happen quickly but in the long run it seems inevitable. This will in many ways be awkward. But little will be gained by trying to shy away from it. Indeed, if the United States wants to take a new initiative in international trade, as it has several times in the last generation, this might be the best to pick. In our present state of knowledge it is impossible to say whose trade is hardest hit by the sum total of nontariff barriers, but there is at least an even chance that the United States has more to gain in this field than others and there can be no doubt that the world economy would benefit from the same degree of progress in removing nontariff barriers in the next 30 years as has been achieved in reducing tariffs and removing quotas in the last 30—thanks largely to American initiatives.

If we are to do this, though, another problem arises, different from the others and also difficult: How can the United States most effectively negotiate about nontariff barriers? The formula delegating powers to the President that has been used successfully in the Trade Agreements Act for over 30 years does not fit. It is not easy to see a clearly analogous definition of the power and its limits considering the variety of the issues and the extent to which domestic legislation is involved in them. But can there be effective negotiations if each agreement depends on positive congressional action?

### Agriculture

The new issues in trade policy discussed so far arise largely because of the progress made in the last 20 years in lowering tariffs and eliminating quotas on manufactured goods. The same cannot be said of trade in farm products; there the same old problems persist and trade barriers have probably been increased more than removed. For a long time many people have felt hopeless about the possibility of liberalizing agricultural trade. The Kennedy Round has not brought a fundamental change but it has pointed to some possibilities.

Although the negotiators failed to work out a long-run agreement assuring outsiders of continuing access to the European Community's market for products covered by the common agricultural policy, they were on the right track. No doubt it was reasonable of the United States to turn down as insufficient the Community's offer limiting the degree of self-sufficiency that it would strive for in grains. However, the fact that this was the kind of issue discussed is a hopeful one, for it has become increasingly clear that, over a large segment of agricultural trade, negotiations can have a major effect only if basic policies are discussed. Negotiations confined to trade barriers will almost surely run into the same blocks as in the past. It is from domestic policies that the trade barriers are to a great degree derived. We are not used to discussing internationally such traditionally domestic matters as farm production goals, prices, land use, and surpluses. That course is difficult for any democratic country and it may be that the United States or others may not in the end be willing to go through with it. But there is a strong case for trying since the alternative seems to be to perpetuate an impasse of the sort we have known in the last 20 years.

This hard choice does not confront us for every farm product. There are quite a few on which conventional tariff reductions (or sometimes