

I indicated in my testimony, unfortunately, I think ill-advisedly, the Congress and the country is becoming less enamored with economic assistance just to the point when in my judgment it is being administered more effectively and more intelligently than it ever has been. If we are to increase rather than cut down on foreign assistance, the need for some kind of tariff preferences might be diminished. I do think, as I said also in testimony, that tariff preferences are in fact a kind of economic aid. But given the reluctance on the part of the country and Congress to support adequate programs, it seems to me we must turn to the other if we recognize the reality and urgency of this problem.

Mr. BALL. If I may add just one word, Mr. Bolling, about the difficulty, the relative difficulty, of getting an appropriation for economic aid as against the difficulty of some kind of an arrangement to give up part of our market to the production of the developing countries. I think experience has shown that Congress would be much more inclined, and the public would be much more inclined to support money for economic assistance, because the burden falls generally on the taxpayer, than it would be to support legislation that would provide preferences in American markets because the burden there would fall on specific identifiable groups of people who are articulate and can make their concern felt in some form of political action.

Representative BOLLING. If that is correct, and I expect it is, we are in serious trouble, because Congress shows no particular willingness to maintain what the Administration—and I guess many others—feel is an adequate level of economic aid. At the same time—and I don't remember this coincidence of events ever taking place, at least in my experience, since World War II—there seems to be a growing reluctance to go along with freer, to use the general term, trade. And I would suggest that it may be—and this is a rather different set of circumstances than we were in not too many years ago during the administration of President Eisenhower, as I remember it, when by one vote only we preserved the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act on a procedural matter.

This sufficiently galvanized a substantial number of people, not in the executive, but also in the executive and in Congress, so that a major educational effort was undertaken by private groups. And while I wouldn't for the moment deny the fundamental responsibility of the executive and the Congress, I would suggest that if my reading of the situation is correct, that the kind of effort that was needed in the middle fifties to revive public support for reciprocal trade, as it was then called, is needed in both areas unless the policy of the United States is to result ultimately in a disaster to the United States in both fields.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOGGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bolling.

I might say that in connection with the statement just made that in 1961 and 1962 we did have very much of an educational program both in and out of Government to secure the enactment of the 1962 act, which a lot of people thought was not possible prior to that time. The difficulty of the problem can be illustrated in many ways.

I was interested in the remarks of Congressman Curtis. And there comes to my mind an incident where the president of one of the large