farmer would have enjoyed a certain prosperity, and China would have been in the same position, no matter what happened. It seems to me that this was a situation where we let a kind of primitive morality get in the way of practical good sense.

Representative BOLLING. On that last point, Mr. Secretary, not long ago some of the members of the Kansas City Board of Trade in my district, all of them good Republicans, complained bitterly about the unrealism of our policy on that particular subject. And I took pleasure in telling them that the main effort in seeing to it that we had this moralistic policy came from others than I.

I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman BOGGS. Mr. Rockefeller has just arrived. We will go ahead with him.

STATEMENT OF DAVID ROCKEFELLER, PRESIDENT, CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, first of all, let me apologize for my delay. I was unfortunately held up over at the airport for an hour and then was sent to Dulles.

For the record, my name is David Rockefeller. I am president and chairman of the executive committee of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

I appreciate very much, indeed, the invitation to appear before a group which, in my opinion, is contributing significantly to better public understanding of U.S. trade policies in the wake of the most sweeping tariff reductions in the history of international trade.

The subject that engages your attention also holds special interest for me for two reasons: first, because it is so directly relevant to what I regard as the major challenges of our time; second, because a good part of my own life has been devoted to studying various aspects of world trade, though I hasten to add that I assert no claim whatever to expert knowledge in this enormously complex area.

Over the past 2 weeks, you have heard testimony from a number of illustrious witnesses about the impact of the worldwide lowering of tariffs. At this early date, any technical evaluation of the over 6,000 U.S. tariff changes is impossible and must await detailed analysis. But a good guess might be that as a direct result of the Kennedy Round, U.S. exports and imports will rise by around 5 percent, with the gain spread over a period of 5 years or more.

This relatively modest percentage impact translates into an increase of close to $3 billion in total U.S. foreign trade. So, you can readily see what it could bring in terms of export opportunities as well as somewhat stiffer import competition. In some instances, substantial adjustments may be required. For this reason, I fully support President Johnson's proposal to improve the adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Expansion Act, so that both industry and labor will find it easier to obtain prompt and adequate aid if adversely affected by the tariff cuts.

The great promise of the Kennedy Round, as I see it, is the effective increase in export opportunities brought about by the reciprocal reductions in foreign tariffs. I feel strongly that U.S. businessmen should approach the results in this affirmative manner, seeking to supply new