temporate zone products—were the matters of greatest concern. But equally important, if somewhat in the background, were the trade and development problems of the poorer countries.

To explore these issues, I began on April 10, this year, a five part series of reports titled "The Kennedy Round and the Future of United States Trade Policy." The April 10 installment, part I, Congressional Record pages H3819–H3830, dealt with the tactical negotiating problem in agriculture, but mostly with the efforts, and the issues, in the negotiation of an international grains agreement.

On April 13, Congressional Record pages H4128–H4140, I submitted part II, which dealt with dairy, meat, poultry, and other major farm products.

In reviewing the content of these two speeches and the results of the negotiations it is obvious that the Kennedy Round agriculture negotiations did not alter at all the Common Market's farm pricing and import restriction systems, which we had hoped we could modify. Of course, many believed that this was not possible, even from the start of the negotiations. But I think we made a very good try—a beginning in treating in an international forum difficult problems of agriculture. This itself was an important initiative, because previous negotiations had not attempted discussion in the agriculture area.

These inquiries into international farm trade demonstrated an important lesson. The failings, the complications of international farm trade, begin at home. Almost all governments have stepped into their own agricultural marketplaces to achieve through government direction social and political objectives they consider important. Establishing real competition in international agriculture markets largely requires that governments first step out of these markets, remaining there only to perform the essential function of guaranteeing their honesty and enforcing other standards of fair competition. So complex is this problem that I am reminded of a statement by the very able, astute Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Eric Wyndham-White, at a press conference in Washington in April 1965. He said that—

> The evolution of an acceptable viable international agricultural and food policy is something which will have to be worked out very patiently over the years. We mustn't expect that one can solve all these very deep-seated problems in one go-around—in a single negotiation.

Part III of the report, which appeared on May 1, Congressional Record pages H4891–H4905, was an effort to explain the tactical problems in the industrial negotiations, particularly the development of the sector approach to negotiations in difficult industries—steel, chemicals, textiles, aluminum, and pulp and paper. Part III also discussed the so-called technology gap which was used by certain countries as a reason for excepting certain tariffs from cuts in the negotiation. In part III I also described the problems facing the conclusion of a meaningful negotiation in the steel sector talks and, in relation to this, I explored some of the problems in our own steel industry, in an effort to bring them out into the open and examine their merits at a key time in the negotiations, the last moment when, if some special measures were required, they would have to be taken.