

countries are doing very nicely, thank you, in reciprocal trade exchanges with the Communist world, and are not having the trauma of internal and external political dissent which we generate on this issue.

Obviously, the calculus of judgment is for us to become convinced that the previous dismal arithmetic of "win-lose"—with U.S. security presumably the loser—can be transformed into "win-win" where there is at least equivalent benefit, and that this benefit can be reciprocal politically as well as economically.

The administration's thesis behind advocacy of a change in U.S. East-West trade policy is essentially that an increase in nonstrategic trade and attendant commercial, diplomatic and other contacts will contribute to the pursuit of peace between otherwise hostile camps. By this thinking, it is asserted that either increased or diminished trade in nonstrategic items can today hardly prove critical or even very important in East-West economic or military relationships; whereas it is possible that increased trade and contacts may serve as a creditable and effective accompaniment to sincere and genuine efforts to bridge differences and resolve conflicts and create a new avenue for seeking East-West understanding.

The implication of this thesis, it must be added, is also that the increase of U.S.-Eastern European trade should not be passive—but should be pressed as a positive element and "instrument" of our foreign policy.

This total concept is now embodied in the administration's proposal now pending before the Congress: the draft statement of purposes reads " * * * to use peaceful trade and related contacts with Communist countries * * * to promote constructive relations * * * to increase peaceful trade and related contacts * * * to expand markets * * * in those countries by creating similar opportunities * * * to compete in U.S. markets on a nondiscriminatory basis."³

The President has clearly indicated that a change in East-West trade policy is a corollary to his other efforts toward "building bridges" to and with the Communist areas.

There is little question that vast changes have occurred and are now in progress in the Communist world that are favorable to our interest—and that we should seek to reinforce and promote the processes of change. Most of these changes are well known and documented: the shattered Moscow-Peking axis, the loosening hold of Moscow over some of the East European countries, the increasing independent initiatives of these countries in their relations with each other and with the West. There has been an opening up within the Communist societies as well—less obvious uses of police power, growing contacts with Western people, greater travel possibilities, and the much more extensive preoccupation with economic reforms, criticism of Communist systems and values and inefficiencies, and somewhat of a retreat from centralized controls and rigid ideological disciplines.

It is this accelerated process of change which provides hope that enhanced economic intercourse and personal contacts and more extensive diplomatic probing for common interests might reduce the chances of hostile actions and confrontations between the United States and the European Communist sphere.

³ Proposed East-West Relations Act of 1966, sec. 2, statement of purposes.