

percent, when they continue to increase their exports of brass mill products to us their wages being far lower than ours, and at the same time our exports to them remain relatively negligible. Their tariffs, after the reductions, will still remain higher than ours. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether our exports to these countries could increase even if their tariffs were eliminated entirely. It may well be that the limited reductions in the brass mill tariffs of these countries were predicated on factors which are not applicable to our domestic industry but involved competition among the affected countries outside of the United States.

If this is so, then the full reduction of 50 percent in the United States tariffs would indicate that a serious sacrifice has been imposed on the domestic brass mill industry for some unknown reason. It is hard to believe that if consultation had been had with experienced men in our industry, familiar with the practical economic factors involved, such an inequitable treatment of our industry would even have been considered.

DUMPING

Unfortunately, in the course of the recent negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act, dumping apparently was viewed as essentially a non-tariff barrier. Possibly from time to time it may have been used for that purpose, particularly by certain foreign countries. Fundamentally, however, dumping is an unfair trade practice, in effect an invasion of a market by below-cost selling, often predatory in motive. It is in this sense that the Antidumping Act of 1921 was enacted. Even GATT (Article VI) combines dumping with bounties and subsidies granted to exporters, against which countervailing duties are considered a proper offset. There is a vital difference in the attitude toward dumping when considered in its true aspect of an unfair trade practice and when it is assumed to be a non-tariff barrier. Rules against dumping as an unfair trade practice would normally be strictly and effectively enforced because of its general rejection as a violation of good business practice. Considered as a non-tariff barrier, however, its essence as a bad business practice would tend to be disregarded and resentment against it as a form of disguised "protectionism" would make the enforcement of the rules against it largely ineffective.

The enforcement of the Antidumping Act of 1921 has been so indifferent that the suspicion naturally arises that priority has been given to preventing its use as a non-tariff barrier. To propose, then, as the international antidumping code does, to apply the same treatment on a world-wide basis, would indicate that this has been inspired by the hope of removing antidumping procedures as a non-tariff barrier by foreign countries, in order to facilitate our exports.

It is quite as important, however, to prevent the inroads into our markets, through unfair and often predatory pricing, difficult to prove under the procedures of our present Antidumping Act. This legislation is badly in need of amendment, so that the criteria for injury are more definitely established and judicial review made possible. If we continue with our ineffective antidumping procedure, either under the Antidumping Act of 1921 or under the international antidumping code, domestic industries adversely affected by dumping can expect but little relief. On the other hand, foreign countries which seem to be more sensitive to actual or potential injuries to their industries, could so interpret the provisions of the international antidumping code as to prevent dumping nearly, if not quite as effectively as in the past.