

This proposal has not met a ready response in Britain where, in contrast to the United States, its supporters are to be found wholly among those who have been either hostile or at best lukewarm towards British entry into the Community. As a tactic, it is seen as being unlikely to bring pressure upon Britain's friends in the Community to help Britain join and more likely to cast doubt upon the firmness of Britain's newly-accepted commitment to Europe.

I shall return to the NAFTA proposal in another context. For the moment I only want to say that it does not affect my belief that Britain will now pursue her objective of joining E.E.C. with persistence and that she will succeed, only the date of success being in doubt.

By the time that governmental decisions have to be taken about new trading policies, this uncertainty may or may not have been resolved. In any event, I do not anticipate that British entry into E.E.C., though it would inevitably affect her attitude on particular tariffs, would alter her fundamental attitude to what your Trade Expansion Act called "open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world". From the time of her entry, Britain would of course be negotiating through the E.E.C. and would have to adopt as her own the common attitudes which had been agreed within that body. I now turn therefore to consider what the attitudes of the E.E.C. have been shown to be in the course of the Kennedy Round.

THE EVOLVING ATTITUDE OF E.E.C.

It is of great significance for the Community and for the world that these gruelling negotiations were carried through to success on behalf of the Six member nations by the European Commission as their sole spokesman. There could hardly have been a stiffer test of the Community's ability to represent a common interest among countries whose national attitudes were widely divergent at the start. It will be remembered that the negotiations were seriously held up for many months while the Community sorted out its sharpest internal conflicts. Frustrating as this was for the other partners, encouragement can be drawn from the fact that, once the internal difficulties were resolved, the Community emerged strong enough to negotiate as a single whole and, in the closing stages, proved capable of greater flexibility than would have been attributed to it only a few months before.

I have already referred to the fact that, on a number of important points, Britain came into conflict with the Community. As examples, our attitude over steel disappointed them; their attitude over heavy trucks disappointed us. But on the wider issue of the approach to the structure of industrial tariffs among the advanced nations, no serious differences of philosophy or principle emerged.

Indeed the fact that, in a field where the target had been set at a 50% across-the-board cut in tariffs, an average cut of 35% was actually achieved is surely strong evidence that really serious differences of principle cannot have existed among any of the main trading nations represented at Geneva. It was not doctrinal differences which caused the greatest difficulty, but rather the power of sectional interests to exert pressure upon governments. Whether a different situation might have been revealed if, as had been hoped in 1962, the enlargement of the Community had led to the raising of the target for many of the cuts from 50% to 100%, we cannot know. For the difference between lower tariffs and no tariffs at all is a qualitative as well as a quantitative one and raises some new issues on which there might have been more fundamental disagreement.

All that one can confidently state about the attitudes of E.E.C., as demonstrated in the negotiations, is that within the limits which were set by the actual course of events, the earlier fear that we might be faced with a determinedly inward-looking and protectionist Community was not borne out. At the end of the Kennedy Round a split between the Community and her Western trading partners on this score seems much less probable than it once did.

THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND UNCTAD, 1968

It has been widely noted that the success of the Kennedy Round in satisfying the wishes of the more advanced countries in respect of industrial tariffs was by no means matched by successes on the issues of primary concern to the less developed countries. To some extent, this is a reflection of the fact that the efforts of the negotiators had to be concentrated on avoiding a failure of the whole Kennedy Round, which seemed all too likely during the greater part of the period, and that the necessary time and energy for dealing adequately with the