little logical basis for selecting among different government acts. At various times over the past 30 years, the writer has seen this thesis used to oppose intergovernmental action directed to such varied purposes (with such varied merit) as maintaining surplus farm product prices above "natural" world market levels, regulating primary commodity trade, rehabilitating the European economies after the war, preventing the wealthy classes in less developed countries from importing luxuries, transferring food surpluses to hungry people, limiting the rapidity of trade increases under especially disrupting circumstances, and many others. From this trade freeing point of view, the conflict among acts of intervention by different countries is sometimes thought of as one of the weapons for use in getting rid of the intervention; coordination is opposed because it tends to continue the intervention by making it intergovernmentally acceptable.

In any case, since all intervention is considered bad intervention "theoretically," there is no underlying ethical or moral or public policy basis except expediency—measuring the power of the persons and interests exerting political pressure—for deciding which intervention to tolerate. The fragmented and sometimes internally inconsistent pattern of current intergovernmental steps (some firm, some faltering) to impose a representative surveillance on the emerging industrial world production mechanism is considered a generally unfortunate drift with the stream of history. As a result, if the various trade affecting elements in U.S. policy at times add up to a coherent expression of public purpose, it is more a matter of administrative genius than the result of an announced overall policy.[4]

Telling Good Barriers From Bad

TO BECOME PART OF A COHERENT FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, TRADE POLICY MUST DISTINGUISH INTERVENTION THAT MUST BE MAINTAINED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST FROM INTERVENTION REQUIRING REDUCTION

Here then is another key to change, *a second major principle*. For U.S. foreign trade policy to contemplate collaboration with other governments in needed actions which affect trade, it must also contemplate a method of distinguishing, other than by naked power or static economic theory, between desirable trade intervention and undesirable trade intervention. We have seen that the process of dynamic competition in a modern nation requires some government intervention in economic matters to assure service of the public interest. We have seen that the economy of the industrial world is becoming a single production mechanism, so that intervention by one government must be coordinated with related intervention by other governments.

[4] There are doubtless other elements to explain the hostility of trade officials toward intergovernmental collaboration in actions affecting trade. One, for the United States at least, is the historical antigovernment attitude expressed in the famous line, "That government is best which governs least;" a basic distrust of government, with its inefficiency, lack of imagination, and proneness to corruption, becomes a supporting argument for laissez-faire even in cases where it may not serve social purposes. Another element may be the separation of powers; the laying of duties and regulating of commerce is a congressional power under the U.S. Constitution while the conduct of foreign relations is an executive one. The consequent cumbersomeness of our own Government may subtly slant our thinking away from the needed coordination of action with other governments. In this connection, it is interesting to watch the consequences of the development of even greater cumbersomeness of the same general kind in the new economic quasi-governing unit, the EEC, allegedly established to gain the internal advantages of a large free trade area such as the United States.