areas.⁵ Generally speaking, the center director was selected most frequently by those who believed they knew who runs the center. There was also a substantial response in the large communities indicating neighborhood people as the ones who run the center.

Finally, a general evaluation question was asked of the clients—namely, did they feel they were any better off as a result of the center. About 90 percent of the total client group answered this question in the affirmative. However, the range of response was quite broad. For example, nearly all (98 percent) of the small town and rural area clients felt they were "much better off" as a result of the center. This percentage declined to 75 percent among the medium size community chests and dropped to 61 percent for the large community clients.⁶ One gets the distinct impression in reviewing these materials that success of the centers (as measured by expressions of client satisfaction) is rather more noticeable in the small communities and rural areas than elsewhere. These small community centers are almost purely service-oriented operations. Furthermore, their modest size and relatively simple organization make for a much less forbidding and more receptive atmosphere than one is likely to encounter in the large, bureaucratically organized centers in large cities.

So far our treatment of outreach has focused almost exclusively on the client and client-related phenomena like outreach techniques. It should be recognized, however, that the poor can be involved with the center in other ways. For example, we have already noted that the poor are represented on policy-making boards, advisory councils, and the employed staffs of the centers. Indeed, the

¹ See Appendix V, Table 2.

² See Appendix V, Table 3.

³ See Appendix V, Table 4.

⁴ See Appendix V, Table 5.

⁵ See Appendix V, Table 6.

⁶ See Appendix V, Table 7.

number of poverty area residents on boards and councils are roughly equivalent to the number employed at the centers. In this regard, the problems and inadequacies surrounding the poverty residents' efforts to participate on the boards and councils have been discussed in the previous chapter on the role of the center. With respect to staff employment, however, little has been said.

RESIDENT STAFF MEMBERS

Nearly all of the centers have hired residents of the poverty area to work as outreach personnel for the centers. The number of such employees ranges from one per center to eighty or more. Something over two-thirds of the centers have assigned such personnel to full-time work on the outreach problem. The characteristics of these center staff members can be sketched in general terms.¹

First, most of them are female with the greatest preponderance of women workers in the small town and rural area centers (67 percent). Second, the bulk of the staff are concentrated in the age groups, 20 to 35 and 36 to 65. The latter are more heavily represented (59 percent) in the small town and rural area centers while the younger age group predominates in the medium and large city centers. Third, Negroes are heavily represented (over 70 percent) on the staffs of medium and large city centers in our sample. In the small town and rural area centers it is the whites who are in the majority (over 85 percent). Fourth, well over one-half of the center staff are married with the percentages varying from a high of 67 percent in the small town-rural area centers to a low of 52 percent in the medium size community centers. Fifth, the families from which the center staff members come are by and large modest in size—averaging just a little over four people. There seems to be no noticeable variation here by community size. Sixth, the great majority of center staff employees report at least a tenth grade education with a substantial proportion (ca. 50 percent) indicating some college training.

Although this sketch of center employee characteristics is a bit awkward to summarize, it can be pointed out that the picture which emerges resembles that of the clients in some respects but certainly not in all. In particular, the size of family and education characteristics show marked differences between center employees and center clientele. The former are associated with small families, and they also have more educational background.

This indication that the center employees are not completely representative of the poverty area population is perhaps not a surprise if it is remembered that the poor do not constitute a homogeneous group. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the outreach effort has so far made effective contact primarily with the "respectable" poor. These are, of course, the easy-to-reach group—the ones who merely need a "break," an opportunity to get out of their dependency situation. Contact with the "problematic" and especially the "disreputable" poor is not very conspicuous. When it does occur, it tends to arise out of some crisis or emergency.

This observation about the selectivity of the outreach effort suggests the possibility that those involved with centers are already the most active element of the poverty area population. That is to say, they are the ones who were involved in what community affairs there were before centers were established. With the introduction of this new organizational unit called a neighborhood center, these people simply have shifted the locus of their activity. Indeed, this was explicitly acknowledged in one community where a poverty area resident identified the local personnel employed by the center as "neighborhood busybodies"—that is, people who have always been concerned about knowing their neighbors and interacting with them in the community. Now, as staff members of the center, they are simply being paid for doing what they have always been interested in doing. The point here is not to derogate the behavior of these people. Many if not most of them are probably sincere and contribute something of genuine value to their communities. Rather, the point is that the center has not changed these people in any significant way. It has merely given them a new (and perhaps more effective) outlet for their behavioral predispositions.

In this discussion of center personnel it would perhaps be appropriate to mention a problem involving organizational and policy matters. This relates to the OEO policy that says no employee of the poverty program nor member of his family may hold a position on a policy-making board. In effect this means that when a person is on the CAA board of directors or the center advisory board,

¹ See Appendix VI.

neither he nor a member of his family can be employed in the poverty program. The reasoning behind this regulation is understandable. It avoids conflict of interest situations. However, it also creates some problems, the most prominent of which is the way it undermines effective participation of the poor in directing the poverty effort. The difficulty is simply this: those members of the poor who possess qualities making for effective action on governing boards are also the ones who can be used effectively on the center staffs. Since there is no monetary compensation for holding a board position, the economic exigencies force these "poverty stars" to give up their board positions so that they can hold remunerative positions in the poverty program. This, of course, simply exacerbates the problem discussed earlier of ineffectual participation by the poor in policy and program decisions.

After all, "boardsmanship" is not something that comes naturally to people. The poor are particularly handicapped here, for most of them have had little experience in formal group gatherings outside of the church or school settings and possibly police courts. In view of this, it is not very realistic to ask untrained poverty area residents to assume positions and operate confidently in a war-on-poverty effort that at times seems to be organized like the League of Women Voters.

The remarks above have focused on the problem of adequate training for poverty area residents who are linked to the war-on-poverty program as employees or board members. There is, however, another aspect of the education or training picture. This relates to the professionals who are working in or out of the neighborhood centers. Our field workers report that there is little, if any, effort expended on training or guiding these people to perform effectively in their new settings. It is apparently assumed that professional welfare workers, health personnel, or employment counselors just naturally know how to function in a neighborhood center. There is reason to believe that this is occasionally, and perhaps frequently, not the case. It appears that there are a good number of professionals who could use some advice on how to relate to non-professional colleagues. More than a little "static" seem to be generated by abrasive relationships between professionals and non-professionals in the centers.

ORGANIZATION FOR OUTREACH AND PARTICIPATION

The previous sections of this chapter have focused on rather specific features of the outreach effort. However, one aspect of this effort has not been directly addressed—namely, how the center functions as an organizational mechanism for promoting outreach. In this regard several observations can be made.

First, the very existence of the center as a visible, material feature of the local neighborhood environment makes for at least potential contact with the poor. This point should not be casually acknowledged as obvious but of minor importance. Numerous studies have revealed that the horizons of life for the poor are severely restricted. This can mean quite literally that for large numbers of the poor the outer limits for 90 percent or more of their daily activity lie just three or four blocks away. Effective contact with such people must be made within the neighborhood area.

Second, the use of neighborhood residents as paid staff members who go out into the local area to make contacts is a direct and potentially effective way of linking people to the center. The potency of direct, face-to-face contact between people has been well documented. This is particularly evident among those who know one another.

Third, the casual, informal atmosphere of small neighborhood centers can be disarming and hence appealing to poor people who are uncomfortable in formally organized settings. This is why large, bureaucratically organized centers tend to be self-defeating in terms of outreach. The forbidding appearance of such centers makes them little different from the central offices of traditional service agencies.

Fourth, although, as noted earlier, the establishment of advisory councils for neighborhood centers militates against effective participation by the poor, this organizational feature can influence outreach in a positive way. The reference here is to the fact that most councils of this kind have in their membership representatives of local organizations like churches, branches of YMCAs, schools, civil rights groups, fraternal organizations, special interest clubs, labor unions, etc. Each of these groups has its own membership among the neighborhood poor. Contact with these area residents can be established by the center through the intervening influence of the local organization's representatives on the center advisory council.

Fifth, the same general process described in "four" above can operate with respect to other service agencies like welfare, health, employment, Salvation Army, etc. That is to say, if the center through its referral functions helps to create a new clientele for the traditional service agencies, these same agencies may well reciprocate in kind. In this way the center's outreach effort can be strengthened by the recruiting efforts of the more traditional service agencies.

SUMMARY

Most center are well designed to engage in outreach efforts and there is evidence that the technique of utilizing local residents for this purpose is effective in reaching at least one segment of the poor. Resident participation as staff members, particularly in outreach roles, appears to work well but there is evidence that there is little effective resident participation on boards and councils. Training programs, to the extent they exist, do not appear to be adequate to enhance substantially the capabilities of the persons, both resident and professional, involved with centers.

VI. ACTIVITIES OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS

INTRODUCTION

In the two preceding chapters dealing with the role of the centers and the outreach of the centers numerous references were made to the activities of the centers. However, except for examples cited for illustrative purposes, these references were rather general in nature. The purpose of this chapter is to flesh out the skeletal structure of center activities sketched earlier. This will be done by discussing the pattern of service activities, the community action effort, and the costs that seem to be involved in neighborhood center operations.

SERVICE ACTIVITIES

The specific kinds of services offered through the neighborhood center programs vary widely. Generally speaking, three determinants seem to be operating here. One is the obvious factor of need. Particular problems require particular service solutions. A second is the factor of service personnel. Regardless of need, where appropriate personnel are unavailable, the service in question cannot be provided. A third determinant (and one clearly related to the first) refers to the auspices under which the center programs were established. In several instances the neighborhood service center organization was built upon previous programs in research and/or service. Understandably, the center programs have reflected this specialized interest. It might also be pointed out here that the composition of the policy-making board which oversees the center operation (usually at the CAA level) influences the programs that are developed. For example, if public health professionals are prominent on the board, services in this area are likely to become a conspicuous part of the center program.

Among the variety of services represented in our twenty centers,¹ employment-counseling-and-placement clearly is the most prominently represented. Eighty-five percent of our centers have this listed by their directors as a particular service offered. The next most frequently mentioned service is welfare of the AFDC type. Seventy percent of our centers offer this kind of aid, according to the center directors. Education and health services follow in frequency with just over one-half of the centers offering them. Education here refers to basic education in the three "Rs", as well as nursery school, grade school, and high school tutoring, etc. Falling below the fifty percent mark in center representation (and in order of decreasing frequency) are such services as housing (finding housing, coping with eviction problems, etc.), recreation, information provider, consumer education, legal aid, and probation and parole assistance. These last two are not at all represented in our small communities and rural areas. However, they do appear in our intermediate size and large communities. Size of community also seems to be related to the frequency of education services offered. More specifically, this service is much less frequently listed in the center programs of the large communities than it is in the small and intermediate size communities and rural areas.

¹ See Appendix VIII.

When attention is turned to how the particular services discussed above are patterned in the way they appear relative to one another, the most common grouping of the two finds education and employment linked together. Sixty percent of our centers exhibit this pattern. The next most common pattern involves the linkage of employment and welfare or employment and health services. Just over one-half of our centers show one or the other of these patterns. If we turn to patterns involving three services, the most common arrangement finds education, employment, and welfare linked together closely followed by a linkage among education, welfare and health services. Forty-five percent of our centers show the first of these three-service patterns while forty percent show the second. With respect to groupings involving four services, only one seems noticeably frequent—namely, the linkage among education, employment, welfare, and health services. Forty percent of our twenty centers exhibit this pattern. Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that all of the centers in small communities and rural areas exhibit this four-service pattern, and two of the five intermediate size communities show it. It is in the large communities that we find the greatest diversity in service patterning.

With respect to the service patterns described above, a cautionary note should perhaps be added lest one be misled by reading into the findings implications that are not properly there. For example, although the most common pattern involving two services links together education and employment, there is no evidence that these represent a coordinated service package in most of the centers exhibiting this pattern. Quite to the contrary, the two services deal with different clientele. The overwhelming bulk of the education service focuses on children and adolescent youth. It is not education directly geared to developing occupational skills. Indeed, there is little evidence in any of the centers suggesting carefully planned efforts to present well coordinated service programs. This is something often talked about but rarely achieved. At present, with rare exceptions the most that can be said about the coordinating function of neighborhood centers is that they represent a single accessible point for the dissemination of information about services. This is a convenience for clients seeking information and represents a service whose values should not be underestimated. At the same time, however, it is a far cry from the idea that centers should function to coordinate services on "a case" basis. This is a much more difficult task *requiring a high order of professional and technical skills*. Where efforts have been made to set up integrated programs, the impetus seems to have come from planning at the CAA level.

The categories used in the preceding discussion inventorying center services are admittedly broad. This was necessary in order to summarize materials for all of the centers studied. As a concluding statement to this section of the report, however, it might be enlightening to examine a more detailed listing of some of the services reported by our field researchers—that is, specific services that might not come to mind readily when contemplating the broad service categories used for statistical purposes.

Under the rubric of recreation a great variety of activities can be listed. These include efforts to arrange team sports for young people by setting up quasi-leagues for different ages groups. Along the same lines, a number of centers are fostering teen clubs for boys and girls, day camps, teen-age dances, and classes in arts and crafts. Such activities are especially promoted in the summer when the close of school leaves great numbers of young people in a state that might be described as "not so much free as at large." One center has tried to promote family recreation nights at the center in an effort to deal with the poor as family units. This has not been notably successful except among those who already seem to have a healthy family life.

One segment of the poverty population which has frequently been very much neglected is the elderly people. Center services catering to the needs of this clientele element include such things as a medicare alert effort, the establishment of senior citizens' clubs, and the organization of volunteers to visit and lend assistance to those confined to their homes. One center which is located in an area with a high proportion of elderly residents has been quite successful in promoting services of the kind described here.

Another somewhat distinctive population element in need of special service attention is the ethnic minority and foreign-born element. Centers with substantial numbers of such residents in the neighborhood have frequently set up English language classes and "Americanization" programs for these people. A few centers have tried to help those residents who have run afoul of

the law by providing probation and parole counseling and by providing legal aid, bail money or other such assistance for those who have been arrested. Still other special services provided by or through the neighborhood centers include planned parenthood counseling, credit union opportunities, neighborhood youth corps, and the scheduling of meetings or forms for political candidates.

One service in particular which attracted the special attention of one of our field researchers is the effort to train clients in how to apply for a job and how to take exams for a job. This is not occupational skill training. Rather, it is training in how to cope with some of the realities of bureaucratic life such as how to take civil service exams. It is a skill which is becoming more and more important in the modern world.

COMMUNITY ACTION EFFORTS

In Chapter IV it was stated that community action is a very undeveloped feature of the neighborhood centers investigated in this study. In this regard it will be recalled that community action here refers to the mobilization of the poor in a collective effort to resolve some problem or issue. Needless to say, efforts of this kind don't just happen. They must be deliberately initiated and managed. This requires leadership skills of an uncommon sort. As a case in point, Saul Alinsky is reported to have said that it takes three years to train an effective community organizer. It should not be surprising therefore to find neighborhood centers, none of which have been in existence more than two years, exhibiting few signs of promising community action development.

These remarks above should not be construed to mean that there are no signs of effective community action among the centers investigated here. In point of fact noticeable community action efforts have been mounted in several communities. None of these, however, are in small town or rural areas. Such locales appear to be utterly devoid of anything resembling collective action by people living in poverty conditions. In some cases (especially in rural areas) this seems to be due at least in part to the lack of frequent contact among the people. It is very difficult to organize people whose settlement pattern places them in situations of relative isolation. In other cases, the community "establishment" is so centrally involved in the whole CAP operation that community action aimed at fundamental change in any feature of the established order is simply unthinkable. This often seems to occur where officials in the education system play prominent roles in the organization and operation of the CAP.

When we turn from the small town and rural area setting to the large city, community action efforts become, if not spectacular, at least visible on occasion. Where they have appeared most conspicuously one can usually find evidence of a leadership which has a background of experience in activist movements (usually civil rights). Such experience, however, provides no guarantee of success. There are still a number of factors that pose serious difficulties for community action enthusiasts. One of these is the heterogeneous character of the population in many poverty areas. Reference here is to racial and ethnic heterogeneity which frequently operates as a divisive force among the poor. Another factor is the high transiency rate of many poverty areas. A sense of solidarity with one's fellows is hard to develop if one's fellows keep changing. A third factor is the counter force exerted by the establishment, often in the form of CAP activities. That is to say, a neighborhood community action effort can be blunted by resolving at a higher level a grievance which is serving as a rallying point for collective protest. This is especially true if the grievance resolution is achieved before the community action is well launched. Of course, one might argue that such a development really represents the triumph of community action. However, such a judgment appears, after some reflection, to be a bit hasty.

When the establishment moves to resolve a grievance which threatens to give rise to collective protest, it is the *potential* of community action that is being reacted to. Although this may appear to be a capitulation on the part of the establishment, it can also mean that the establishment is attempting to forestall the development of something far more significant than the particular point at issue—namely, the effective organization of poor people in a self-conscious effort to exercise their voice in affairs of consequence to them. It takes an astute community action leadership to cope with this problem be-

cause poor people tend to be rather forthright pragmatists. If the cause that is stirring them up disappears, they rapidly become "unstirred."

The reason for discussing this point is that it is illustrated in several of the communities under study. Center programs are being used in these communities to contain militant elements of the poverty population. Most of these communities have had histories of violence and riot. Apparently it is believed that improved service programs linked to neighborhood centers can blunt the aggressive impulses of the poor who are being wooed by agitators. The strategy seems to be: "Give them a little so that they won't ask for a lot." It is a strategy that seems to work if the activist leadership is unsophisticated.

Another technique used to achieve the same result is to coopt the activist leadership by hiring it to work in the CAP operation. Such employees can always be dismissed if they turn out to be recalcitrant and uncooperative. Indeed, this is precisely what was done in one community. What is more, the dismissal of the agitators was accompanied by explicit efforts to resolve several grievances voiced by the poor through their leadership. This had the two-fold purpose of undermining the specific grounds for community action protest and also undermining the basis of the protest leadership.

Organizationally speaking, community action efforts tend to take the form of setting up neighborhood associations, block clubs, mothers' organizations, and other special interest groups. The constant problem here is how to stimulate and then sustain interest. Organizing for the sake of organization is not very appealing to most people—particularly poor people. Concrete issues of the bread-and-butter type are the effective stimuli for these people. Since such issues are an everpresent reality in the life of the poor, interest would seem to be easy to generate if the community action leadership can dramatize how collective action can be effective in dealing with the issues. The problem of sustaining interest, however, is more complex. Unless there are relatively immediate rewards to serve as reinforcement stimuli, the rank-and-file participants are quick to lose interest in community action efforts. It is for this reason that effective community action organizers must possess unusual skills and be sophisticated in their use. It is also for this reason that measures taken by the establishment to obscure the successes of community action can blunt the impact and destroy the long range significance of such efforts.

As has been noted above in a couple of different contexts, leadership skills in the area of community action are not in long supply. Where they do make their infrequent appearances, they seem to be linked to background experiences in labor union and/or civil rights movements. Even here, however, many of the emergent leaders do not appear to be very sophisticated. What frequently enters the picture to sustain their efforts in the ineptitude of the establishment. In short, where there has been mounted some significant community action effort, it has almost invariably been associated with rather forthright expressions of opposition from the traditional social order. This has served to crystallize and dramatize the issues for the poor and provided them with beautifully tailored "bad guy" symbols against which they can enthusiastically unite.

In only one city with a noticeable community action effort is the picture described above significantly altered. This is a community in which professional service personnel, dismayed by the ineffectiveness of their own agency efforts in dealing with poverty, initiated their own program of giving the poor a voice in determining events affecting their welfare. This was done prior to the establishment of the whole OEO and CAP venture. When the latter was introduced, it in effect took over with minor modifications an ongoing enterprise. The apparent success of this community action effort to date is conspicuous when set against the complete absence of such developments in most other communities and the rather marginal results appearing in those few communities which have seen some concerted attempt to amount an effective community action effort. It would appear that cooperation rather than opposition from the established order can do a lot toward implementing the idea of the poor organizing to help themselves. Unfortunately, such an enlightened viewpoint is not often found in establishment circles.

COSTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS

As previously indicated, neighborhood centers vary in size from a one-man rural operation to a two hundred person enterprise in a metropolitan city. Another significant variation is that in some CAP's almost all of the community's programs are operated through and by the neighborhood centers while in other

cases centers have no program involvement except reaching out into the community to obtain participants. These wide variations in size and mode of operation are naturally reflected in the funding of the centers. Some centers have annual budgets in excess of \$1 million while others spend less than \$25,000 a year.

Almost all of the center budgets are devoted to staff salaries and almost all of the staff are poor residents of local neighborhoods. Thus, it can be said that the funds utilized in center operations are resulting directly in the employment of poor people, most of whom were previously unemployed.

It is almost impossible to compare costs and achievements at different centers because no two centers operate in the same way. Further, the records of outreach and services are fragmentary and incomparable. However, there are some comments that can be made regarding this subject. Two functions occupy almost all the efforts of most centers and these are outreach and services. Community organization or community action receives comparatively little attention at most centers except insofar as it is a method of getting people involved with center affairs. The outreach effort is costly because it involves personal door to door "selling" and there are no economies of scale in this activity. The economies that are realized are important and these are that the same outreach effort is generating a clientele for many organizations that would otherwise not be serving these people or would be involved with probably more costly and duplicative outreach efforts of their own. Thus, it is suggested that this work, although as yet not reaching a significant portion of the target populations, is a utilization of funds with a high return for the amount invested.

Funds are also spent for center staff and for staff of other agencies outposted to the centers who provide services. Most of the services provided are not new but are instead the traditional fare of established agencies are relatively minor modifications. Thus, the cost of providing the services and their quality is comparable to experience in better established social agencies. What is new is that a new "market" is being reached and in a way that is somewhat more responsive to the demands of the service recipients.

Most centers do not devote a lot of time and resources to community action although there are some notable exceptions. Where community action is emphasized a great deal of effort has been expended for what appear to be relatively minor results in the way of residential participation. However, the lack of standards makes it difficult to measure achievement. It is suggested that both the propriety and efficacy of emphasizing community action continue to be moot points until there is considerably more evidence to evaluate.

VII. EVALUATION

CRITERIA

This section deals principally with the neighborhood center as a device for implementing the purposes of the Economic Opportunity Act. Any evaluation of these purposes is peripheral to the task at hand.

About two years ago there were no such organizations as neighborhood centers. They are not required or suggested by law but are instead an outgrowth of administrative suggestions by the national level of OEO to the hundreds of community action agencies established to carry out the mandate of Title II. At the first rather confused period of their development there was little in the way of clear exposition of their precise goals, functions and justification for existence. Apparently, some previous experiences prompted the concept; it seemed to have merit; and it was incorporated into the CAP arsenal of programs and organizational devices.

The Community Action Program Guide¹ briefly mentions "neighborhood centers" and "multi-service centers" but the exposition is very limited. Since the first hectic days, there appears to have been a deliberate effort at the national level to avoid detailed instructions with respect to centers. This is a way of giving expression to the general philosophy that the local people should be encouraged to develop their own programs and organizations and that federal officials must be careful not to preempt this role. Recently, a pamphlet entitled "The Neighborhood Center"² was released. This document does not focus on the "service"

¹ "Community Action Program Guide," Volume 1. Instructions for Applicants, October 1965, p. 28.

² *The Neighborhood Center*, Office of Economic Opportunity, July 1966.

aspect of centers; it is quite general; and its distribution is so current that it cannot have affected the centers studied. In view of these facts, precise criteria for the evaluation of neighborhood centers are not available from official sources. Instead, these criteria must be inferred from an analysis of events which actually occurred and from a review of the few written materials available.

The criteria for evaluation suggested below are not mutually exclusive but each emphasizes a particular characteristic that can be considered on a reasonably separate basis.

Criterion 1. Local Outreach

Centers are considered to be mechanisms for reaching out in a neighborhood to contact the poor residents. There is the belief that the poor do not have adequate contacts with the organizations representing the social, political and economic structure and with each other. The center is conceived of as an important institution to overcome this deficiency. All concepts of the proper center role tend to hinge on the ability of centers to create a clientele of poor people who have some kind of continuing relationship with the centers. The nature and extent of the outreach of centers is clearly an important consideration in their evaluation.

Criterion 2. Integration

The CAA is supposed to be a device to integrate a wide variety of interests so that they will deal constructively, efficiently and comprehensively with the problem of poverty in the community. The neighborhood center is to carry out this same role at the neighborhood level—the level affording the most direct contact with the poor.

Criterion 3. Maximum Feasible Participation

Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act defines a community action program as one which, among other things, "is developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served." Although this mandate is interpreted in a wide variety of ways it is clear that centers should be organizations where the maximum feasible participation is taking place.

Criterion 4. Significant Change

One of the basic postulates underlying the entire OEO effort is that there should be changes in the ways existing institutions relate to the poor and the ways in which the poor relate to these institutions and other aspects of their environment. Thus, it is clear that centers must be agents for change.

Criterion 5. Reasonable Cost

A criterion for considering any program or institution is that its costs bear some reasonable relationship to the results it is achieving and that alternative approaches do not offer equivalent solutions at considerably less cost.

It is believed that the inter-related criteria set forth above provide useful broad categories for developing an evaluation framework. More precise and specific criteria within these broad categories will be utilized when considering the available data. Thus, the following evaluation introduces and develops additional specific criteria as necessary.

OUTREACH

Discussion

The materials presented in previous sections of this report and in Attachment 1 describe both the strengths and weaknesses of neighborhood centers in terms of their outreach to the poor. To review, there is clear evidence that a very considerable effort, indeed the major effort at most centers, is being devoted to reaching the poor. The records maintained at centers are so inadequate that it is difficult to assess quantitatively the results of the outreach effort, but two conclusions may be drawn: First, the work is having some success because a clientele for services and center participation has developed in every case; and second, the success is very small in terms of the total numbers of persons to be reached, the quality of these contacts, and the extent to which the "hard to reach" poor are being drawn to center programs. An attempt is being made to do a job never before accomplished, and the attempt is being made with brand new organizations and staffs composed largely of people with only the most meagre work experience and an almost complete lack of prior training. In view of the shortcomings and the problems, it is indeed remarkable that the program has accom-

plished so much so fast. The accomplishments are even more remarkable when one realizes that many of the targets of the outreach effort have been either ignored, or at best casually handled, by most of the traditional service organizations.

It is true that outreach efforts have concentrated on the upper levels of the poverty group (the respectable poor) because they are the easiest to reach, the most likely to respond favorably, and because the alternatives of attempting to reach the "problematic poor" can be extremely difficult and frustrating, especially for the typical outreach worker who is generally a member of the "respectable poor." Even though the easier road may seem to have been chosen in most cases, it has not been an easy road, and the numbers and types of persons reached do constitute an encouraging beginning.

The present organizational arrangements of the neighborhood centers present some problems as well as a generally favorable outlook. In some cities, extremely large centers have assumed an institutional quality which is unattractive to the clientele. In some cases, local outreach workers have grown away from their own neighbors and can no longer perform effectively. In some cases the struggles between the centers and the traditional agencies have been so abrasive and demanding that little effort is left over for reaching the poor. In some cases, the newly-created clientele were not satisfied with their relationship to the center and slipped away. This last factor is rather complex and has been discussed more fully in other sections. Needless to say, the outreach is of little avail if the persons contacted do not find some satisfactions in their subsequent encounters with the center.

Evaluation

Neighborhood centers that have close ties with other local groups, that involve local people in the organization and operation of programs, and that have an active outreach effort, appear to be making a significant beginning in reaching at least one strata of the poverty group. Although improvements are possible, it is clear that the concept, organization and operation of the centers are quite appropriate for an effective outreach program. Indeed, it is difficult to envision a basically different organizational and operating arrangement that is likely to be more successful.

INTEGRATION

Discussion

Each community has a variety of public and private organizations concerned with providing services or assistance of some type to a clientele. One of the purposes of the neighborhood center is to insure that the clientele of these organizations is defined to include the poor. Another purpose is to act as a catalyst or focal point for the organization of all resources for the poor. This latter role implies that pre-existing organizations will function in such a way as to contribute to a joint or collective effort in eliminating poverty and its causes. It implies that there must be substantial changes in previous modes of operation because poverty has in the past been relatively unaffected by these organizations.

This project was not designed to study the policies and programs of "traditional" public agencies and private groups concerned with social services, but a few broad comments are appropriate at this time. These organizations, operated largely by professionals, have had great difficulty in coordinating their activities despite frequent efforts to do so. Differences in outlook, type of service, internal organization and professional background have often militated against effective joint efforts. The integrated efforts that appear to have been most successful have focused on "case" coordination and have involved a very considerable devotion of time and effort to provide across-the-board but intensive help for families. Integrated efforts of large organizations dealing with particular neighborhoods, types of clientele or problems have been rare and not often successful.

The neighborhood center introduced a number of new factors into the situation. First, there was emphasis on reaching and serving the poor, a group inadequately served by other organizations for a variety of reasons. Second, a new organization was created with its own values and its own internal problems, and this organization presumed to suggest and in some cases demand radical changes in the pre-existing agencies. Third, there was money available, very often in considerable amounts, to be utilized for services that might help the poor. It is now possible to determine in some measure the results of combining these factors.

There is evidence that the activities and attitudes of many agencies, private and public, have changed significantly in the past two years. The evidence sug-

gests that a new clientele of poor has been recognized and that efforts are being made to serve these people in new ways. Agencies post their own people in centers to provide services; they take referrals from centers; and, although the relations are often acrimonious, in many cases agency-center accommodations have been worked out. Whether there are basic changes in the attitudes of these agencies toward their clientele is a moot point. It appears that although there may be some changes in traditional ways of doing things, there are not yet changes in the traditional ways of thinking.

Observations of center operations indicate they are not generally efficient or well-organized, using the same criteria that would be applied to a welfare department or employment service, for instance. To the extent that they are well organized in conventional terms, they seem to be ineffective in their outreach and community action roles. Nevertheless, highly structured traditional agencies are now interacting with loosely structured centers and, while each is influenced by the other, the result has not yet been an effective integration of effort to solve the problem of neighborhood poverty. For instance, there appears to be relatively little program coordination within the center, among agencies, and between the center and agencies. Clients continue to perceive the center and the agencies as places where they may get help with a particular kind of problem. Indeed, most clients tend to identify the centers so closely with particular services that they often do not even know that it is a neighborhood service center as such.

It is interesting to note that when centers have considerable autonomy and have a definite interest in community action there is the greatest difficulty of coordination between service agencies and centers. Agencies tend to operate on a community-wide basis and it is apparently disruptive to them to have to operate on a multitude of different neighborhood bases.

It has been observed that in the cases where the centers are most closely associated with the structure of the municipal government there has been the most effective integration of services—most of which are also associated with this same level of government. Where centers are relatively independent and autonomous and where there has been the fullest participation of poor residents, the integration of services has been least in evidence.

Evaluation

It appears that the present organizational arrangements, staffing patterns and goals most common to centers and agencies do not encourage an integration of services of benefit to the poor. There is evidence of modification of individual services, but coordinated neighborhood approaches and programs continue to be rare.

MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION

Discussion

Previous sections of this report have discussed the variety of interpretations of the phrase "maximum feasible participation" and the ways in which the interpretations are implemented at neighborhood centers. In spite of the variety evident, it should be clear that centers are an appropriate locus for this participation. Further, it is clear that the view is generally held, at least by many center officials, that an appropriate goal of center programs is to decrease the dependence of the poor on services and to cultivate their individual growth, independence and aspirations for achievement. In this discussion, participation of the poor is defined as including but not being synonymous with aggressive community action.

The research has revealed one common thread that appears evident through all forms of participation in all areas—it is the upper stratum of the poor which is involved and the "problematic" and "disreputable" poor are almost totally uninvolved with the center except on an emergency basis. Thus, the comments to follow deal only with this upper group and it must not be forgotten that most of the poor have no involvement whatsoever.

In discussing this subject, it is appropriate to consider what is happening to the people involved and what is happening to their environment as a result of their involvement. The focus in this section is on the former question and the latter subject is considered in the following section.

Participation of the poor and other neighborhood residents occurs in the roles of neighborhood council members, paid centers employees and volunteer workers. Aggregate data for our sample indicate that, numerically, participation is approximately equal in the council roles and the employee roles. A thorough investigation of council members was not possible in this study but a number of tentative generalizations appear to be possible. First, many of the poor mem-

bers of councils are inarticulate and ineffective in terms of influencing the courses of action chosen. They may well be learning how to participate in this type of group situation, but the overt evidence indicates that for the most part the learning has not yet been transferred into effective participation. Second, those of the poor who are most active are those most active and aspiring at the outset so their roles are changed generally only to the extent that they have a new organization in which to participate. Third, there seems to be a great deal of frustration associated with board membership, especially as compared with being a paid staff member. As a matter of fact, one of the chief frustrations is that it is impossible to be both. In addition, council members feel that their views are not respected, that they have no control over the center and/or that they are inadequate to cope with the complexity of affairs confronting them. There are exceptions to this generalization, but they are rare. The more common situation is one in which board membership has tended to be an unrewarding experience. In addition to other factors, this may be because few CAA officials seem to realize that board membership requires skills which can and should be taught and that board members should be compensated for their time involved.

Paid employment of local residents seems to be a much more satisfactory type of participation. Another project¹ concerned itself more fully with this subject. However, the findings of both research efforts indicate that the participation of the nonprofessional in center activities is a very favorable development and that the problems involved are minor when compared with the obvious benefits and achievements. Those involved with this project believe that the lack of adequate training for these people is one of the most serious problems that needs attention.

Volunteer services are offered in a comparatively limited way by residents of poverty neighborhoods. Few efforts have been made to involve people on a voluntary basis and these have tended to concentrate on attracting people with particular skills, such as teachers. Thus, few data are available to evaluate the volunteer problem accurately.

There has been an impetus from Washington to involve the poor in positions having responsibility and authority. The approach has focused on involving people who are chosen through some sort of democratic process. This approach has been successful on a quantitative basis for the poor are indeed filling board positions. While this is, of course, a necessary first step, the quality of the involvement should now be a matter of concern. The same may be said for the poor involved as staff members, although in this case the problems do not appear as severe.

One organizational feature that has tended to inhibit satisfying participation at the neighborhood level is the degree of control which the CAA often exerts over the center. The more aspiring poor members of neighborhood boards feel that their activities are circumscribed and futile as long as budget control, staff selection and program development are largely confined to the CAA level. Since the CAA is the focal point in terms of control of the CAP, and since this control tends not to be delegated to the neighborhood level, the neighborhood center has not yet become the ideal locus for maximum feasible participation.

Evaluation

Participation of the poor as employees in the conduct of center programs seems to be well advanced and largely successful in terms of immediate aspirations. Participation of the poor as policymakers and administrators seems to have been achieved on a quantitative basis but there appears to be little effective involvement due to a lack of training in some cases and a lack of authority in others. The "problematic" and "disreputable" poor appear to be almost completely uninvolved as active participants in center programs. It is suspected that an examination of middle-class society might well reveal the same patterns, and it is important not to establish criteria for neighborhood centers that exceed those appropriate for other types of organizations.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGE

Discussion

Significant changes involving the poor can take place in social, economic and political institutions, in the physical environment, and among the poor

¹ Daniel Yankelovitch, Inc., *A Study of the Nonprofessional in the CAP*, Prepared for the Office of Economic Opportunity, September 1966.

themselves. This section briefly summarizes the changes that appear to have occurred and some of the reasons for them. It is extremely difficult to disassociate the neighborhood center from the entire OEO effort in this regard and to isolate causes and effects. For instance, it is believed that the pervasiveness of the anti-poverty program has created a new awareness of poverty as a problem, and this awareness is a significant change. The extent to which the change is attributable to any particular feature of the anti-poverty program is almost impossible to measure. This section, however, attempts to focus on those changes which appear to relate most directly to the neighborhood centers.

As indicated before, it is believed that certain significant changes have taken place in many public and private social agencies. They are involved with extending their outreach to the poor; they have exhibited some flexibility in redesigning their services to suit the poor, and they evidenced at least some sympathy in some places for the concept that the poor are deserving of the respect appropriate for any human being. It is difficult to ascertain which of these changes are associated with particular causes. It does seem evident that the existence of centers as physical entities with some funds and some staff has involved social agencies with serving an extended and somewhat different clientele. Pressures of many types have probably resulted in changes in the nature of services offered and the way they are offered. The lack of integrated service programs does not generally seem to have been affected by the existence of the centers. Further, this research project was not designed to determine if particular services actually provided are appropriate to the problems being encountered by the poor and if they are assisting with the solution of these problems. The general impression conveyed by our field research associates' reports, however, is somewhat negative.

Political organizations (including political parties and local government officials) appear to be concerned that neighborhood centers are being or can be used for grass roots organization that might be threatening to the established order. In certain cases this has resulted in efforts to suppress and/or control centers with community action interests, and in some cases it has resulted in greater sensitivity to the requirements of poor citizens. These large-city reactions appear to relate directly to the existence of the neighborhood centers that have direct contact with the poor. They also appear to relate to the fact that the centers and their clientele are not completely predictable and thus the established official has to be alert to developments which may injure him.

Economic institutions appear to be least affected by the existence of neighborhood centers. There have been minor instances where local business abuses in poverty neighborhoods have been discovered and corrected but, for instance, the employment practices of businesses remain essentially unchanged and they still militate against the poor.

The research reveals isolated instances in which there is a noticeable change in the environment, but for the most part the conditions in which poor people live remain unchanged. Poor housing, sanitation, transportation, education, etc. continue to be endemic.

The most important possibilities for change are with the poor themselves, and the heart of the CAP concept is that opportunities for the poor to advance will be created and that the desire and capability to advance will be encouraged. With respect to the opportunities, the neighborhood center has created paying and volunteer positions open to poor people, but other opportunities for development and advancement continue to appear very limited, especially for adults. The extent of the opportunities for educational advancement for youngsters have not been studied here.

Some evidence is available about the attitudes of the poor people contacted in their roles as council members, employees and clients of centers. It is clear that it is the employees who appear most changed. They appear to have the spirit, dedication and desire to succeed; they have the feeling they are already doing useful things; and they expect to continue to be able to operate with some degree of effectiveness. Some board members share the enthusiasm and optimism of the staff but others have not yet been reached or are already disillusioned.

The clientele appears to be least affected although not unaffected. Most clients contacted continue to focus on the need for basic services to help get a job or solve some emergency problem such as a fire, injury or eviction. Most, however, do feel that the center has helped them and that someone does care about their plight although they continue to be skeptical that their situations will be really

improved. A smaller number of center clients appears to feel that they can influence the society in which they live and that the center can be a helpful agent in this activity. Apparently, a significant minority of those having some contact with the center have this view. Thus, one can say of the target population that most have not yet been reached in a meaningful way at all; that some have become clients for services and perceive the centers as givers of services and themselves as recipients of services; and that a still smaller number regard themselves as active members of society with the right and ability to influence it. To the extent that these feelings represent shifts from apathetic, helpless attitudes they are significant and appear to relate to some involvement with the center.

Evaluation

Neighborhood centers appear to be influencing the significant changes that are taking place in some social service agencies, some political and governmental bodies, and among some of the poor people. With regard to the poor, there is evidence that at least a significant minority of those in contact with the center have an enhanced view of their own possibilities and roles in society. There do not appear to be basic organizational or operational arrangements which preclude significant changes from occurring if the CAA and center concur on the need for and nature of the changes.

REASONABLE COST

Discussion

To determine if the neighborhood center program is carried on at reasonable cost it is appropriate to review the nature of the costs involved, the magnitude of the expenditures, the purposes of the centers and the alternative ways of achieving similar goals.

A previous section of this report has indicated almost all of the funds devoted to neighborhood centers are for the payment of staff salaries and that most of the staff employed are poor people from local poverty areas. These people generally have not been able to obtain other employment opportunities and their association with the center, if nothing more, does provide decent work and incomes for them and their families. This research and other inquiries also reveal that these poor employees are developing positive attitudes about their own roles in society and are gaining some competence to cope successfully with their environment. Thus, the center experience is a training program for these workers and, as such, may not be more costly than other forms of training.

Centers serve three different principal functions: outreach, service and community action. The outreach function is difficult because it requires personal contact with potential clients—an expensive process. The experiences of well-established social service agencies indicate that they have not been able to perform this function at a lesser cost. Indeed, for the most part, such agencies have been able to perform it only in a very limited way. The centers' outreach to the poor has enabled them to extend their services substantially. Thus, it is suggested that this aspect is performed at reasonable cost and the marginal returns on the expenditures for outreach are great.

In some of the larger centers, service programs are operated by center personnel, but in most cases services are provided by the agencies that have traditionally provided them. Thus, the reasonableness of the costs involved is a question of whether these agencies and their personnel are performing worthwhile functions in a responsible and efficient manner. This question cannot be answered with accuracy unless these agencies, their programs and the results are studied in detail. It must be presumed, however, that these agencies operate with at least a modicum of competence and that their cooperation with the CAP and center programs is a desirable feature. It is suggested that their association with centers is increasing their efficiency by putting them in touch with more clients and making them more responsive to client requirements. This increase of effectiveness is a benefit to society, and the cost of achieving this benefit appears to be relatively low. Most center personnel are involved with services principally as referral agents. They appear to perform this task with reasonable economy. When center staff members are engaged directly in providing services, their activities appear to be characterized by disorganization and inefficiency. On balance, however, it happens that the cost of providing services utilizing the neighborhood center is as reasonable as utilizing alternative traditional methods.

The most difficult cost question deals with the propriety and efficiency of utilizing federal funds in the community action-community organization aspect of neighborhood programs. The propriety of federally-supported community action is a philosophical issue integral to an evaluation of the entire CAP effort. The information in this report may be of value in deciding this issue but the focus of this report is really on a subsidiary issue; that is, are the neighborhood centers an effective and efficient organizational arrangement to achieve the goal of community action. In answering this second question it is to be remembered that the centers studied in this project devote a comparatively small part of their resources to community action but have instead concentrated on the outreach and service aspects.

Community action is carried on quite differently in the various centers throughout the country. It is quite clear that few people agree on what is meant by this phrase or how it is to be accomplished. Further, there are few counterparts in other programs that can be compared with community action. In view of these factors, any determination of the reasonableness of the costs involved would be extremely nebulous.

Evaluation

It is believed that the outreach and service functions of the center are being handled at a reasonable cost. However, the internal disorganization and lack of adequately trained staff at most centers leaves some room for cost savings. It is not anticipated that centers ever will or ever should operate as efficiently as traditional agencies for the centers are training grounds for poor people without experience in similar jobs.

No method exists to determine whether the community action aspect is reasonable in cost and this remains a moot point.

SUMMARY

The neighborhood center is an effective organizational device for reaching out to the poor, for engaging the participation of other neighborhood groups and local residents, and for changing existing institutions. For the most part these functions are being achieved at reasonable cost.

There is little evidence that centers are acting in an integrative capacity and it appears that this role is incompatible with their other functions. Some centers concentrate on developing an informal atmosphere that is inviting to the poor people of the neighborhood. These centers are less concerned with service integration or refinements. Other centers encourage attitudes and organizational arrangements associated with aggressive community action and these appear antithetical to close collaboration with traditional agencies. Thus, unless the center views its role solely as a service agency, and this is rare, service integration cannot be expected to take place in the centers.

The lack of emphasis on training local residents for the staff and board positions they occupy jeopardizes the extent to which any center programs may be carried forward successfully. This problem is pervasive and crucial.

On balance, it is concluded that the neighborhood center is a worthwhile institution to achieve most of the purposes for which it is designed. The trend of development of centers is encouraging and more effectiveness can be anticipated if they are not expected to accomplish incompatible service and community action functions. With comparatively minor modifications of emphasis and structure, centers can be even more valuable features of the Community Action Program.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations to follow deal with ways to make neighborhood centers more effective. This, therefore, implies the first and most fundamental recommendation which is that centers should continue to be important features of the anti-poverty program. Subsequent recommendations are, of course, contingent upon implementation of the first.

THE ROLE OF THE CENTER

The evidence obtained in this project indicates that there is considerable confusion at all levels of the community action program as to the proper role of neighborhood centers. This confusion is reflected in organizational and operating difficulties.

It is suggested here that the role of the neighborhood center is to afford local residents a meaningful opportunity for participation and self development. It is to provide the poor person with the power that most other citizens have and through this means to alter the relationship of the poor person to his environment. It is to make legitimate and effective the claims of the poor on society.

Either by design or by happenstance, neighborhood centers have not generally become organizations to enhance the status of the poor. In some cases the establishment has controlled CAA's and centers and, fearful that the poor might disturb the status quo, has manipulated the organization to preclude participation by the poor. In other cases social or political activists have gained control of centers and, to protect the poor from making costly blunders, they too have not encouraged effective development and participation by the poor. In those few cases where there has been real concern with this goal, a lack of training for all involved, the difficulties of formal mechanisms, large size and the absence of attainable programs have all militated against effective participation.

Previous discussions have focused on the service role and the community action role of centers. It is suggested that neither of these roles has any new meaning unless the poor residents of the neighborhood have some legitimate power to change services or to act in concert. It must also be realized that the power of the poor may not be exercised at all or may be exercised imprudently. However, the mere fact of this power, whether latent or dynamic, has already proven to be effective in bringing changes in service arrangements of advantage to the poor.

The confusions that attend neighborhood centers appear to result from providing lip service to the idea of legitimizing the power of the poor and at the same time compromising this idea by efforts to improve services and/or attain political goals. If the centers cannot be designed and operated to support the experimental notion of enabling the poor to participate in a meaningful way in solving their own problems, then there is little reason for such centers. Other less troublesome arrangements can also attack poverty effectively. This is not to say that improved service programs should not be promoted at centers. Quite the contrary. It is expected that in many cases they will result naturally from a new type of relationship between the poor and service agencies.

It is recognized that there are differences from neighborhood to neighborhood in the ways that the poor can and will participate in center affairs. There are also differences in tactics appropriate at the different stages of development of centers. Both of these types of differences are important if one does not lose sight of the principal strategy which has been set forth above. The subsequent recommendations are means of making neighborhood centers work more effectively as organizations to enhance the power of the poor to help themselves. This is the unique role of the neighborhood center. All programs and organizational arrangements should support this role.

TRAINING

If the poor are to function more effectively, they must be offered training programs in a variety of fields. The power of the poor will be hollow if it is not exercised with the knowledge, judgment and insight that training can provide. The notable lack of intensive training for the poor who are employees or board members is extremely damaging to the center activities in particular and the entire CAP in general.

Training for nonprofessional neighborhood staff members should be intensive, and it should be continuing. It should be geared to provide the staff members with specific technical information needed in jobs as well as fundamental skills and attitudes necessary in most organizational efforts.

It is recognized that little is known about training in general and training poor people in particular. Nevertheless, some important knowledge has resulted from training programs in business and government. More recently important innovative concepts have resulted from Peace Corps and VISTA programs. Unquestionably there is a need and basis for developing a wide variety of training programs for center employees. It is suggested that a major investment in the development and use of such programs is essential to the success of all aspects of the neighborhood center concept. No other investment appears to offer such great possibilities for significant rewards.

In addition to devising and utilizing staff training programs, it is necessary to devise training programs for the many residents who participate in center affairs as board or council members. These people are presently at a marked disadvantage in fulfilling their responsibilities because they lack the experience,

knowledge, and background to contribute with full effectiveness. Their personal knowledge of life as poor people is not enough. They need to know more about parliamentary procedure, about their community and about programs and possibilities. It may also be appropriate to follow the practice of business and compensate board members for the time they devote to center affairs. This may help to make board positions more attractive than at present.

Last, it appears appropriate to devote some attention to training the professional and agency personnel who become involved with center activities. To most of these people the center represents a new work environment and the poor a new type of client and associate. Thus, they need to be retrained so that their attitudes and approaches are suitable for their new positions.

To repeat, the need for intensive training of all persons associated with neighborhood centers cannot be overstressed. The potential benefits cannot be overestimated.

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

If the neighborhood centers are to afford local residents a meaningful opportunity for participation and self development, there must be a redefinition of the relationship between the CAA's and the centers. At present, in most cases, the CAA dominates the center in every important respect—namely, program development, funding and personnel selection. Thus, only the most minor prerogatives exist at the center and efforts to expand their scope are generally vetoed at the CAA level. This situation does not strengthen the capabilities of the poor to help themselves.

One way to make participation in center affairs more meaningful is to increase the autonomy of centers by establishing them in a status equivalent to delegate agencies rather than integral parts of CAA's. In this status, the centers can have real responsibilities for program development and management of their affairs. The role of the CAA can be modified so that it is no longer the nexus of all community anti-poverty authority but instead is a source of expert advice and counsel as well as a body to coordinate center and other delegate agency activities.

At present most center-service agency relationships are negotiated between the CAA and the concerned agency and then imposed upon the center. If the center becomes the equivalent of a delegate agency, it is then in a position to negotiate with other agencies on a relatively equal status. This organizational expression of the legitimacy of the power of the neighborhood poor should result in relations which more fully reflect the desires of the local residents. It will clearly be more complex and difficult for traditional agencies to negotiate with many centers and to enter into a wide variety of operating arrangements. It must be remembered, however, that the goal of the centers is not to ease things for the agencies but to benefit the poor neighborhood residents. Further, if particular center boards choose to have no relationships with certain agencies or to have only adversary relationships, this should be possible.

In addition to being more autonomous, it is appropriate to organize centers rather informally and to limit their size. The formal structures necessary in large centers inhibit the effective participation of the poor who are not experienced with such arrangements. Large boards, in particular, are a most inappropriate vehicle for the development of the capabilities of the poor and the expression of their views. Small boards, and smaller committees and subcommittees organized and operated on informal lines are needed. Parliamentary procedures are neither required nor useful in these situations.

Small centers, with staffs of from five to twenty persons, are also more hospitable to clientele who tend to associate large institutions with the traditional agencies. Small centers are easier to manage; they permit more personal development; and they are a useful entry level to the world of public affairs. Small centers also permit programmatic flexibility not otherwise possible. Centers with only a very few employees are not recommended. It has been noted that centers of this size have little outreach, little to offer participants and not enough solidarity to support the local people through difficult periods.

The cost of having many small centers is not much more than having fewer large centers. The largest cost by far of all operations is the cost of paying the staff salaries. Fixed overhead costs are relatively low. Thus, if large centers are divided into smaller ones and the same numbers of people are involved, costs should not be greatly increased.

If CAA's are really concerned with making neighborhood centers operational, centers should have the opportunity of having the neighborhood representatives

of other programs in the CAP arsenal. Often CAA's run their programs such as Head Start and NYC independently of centers. As a result, the centers may be denied opportunities to reach the local residents with appealing programs. This is not to say that all CAP programs should be operated by centers. It does suggest, however, that centers should be given more opportunities to become actively involved with these programs if they choose. This is one way to offer centers a program content that can help to build resident support and involvement.

The comments above reveal, by indirection, the conclusion that the CAA's are not organizations designed to encourage the participation of the poor. They tend to be large, formal, and complex. They represent an area of involvement of powerful and experienced operators. The organizational directions suggested for neighborhood centers are designed to insure that at least one of the CAP sponsored entities is congenial to the poor people.

CENTER LEADERSHIP

Extremely skillful leadership is needed at centers if they are to become focal points for developing the resourcefulness and capabilities of the poor in the neighborhoods. This is a difficult task and it should not be left to the three principal types of persons now most commonly involved with center direction: persons from public or private social service agencies; persons from activist civil rights organizations; and poor people with no special training or capabilities. These types of leaders generally have neither the desire nor the capabilities to sponsor the growth and independent self development of the neighborhood poor. Peace Corps community development workers probably most closely fit the centers' needs for leadership.

The concept of the neighborhood center is new, and there is no reason to expect that ready-made leaders for such enterprises can be found. It is much more reasonable to expect that very special efforts will have to be made to select and train persons to fill these positions. This is perhaps the most delicate and central job of the CAP effort. The widespread lack of attention to this matter must be overcome if any optimistic expectations for centers are to be realized.

SUMMARY

The recommendations briefly set forth in this section include—

1. To continue neighborhood centers as prominent features of the anti-poverty program;
2. To clarify the principal role of neighborhood centers as enhancing the power of the poor to help themselves;
3. To emphasize intensive and continuing training programs for both professional and non-professional staff and for board members;
4. To modify existing organizational arrangements so that centers are relatively autonomous and so that they are small and informal; and
5. To develop special programs to select and train persons for positions of leadership in centers.

Last, it is recommended that those with a view to the grand strategy of the war against poverty must have the patience and determination to support the cause of the poor against all adversaries including the poor themselves.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I.—SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH CENTERS SURVEYED

Center code	Population of metropolitan area (thousands)	Population of center target (thousands)	Families under \$3,000 income (percent)	Negroes in city (percent)	Other minorities (percent)	Negroes in target area (percent)
A.....	1,243	25	36	20	6	50
B.....	750	40	30	29	14	75
C.....	405	100	19	34	34	168
D.....	170	170	15	1	26	110
E.....	1,000	33	29	55	13	80
F.....	3	3	37	(?)	(?)	(?)
G.....	64	10	32	33	21	10
H.....	340	7	17	8	6	19
I.....	70	70	53	8	(?)	8
J-I.....	3,550	200	34	24	24	95
J-II.....	3,550	140	24	24	24	25
K.....	423	10	26	6	23	20
L-I.....	1,670	125	30	29	20	75
L-II.....	1,670	125	30	29	20	90
M.....	451	170	29	12	5	32
N.....	40	40	45	5	1	5
O-I.....	6,039	106	30	11	33	160
O-II.....	6,039	16	43	11	33	15
P.....	1,648	85	28	29	31	63
Q.....	523	36	24	3	1	33

¹ Estimated.² Not available.

APPENDIX II.—TYPES OF SERVICES BY COMMUNITY SIZE

	Size class of community		
	Small	Medium	Large
Number of communities reporting.....	3	5.0	11.0
Services provided:			
Education.....	3	4.0	4.0
Employment.....	3	4.0	9.0
Housing.....	1	2.0	4.0
Consumer.....	1	1.0	2.0
Welfare.....	3	3.0	7.0
Legal.....	0	1.0	2.0
Health.....	3	2.0	5.0
Parole.....	0	1.0	1.0
Recreation.....	1	1.0	5.0
Information.....	0	2.0	2.0
Average number of services per center.....	5	4.2	3.7

¹ As reported by center directors.

APPENDIX III.—PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENTS' AND OFFICIALS' PERCEPTIONS OF CENTER FUNCTIONS

{In percent}

	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Clients: ¹				
Service function.....	81	80	79	80
Community action function.....	19	20	21	20
CAP personnel: ²				
Service function.....	63	57	67	62
Community action function.....	37	43	33	38
Agency personnel: ³				
Service function.....	60	93	81	81
Community action function.....	40	7	19	19

¹ Includes clients and other neighborhood residents interviewed.² Includes CAA and Center directors, staff and board members.³ Includes personnel of public and private agencies having some relationship to Center.

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APPENDIX IV.—PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CHARACTERISTICS OF CLIENTS AND RESIDENTS INTERVIEWED ¹

[In percent]

	Size class of community			
	Small	Medium	Large	Total
Sex:				
Male.....	11	37	41	32
Female.....	89	63	59	68
Age:				
Less than 20.....	13	16	14	14
20-35.....	20	32	45	35
36-65.....	41	47	36	41
Over 65.....	26	5	5	10
Race:				
Negro.....	18	67	81	60
White and other.....	82	33	19	40
Marital status:				
Married.....	71	56	64	64
Other.....	29	44	36	36
Family size:				
Less than 6.....	58	50	55	54
6 or more.....	42	50	45	46
Employment status:				
Employed.....	26	48	53	45
Unemployed.....	74	52	47	55

¹ 189 clients and residents were interviewed. Not all respondents answered all questions.

APPENDIX V.—PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CLIENT AND RESIDENT RESPONSES TO SELECTED QUESTIONS

TABLE 1

Question: How did you learn of center?

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			
	Small	Medium	Large	Total
House-to-house survey.....	33	34	14	26
Other resident referral.....	28	26	36	31
Non-OEO agency referral.....	12	7	22	15
News media ¹	27	13	11	15
Other ²	0	20	17	13

¹ Includes TV, radio, newspapers, leaflets, mail, and billboards.

² Includes OEO agency referral, center-sponsored activities, telephone and clients who "just wandered into center."

TABLE 2

Question: What is the purpose of the center?

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			
	Small	Medium	Large	Total
Services.....	73	64	63	65
Community action.....	17	16	17	17
Don't know.....	10	20	20	18

TABLE 3

Question: What has the center done for you?

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Employment services.....	27	15	15	18
Other services.....	43	30	37	36
Nothing.....	22	46	27	31
Other ¹	8	9	21	15

¹ Includes recreation, community action, furnishing food and/or clothing in emergencies.

APPENDIX V

TABLE 4

Question: What have you done for the center?

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Volunteered time and/or money.....	19	21	22	21
Spread the word.....	10	22	7	12
Committee work.....	0	7	16	10
Nothing.....	71	50	55	57

TABLE 5

Question: Who pays for operation of center?

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Federal Government.....	46	40	36	40
Don't know.....	43	40	28	35
Other ¹	11	20	36	25

¹ Includes State and municipal governments, neighborhood people, and private agencies.

TABLE 6

Question: Who runs the center and decides what is to be done?

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Neighborhood people.....	2	4	13	8
Center director.....	33	29	12	22
Center staff.....	16	9	4	9
Don't know.....	23	53	53	45
Other ¹	26	5	18	16

¹ Includes Federal, State, and local government; professional people such as social workers, non-OEO agencies and local politicians, CAA Director and staff.

TABLE 7

Question: Do you feel any better off as a result of the center?

Response	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Much better off.....	95	60	57	68
Somewhat better off.....	3	14	21	14
Other ¹	2	26	22	18

¹ Includes "no better off," "worse off" and "don't know."APPENDIX VI.—PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CHARACTERISTICS OF CENTER STAFF MEMBERS INTERVIEWED¹

[In percent]

Response	Size class of community			Total
	Small	Medium	Large	
Sex:				
Male.....	33	44	39	39
Female.....	67	56	61	61
Age:				
Less than 20.....	0	9	2	3
20 to 35.....	39	68	52	53
36 to 65.....	56	23	46	43
Over 65.....	5	0	0	1
Race:				
Negro.....	11	70	71	60
White and other.....	89	30	29	40
Marital status:				
Married.....	67	52	58	58
Other.....	33	48	42	42
Family size:				
Less than 6.....	75	76	79	79
6 or more.....	25	24	21	21
Employment background:				
Employed.....	33	96	98	87
Unemployed.....	67	4	2	13

¹ 105 Center staff members were interviewed. Not all respondents answered all questions.

APPENDIX VII.—CENTER TRAINING PROGRAMS

City	Type of employee	Description of training
A	Professional (degree or some college)-----	(1) Inservice training for 3 months under supervision of center staff members; (2) return-to-college program—employees may earn up to 6 hours each semester, attend class during working hours, etc.
B	Professional-----	No training program.
	Resident-----	(1) 5 seminars, followed by (2) inservice training.
C	Professional-----	No training program.
	Resident-----	(1) 2 weeks training by CAA, followed by (2) on-the-job training at center.
D	-----do-----	20-day training program at CAA.
E	Professional-----	No training program.
	Resident-----	Inservice training conducted by department heads at center.
F	Professional-----	No training program.
G	-----do-----	Do.
H	-----do-----	Do.
	Resident-----	(1) Center director gives orientation; (2) board of education sponsors adult education programs; (3) YWCA, "middle class values"; (4) university, "social work," "child development," "poverty seminars."
I	Professional and resident-----	(1) Weeklong workshop conducted by established agencies; (2) staff seminars for discussion of OEO policies.
J	Professional-----	No training program.
	Resident-----	(1) Applicants tested and trained by private firm of personnel psychologists; (2) this is followed by inservice informal training at center.
K	-----do-----	Weekly staff meetings.
L	Professional-----	Orientation of 12 to 20 weeks. Course deals with management techniques and OEO policies.
	Resident-----	(1) Course at center—how to apply for jobs; how to pass civil service examination; (2) civil service department of city sponsors extensive program—interviewing techniques group organization, "role playing."
M	Professional and resident-----	(1) Informal training under assistant center director; (2) outside agencies instruct in their procedures.
N	Professional-----	No training program.
	Resident-----	(1) Enter program as homemaking students; (2) when skills develop, residents hired as homemaking instructors; (3) thus, residents trained before they are hired.
O	-----do-----	(1) Orientation, 2 weeks; (2) feedback sessions held weekly at center; (3) 1 center supplemented with weekly conferences and inservice training, the other center did not offer these; (4) no training except 2-week orientation for resident supervisors.
	Aides in training-----	(1) 2-week orientation; (2) inservice training at established agency; (3) feedback sessions at center.
P	Professional-----	No training program.
	Resident-----	(1) Part-time training consultant assists in orientation of workers at all centers; (2) informal, on-the-job training.
Q	Professional and resident-----	"Brief" orientation by CAA, center, and outside agency officials.
	Secretary-aides-----	Education program includes basic English, typing, shorthand, office procedures.

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APPENDIX VIII.—DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICULAR SERVICES AMONG NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS GROUPED BY SIZE CLASS

Centers grouped by size class	Educa- tion	Employ- ment	Hous- ing	Con- sumer services	Welfare services	Legal aid	Health services	Probate parole	Recre- ation	Informa- tion dispen- sion
Small center:										
1.....	X	X	-----	-----	X	-----	X	-----	-----	X
2.....	X	X	-----	-----	X	-----	X	-----	-----	-----
3.....	X	X	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----
4.....	X	X	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----
Subtotal.....	4	4	1	1	4	0	4	0	1	1
Medium center:										
1.....	X	X	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----
2.....	X	X	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----	-----	-----
3.....	X	X	-----	X	X	X	X	-----	-----	X
4.....	X	X	-----	-----	X	-----	X	-----	-----	-----
5.....	X	X	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	X	-----	X
Subtotal.....	4	4	2	1	3	1	2	1	1	2
Large center:										
1.....	X	X	X	-----	-----	-----	X	-----	-----	-----
2.....	X	X	X	-----	X	-----	X	-----	-----	-----
3.....	X	X	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	X	X	X
4.....	X	X	-----	-----	X	-----	X	-----	-----	-----
5.....	-----	X	X	-----	-----	-----	X	-----	X	-----
6.....	-----	X	-----	-----	X	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
7.....	-----	X	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	X
8.....	-----	X	-----	-----	X	-----	-----	-----	X	-----
9.....	-----	X	-----	-----	X	X	X	-----	X	-----
10.....	-----	X	-----	X	X	X	X	-----	X	-----
11.....	-----	-----	X	X	X	X	-----	-----	-----	-----
Subtotal.....	4	9	4	2	7	2	5	1	5	2
Grand total.....	12	17	7	4	14	3	11	2	7	5

ATTACHMENT No. 1

DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS FOR THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY CONTRACT No. OEO-1257, NOVEMBER 15, 1966

(The conclusions and recommendations in this report are those of the Contractor and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Economic Opportunity or any other agency of the United States Government.)

PREFACE

This is an Attachment to a Report which describes and evaluates neighborhood centers as an organizational feature of community action programs. The Report is concerned principally with analysis and interpretation of aggregated data obtained from field investigations at individual centers. This Attachment is for the reader interested in the descriptions of the individual centers composing the sample included in the research project. It provides him with data not available in the analytic Report, and it enables him to form judgments independent of those offered by the authors.

This Attachment contains a description of twenty neighborhood centers. These twenty centers are assumed to be a sample that is representative of the almost two hundred centers in operation. Included are center from every major geographic region of the country; centers in rural areas and in cities of different sizes; and centers representing different types of control, organization and operating philosophies.

The descriptions in this Attachment have been developed utilizing information from over 500 field interviews with concerned officials, staff and clients as well as other materials and personal observations. The descriptions have been presented in a fairly uniform format and concentrate on the factors considered to be most important to an understanding of neighborhood centers. Although these

descriptions, of necessity, condense and organize a vast mass of raw data, an attempt has been made to report these data accurately and without bias.

Centers are not identified by name or community for two principal reasons. First, to encourage respondents to our inquiries to speak frankly, they were assured that their replies would not be identified with them. Second, this project is concerned with the analysis of neighborhood centers as a common feature of community action programs and the particulars of individual centers in individual communities are secondary. It is assumed that normal administrative channels will provide appropriate officials with the information necessary for normal administrative duties.

Our field research associates provided excellent detailed and comprehensive reports describing, analyzing and evaluating the centers they investigated. The descriptions in this Attachment were written by our central staff and we assume complete responsibility for them. We acknowledge, however, the invaluable assistance given this entire project by our field research associates whose names are listed below:

Dr. Mark Abrahamson
Dr. Joseph L. Albini
Mr. Isaac B. Balbus
Mr. Harold Bram
Mr. James H. Cobb
Dr. William E. Cole
Dr. James H. Craig
Dr. G. Franklin Edwards
Mr. Donald R. Ewan

Dr. Robert G. Foster
Dr. Mary Ellen Goodman
Dr. Edwin S. Harwood
Dr. Hannah A. Levin
Dr. Frank M. Loewenberg
Mrs. Marion C. McPherson
Mr. Marvin R. Munsell
Mr. Milton J. Peterson
Dr. William S. Pooler

Last, but not means least, we acknowledge the patience and forbearance of the private citizens and officials of CAA's, centers, and public and private agencies who were kind enough to respond so fully and frankly to our inquiries.

RICHARD W. KIRSCHNER.
DAVID W. VARLEY.
BERT ZIPPEL.

CENTER "A"

1. Origin and Early Development of Center

In order to understand some peculiarities in the present organizational set-up of the Neighborhood Service Center here examined it is necessary to look briefly at some recent history. Early in the 1960 decade two major community organizations co-sponsored a rather large juvenile delinquency research project. The operation of this project soon became a bit "sticky" because of what is now described as a power struggle between the project's co-directors. In an effort to resolve the problems the co-sponsoring organizations brought in a third person to serve as a coordinator. Within a short time this coordinator was granted executive powers over the warring co-directors and thereby became "boss" of the whole operation.

After completion of the research project a decision was made to set up an action program to attack the problems of youth presumably revealed by the research effort. Accordingly, a non-profit corporation, which became the CAA, was established to plan programs and to seek out public and private funds for financing. With the help of major financing from federal funds plus some local moneys this action effort got under way.

Although the CAA developed out of a primary concern for problems of juvenile delinquency, the particular programs it fostered were much broader in scope with major emphasis on neighborhood self-help and local leadership development. Every effort was made to avoid activities or programs which were at all suggestive of welfare state "paternalism." The residents of the CAA demonstration areas were encouraged to help themselves, develop their own leadership, and take an active part in guiding CAA policy.

It is readily apparent that with its broad approach to community problems CAA was in a good position to take advantage of federal War on Poverty funds when they became available. This it did at the first opportunity. It should be noted that the city did not develop a community action program in response to the federal government's War on Poverty directives. Rather, it already had such a program. Funding from the OEO simply made it possible to expand operations.

The brief history sketched above helps to explain the current decentralization of this community's anti-poverty program. By staking out a substantial demon-

stration area (over 150,000 people) in the community, CAA was not about to be dislodged when the more comprehensive, community-wide OEO program was established in mid-1965. As a result, the CAA operation continues in a fashion that is, administratively speaking, quite independent of the rest of the community's OEO program. Indeed, there seems to be antagonism and conflict when the two organizations (i.e., OEO and the CAA) "brush up against" one another. CAA does not view calmly any effort to have non-CAA poverty workers "invade its turf!" In this regard, it should perhaps be mentioned here that CAA's executive director (the one who originally was the coordinator of the juvenile delinquency research project) is a person with apparently forceful and abrasive qualities which tend to aggravate what is, organizationally speaking, already an awkward situation.

2. *Purposes of the Center*

The general purpose of the neighborhood center is to serve as a spatial and organizational focal point for grass-roots participation in self-help programs by the area residents. Initiative rests with the local residents from whom leadership is expected to emerge. This native leadership is assisted by the paid staff members of CAA, but in no sense is the staff to "impose" a program on the area residents from above. It is evident, therefore, that depending on the desires of the local residents, the neighborhood center can function as a referral point for services dispensed elsewhere, as a local out-post site for the rendering of services both public and private, as a generator of new services, and as a central meeting place for area residents. Furthermore, the center is intended to serve *all* the needy people in its area, not just the young, or the old, or the sick, etc. In short, the ideal here is the multi-purpose center catering to the felt and expressed needs of the local resident population. It should perhaps be noted here that the idea of the residents organizing themselves to exercise more effective *political power* did not appear in the interviews with CAA personnel.

3. *Organizational Arrangements*

The organizational arrangements surrounding the neighborhood centers are in some respects rather loose. Each of the half dozen centers operated under CAA auspices has a complement of affiliated organizations attached to it. These are organizations like churches, YWCA's, neighborhood advancement associations, etc., which are linked to the center usually in some service capacity. Representatives from each of these affiliated organizations form an Advisory Committee which functions as a kind of overseer for the center. These Advisory Committees usually have about two dozen members. They meet regularly (usually weekly) to establish policies and make recommendations about center programs and activities to the center staff who are personnel paid by CAA. Typically the center staff numbers about five. This includes a center Director, a Programmer, a Counselor, a Clerk-Receptionist, and a Maintenance person. Depending on how active the center program is, the center staff may run larger than five. This is the case in the particular center investigated by our field workers. It has a staff of approximately eight, including two full-time programmers and two full-time neighborhood organizers. In addition there are seven unpaid volunteer aides at the center who help conduct sports activities, Boy Scouts, etc.

The types of staff positions listed above are rather self explanatory except for perhaps the Programmer, the Counselor, and the neighborhood organizers. The first is a person who facilitates the establishment of programs which are responsive to the stated needs of the neighborhood residents. This may involve coordinating already existing services or setting up new services and training personnel to handle them. The Counselor is the person who meets in the Center with individuals and groups, counsels them about services available, refers special problems to appropriate resources, enrolls residents in desired activities, and supervises the Clerk-Receptionist who receives applicants initially. The neighborhood organizers are the employed field contact people for the Center. They meet with the Neighborhood Advancement Association and other groups affiliated with the Center in an effort to promote the Center programs as well as determine the needs of the residents.

The question of how the Advisory Committee can exercise any effective control over the center staff when that staff is both hired and paid by the CAA is most simply answered by noting that each Advisory Committee is represented on a Board of Directors which governs CAA. To be sure, they don't

constitute a majority of the Board, but they are represented and do have a voice and vote. The size of this Board of Directors varies between 40 and 50 members about 40 percent of whom are or were residents of the poverty area being served by CAA. This means that the Board is weighted in favor of the prominent civic business leadership of the community—the so-called “Establishment.” Needless to say, this also means that there will be no undue “rocking of the boat” when decisions are made. What is more, the procedures for recruiting Board members fairly well guarantee that “safe stability” will characterize the Board majority.

Members of the Board of Directors are recruited in several ways. One involves having the Board's nominating committee nominate individuals recommended by other Board members. Another way is to have individuals recommended by the administrative staff of CAA for nomination. These may be, and indeed have been, at times residents of the poverty area. Such people are of course likely to be tractable and cooperative from the point of view of those running the program—the so-called “tame” or “respectable” poor. A third way in which Board members are recruited is through an organization called the General Area Council. This is a large representative body numbering some 200 members who represent every club and neighborhood association in the entire CAA poverty area. Each club or association elects three members to this General Area Council. This council in turn elects six of its community resident members to the CAA Board of Directors. The fourth way in which Board members are selected has already been mentioned—namely, through representation of each neighborhood Advisory Committee.

The above sketch of procedure for recruiting Board of Director membership suggests that while there is no guarantee that “rebel” types won't appear in the governance of CAA, it is certain that such disruptive people will not gain control over the operation. Furthermore, the presence of “tame” representatives of the poverty area on the Board tends to counter or soften the impact of any rebel effort to alter the status quo.

Another aspect of the general “control” picture involving neighborhood center organization appears when the relationship between the center staff and the neighborhood Advisory Committee is examined more closely. There is evidence that local residents do in fact “run” the meetings of the Advisory Committee. Advice from the professional center staff is sought, but initiative is retained by the Advisory Committee “laymen.” However, at all such meetings there is what might be called “a hidden agenda” item which seriously limits the extent to which the local residents really control the center programs. This item is the simple fact that the Advisory Committee does not control the budget and the allocation of funds. Whether or not a given activity or program will actually be established depends on whether funds are available. Through its control of funds CAA's top-level administrative staff exercises considerable control over local neighborhood programs. Because of this organizational arrangement the idea that CAA is a model for efforts to set up grassroots participation in self-help programs has a bit of a hollow ring. It does appear true that there is little if any effort to impose programs on the area residents from above. However, the power of those “above” to exercise budgetary vetoes on ideas from below serves to limit severely the effectiveness of the much heralded local initiative. As will be seen later, this limitation is frustrating to some of the residents and lower-level staff members involved in the activities at the Center.

With respect to staff recruitment and training most of the neighborhood organizers have college degrees or at least some college training. The top level administrators of CAA encourage lower level staff to continue their education. Arrangements can be made so that staff workers can earn up to six credit hours of college work each semester while they are working for CAA. There is also an in-service training program for the new staff members. This apparently runs about three months during which they work under the supervision of various staff people at the different neighborhood centers. The results of staff recruitment efforts have been partially interesting in that the preponderance of the staff is Negro even though “Anglos” and latin-Americans are substantially represented in the area served by the CAA. One explanation for this selectivity is that college trained Anglos and Latin-Americans can get higher salaries than the CAA pays. Whether or not this reflects differential quality of college education as between Negroes and non-Negroes is an interesting question to contemplate. In any event, college-trained Negroes find CAA salaries (mini-

mum: \$400 per month for college educated) to be better than what they can get elsewhere.

4. *Relationship of Center to Clientele*

The area served by the CAA numbers over 150,000 people living in the central part of a major metropolitan community of over one million persons. More than one-half of the CAA area population is Negro and approximately one-sixth is Latin-American. A little more than one-third of the families have incomes under \$3,000. About four of every ten residents of the area have less than eight years of formal schooling. In general the area is conspicuously depressed and has been rather neglected by traditional services and welfare type agencies.

There is considerable concern expressed by center staff and by resident volunteer workers about the outreach of the center program. Since there are no data on contracts with clientele tabulated by center, precise figures on outreach are not available for the Center. One rough estimate mentioned in interviews with our field people was 40 percent. However, there is some reason to believe that this is an inflated figure. We do have some data for May, 1966 which reveals that contracts were made with 776 different people, 650 of whom were contacted in a survey of resident needs. The estimated total population served by the Center is 25,276.

There are several methods used by the Center to reach the clientele. One of these is a letter sent weekly apprising clients of activities and events organized by the Center. Another method is through a survey in which residents are systematically contacted at their homes by field workers. A third method is personal contact by field workers following up a reference of some kind. A fourth method involves working through other organizations like churches, schools, sport groups, etc.

Unfortunately, there are no really adequate data on which to base a very precise evaluation of the outreach effort of the Center. It does appear, however, that the clientele of the Center is selective of Negroes almost exclusively. This "fact" came out both in interviews and site observation by our field worker. In this regard it is interesting to note that the particular neighborhood served by the Center is about 25 percent Negro. Thus, it would seem that three-fourths of the neighborhood population is not being served by the Center. It will be remembered that Negroes predominate on the CAA staff. It has been suggested that this might be the reason for the failure of whites to gravitate to the Center. Another selective feature of the Center clientele is their age. Older people are apparently not very receptive to overtures made by Center personnel. Young adults, youth and children seem to constitute the major portion of the clientele.

When we turn to the question of just what specifically goes on in the form of the Center program, it is well to keep in mind that the Center is a multi-purpose operation which responds to the expressed desires of the residents of the area. Accordingly, quite a variety of activities are exhibited. Among the more prominent of these are: counseling youth and adults with respect to employment prospects; recreational programs for children and youth; counseling clients about available agency services; day care program for children probation and parole counseling (handled exclusively by the Director who works closely with the police, probation officials, juvenile court, etc.); adult education classes in subjects like nutrition, childcare and budgeting as well as reading, writing and arithmetic; sewing and arts and crafts classes; "fun night" recreational program for adults and family units; sponsor of forum for political candidates running for local office; special events like dinners, dances etc. Of course, the center also serves as a meeting place for various groups like the Advisory Committee, the Neighborhood Improvement Association, etc. Some of these activities like employment counseling and day care are handled on a contractual basis by outside agencies.

Unfortunately, we must again note that the absence of data precludes evaluating the different degrees of prominence exhibited by these various services and activities enumerated above. However, interview cues prompt one to suspect that recreation is the most conspicuous service rendered. In this regard, some problems are clearly evident. They involve the lack of material resources for the programs. This was especially evident with respect to recreation. Outside of a ping-pong table, some baseball equipment, a deflated volleyball, and some table games like checkers, there was nothing. In particular there was no readily accessible field or grounds for youth recreation. This poverty of material resources