

In our initial presentation to American businessmen last Friday before the chamber of commerce, I think the discussion indicated that there was an acceptance in large part of these facts.

Briefly, what we achieved out of the Kennedy Round was, first, as I said, a reciprocal deal, including something of benefit to agriculture. For the first time in a major trade negotiation something of benefit to agriculture was achieved.

And then, Senator Miller, I would like to have the opportunity during questioning time to comment in some detail on the problems you raise.

We also achieved a very full agreement with Canada in which tariffs were sharply cut on both sides of the border. In many areas where our tariffs were under 5 percent we in effect went into free trade. In an area of particular export interest to the United States, production machinery, the Canadians made sharp cuts, from 22½ to 15 percent in the tariffs.

We negotiated a wheat agreement—which again, Senator Miller, goes back to your question—which I think will prove to be of substantial benefit to American wheat producers. Representatives of those producers were with us in Geneva at the time of the final negotiation and worked closely with us.

Finally, a first major breakthrough in the area of nontariff barriers—we negotiated an international code on dumping. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read two paragraphs from what I said to the chamber of commerce the other day on this subject, because it is a critical one:

A major accomplishment was the negotiation of the antidumping code, committing other countries to fair and open procedures along the lines of the present United States procedures. The new common antidumping regulations that are being developed by the European Community will conform with the code. Of special interest to the United States will be the adoption by Canada of an injury requirement in its antidumping legislation. The lack of such a requirement has impeded American exports for many years.

For our part, we have agreed to certain useful refinements of the concepts we presently use in our antidumping investigations, once preliminary measures are taken against allegedly dumped imports. I would emphasize, contrary to what you may have read in the newspapers lately, that all our obligations in this agreement are consistent with existing law, and in particular that we have not agreed to the simultaneous consideration of price discrimination and injury.

And finally, before leaving the Kennedy Round, let me say that I think many of us who worked in this have felt that one of the great advantages of a successful Kennedy Round was that we averted something quite terrible—that is, a failure. If there had been a failure, I feel—and I think all of us who worked in this felt—that it would have set back the growth of a liberal world trade policy many years. And therefore we are grateful that it was, in the final analysis, possible to put such an agreement together.

Having said this, I would then focus my remarks on the immediate future, to include, first, the issues that we face as a result of the Kennedy Round and, second, the question of what we envision as the means of meeting the President's request for a major administration review of trade policy.

If this approach is agreeable to you, Mr. Chairman, I will proceed to the discussion of our immediate post-Kennedy Round problems.

Chairman Boggs. Go right ahead.