the bargaining process, that a certain level of tariff—perhaps about 5 percent—is "reasonable" and even desirable. A certain amount of "fairness" comes to be attributed to the increase of tariffs which are below that level.

THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPROACH CALLED ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM BUT DID LITTLE TOWARD REMEDYING IT

The "across-the-board" or "linear" approach was put forward by the U.S. Government in an effort to get around some of these weaknesses. It was apparently inspired, on the constructive side, by analogy with the European Common Market which was planning to eliminate, or coordinate, all of its internal trade barriers—reducing tariffs to zero by a series of across-the-board percentage cuts and "harmonizing" other actions affecting trade. This dramatized for the public the weaknesses we have been discussing. But for those who saw the need of specific types of intervention, whether for the public interest or for themselves, it created a strong desire to keep those specific "barriers" from the negotiating process. It gradually became evident that the across-the-board approach was not applicable among governments not otherwise integrating their economic governance. The public—not to mention the negotiators—had difficulty understanding what across-the-board could mean for quotas, price supports and various other non-tariff trade barriers.

It is reported that the approach resulted in much deeper and more extensive tariff reductions in the Kennedy Round than would otherwise have obtained because there was a presumption for reduction of each tariff.

However, even for tariff barriers, the use of the bargaining technique as the vehicle of negotiation meant that, after across-the-board offers and their exceptions, adjustments had to be made so that the final bargains were reciprocally equitable. The principal virtue of across the board was then gone.

THE BARGAINING FORMAT IS PROTECTIONIST

The bargaining format, in its basic concept and operation, is economic nationalist and protectionist—that is, barrier raising. Bargaining governments, in order to sell reduction of their trade barriers dearly, must argue that all of them are in their own national public interest and are harmful to foreign countries. Thus public support is enlisted—as, in the United States, for "shrewd Yankee trading" by the negotiators. There is little said of barrier reduction to benefit all countries. The harm being done to one's exports by foreign countries is bitterly exaggerated. To the extent that the merits are discussed, everything possible is done to emphasize the static, short-term validity of the protectionist case. Buying from foreigners is treated as a substitute for producing at home. Trade barriers are thought to "beggar thy neighbor"—thus increasing national product.

The original concept of a high-trade area to be created through reducing barriers reciprocally has been transformed by the bargaining process into one where each government tries to use its bargaining power to beggar without being beggared.