rules about their use and abuse. General rules covering a range of practices could be devised or codes of behavior drawn up. But would not a code that was general enough to apply to all nontariff barriers be so general as to be meaningless? We shall, then, probably end up with a number of different agreements of rather different sorts. An agreement to prevent the misuse of antidumping procedures has come out of the Kennedy Round. There has been talk of a code covering government purchasing. Europeans believe it would help matters if the United States accepted the Brussels customs nomenclature and the practices common in other countries.

Something more is probably needed, some kind of consultation procedure. This would help to reveal which things are important and to whom. It would explore the possibility of adjustments that would make it unnecessary to go through the elaborate process of devising and negotiating an international code capable of regulating very different national situations. While bilateral adjustments may prove expedient, the most sensible approach to the most prevalent barriers would be to provide a place in one of the multilateral agencies to which countries could go with their complaints at the same time that they raised the issue with the offender. Out of the accumulation of case material might come a more objective study and appraisal than would otherwise be possible and some guidance as to relevant and enforceable rules. An agreement setting up this kind of procedure might also incorporate some broad principles about nontariff barriers, but whether much would be gained by this step is hard to judge until we find whether major trading nations are ready to go beyond the broadest statements of principle.

The heterogeneity of nontariff barriers makes for separate treatment. This will undoubtedly sometimes be the best way, as in the case of the antidumping code. But the separation of issues may make it impossible to agree on some of them. Countries are not equally interested in the removal of each type of barrier. For example, if negotiations had been over road taxes alone, what could the United States have offered the Europeans to persuade them to end their discriminatory practices? Formally or not, therefore, it may be necessary to link specific nontariff barriers of quite disparate types. For the same reason, it seems unlikely that arrangements on nontariff barriers can be totally separated from tariff bargaining.

How we negotiate about nontariff barriers is related to where we do it. GATT and OECD both have claims. There seems no reason to choose one as the exclusive arena. Purely pragmatically one might pursue an issue in one place at one time, in another at another time, and sometimes in both. So far as logic goes, nontariff barriers related to tariffs are certainly best discussed in GATT; some of those linked to invisible transactions and primarily of interest to industralized countries might well be brought into the discussions of the OECD's code of liberalization. In between are a large number of issues that might reasonably be looked at in either place as opportunity offers.

The examples of nontariff barriers already cited show how far afield from traditional trade negotiations we are likely to move in the next decade. All kinds of issues usually thought of as "domestic" may become the subject matter of international negotiations—either because the United States asks it of others or they do of us. This may not