ing its adverse effects; moreover, the effort to understand one another's acts provides a basis for meaningful trade conversation with countries which will not accept the reduction of government intervention as an ideal objective. The proposals may be characterized as a shift of emphasis in U.S. foreign trade policy toward this process of seeking understanding. The five principles may be crudely summarized as follows:

1. Governments should collaborate in administering their trade barriers.
2. Collaborating governments require a means for distinguishing trade barriers which serve the public interest from those which do not.
3. Barriers which do not serve the public interest should be scheduled for elimination.
4. The public purpose behind a given trade barrier should be served in the most efficient way and with the least harmful side effects.
5. The conduct of foreign trade policy—in its details—should be open to informed public surveillance.

The essence of the proposed mechanism is:

(a) A continuing (rather than sporadic) multilateral trade barrier forum, for discussion of the trade effects of specific government actions, including actions taken to meet the domestic problems of individual nations;

(b) All procedures of the organization to be public rather than behind closed doors, with machinery for getting all relevant facts meaningfully considered;

(c) Individual governments to publicly reconsider their actions, through their own constitutional processes, in the light of the public purpose of the action and of the findings of fact at the multilateral examination; and

(d) Individual governments to consider cooperating to help in the achievement, most efficiently and with minimum adverse side effects, of the public purposes of actions examined intergovernmentally and maintained after public national reconsideration.

A SHIFT OF HYPOTHESES FROM BARGAINING TO DELIBERATING

Adoption of such a program calls for a shift of emphasis in the official view as to the actions which will accomplish our objectives in the foreign trade field. Since the end of the great depression, we have been committed to the hypothesis that "trade barriers" prevent desirable economic activity and cause conflict with foreign governments; therefore, reducing them makes for prosperity and peace; eventually, they should be eliminated (free trade). One reduces them progressively by bargaining between governments.

Underneath this hypothesis, however, there has developed a tacit, qualifying counterhypothesis: Certain "barriers"—old and new—ours and other countries'—are exceptions to the rule; they are necessary to maintain or bring about desirable national economic objectives; reducing them would be disruptive or otherwise undesirable; but the government imposing them cannot refuse to discuss them with other governments adversely affected by them; these "barriers" must be