tical division, was distracted from F.D.A. negotiations seeking to define the rules governing research on recombinant DNA, the outer limit of drug industry research. It could offer a means of obtaining insulin from human cells, a far better source than the pancreases of swine and cattle now being used. James M. Gorrel, director of Government programs, dealt only with Darvon for two months. "The only mail I looked at," he said, "were things that were hand-carried in here and I was told, 'This has something to do with Darvon.' "

Typists in Lilly's Word Processing Center worked 480 hours of overtime, cranking out the documents for the Darvon defense. Two computer analysts did the equivalent of four months' work in two, reviewing Darvon data that Lilly computers spent 289 hours compiling. Over a 10-week period, the Lilly corporate jet, which normally flies one round-trip between Indianapolis and Washington a week, made eight extra trips, and Covington & Burling, Lilly's Washington law firm, committed one partner full time to the project and another half time.

THE INDUSTRY'S NEMESIS

The man who went after Lilly is the pharmaceutical industry's No. 1 nemesis. Dr. Wolfe helped bring about the ban, three years ago, of Red Dye No. 2, widely used in food then but found to cause cancer, and of phenformin, an oral diabetic drug that was found to hurt more people than it helped. He is a graduate of Cornell and of the Western Reserve medical school and did his residency and internship at the National Institutes of Health. He is a vigorous 41-year-old who runs the 400-meter dash for the Potomac Valley Seniors Track Club.

"I've been aware for a long time that Darvon is not a very effective painkiller, and I never prescribed it to patients," said Dr. Wolfe. "Then I became aware of widespread abuse and of people dying from taking Darvon. I reviewed all the literature on Darvon-related deaths and concluded that more people were dying from Darvon than from any other drug."

Dr. Wolfe actually delivered two petitions that day, both prepared by Michael Lipsett, a young lawyer now in his third year of medical school in San Diego. One went to Mr. Califano asking that the F.D.A. declare propoxyphene an imminent hazard and ban it from the marketplace. If not that, Dr. Wolfe asked that the F.D.A. support the second petition. to the Justice Department and its Drug Enforcement Administration, urging that propoxyphene be reclassified to prohibit refills and over-the-phone prescriptions.

He then delivered copies to the Washington press corps and to Senator Gaylord Nelson, Democrat of Wisconsin, the drug companies' top political watchdog and chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Monopoly and Anticompetitive Practices. "The object," said Dr. Wolfe, "was to get the question aired and to get people to ask what the F.D.A. was doing."

Mr. Davis, 47, had been planning to take off the week between Christmas and New Year's, when Lilly shuts down. He and his wife were to go to Florida to join their three children, now at colleges in New England. Mr. Holt was planning to be in Florida as well as Dr. Robert H. Furman, 60, vice president for corporate medical affairs, had scheduled a ski week in Aspen. Now they would all stay in Indianapolis. The Davis children would come to Indianapolis, and their father would see them on Christmas Day.

A STRATEGY SHAPES UP

Mr. Holt became Mr. Davis's executive officer on the working group. The 11 other members included Dr. Furman, Mr. Gorrel, Stephen A. Stitle, chief of the Washington office, William D. Cairns, director of public relations, Robert Luedke, director of market planning. and Charles E. Redman, director of scientific information services and one of Lilly's 450 Ph.D.'s.

A strategy began to fall into place. Said Mr. Wood: "My job was to say, O.K.. here's the problem. Analyze what the petitions said. Make sure we have the proper people in the corporation paying attention to them. There's a psychology you have to put forward: We're on firm ground. We have to turn the charges around."

Right from the start, there were problems. CBS News called when Mr. Durbin was upstairs alerting Mr. Davis. A correspondent, Leslie Stahl, wanted to interview a Lilly executive in Washington. But Mr. Stitle, a 33-year-old lawyer, was in Indianapolis that day, so Lilly lost an early round in the public relations war—a chance to air its case on network television.