

organizational arrangements can be improved. But one need only consider the achievement of the Kennedy Round to realize not only the importance of GATT but the extraordinary labor (and risks of failure) that would be involved in trying to build a new code of trade policy on a different foundation. The separation of issues will no doubt sometimes make it sensible to deal with certain kinds of problems outside GATT, though the need to match concessions on otherwise unrelated matters in order to strike bargains may tend to pull issues toward GATT. It would probably not be wise to try to find a place for every trade issue in a revised GATT structure, but a good general guide might be the maxim suggested by my colleague, Helena Stalson: Do it in GATT unless it can clearly be done better somewhere else. And in making that judgment the prime consideration is not just whether it is easier to get agreement in one place rather than another, but what the effect of the agreement is likely to be on the structure of world trade. In facing the issues outlined in this paper, the United States will find that its interest in coherence and order in the system of world trade will usually be best served by strengthening the position of GATT and the principle of equal treatment it embodies.