

The justification most often advanced is that were it not for this differential, the West Europeans would relax the trade even further (they ship very few of the contested items in any event)—and since these are largely items of advanced technology, the United States has some other means to limit their sale to the East through end-use control over components and technical data control and private industrial cooperation.

The burden of these arguments are not, and need not be, to pare our lists of strategic items to the Cocom level. It is far more important merely to realize that maintaining this differential does not necessarily serve our national interest in any truly effective manner—and that we seriously err if we insist that the disagreement of others is not genuine—or is occasioned by the alleged opportunity to profit at the expense of our higher standards of trade morality and greater sensibility to security interests.

The discussions, analyses and attempts at reconciling views about strategic list items have gone on with our European allies and Japan too long and with too great sincerity to merit that suspicion and disdain. We shall probably have to just accept the fact that there is disagreement on this range of items. Similarly, we shall have to accept the fact that as the economies and technological prowess of the U.S.S.R. and the other East European countries grow—along with their military capabilities—it will be harder still to identify items which would be sought by them in overt trade which will have apparent direct relevancy to Soviet bloc military potential. Our NATO allies and Japan are not disregarding strategic considerations in their trade dealings. They do, however, take the view that selective denial is in any case extremely uncertain as to effectiveness and almost hopeless to maintain indefinitely in the face of technological progress the world over. In effect, they question—as we must—whether these measures are not so extremely marginal in their possible present and future effect on the relative strengths of East and West as to be almost inconsequential.

Finally, we should also realize that as we appear to have gained little in a substantive sense by our insistent and isolated posture, we similarly have often made it more difficult to obtain the understanding, agreement and cooperation of our friends and allies on other policies and programs when our apparent and prolonged intransigence in this field is of related consequence.

7. This brings us to the point of real disparity and difference which has existed between the United States and our free world friends. That is, the basic difference in general trade policy vis-a-vis the European Soviet bloc.

This difference has been based largely upon U.S. political and foreign policy and public opinion considerations not shared in extent or degree by most other free world countries. It is exemplified and underscored by the fact that in the 1961–65 period alone, there has been an exchange of goods and services between the free world and the Soviet bloc of an aggregate of about \$51 billion—\$25.4 billion exports and \$26.2 billion imports. Of this, somewhat over half was CoCom country trade. And for the same period, total United States-Communist bloc trade was \$1.4 billion (\$906 million exports; \$496 million imports).