

tiations. These alternate members, one from each party, have served as full congressional delegates.

The language of section 243 obviously leaves the congressional delegates' role open to interpretation, but it is nonetheless important. For the first time, congressional participation in trade negotiations was elevated from the level of "observer" status to that of actual participant. This is an important distinction, one that I am keenly aware of, having also served as a congressional "observer" of past negotiations. As "observers" access to documents and meetings was limited. As "delegates" we have access to classified data and to negotiations between governments.

The resulting relationship between executive and legislative branches has been described as "unique." Initially it may have created a bit of disquiet in administrators accustomed to the usual cards-against-vest approach to dealing with Congress. But my opinion is that the "unique" relationship has worked well: I have found that efforts to expand and intensify congressional knowledge and participation in the foreign trade program have been met with good cooperation by the executive branch.

My interpretation of the language of section 243 and the role of congressional delegate for trade negotiations has been to keep well informed about the negotiations and trade matters generally, to consult with the trade negotiating staff, and to attempt to explain to the public and its representatives in Government—my colleagues here in Congress—the issues in the trade negotiations, with attention at the same time to their meaning to our domestic industries, our relations with other nations, and our future trade concerns.

Moreover, I have hoped to promote what I consider to be another profoundly important objective. I believe the Congress is an institution intended to make decisions through processes of open study and debate. I have hoped that publicly exposing as completely as I could the facts about the negotiations would aid better congressional decision-making in foreign trade and related matters. This has been a principal reason why I have used the consultations and participation open to me as a congressional delegate to report extensively on the negotiations and related problems to the Congress.

In May 1963 at a meeting in Geneva the Ministers of the major countries participating in the Kennedy Round resolved upon certain resolutions to guide the "Kennedy" negotiations. A year later, in May 1964, I attended the formal opening of the Kennedy Round, at which time the Ministers published new resolutions essentially reaffirming those of a year earlier.

But by May 1965, my second visit to the negotiations, very little had been accomplished in fulfilling the earlier ministerial resolutions. So on June 2, 1965, Congressional Record pages 11925–11930, I explained the arguments surrounding the negotiating ground rules that had absorbed everyone's energies during this 2-year period.

Our negotiators had spent months simply trying to define the meaning of a "tariff disparity," and the idea of establishing world reference prices for all agriculture commodities based upon fixed levels of farm support—a Common Market proposal known as the "montant de soutien." These intellectual exercises had delayed any real tariff bargaining very effectively.