

with opponents. And, indeed, the present concept of a reciprocal "balance" of concessions to be restored when a concession is impaired, has not been very successful in restraining new or increased trade intervention in recent years. Retaliation by "hurting" the impairing one has become commoner, the granting of equivalent new concessions less common. Even in the Trade Expansion Act negotiations, many countries settled down to sweat out reciprocal "suffering" and resigned themselves to the economic costs of this limited economic warfare in the vague hope that it would force their trading allies to agree to an advantageous "armistice" or trade treaty. Under the proposed approach, public intergovernmental trade discussion would not emphasize such adversary alternatives, whether or not there was a contravention of the GATT or some change in its bargained "balance." They would emphasize the economic pros and cons particular to each action.

The new examinations of the effects of trade intervention should probably not—as a formal matter—replace the GATT "bargain," the underlying obligations of which were the basis for the GATT's strength as an institution over the years of national efforts to avoid more thorough or formal coordination. Reciprocity broadly conceived would continue. The mechanism proposed is inspired by successful past improvisations for meeting difficulties encountered in those efforts. If the fundamental approach catches men's imagination, ways to effect it will be discovered—not invented—in the reports of Geneva dinner conversations, in the qualifications of economic pronouncements, and in many places and forums. The ideas in this paper, if they should be noticed, will then be awarded that very high accolade among officials and professors: "Correct, but not very new or original!"

PUBLIC PROCESS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST

THE KEY ROLE OF INFORMATION

The *fifth and final principle* is that the conduct of foreign trade policy—in its details—should be open. The policy approach proposed in this paper requires that intergovernmental trade conversation and the effects of trade intervention be subject to informed public surveillance, at least proportional in extent and depth to the surveillance exercised by the public over Government intervention in domestic market processes within the United States and the other industrial countries. The responses of governments, separately or in coordination, to the need of the world production and distribution mechanism cannot be representative and, therefore, proportioned to the public need, unless they are open. It is not enough to debate general principles and doctrines, but be secretive when considering their application to cases. There must be informed debate in advance of significant decisions and there must be public scrutiny of subsequent performance.

INTERNATIONALLY, THE EXECUTIVE HAS DISPROPORTIONATE POWER, USED NEGATIVELY AND SECRETLY

A major problem of governance of the dynamic world-production-distribution mechanism is that the governing institutions, both government and nongovernment, are less flexible and less representative than those within the national dynamic competitive economies. At