

would benefit greatly. In view of the economic and political dynamics of economic regionalism and the aspirations of the developing nations, the need more closely to intertwine the economies of the free world is not a matter of theory or doctrine, but of considerable practical urgency. . . .

"Of highest priority in the pursuit of these goals is a successful Kennedy Round of trade negotiations that would move significantly toward its original objectives. The United States should mobilize all the leverage at its command to this end and be prepared with new initiatives based on a highly successful Kennedy Round and aimed at the earliest possible achievement of the goal toward which we have been moving for more than 30 years."

The clear implication of this statement is that, even with impressive success in the Kennedy Round, no time should be lost by the economically advanced countries in preparing new initiatives pointing to free trade. Also clearly implied is the even greater urgency of such initiatives if the current negotiations should fall substantially short of such results. There was in fact strong sentiment in the committee for outlining some of the specifics of such initiatives. Concerned with the effect such detailed proposals might possibly have on the negotiations—a stance of responsible, perhaps excessive caution—the committee omitted such specifics from its final report. The need for momentum, however, and for resolute U.S. determination to spark a negotiated timetable for complete free trade, survived the final editing and became one of the major contributions of this historic document.

The Administration, rightly or wrongly, persisted in remaining silent about its long-range trade policy plans, other than to reaffirm its dedication to freer trade—an abstraction to which the modern, sophisticated breed of protectionist has no difficulty in subscribing. What was for so long a professedly necessary ploy in the gamesmanship of trade negotiations now appears increasingly to be something more basic: a lack of preparation for what the more responsible trade-policy rhetoric and research have long identified as urgent goals, the importance of which has been underscored by more recent world developments.

This apparent lack of preparation—hopefully more apparent than real—came to public notice on March 24 when the President announced that preparations would begin (presumably after the Kennedy Round) for a "long-range study" of U.S. trade policy. This is to date the only precise indication the Administration has given of future steps in this important policy area. A few weeks later, faced with a golden opportunity, and what should have been regarded as a pressing necessity, to articulate overall U.S. trade policy objectives of great importance to Latin American aspirations and to the planning of a Latin American common market in particular, the United States could only say, with respect to trade policy:

"We are ready to explore with other industrialized countries, and with our people, the possibilities of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all the industrialized countries. We are also prepared to make our contribution to additional shared efforts in connection with the International Coffee Agreement."

CNTP has for some time been formulating proposals for future trade policy, regardless of the outcome of the Kennedy Round. We have submitted these proposals to the Administration. We are continuing to do so and, at an appropriate time, shall make these ideas public. Our efforts are in tune with the exhortations of a 19th century New England poet, cited in the recent Congressional testimony of a modern New England economist (reported elsewhere in this issue): "We must sail, and not drift, nor lie at anchor."

*Editorial*³

FUTURE TRADE POLICY

Thirty-three years of avowed dedication to freer international trade, with many legislative and negotiating successes marking the rocky road, still leaves U.S. foreign-trade policy in a condition of substantial underdevelopment. The prospects for correcting this condition in the very near future do not seem promising, particularly since it will take another year or two before the Administration's announced foreign-trade-policy study is completed and at least that long before the future course of U.S. policy is definitely clear.

³ Vol. XIV, No. 3, May-June-July, 1967.