that they must diversify their economies, that they must not depend on exports of agricultural products, particularly one special crop in the case of many countries, and that they must therefore begin to industrialize. But the structure of tariffs applied by most of our countries in the developed world makes it exceptionally difficult to do this. And from the moment they begin to try to export semiprocessed goods they meet a higher tariff, and fully manufactured goods, a higher one still. This is something I think which very urgent attention should be given.

The other great issue for them is the question of commodity agreements. And here there has been, I think, a considerable resistance in the developed world, not only because of what one might call doctrinal grounds, but because it is intrinsically a very difficult thing to regulate prices in a reasonable way, if you once start interfering with the market.

The point here that I would like to make is that, particularly so far as agricultural produce is concerned, since virtually no country is prepared to apply the principle of free trade to its own agriculture, it is not plausible to object to the organization and regulation of the international market in agricultural produce on any kind of theoretical ground. I think the pressures that prevent it being done are very largely against interests. I hope that we may see a more active support in the future, certainly from my country and from other countries, but perhaps particularly from the United States, and the U.S. Congress, which has a very powerful influence in these matters.

Mention has already been made of the nontariff barriers to trade, which are rapidly becoming the most important issue, more important than further reduction of tariffs.

I don't know whether it is true, it may well be quite untrue, but I think it is fair to say that there is a general impression outside the United States that the protection offered by nontariff barriers to U.S. producers is somewhat more marked than it is in the case of other countries. This may only be because you have explicit expressions of this, such as the Buy American Act. All of our countries, of course, adopt practices of one kind or another, often very subtle, and often very hard to identify, which have the same effect. And they all affect particular business interests, and they are therefore particularly hard for us to change.

The famous instance of the American Selling Price, which is the most prominent one which has come up in the Kennedy Round, is a good example of this. But it is, of course, by no means the only one. Indeed, these nontariff barriers are so varied and so numerous that one's heart quails at the thought of a round of negotiations on a multinational basis which are directed to this particular problem.

One aspect to which I would like particularly to call your attention is that the removal of nontariff barriers nearly always takes one directly into what have previously been considered purely domestic matters. There is therefore a specially strong resistance to what seems to be foreign interference.

Here again I would like to come back to what I understand to be the approach of the European Economic Community.