

The act further obliged the President to seek Tariff Commission advice (sec. 221), advice from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury (sec. 222), and public views through hearings (sec. 223).

A hierarchy of interagency committees, including one at the Cabinet level, was established for the purposes of formulating policy recommendations, with the Special Representative and members of his staff presiding over their work. Similarly constituted was the Trade Information Committee, which held public hearings on concessions that might be made or sought by the United States. These supplemented the hearings which were held by the Tariff Commission.

The President appointed a 45-member public advisory committee to the Special Representative, made up of spokesmen for the public interest selected for their leadership in the business, labor, farm, and consumer sectors. This group met regularly with the Special Representative and many of its members traveled to Geneva for a firsthand look at the negotiations.

Members of Congress have also been brought in as an integral part of the policy formation process in the role of congressional delegates. The creation of congressional delegates was an important innovation of the Trade Expansion Act, which, in section 243, states:

Before each negotiation under this title, the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, select two members (not of the same political party) of the Committee on Ways and Means, and shall, upon the recommendation of the President of the Senate, select two members (not of the same political party) of the Committee on Finance, who shall be accredited as members of the United States delegation to such negotiation.

Two Members of the House and two delegates and two alternates from the Senate were so accredited from the beginning of the Kennedy Round.

Throughout the negotiations, and increasingly as the bargaining reached the critical stage, we were kept current with developments and were consulted on moves to be made. We held regular meetings with the Special Representative, received written reports from him, and, on several occasions, made individual trips to Geneva. There we sat in delegation meetings and negotiating sessions and were given access to the position papers and cable messages concerning negotiations.

As the U.S. position evolved on the handling of such difficult questions as American selling price, an international antidumping code, inclusive of agriculture and nontariff barriers, the views of the congressional delegates were sought, given, and, in my view, very carefully considered.

Ambassador Roth has, on several occasions, testified before congressional committees on the usefulness to him of the delegates to the Kennedy Round. He has had an opportunity to probe congressional views and sensitivities and to take advantage of prior consultation on matters that might require, or result, in congressional action. He has been able, based on the consultations, to make clear to other participants in the negotiation the realities of U.S. politics.

With the Kennedy Round concluded, we, the congressional delegates, would appear to have finished our assignment. I believe very